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In 2001, the government of Thailand implemented a universal coverage (UC) policy for 
access to health care by introducing a tax-funded health insurance scheme, the UC 
scheme, to approximately 47 million people who were not previous beneficiaries of the 
Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) or the Social Security Scheme (SSS). 
The UC policy resulted in a significant change in health care financing arrangements and 
financial barriers to health services. The purpose of this research was to explore the 
likely impact of the UC policy in terms of the following factors: changes in health care 
use, equity in health care finance, and the distribution of public subsidies on health 
among different socio-economic groups of Thais. In addition, the effectiveness of the 
UC policy in protecting households against financial hardship as a result of medical care 
costs was explored at the household level. Benefit incidence analysis (BIA) was 
employed as a tool to assess equity in health service use and the distribution of public 
subsidies. Two case studies of renal replacement therapy (RR T) for end-stage renal 
disease (ESRD) patients and cardiac operations for heart disease patients were employed 
as tracers to explore the impact of the UC scheme's benefit package for better-off and 
less well-off households. Different choices of socio-economic group indicators 
(household income per capita or an asset index) and the use of aggregate and regional 
unit subsidies to calculate benefit incidence were also applied. 
Research results indicate that the UC policy did expand health care coverage to include 
nearly all Thais and increased the pro-poor nature of the Thai health care system, as well 
as the distribution of public health-related subsidies. Ambulatory service use and 
hospitalization of poorer quintiles significantly increased after the UC policy was 
implemented. The poorest quintiles gained the highest amount and proportion of public 
subsidies both prior to and after implementation of the UC policy. There was no change 
in conclusions regarding the distribution of public subsidies among different socio-
economic groups when different choices of socio-economic indicators or different levels 
of government unit subsidies were used. The analysis of financing incidence between 
2000 and 2002 also showed less regressive overall health care finance, a greater decrease 
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in household expenditure for health care among poorer quintiles, and a decrease in the 
catastrophic expenditure incidence in 2002, compared to 2000. 
The decision to exclude RRT from the UC benefit package resulted in a considerable 
financial barrier to health services and a substantial economic impact on poorer ESRD 
patients. Infrequent access to haemodialysis and the inability to obtain essential and 
expensive medication (erythropoietin) was shown to be a major cause of patients' death. 
Financial barriers to RR T prevented poorer ESRD patients from benefiting from access to 
essential health services, and the financial burden of RR T meant all poorer patients were 
inevitably faced with financial catastrophe as a result. Poorer ESRD patients adopted 
various financial strategies to cope with high health care expenditures, which impacted 
not only the ESRD patients themselves, but also other household members and relatives 
who had to provide supplemental financial support to help cover the costs of RRT. In 
contrast, neither poorer nor richer heart disease patients under the UC scheme 
experienced significant payments for the health care costs of open heart surgery due to 
the effectiveness of the scheme in financial risk protection. During the operation, a few 
poorer heart disease patients experienced financial burdens for travel costs and food 
expenditures for their relatives, but they were able to manage this financial burden by 
using their savings or taking loans, all without a significant financial impact on household 
living standards. 
In conclusion, the UC policy does appear to have overall improved equity in health care 
use and health care finance, and the distribution of public subsidies. Achievements of the 
UC policy in Thailand were most likely caused by the following three financing 
strategies: 1) the expansion of public health insurance to nearly universal coverage; 2) the 
removal of financial barriers to health services; and 3) the promotion of primary care use 
which is preferentially accessed and utilized by the poor in rural areas. 
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Universal coverage (UC) in access to health care is an important health policy aimed at 
guaranteeing universal access to effective health services regardless of a person's income 
or social status, and to protect household income and assets from medical care costs 
(Mills 1996; Nitayarumphong 1998; Kutzin 2000; World Health Organization 2005; 
Carrin, Evans et al. 2007; Mills 2007). Policy makers in both developed and developing 
countries accept that achieving universal health care coverage is a desirable goal for 
health policy in their respective countries (Mills 2007). International development 
organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International 
Labour Organization (lLO) also support the efforts of achieving universal coverage in all 
countries. In May 2005, the 58th World Health Assembly adopted Resolution 58.33 
urging Member States to work towards universal coverage and to ensure that their 
populations have access to needed health interventions without the risk of financial 
catastrophe (World Health Organization 2005a). 
In general, countries achieving universal coverage employ a variety of health financing 
arrangements and different benefit packages in accordance with their national income 
levels and the development of their health care system. Evidence shows that the 
combination of financing sources and provision arrangements within a universal coverage 
system, and the degree of equity achieved, vary widely among countries (Hsiao and Liu 
2001; Preker, Langenbrunner et al. 2002; Gottret and Schieber 2006; Mills 2007). 
Typically, health financing arrangements in high-income countries rely on general tax or 
social health insurance because large segments of the population work in the formal 
sector which makes it easy for governments to tax their people at source and to design 
health care systems financed by either general or payroll taxes. In contrast, health 
financing arrangements for low- and middle-income countries often rely on household 
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out-of-pocket payments because a large share of the population in these countries lives in 
rural areas and works in the informal sector. This difficulty, coupled with a poor political 
will to enhance social welfare, often means that governments in developing countries 
usually fail to effectively collect taxes and pool resources for financial risk protection. 
Hence, people in low- and middle-income countries often have no effective risk pooling, 
while governments in high-income countries generally provide universal access to health 
services and financial risk protection for the entire population (lLO 2002; World Health 
Organization 2005b). 
Most developed countries achieving universal coverage generally employ two alternative 
types of health financing arrangements-contribution-based employment-related social 
security (the "Bismarck Model") and tax-financed public health insurance (the 
"Beveridge Model") (Saltman and Figueras 1997; Saltman, Figueras et al. 1998; 
Musgrove 2000). The "Bismarck model" refers to a health financing arrangement which 
is predominantly funded by social insurance. This model was first developed in Germany 
and has been adopted by many countries throughout Europe including Belgium, France, 
and the Netherlands. The "Beveridge Model" is a tax-based health insurance system 
which can be found in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden. Prior to 2000, it was 
noted that the core of health care funding for many countries moving towards universal 
coverage was compulsory social insurance, not general tax revenues (Mills 1998). The 
option of tax-based health insurance or the "Beveridge Model" was not attractive for 
many governments because of limited government health resources and low political 
acceptance (Nitayarumphong 1998). This is evident in three Asian countries (Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, and Taiwan) as well as some developing countries in Latin America 
(Mexico and Costa Rica), which achieved universal or close-to-universal health insurance 
coverage by building on the Bismarck Model (lkegami and Hasegawa 1995; Moon 1998; 
Nitayarumphong 1998; Acuna, Gattini et al. 2001; Kwon 2002). Although there are two 
main types of health financing arrangements, core guiding principles of achieving UC 
must include enhancing pre-payment for health services, determining household 
contributions according to the ability to pay, and introducing risk pooling (Carrin, Evans 
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et al. 2007). These principles imply solidarity between the healthy and the sick, and 
between population groups of different socio-economic status. 
Evidence indicates an increasing trend of middle- and low-income countries having a 
mixture of health care finance from five financing sources: general taxation, social 
insurance contributions, private insurance premiums, community financing, and 
household out-of-pocket payments (Hsiao and Liu 2001; Gottret and Schieber 2006). In 
light of an attempt to move towards universal coverage, many less developed countries 
rely on a mixture of general tax funding and mandatory social health insurance to achieve 
policy goals of universal coverage in equal access to health care, and protecting 
households from catastrophic health care payments (Mills 2007). Less of a tax base and 
less capability to collect taxes is a key concern in financing health care in low- and 
middle-income countries (Hsiao and Liu 2001). However, it has been argued that raising 
additional general tax revenue is feasible and has been successfully done by a number of 
these countries such as Bolivia, Armenia, Bulgaria, Estonia, and Slovakia (Wagstaff 
2007). In addition, to collect Social Health Insurance (SHI) revenues requires substantial 
management demands, and possibly leads to leakage of public resources, for instance, 
from corruption in the Columbian system, or a discretionary transfer by the Social Fund 
in the case of Kyrgyzstan (Mills 2007). 
Limited government health resources, inadequate infrastructure of health services, lack of 
political support, and poor administrative and technical capacity of the government, have 
all been identified as key constraints for low- and middle-income countries to move 
towards universal coverage (Nitayarumphong 1998; Mills 2007). The shortage of public 
resources is confirmed by an estimate of the expenditure gap in achieving universal 
access to health services at low-income levels through public finance (i.e. general tax and 
social insurance), which currently ranges from 40-50 billion USD (Jha, Mills et al. 2002) 
and is expected to reach over 100 billion USD by 2015 (Preker, Langenbrunner et al. 
2002). In addition, many technical issues such as appropriate sources of funding, 
methods of resource allocation to financial intermediaries, payment methods for health 
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care providers, and regulation and sustainability of the system, have been raised as policy 
questions for developing countries aiming to achieve universal coverage (Mills 1998). 
The absence of financial risk protection for the great majority of the population in low-
and middle-income countries often leads to impoverishment for those households \vith 
excessive health care costs (World Bank 1997; ILO 2000; World Health Organization 
2000). Many of the world's 1.3 billion poor still do not have access to effective and 
affordable medicines and health services due to weaknesses in health care financing 
strategies (Preker, Langenbrunner et al. 2002). Poor financing arrangements lead to the 
situation wherein large segments of the population in developing countries rely heavily 
on out-of-pocket payments instead of risk-sharing arrangements, and have to face direct 
payments for health care costs. In addition, the absence of health insurance is likely to 
prevent the poor from accessing and utilizing health services because they cannot afford 
health care costs, particularly when expensive and long-term care is needed (Ranson 
2002). In the event of a serious illness, the poor are vulnerable to financial consequences 
of health care payments in terms of out-of-pocket payments and income losses (McIntyre 
and Thiede 2003; Russell 2005). A recent study indicates that every year, approximately 
44 million households worldwide, or more than 150 million individuals, face catastrophic 
health expenditures (Carrin, Evans et al. 2007). Of these, about 25 million households 
containing more than 100 million people are pushed into poverty by medical care costs. 
Empirical evidence for households facing catastrophic health care payments indicates a 
positive correlation between the proportion of households with catastrophic health 
expenditures and the share of out-of-pocket payments in total health expenditures (Xu, 
Evans et al. 2003; Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2005; van Doorslaer, 
O'Donnell et al. 2005). Three factors influencing the severity of catastrophic health 
expenditures are: 1) the lack of pre-payment for health insurance; 2) the availability of 
health services requiring household payments; and, 3) the household's low capacity to 
pay for health care. Low- and middle-income nations in Asia, Latin America, and other 
countries in transition experience higher rates of catastrophic household spending on 
health care because of the low percentage of people with financial risk protection (Xu. 
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Evans et al. 2003; van Doorslaer, O'Donnell et al. 2005). Many studies indicate that 
people in poor households can be protected from catastrophic health expenditures by 
government policies which would reduce the proportion of people relying on out-of-
pocket payments for health care and provide more financial risk protection (lLO 2002: 
Jha, Mills et al. 2002; Preker, Langenbrunner et al. 2002; Ranson 2002; Xu, Evans et al. 
2003). 
Apart from providing financial risk protection for health care, a government policy on 
health financing reform is an effective tool to improve the efficiency of health care 
systems and reduce health care inequalities (Hsiao and Liu 2001; McPake, 
Kumaranayake et al. 2002; Than Sein 2002; World Health Organization 2005). To 
achieve improved efficiency, governments have to spend on public goods or health 
services that have positive externalities to society, and provide or contract for public 
health services where the private sector is negligent (van de Walle 1996; Castro-Leal, 
Dayton et al. 2000). To reduce health care inequalities, governments employ health care 
financing to determine the availability of health care and provide effective health services 
through public subsidies or free of charge for those who are in need. With this objective, 
health care financing arrangements also address the issue of poverty reduction through 
the redistribution of public resources and government health care subsidies (Hsiao and 
Liu 2001; Preker, Langenbrunner et al. 2002). The degree of financial protection against 
catastrophic costs of illness is determined by the depth and breadth of the benefit 
package. With these mechanisms in place, a universal coverage policy comprising well-
designed health care financing arrangements can achieve the policy goals of enhancing 
financial risk protection, and improving both the overall efficiency and equity of the 
health care system. 
Given the importance of financial risk protection and key constraints in low- and middle-
income countries, achieving universal health care coverage is a key challenge for policy 
makers and health care reformists in the developing world. In addition, lack of financial 
risk protection for the poor in these countries poses a serious concern for international 
organizations and the government of each country, who need to expand health insurance 
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coverage and improve equitable access to health servIces. The Thai experience in 
achieving universal coverage (UC) using the Beveridge Model should be useful for other 
low- and middle-income countries, to learn from the successes and failures of this policy 
implementation in the Thai context, and its impact on the overall health care system. 
1.2 Universal health care coverage in Thailand 
Thailand, a lower middle-income country, launched a policy on universal coverage (UC) 
in April 2001 due to a political commitment from a new government to provide universal 
access to health services and a considerable increase in public concern over inequitable 
access to health care. Objectives of the UC policy in Thailand were to provide accessible 
and equitable quality health services, and reduce the national, as well as household, 
health care expenditures through a minimal co-payment of 30 Baht (around £0.48 or 
US$0.95) per ambulatory visit or hospital admission, as shown in the following 
government statement. 
(7) Provide universal health insurance with a view to reducing the overall cost to the 
country and the people in acquiring health care capping each hospital visit at 30 baht. 
All Thai people will be guaranteed equal access to a nationally acceptable standard of 
health care. 
(Government Policies of H.E. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra delivered to the 
National Assembly on Monday, 26 February 2001) 
The universal coverage policy introduced a tax-funded health insurance scheme, the so 
called "UC scheme", to approximately 47 million people who were not beneficiaries of 
the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) or the Social Security Scheme 
(SSS). Health services included in the UC benefit package comprise ambulatory care and 
hospitalization, essential interventions for health promotion and disease prevention, and a 
wide range of expensive medical services. Main health care providers are designated, 
district based networks including health centres, community hospitals, and cooperating 
provincial or regional hospitals at the provincial level. Eligible persons are required to 
register with their primary care network and obtain a free insurance card which requires a 
nominal 30 Baht co-payment for each ambulatory visit or hospital admission. Those who 
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were former beneficiaries of the Low Income Card (LIC) scheme (children aged less than 
12 years, the elderly aged over 60, and the disabled) were exempt from the UC scheme's 
co-payment. However, when the new government came into power in November 2006. 
the Minister of Health declared the termination of the 30 Baht co-payment for everyone 
(TreerutkuarkuI2006). 
After the UC policy was introduced in 2001, there were three major public schemes 
providing health insurance for the entire population. These were: 
• the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) which covers around SIX 
million government employees and their dependants; 
• the Social Security Scheme (SSS) which protects employees in the formal sector 
from non-work related health care expenditures; and, 
• the UC scheme which covers the rest of the population and replaces all previous 
government-subsidized health insurance schemes, namely the Voluntary Health Card 
(VHC), and the Low Income Card (LIC) scheme for the poor, the disabled, the 
elderly, and children aged less than 12 years. 
As a result, the combination of these three schemes makes up the UC coverage 
arrangements in Thailand. 
1.3 Health financing reform under the UC policy in Thailand 
The Thai government introduced health care financing reform as a crucial tool III 
achieving both efficiency and equity goals under the universal coverage policy III 
Thailand. Prior to 2001, government health resources were allocated to public health 
facilities on a historical basis without a link to either performance or registered 
population. After the implementation of the UC policy, contracted health care provider 
networks received government budgets according to the number of people registered with 
each primary care network and the types of health services provided. The government 
pays both public and private health care providers by using a contracting model which 
includes capitation payment for ambulatory care, and diagnostic related group (DRG) 
case payment within a global budget for hospitalization. The amount of government 
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subsidies for UC beneficiaries has increased from 1,202.4 Baht (approximately £19.1 or 
US$38.3) per capita per year in 2001 to 1,308 Baht (approximately £20.8 or US$4 1.6) in 
2004 (Towse, Mills et al. 2004), and has reached 1,899.7 Baht (approximately £30.1 or 
US$60.1) per capita in 2007 (NHSO 2007a). In 2005, the total government budget for 
the UC scheme was estimated at 270/0 of total national health expenditures and accounted 
for 450/0 of government health care spending (Tisayatikom, Patcharanarumol et al. 2007). 
With these new financing strategies, the core of health care financing for the Thai health 
care system has shifted from household out-of-pocket payments to general taxation 
(Towse, Mills et al. 2004; Limwattanonon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2005). 
The UC scheme promotes use of primary care at the district level by shifting health 
service delivery from tertiary care hospitals to primary care provider networks through 
the contracting payment method. The government contracts a contractor unit for primary 
care or 'CUP' as the main provider to deliver health care for its registered population. 
The CUP comprises all health centres in a district along with a primary unit set up in the 
community hospital. Patients can access either health centres or the community hospital 
associated with their contracting unit, and will be referred to a provincial or regional 
hospital at a higher level of care if necessary. The CUP receives a capitation budget for 
ambulatory care according to the number of people registered and reimburses the 
expenses for inpatient care from a provincial budget based on diagnostic related group 
weights. As a result, evidence suggests that government health resources have tended to 
shift from urban hospitals to primary care facilities, and more public health care subsidies 
have been allocated to rural areas (Jongudomsuk 2002a). In addition, the promotion of 
primary care is likely to increase access to health care services of the poor in the 
countryside (Vasavid, Tisayatikom et al. 2004). 
After the UC policy was implemented, an interesting question was raised regarding who 
benefits from government health resources under UC. This is because the poor and 
disadvantaged groups in Thailand were previously protected by targeted government-
subsidized health insurance schemes, namely the Low Income Card (LIC) Scheme. 
Social Security Scheme (SSS), and Voluntary Health Card (YHC) Scheme. The LIe was 
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launched in 1981 and provided health insurance to the disadvantaged including those who 
were identified as poor, elderly, disabled, and children aged under 12 years 
(Pannarunothai 2001). The SSS has protected fonnal employees from health 
expenditures caused by non-work related illness since the Social Security Act was 
enacted in 1990. The VHC provided health insurance for those who were ineligible for 
the LIC scheme and could afford to pay an annual premium of 500 Baht per household. 
With the expanded coverage of public health insurance, the question of whether the poor 
or non-poor benefit more from the new universal coverage policy has been widely raised 
by social scientists and the public media in Thailand (Na Ranong and Na Ranong 2002; 
Siamwala 2002). 
1.4 UC benefit package 
The UC scheme comprises a comprehensive benefit package which includes ambulatory 
care, hospitalization, disease prevention, health promotion, and many expensive medical 
services such as radiotherapy and chemotherapy for cancer treatments, surgical 
operations, and healthcare for accident and emergency illnesses. Prescription drugs are 
also free of charge. UC beneficiaries are guaranteed universal access to health services 
by registering with primary care networks, after which they can then obtain health 
services when needed. If the registered hospital cannot provide appropriate treatment, 
patients are transferred to a higher level health facility such as provincial or regional 
hospitals, and sometimes university hospitals. Although the UC benefit package is quite 
comprehensive, some expensive medical care has specifically been excluded due to high 
costs of certain procedures and the limited government health care resources 
(Jongudoumsuk 2002; Tangcharoensathien, Kasemsup et al. 2005). 
In March 2001, the Thai government decided not to include renal replacement therapy 
(RRT) for end-stage renal disease (ESRD) patients and anti-retroviral drugs CARY) for 
HIV / AIDS patients due to their long-term, high costs and the risk of overburdening the 
UC budget. It was estimated that if the UC policy provided universal access to RRT and 
was implemented without any strategy in place to reduce the costs of RR T or without 
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appropriate selection criteria for eligible ESRD patients, the government would expect to 
spend more than five billion Baht in the first year of policy implementation. Projections 
also showed that the government budget for universal access to RRT would increase to 
more than 74 billion Baht (approximately £1.17 billion or US$2.36 billion) by the 
sixteenth year of implementation if the government played a passive role in controlling 
access to ESRD treatment and RRT costs (Tangcharoensathien, Kasemsup et al. 2005). 
The decision to exclude RRT from the UC benefit package created a public debate over 
the objectives of the UC policy and concerns the financial burden of the scheme would 
place on the overall government health budget (Tangcharoensathien, Kasemsup et al. 
2000; Tangcharoensathien, Teerawattananon et al. 2001). A recent study revealed that 
the exclusion of RRT from the UC benefit package was likely to result in a considerable 
financial barrier to such health services and substantial economic burden of health care 
costs on ESRD patients, especially those in poor families (Tangcharoensathien, 
Kasemsup et al. 2005). 
1.5 Knowledge gaps 
Experiences in achieving universal coverage in industrialized countries show the 
attainment of more equitable access to health care of the population and a higher degree 
of financial risk protection from the costs of illness, compared to low- and middle-income 
countries. However, empirical evidence indicates that socio-economic disparities in 
health and health care use in some high-income countries still remain (DHSS 1980; 
Whitehead and Diderichsen 1997; Diderichsen, Whitehead et al. 2001; Kwon 2002; 
Mossialos and Dixon 2002b; Veugelers and Yip 2003). For example, specialist medical 
services in Canada were underused by lower socio-economic groups and may even 
contribute to a widening of the socio-economic gap (Veugelers and Yip 2003; Health 
Disparities Task Group 2005). Even in some of the healthiest countries in Western 
Europe - Finland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom - a gradient in health across 
the social spectrum was experienced (Whitehead and Diderichsen 1997). Hence, 
questions regarding financial and non-financial barriers to health services. along \\ith 
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factors influencing the effectiveness of a universal coverage policy in reducing health 
disparities, are raised in both developed and developing countries. 
Since relatively few developing countries have achieved UC, much is still unknown 
about how a universal coverage policy can promote equity of health care systems in low-
and middle-income countries, especially within different health care systems and social 
contexts. Limitations of current research on the linkage between health care financing 
arrangements and achievements of health care systems, especially in low- and middle-
income countries, includes factors such as the absence of well designed large scale 
evaluations on the effect of health financing interventions, a lack of control groups, 
insufficient socio-economic data, and a short timeframe of existing studies (Palmer, 
Mueller et al. 2004). It is hoped that an assessment of the impact of the universal 
coverage policy on the Thai health care system can help address international knowledge 
gaps and limited current information. This would contribute to the body of knowledge 
and provide lessons for other developing countries moving towards universal coverage. 
The availability of national household surveys on health service use, and existing input 
and output reports of public health facilities, provide a good opportunity to explore 
changes in health service use and the distribution of public subsidies on health, or 
'benefit incidence', for the whole Thai health care system, prior to and after universal 
coverage. In addition, an investigation into the impact of the UC policy and its 
relationship to changes in health financing arrangements would be useful for knowledge 
and further research on health care financing, equity in health, and health risk protection. 
The shortage of experiences regarding the adoption of tax-based public health insurance 
for achieving universal coverage in low- or middle-income countries is another 
interesting point in support of the need to evaluate the impact of the UC policy on the 
Thai health care system. The shift of health care financing sources from household out-
of-pocket payments to general taxation raises a question as to the impact of the UC policy 
on changes in equity in health care finance and financial burden for health payments 
borne by households from different socio-economic groups. In addition, the exclusion of 
certain expensive medical services from the UC benefit package such as RRT for ESRD 
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patients, poses a question to the financial impact on Thai households of different socio-
economic status. The extent of inequitable access to RRT and the magnitude of financial 
consequences from direct payments for RRT between better-off and less well-off 
households are unknown. 
At the heart of assessing the impact of UC policy on health equity lies in how poorer and 
more vulnerable groups are defined. Criticisms have been made over using monetary 
measures, either income or expenditure, to assess household living standards or 
individual socio-economic status in developing countries (Filmer and Pritchett 2001; 
Sahn and Stifel 2001; Oakes and Rossi 2003). Limitations in national household surveys 
on socio-economic status, problems of accuracy in household income and expenditure 
reporting, and sampling biases in low- and middle-income countries, have led to a search 
for an alternative tool to classify individuals or households into different socio-economic 
groups (Morris, Carletto et al. 2000; Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Sahn and Stifel 2001). 
Use of a non-monetary measure, such as an asset index, to assess health disparities in 
developing countries is quite rare. A comparison of the effect of using monetary and 
non-monetary tools on equity in health care use, and the distribution of public subsidies 
on health, would be useful for developing countries, where individual and household 
socio-economic data are limited. 
1.6 Purpose and contents of thesis 
1.6.1 Purpose 
The aim of this research is to describe changes in health care use, equity in health care 
finance and financial burden of health care payments borne by different socio-economic , 
groups of Thais prior to and after the UC policy implementation, and to analyze the role 
of the UC policy in any changes observed. In addition, the distribution of public 
subsidies on health or benefit incidence prior to and after UC and the economic impact of 
the UC benefit package on poorer and richer households are all investigated. The 
ultimate purpose is to draw lessons from UC policy implementation in a developing 
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country like Thailand for presentation to the international audience and to contribute to 
the body of knowledge. Finally, the sensitivity of conclusions on choice of socio-
economic group indicator (household income per capita or the asset index), and the use of 
aggregate and regional unit subsidies to calculate benefit incidence, are also explored. 
With this research aim, the five specific objectives of this thesis are to: 
1. analyze changes in health care use and the distribution of public subsidies on 
health gained by different socio-economic groups of Thais prior to and after 
universal coverage, and to describe the role of the UC policy in any changes 
observed; 
2. investigate changes in progressivity of health care finance, financial risk 
protection, and financial burden on households for health care payments prior to 
and after universal coverage; 
3. explore differences between the use of an asset index and household income per 
capita to categorize individual socio-economic status, and the use of an 
aggregated and regional unit subsidy, to calculate benefit incidence; 
4. explore the economic impact of the UC benefit package on poorer and richer 
households, comparing the exclusion of RRT and the inclusion of open heart 
surgery; and, 
5. provide lessons learnt and policy recommendations for improving equity in the 
Thai health care system and other developing countries through the introduction 
of universal coverage and health financing reform. 
It should be noted that the UC policy comprises several health financing strategies which 
tended to affect the whole health care system and population covered by the UC and 
other health insurance schemes. Therefore, an assessment of the impact of the UC policy 
on equity in health care use and health care finance requires an investigation on changes 
in equity for the overall population. 
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1.6.2 Contents 
The thesis is divided into four major sections. The remainder of Section 1 consists of 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4, and provides a theoretical background related to this research, 
background information on the Thai health care system and characteristics of the UC 
policy, and then the purpose as well as scope and methodology of the research. Chapter 2 
describes the theoretical background and philosophies of equity in health and health care 
use, health care finance, universal coverage, methods and databases for assessing health 
equity. Chapter 3 presents background information on the Thai health care system, main 
features of the UC policy, the UC benefit package, and previous studies which evaluated 
the UC policy in Thailand. Chapter 4 identifies objectives of the study and justifies the 
choice of research methodology. 
Section 2 consists of three chapters presenting secondary data analyses and the 
quantitative approaches of the thesis. Chapter 5 assesses changes in health care use 
among individuals of different socio-economic status prior to and after the 
implementation of the UC policy. Chapter 6 explores benefit incidence on different 
socio-economic groups of Thais prior to and after the universal coverage policy. Chapter 
7 presents an assessment of equity in health care finance and changes in financial risk 
protection prior to and after the UC policy. 
Section 3 presents findings of the economic impact of the benefit package of the UC 
scheme on Thai households with different socia-economic status. A case study of two 
expensive medical services, renal replacement therapy (RRT) for end-stage renal disease 
patients (ESRD) and open heart surgery for heart disease patients, which are respectively 
excluded and included in the UC benefit package, are explored in terms of three aspects: 
equity in access to health services; financial consequences for households; and coping 
strategies adopted by richer and poorer households. 
Section 4 comprises two chapters and annexes. Chapter 9 discusses the research findings 
from both the quantitative and qualitative approaches, and how the UC policy had an 
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impact on changes in health care use, equity in health care finance, and benefit incidence 
gained by different socio-economic groups of Thais. Limitations of the study, along with 
strengths and weaknesses of the study's methodology, are also presented. Chapter 10 
presents conclusions of the study, policy implications and lessons learnt for Thailand as 
well as other countries, and further research needs. Annexes of the thesis include 
advantages and disadvantages of different household socio-economic indicators, with an 
emphasis on using an asset index for measuring household living standards in Thailand, 
the 2002 SES and the 2003 HWS questionnaires, the UC benefit package, investigating 
tools of the qualitative household study, patient information sheet and informed consent 




In this chapter, a review of the relevant literature is presented in three sections. The first 
section describes the importance and definitions of equity in health, philosophies and the 
principles of equity in health related to the universal coverage policy. The second section 
focuses on the literature about universal coverage, health care financing reform, roles of 
universal coverage and public health insurance in improving equity in access to health 
services, and financial risk protection, especially in developing countries. The last 
section provides a literature review of methods and potential databases for assessing 
equity in health. 
2.1 Equity in health 
Equity in health has been recognized to be an important objective of health care systems 
in many countries, and has recently received greater attention from key international 
organizations (International Society for Equity in Health 2005; The World Bank 2005; 
World Health Organization 2005). During the past three decades, concerns over equity in 
health have been acknowledged by several international initiatives, beginning with the 
Alma Ata Conference on Primary Health Care in 1978 (WHO 1978), followed by a 
number of global and regional health equity initiatives including WHO Initiative on 
Equity in Health and Health Care, RockefellerlHarvard University Global Health Equity 
Initiative, Southern African Development Community (SADC) Regional Network on 
Equity in Health, World Bank Study on Equity in Health in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and finally the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations (United 
Nations 2005), which had explicit statements on gender equity, especially in health and 
education. To help achieve the policy goal of equity in health, many countries in 
Southeast Asia and Latin America have employed a universal coverage (UC) policy in 
access to health care as both a means and an ends to achieve this objective 
(Tangcharoensathien, Wibulpolprasert et al. 2003: Frenk 2006). In May 2005. the 58th 
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World Health Assembly adopted Resolution 58.33 urging member states of WHO to 
work towards universal coverage and to ensure that their populations have access to 
needed health interventions without the risk of financial catastrophe (W orld Health 
Organization 2005). The International Conference on Social Health Insurance in 
Developing Countries held in Berlin in 2005 also recommended that governments should 
promote and expand universal health protection through pre-paid, pooled, and solidarity-
based social health insurance schemes with good and effective government stewardship 
(International Labour Office, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit et 
al. 2006). Most recently, the 2006 World Development Report expressed its concerns 
over health inequalities caused by market failures for health insurance and health care, 
especially in developing countries where inappropriate and inefficient flows of health 
resources are highly prevalent (The World Bank 2005). 
Health inequalities appear to be pervasive both between and within nations across the 
globe (Evans, Whitehead et al. 2001; Coburn and Coburn 2007). For example, infant 
mortality among blacks in South Africa was five times higher than that among whites 
(Gilson 1997), maternal mortality in the poor province of Quinghai in China was ten 
times higher than in more prosperous areas such as Zhejiang Province (Hsiao and Liu 
2001), and the share of children under age 5 years who were stunted was higher in rural 
parts of Malawi, Vietnam, and China than in urban parts of these countries (UNICEF 
1999). In addition, a similar pattern of health inequalities is evident among affluent 
countries such as the United States (Murray, Michuad et al. 1998), the Netherlands, 
Finland, and the United Kingdom (Whitehead and Diderichsen 1997; Allin, Masseria et 
al. 2006). It can be said that regardless of whether a country is rich or poor and whether 
it has high aggregate or low health status, opportunities for good health and health care 
are highly unequal between the rich and the poor across the globe. 
It is estimated that 1.3 billion people worldwide do not have access to effective and 
affordable health care (GTZ-ILO-WHO-Consortium on Social Health Protection in 
Developing Countries 2006). The poor are the most vulnerable as they are less able to 
recover from the financial consequences of out-of-pocket payments and loss of income 
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associated with ill health. WHO estimates that every year, more than 150 million 
individuals in 44 million households face financial catastrophe as a direct result of having 
to pay for health care (World Health Organization 2005). About 25 million households 
or more than 100 million individuals are pushed into poverty by the need to pay for 
health services. There is an urgent need for governments in developing countries to set 
improvement of financial risk protection and equity in health as their policy objectives. 
From a social justice perspective, Sen explained the importance of equity in health in the 
following three aspects. 
• First, health is among the most important conditions of human life and a significant 
component of human capabilities that must be valued. The opportunities of an 
individual to achieve good health (i.e. free from avoidable illness and afflictions, and 
premature mortality) should be informed by the conception of social justice and be a 
high priority of health policies in both developed and developing countries; 
• Second, process and procedural fairness have an inescapable relevance to social 
justice, thus governments must go beyond health achievements and the capability to 
achieve health; and, 
• Third, health equity cannot only be concerned with inequality of either health or 
health care, and must take into account how resource allocation and social 
arrangements link health with other features of states of affairs (Sen 2002). 
Given Sen's perspective and the current situation of health inequalities, achieving equity 
in health requires a host of interventions and measures to deal with many issues, both 
inside and outside the health sector. In addition, policy makers and international 
organizations need a clear understanding of the situations and must develop policy goals 
of improving health equity. 
2.1.1 Philosophies of health equity 
Philosophies of social justice bearing on the issue of equity in health are di\'erse. This 
leads to debates about the meaning of equity in health and how best to achieve it. To 
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understand the philosophies 'of social justice and the different viewpoints of health equity. 
there are three clear philosophical approaches: libertarianism, utilitarianism, and 
egalitarianism. 
Libertarianism emphasizes a respect for natural rights, focusing in particular on two of 
Locke's natural rights-the rights to life and to possessions (Gillon 1986). This provides 
a belief that people can acquire and transfer their properties without violating other rights. 
In health care, the libertarian concept is concerned that a minimum standard of health 
care should be provided to all people, while additional health care can be obtained 
depending on an individual's purchasing power and preference. Libertarians view access 
to health care as "part of society's reward system" and people should be able to use their 
income and wealth to get more or better health care than their less wealthy fellow citizens 
if they wish. Thus, a libertarian health care sector should be privately financed and 
health care should be rationed primarily according to willingness to pay. State 
involvement should be limited to ensure a minimum standard of care for the poor. 
The second philosophy, utilitarianism, has different concepts and goals. Utilitarianism 
aims to maximize the sum of individual utilities or welfare. It gives equal weight to each 
individual's happiness. Therefore, in health care, utilitarianism has much in common 
with the notion of efficiency, allocating resources according to the likelihood of medical 
success. During the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the utilitarian concept was 
passionately adopted by advocates of radical social reform which sought to redistribute 
income, health care, and other utility-yielding goods from the rich to the poor (Williams 
and Cookson 2000). Redistribution is bound to be a good thing for a utilitarian, since the 
gain in happiness by the poor from one more unit of the benefit is assumed to be greater 
than the loss in happiness by the rich from one less unit (diminishing marginal utility). 
The last philosophy is egalitarianism, which seeks to reduce inequality. Egalitarian 
health care should be financed according to ability to pay, while the delivery of health 
care should be allocated on the basis of need, which would promote equality in health. 
Williams (1993) supported this concept in his view of "access to health care being every 
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citizen's right" that ought not be influenced by income and wealth. Therefore, from an 
egalitarian viewpoint, a publicly financed system should dominate in health care 
financing, and health care should be distributed according to "need" and financed 
according to "ability to pay" (Wagstaff and Doorslaer 2000). 
Each of the three aforementioned broad viewpoints generates a distinctive health care 
system with very distinctive characteristics, each different from the other. In a libertarian 
system, willingness and ability to pay are the determinants of access, and this is best 
accomplished in a market-oriented private system. In a utilitarian system, basic health 
services are available for every citizen and effective health services should be prioritized 
where they maximize the sum of utilities. Finally, equal opportunity of access for those 
in equal need is the determining rule in an egalitarian system, and this requires the 
establishment of a social hierarchy of need which is independent of who is paying for 
care. This equal access is best accomplished in a publicly financed health system. 
In practice, health care systems in low- and high-income countries are financed and 
delivered by a mixture of systems relying on different philosophies. Policy-makers in 
European countries give the impression of being much more inclined towards the 
egalitarian viewpoint in health care matters (Hurst 1991; Wagstaff and Doorslaer 2000) 
rather than leaning towards a more libertarian philosophy, like the US and some countries 
in Asia (Havighurst 2006; Mettanando Bhikkhu 2007). Most studies of equity in health 
in European countries begin with the premise that payments towards health care should 
be related to ability to pay rather than to use, and health care should be distributed 
according to need rather than willingness or ability to pay (Andersen 1975; Le Grand 
1978: Hurst 1991). 
2.1.2 Definitions of health equity and underlying social advantage 
In general, different social, political, economic and cultural contexts suggest the need for 
different ways of defining and explaining health equity (Braveman and Gruskin 2003). 
However, clarity in the principles and definitions of health equity and health disparities 
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has important policy implications and practical consequences. A clear definition is 
required to determine when different definitions represent substantially different 
paradigms and the implications of adopting these paradigms in particular contexts. In 
addition, an unequivocal definition can help to guide which measurements are relevant 
for monitoring health disparities at different levels (e.g. national, state/provincial, and 
local levels), and help to enhance accountability for the effects of policy actions. 
Equity means social justice or fairness; it is an ethical concept, grounded in principles of 
distributive justice. Equity in health has been widely defined as the absence of socially 
unjust or unfair health disparities (Whitehead 1992). Evidence from the literature review 
indicates that there was little consensus about what these terms mean during the 1990s. 
At present, however, common to most definitions of health equity is the idea that certain 
health differences or health disparities are unnecessary, avoidable, unfair and unjust 
(Macinko and Starfield 2002). In addition, equity in health refers to the circumstance 
which allows for all persons to have fair opportunities to attain their full health potential, 
to the fullest extent possible given their context and situation (Whitehead 2000). The 
International Society of Equity in Health defines health equity as "the absence of 
potentially remediable, systematic differences in one or more aspects of health across 
socially, economically, demographically, or geographically defined population groups or 
sub-groups" (International Society for Equity in Health 2005). For the purposes of 
operationalization and measurement, a recent study characterized equity in health as the 
absence of systematic disparities in health or in the major social determinants of health 
between social groups who have different levels of underlying social advantage and 
disadvantage (Braveman and Gruskin 2003). 
Underlying social advantage and disadvantage refers to wealth, power, prestige, and other 
attributes that define how people are grouped into social hierarchies. Advantaged and 
disadvantaged social groups include socio-economic groups (typically defined by 
measures of income, economic assets, occupational class, and/or educational level), 
racial/ethnic or religious groups, or groups defined by gender, geography, age, disability. 
sexual orientation, and other characteristics relevant to a particular setting. It is 
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suggested that a health disparity must be systematically associated with social advantage. 
that is, the associations must be significant and frequent or persistent, not just occasional 
or random (Starfield 2001). For instance, the efforts of the World Health Organization to 
define and measure health equity using only individual-based health status in the World 
Health Report 2000 (World Health Organization 2000) were criticized by many social 
scientists (Braveman, Krieger et al. 2000; Almeida, Braveman et al. 2001). These 
scientists argued that such an approach of the WHO would: 1) ignore important social 
determinants of health inequalities; 2) prevent social disparities in health from occupying 
an important place on the global research and policy agenda; 3) ignore ethical 
considerations at the population level that would favour guiding resources to those with 
both poorer health and lower social position; and, 4) undermine current global efforts 
aimed at the study of social determinants of health. 
The terms "equity" and "equality" are often used interchangeably, despite the fact that 
their concepts are quite different. In general, equity is fairness, impartiality, justice 
according to natural law or right, and freedom from bias or favouritism (Merriam-
Webster 2008). Equality, on the other hand, is defined as the state of being equal. This 
in tum is defined as having the same rights, privileges, ability, rank, or being the same 
quantity, size, number, value, degree, intensity and quality (Kluthe 2002). On the one 
hand, equality is a dimensional concept, simply referring to measurable quantities, while 
equity is a political concept, expressing a moral commitment to social justice. The 
concept of health equity focuses attention on the distribution of resources and other 
health-related processes that drive a particular kind of health inequality, that is unjust or 
unfair (Braveman and Gruskin 2003). Given this understanding, aims of policies to 
achieve equity in health are not to eliminate all health differences so that everyone has 
the same level and quality of health, but rather to reduce or eliminate those which result 
from factors which are considered to be both avoidable and unfair. 
Like most concepts, equity III health is difficult to measure directly. However, 
operational definitions of equity in health based on meaningful and measurable criteria 
have been proposed. For example. Mooney suggested seven possible definitions of 
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equity in health after the publication of the Black Report) and a wide discussion on this 
issue in the UK during the 1980s. These definitions included: 1) equality of expenditure 
per capita; 2) equality of input per capita; 3) equality of input for equal need; 4) equality 
of access for equal need; 5) equality of utilization for equal need; 6) equality of marginal 
need; and 7) equality of health (Mooney 1983). Whitehead (2000) also proposed the 
following seven main determinants of health differentials which can be identified as just 
or unjust: 
1. Natural and biological variation; 
2. Health-damaging behaviour if freely chosen, such as participation in certain 
sports and pastimes; 
3. Transient health disadvantage of one group over another when that group is first 
to adopt a health-promoting behaviour (as long as other groups have the means 
to catch up fairly soon); 
4. Health-damaging behaviour where the degree of choice in lifestyles is severely 
restricted; 
5. Exposure to unhealthy, stressful living and working conditions; 
6. Inadequate access to essential health and other public health services; and, 
7. Natural selection or health-related social mobility involving the tendency for 
sick people to move down the social scale. 
The consensus from the literature suggests that health differences determined by factors 
in categories 1, 2 and 3 above would not normally be classified as inequity in health, 
whilst those factors in categories 4, 5, 6 and 7 would be considered by many to be unfair 
and unjust. 
I Black Report was published in 1980 by a committee led by Sir Douglas Blac~. This report 
tacked the patterns of inequalities in health across Britain and made recommendations .for he.alth 
improvement. Though many of the recommendations were not implemented, the dISCUSSIOns 
surrounding its finding continue to this day. 
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2.1.3 Debates on vertical equity and procedural justice 
Considerations of equity in the health policy literature have mainly focused on horizontal 
equity (the equal treatment of equals) and as a consequence have tended to overlook 
vertical equity (unequal treatment for unequal needs) (Mooney and Jan 1997). Typically. 
horizontal equity applies to people in the same status or situation, and people who are 
alike should be treated in the same fashion, in other words, equal treatment for equal 
need. For example, patients with the same health needs should receive an equal share of 
health care resources and treatments. In contrast, vertical equity focuses on the 
difference between individuals or groups of people, and people who are unlike in relevant 
respects (e.g. income, health needs), and states that the differences should be treated 
differently in a just way. For example, people in a lower economic group should receive 
more priority in public support than higher economic groups, and people with higher 
health needs should receive more treatment. Evidence from the literature shows that it is 
relatively easy to argue who is equal and the terms of horizontal equality (e.g., people 
who have equal health needs, people who are equally sick). What is more problematic is 
vertical equity which needs to first determine how great any inequalities in terms of 
health needs are, and then determine how great any differences in policy responses 
should be to these inequalities. Such judgements are clearly subjective and difficult to 
measure or address with a formula. This requires a much more concerted effort on the 
part of health economists and researchers to tackle issues of vertical equity, which is 
highly prevalent in many countries and between countries. At present, the quantity of 
literature related to horizontal equity is far greater than that of vertical health equity. 
In general, equity strategies within the health sector have focused on establishing 
mechanisms for achieving horizontal equity in health care delivery (e.g. equal access for 
all or universal access), whilst recognizing the importance of vertical equity in relation to 
health care payment mechanisms or ability to pay (McIntyre and Gilson 2002). 
However, there is an increasing concern that vertical equity should receive more attention 
as a health policy goal, particularly in countries where there are substantial differences in 
health status between different groups in society (Mooney and Jan 1997). In addition. 
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possibilities to incorporate vertical equity into health care policy through distributive 
and/or procedural justice have also been explored. Given this perspective, distributive 
justice focuses on the distribution of health outcomes across individuals and groups 
within society, whilst procedural justice approaches emphasize fairness with respect to 
processes (e.g. access and financing) rather than outcomes. Difficulties with a purely 
distributive justice orientation to vertical equity include the possibility that it would 
advocate health equality regardless of genetic, environmental, or behavioural differences 
(Macinko and Starfield 2002). 
Evidence from the literature review indicates that a practical mechanism through which 
concerns for procedural justice and vertical equity can be reflected is currently under 
exploration. Mooney and Jan (1997) suggest that in determining resource allocation 
patterns which reflect a vertical equity goal, it is unavoidable to consult widely within a 
society to identify which groups should be prioritized in policy action and how much 
additional weight they should receive compared to other groups. Other specific actions 
which put the needs of the poorest at the heart of health policy development and 
implementation include: 1) establishing or strengthening mechanisms for ensuring the 
accountability of health services to the population; 2) initiating participatory processes 
which can help direct local level health action; 3) strengthening the technical systems of 
supervision and accountability which safeguard clinical care; and, 4) developing national 
strategies to establish citizen's rights and allow the implementation of those rights to be 
monitored (Gilson 1998). 
It should be noted that the scope of health equity should not be limited to equity of health 
care use or access. Recent debates on health equity have expand its scope to also include 
the distribution of health within the population (Evans, Whitehead et al. 2001). Sen 
(2002) took this further and argued for an even broader scope, equity in the opportunity 
to health. Given this perspective, health equity should also consider how "resource 
allocation and social arrangements link health with other features of states of affairs" 
(Sen 2002). 
45 
2.1.4 Government roles in improving health equity 
The W orId Health Organization has summarized government roles III integrating a 
principle of health equity in overall health policy as follows: 
The underlying principle of equity in health care requires that [health care] be distributed 
according to need and regardless of ability to pay. In practical tenns, this means 
providing universal access to the poor to comprehensive and good quality health services 
without regard to financial barriers. The government will need to assume a key role in 
ensuring that the principle of equity is interpreted into specific and concrete actions 
through the design and monitoring of overall health policy (Whitehead 1992). 
In addition, WHO views the principle of "equal access to essential health services" as a 
human right among its member states (World Health Organization 2005). This aims to 
ensure that health care is financially accessible to the entire population and there is no 
financial barrier to health services when needed. 
Striving for equity in health and health care means doing what is necessary to (1) reduce 
avoidable, unfair, and unjustifiable differences in health status, health detenninants, and 
risk factors; (2) improve access to and utilization of quality health care services by all 
population groups according to need; and, (3) create an enabling inter-sectoral policy and 
resource environment for establishing and sustaining equity in health and health care as 
national development policy (World Health Organization 1999). 
Based on principles of health equity and the context of the WHO's Health for All policy, 
equity in health is concerned with creating equal opportunities for health, and with 
bringing health differentials down to the lowest possible level. Seven principles of action 
for addressing global health inequities proposed by the WHO include: 1) improving 
living and working conditions; 2) enabling healthier lifestyles; 3) decentralizing power 
and decision-making and encouraging citizen participation in policy-making; 4) 
conducting health impact assessments of multi-sectoral actions; 5) keeping equity on the 
global health agenda; 6) assuring that health services are of high quality and accessible to 
all; and, 7) basing equity policies on appropriate research, monitoring, and evaluation 
(Whitehead 2000). 
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In recognition of the important role of member state's legislation in further reform of 
health-financing systems with a view to achieving universal coverage, during the 58th 
WHA in 2005, the WHO urged member states to: 1) ensure that health-financing systems 
include a method for pre-payment of financial contributions for health care, with a view 
to sharing risk among the population and avoiding catastrophic health expenditure and 
impoverishment of individuals as a result of seeking care; 2) ensure adequate and 
equitable distribution of good-quality health care infrastructures and human resources for 
health so that citizens will receive equitable and good-quality health services according to 
the benefits package; 3) ensure that external funds for specific health programmes or 
activities are managed and organized in a way that contributes to the development of 
sustainable financing mechanisms for the health system as a whole; 4) to plan the 
transition to universal coverage of their citizens so as to contribute to meeting the needs 
of the population for health care and improving its quality, to reducing poverty, to 
attaining internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the 
United Nations Millennium Declaration, and to achieving health for all; 5) to recognize 
that, when managing the transition to universal coverage, each option will need to be 
developed within the particular macroeconomic, socio-cultural and political context of 
each country; 6) to take advantage, where appropriate, of opportunities that exist for 
collaboration between public and private providers and health-financing organizations, 
under strong overall government stewardship; and, 7) to share experiences on different 
methods of health financing, including the development of social health insurance 
schemes, and private, public, and mixed schemes, with particular reference to the 
institutional mechanisms that are established to address the principle functions of the 
health-financing system (World Health Organization 2005a). 
2.1.5 Access to and utilization of health care and barriers to health services 
Many policy makers use the terms "access to" and "utilization of' health care 
synonymously, while some social scientists strongly argue that there is a clear distinction 
between "access to" and "utilization of' health care and these two phrases should not be 
used interchangeably (Le Grand 1982; Mooney 1983; Gulliford, Hughes et al. 2001). 
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However, the distinction between access to and utilization of health care is not widely 
appreciated, either by policy makers or academics (Wagstaff and Doorslaer 1993). Thus, 
the two terms are often used interchangeably in various studies related to equity in access 
to health care in both developed and developing countries. 
Access to health care is concerned with the relationship between need, provision, and 
utilization of health services (Acuna, Gattini et al. 2001; Gulliford, Hughes et al. 2001). 
Access describes the potential and actual entry of a given individual or population group 
into the health care delivery system. In general, indicators to assess equity in access to 
health care include availability of health resources, waiting time, user charges, and other 
barriers to health services. 
Utilization of health care is a function both of individual attributes of the patient and 
organizational factors including the availability and accessibility of health care services. 
Among individual attributes, the severity of a person health problem or illness, his or her 
perception of vulnerability, cultural and psychological attitudes towards health care 
systems, influence utilization behaviour of individuals (Andersen 1975). Organizational 
factors include economic costs, availability, distance, and location of health care services. 
Barriers to health services are significant factors which lead to inequitable access to and 
utilization of health services. They can be classified into various categories depending on 
the type of health care provided, places of analysis, and who is conducting the analysis. 
Barriers in access to health care can be classified as physical, financial, attitudinal and 
process barriers (California Health Care Foundation 2000). 
Categories for understanding barriers to health care are presented as follows. 
1. Physical barriers: 
a. Lack of available health services in area; and, 
b. Lack of resources for overcoming physical barriers (e.g. handicap, 
transportati on). 
2. Financial barriers: 
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a. High cost of health services; and, 
b. Lack of health insurance coverage. 
3. Attitudinal barriers: 
a. Cultural discordance between patients and providers; and, 
b. Perception of health service importance relative to other priorities. 
4. Process barriers: 
a. Lack of knowledge of eligibility for public assistance, health servIce 
coverage, and/or enrolment processes; and, 
b. Limited office hours and employers who do not provide time off for 
utilizing health services. 
Evidence from the literature indicates that financial barriers in terms of user fees or 
patient charges hamper access to and utilization of health care, especially for low-income 
households (Carrin and Hanvoravongchai 2003). For instance in China, the collapse of 
rural insurance in the 1980s and the growth in importance of user fees have dramatically 
affected access to health care (Hsiao and Lui 1996). In some African countries, access to 
essential health care was reduced because of financial barriers when a user fee policy was 
implemented (Creese 1997). A study of two low-income communities in Colombo, Sri 
Lanka shows that changes in health system financing and delivery were likely to impose 
higher illness cost burdens on poor households. Sri Lankan households often required 
additional resources to meet illness costs and income-poor households had weak social 
resource endowments to draw upon (Russell 2001). In addition, research by Rand Health 
Insurance in the US indicates that low-income patients exempted from user charges 
experienced significant improvements in visual acuity and better control of blood 
pressure, compared with non-exempt patients (Brook, Ware et al. 1983). 
2.1.6 Equity in health care finance 
The way in which health systems are organized and financed is one of the key 
determinants of overall population health and access to essential health care (McPake 
2000; Palmer, Mueller et al. 2004). From an equity perspective, health care financing is 
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important for two reasons. First, financing determines the availability of health care as 
well as who can access it, as highlighted in the previous section. Second, financing 
mechanisms provide financial protection against catastrophic costs of illness (Hsiao and 
Liu 2001). Due to the unpredictable manner of illness and health care costs, governments 
play a crucial role in protecting households from impoverishment caused by costs of 
illness and ensuring that all individuals have an equal opportunity to access essential 
health care. 
Health care financing has become a central issue of health sector reform in many middle-
and low-income countries for three reasons. First, considerable evidence indicates that a 
large proportion of households in these countries mainly rely on out-of-pocket payments 
for health care and have been impoverished by a high level of household spending on 
health (World Health Organization 2000; Rannan-Eliya 2001; O'Donnell, Doorslaer et al. 
2005). Second, the large gap between limited government resources and increasing 
demand for health care due to epidemiologic and demographic transitions requires 
effective public resource allocation and government interventions (Kutzin 2000; 
Newbrander, Collins et al. 2000). Lastly, the advancement and adoption of expensive 
medical technology has put additional pressure on limited government health resources. 
As a result, WHO stressed its concerns about health care financing reform by adopting a 
resolution on 'sustainable health financing, universal coverage, and social health 
insurance' at the 58th World Health Assembly in May 2005 (World Health Organization 
2005). 
Health care financing involves three basic functions: collecting revenue, pooling 
resources, and purchasing health services (World Health Organization 2000). These 
functions often involve complex interactions among key stakeholders in the health sector 
(e.g., purchasers, public and private health care providers, employers, public and private 
insurance organizations, health insurance beneficiaries and their household members). 
Therefore, policies concerning these functions provide an opportunity to reform the 
health sector in the areas of financing, payments, organization, regulation, and persuasion 
(Roberts, Hsaio et al. 2004). Revenue collection is the way health systems raise money 
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from individuals, households, businesses, external sources, and governments. Pooling 
deals with the accumulation and management of revenues so that members of the pool 
share health risks, thereby protecting individuals from large, unpredictable health 
expenditure. Pre-payment allows pool members or the government to pay for average 
expected costs in advance, relieving individuals of uncertainty. It is worth noting that 
pooling with pre-payment enables the establishment of insurance and the redistribution of 
health spending between high- and low-risk individuals or risk subsidies, and between the 
rich and the poor or equity subsidies (Gottret and Schieber 2006). 
One challenge in reforming health care finance is to harmonize these three functions in 
such a way that health systems can financially protect individuals from expensive 
medical care costs and provide appropriate incentives for health care providers so that 
providers are motivated to improve population health and the quality and efficiency of 
health services. However, most countries have a fragmented set of administrative 
structures for collecting revenue, as well as limited resources for pooling and purchasing 
health services, which require better design and stronger regulatory functions. This, 
therefore, creates an opportunity as well as a challenge for governments to improve their 
health care financing systems. 
2.2 Universal coverage 
Universal coverage (UC) has been defined as 'a situation where the whole population of a 
country has access to good quality services according to health needs and preferences, 
regardless of income, residency and other social circumstances (Mills 2007). Typically, 
UC refers to the extension of two health insurance functions to the entire population: 1) 
equitable access to effective health services when needed; and, 2) protection of household 
income and assets against expensive medical services (Mills 1996; Kutzin 1998). 
According to this definition, UC includes two important equity-related health policy 
objectives, notably equity in access to effective health services and the broader social 
welfare objective of poverty avoidance from expensive medical care. Thus, a policy to 
enhance health insurance within health systems involves two dimensions: 
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• Breadth of coverage, meaning the proportion of the total population with effective 
health care risk protection' and , , 
• Depth of coverage, referring to the range of health services available to beneficiaries 
without exposure to out-of-pocket payments. 
The latter dimension is closely associated to the protection function of health insurance 
against expensive medical care, and refers to the extent of the benefit package provided 
by health insurance schemes. 
2.2.1 Benefit package of public health insurance 
In general, public health insurance provides financial risk protection against costs of 
illness through the list of health services included in its benefit package. The benefit 
package is not only a means for encouraging an appropriate use of medical care, but it 
also indicates the extent of risk protection against medical care costs obtained by 
beneficiaries of the health insurance scheme, and which types of health services require 
either direct out-of-pocket payments or public subsidies (Kutzin 1998; Kutzin 2000). 
In low and middle income countries, the issue of the benefit package being guaranteed by 
health systems has received intense attention since the publication of the World 
Development Report (WDR) in 1993 (The World Bank 2005). Since the 1993 WDR 
specified a basic package of health care for low and middle income countries, health 
services included into the packages have been mainly justified by using economic 
analysis in the form of either cost-effectiveness or cost-utility analysis of health service 
interventions (Drummond, Torrance et al. 1993; Eichler, Kong et al. 2004; The World 
Bank 2005). This notion of health care priority setting has been favoured by health 
economists and policy makers since efficiency concepts rose to dominate health sector 
reform in the early 1990s (Gwatkin 2000). 
However, the extent of the benefit package guaranteed by health systems has been 
debated over the years. Although the 1993 WDR suggested that health services or 
medical interventions which are not cost-effective should not be financed by public 
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resources, concerns over financial risk protection against unanticipated high-cost medical 
care, which is an important function of health insurance, were also raised (Hammer and 
Berman 1995; Soderlund 1998). In addition, in terms of practical implementation, 
Soderlund (1998) argues that the development of benefit packages based wholly or 
mainly on cost-effectiveness has yet to be seen at a national level anywhere in the world. 
Moreover, in political terms, explicitly limiting the health services available to a large 
segment of the population has proven quite difficult (Eddy 1991; Glasziou and Mitchell 
1996; Glasziou 1998). In addressing these debates, Kutzin has suggested that the validity 
of the arguments in favour of an "essential package" or a "catastrophic package" cannot 
be addressed in isolation from the other elements of the insurance function. The benefit 
package, and options for reform, need to be considered in the light of the comprehensive 
financing system, allocation mechanisms, and associated institutional features (Kutzin 
1998). 
Differences in the principles of equity III health valued by policy makers imply 
differences in the scope of the benefit package. The application of cost-effectiveness and 
the burden of disease analysis to determine how best to generate overall health gain with 
limited health resources reflects the utilitarian goal of pursuing the "greatest good for the 
greatest number". At the same time, the idea of an essential package seems to be 
compatible with the Rawlsian notion of equity as requiring the worst-off in society are 
provided with a decent, basic minimum of health care (Gilson 1997). According to this 
perspective, inequitable distribution of health services, which supports the delivery of a 
minimum standard of care to the most needy, is considered to be equitable. However, 
both perspectives of equity in health are criticized by egalitarians who judge equity in 
health by assessing whether health care is distributed according to need and financed 
according to ability to pay (Doorslaer and Wagstaff 1993). They argue that aggregate 
health gains, which are of concern to utilitarians may be achieved even whilst the poorest 
gain little or nothing. In other words, the situation of the poorest relative to other groups 
may worsen even when the goals of achieving maximum health gain are achieved. 
53 
A key issue for countries moving towards universal coverage is whether the benefit 
package should include all levels of care or only health services that are more costly 
(Mills 2007). It is clear that the very poorest generally can not cope with any level of 
health expenditure, and costs of health services can force them into poverty. In contrast, 
wealthier households can often afford primary care expenditure, and sometimes even the 
costs of hospitalization or chronic illness. This is a challenge for the design of any UC 
policy in developing countries where health resources are quite limited. 
2.2.2 Financing options for achieving universal coverage 
The essence of financing arrangements for universal coverage is to ensure financial risk 
protection against medical care costs for everyone. In developing countries, financing 
universal coverage is a crucial tool to reduce the often high out-of-pocket payments for 
health care, and to increase the share of progressive health financing sources such as 
general tax and social health insurance contributions. Health care financing systems in 
many countries rely on a mixture of health financing sources, namely general taxes, 
mandatory social insurance contributions, private insurance premiums, community 
financing, and direct out-of-pocket payments. Each health financing source has different 
equity implications for overall health care finance. To elaborate on the relationship 
between each financing source and equity in health care finance, the main features of 
these financing sources are summarized below. 
General taxes have long been used in every nation to finance a major portion of health 
care. In general, developing countries and low-income nations often rely on general 
taxes to finance the public health care system because fewer technical and administrative 
complexities are required compared with private and social health insurance. Moreover. 
the high proportion of the infonnal sector in low- and middle-income countries leads to 
difficulties in collecting insurance premiums and social health insurance contributions. 
Although tax-based health financing arrangements imply a greater likelihood of pursuit 
of public health objectives, criticisms over this sort of finance are evident in many ways 
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(McPake 2000). For instance, employment rights and the status of civil servants in many 
countries result in a lack of pressure for improving the efficiency of the system 
performance of public health insurance for civil servants. There are counter-efficiency 
incentives implicit in traditional budgeting systems: over-centralized systems can be 
unresponsive to the needs of populations remote from the capital city, and there is often a 
lack of market discipline enforcing efficiency throughout the public sector. 
During recent years, a number of civil service reforms aiming to improve effective use of 
public resources have been carried out (Lethbridge 2004). An attempt to reduce the size 
and levels of the bureaucratic system and the introduction of incentives with respect to 
performance of public employees are two examples of initiatives for reforming 
bureaucratic government services (Cassels 1995). Furthermore, budgetary reforms, 
namely a performance-based budgetary system (PBBS), have been introduced in several 
countries (McPake 2000). In addition, decentralization and managed market reforms, 
including contracting in and contracting out, are other approaches for improving the 
efficiency of bureaucratic systems (Walford and Grant 1998; Palmer, Strong et al. 2006; 
Liu, Hotchkiss et al. 2008). It is worth noting that any assessment of the effectiveness 
and efficiency of tax-based health financing must include an assessment of the 
management of public finances from their collection through to their application in 
purchasing health services for the population. 
Social health insurance (SHI) has two distinguishing characteristics from private health 
insurance (Hsiao and Liu 2001). First, SHI is compulsory, and eligible individuals must 
enrol and pay a specific contribution in exchange for a set of benefits. Second, premiums 
of social insurance and its benefits are described in social contracts established through 
legislation. Premiums or benefits can be altered only through a formal political process. 
In general, SHI contributions tend to be less progressive than tax health financing 
because the contributions are often a proportion of income with caps at a specified 
income level (Gottret and Schieber 2006; Mills 2007), though to some extent subsidies to 
lower income members may offset this shortcoming (Wagstaff 2005) In most cases, the 
agencies responsible for SHI are public or quasi-public, with a certain degree of 
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autonomy in financing and administration. Possibilities to pursue a public health agenda 
are likely to exist, but are less direct and tend to be weaker than in a tax-based system. 
Evidence shows that low coverage and lack of solidarity are usually identified as among 
the main problems of SHI in most developing countries (Kutzin and Barnum 1992; 
Wagstaff 2007). Although some developing countries in Asia such as China, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines have had social health insurance for several years 
(Ensor 1999), the major challenge remains to extend health insurance coverage to the 
informal sector, which accounts for the majority of the population. In some countries, 
such as Thailand and Vietnam, social health insurance does not cover the beneficiary's 
spouse, dependents, or other family members (Than Sein 2002). 
Inefficiency and cost-containment are two major concerns influencing reforms to social 
insurance systems (McPake 2000). A decrease in income levels of beneficiaries, 
especially during economic decline, and an increase in medical care costs have resulted in 
a crisis in the social insurance systems of many countries. Reforms in favour of 
competition and providing choice of insurers have been introduced to social health 
insurance systems by some countries in Latin America (Jimenez de la lara and Bossert 
1995). However, health system analysts have argued that although such reforms 
introduced pressure for efficiency and consumer responsiveness, at the same time they 
weakened other pressures to promote public health objectives (Yepes and Sanchez 2000). 
For example, epidemiological surveillance in Colombia suffered in the wake of social 
health insurance reforms. 
Experiences in the implementation of social health insurance in two developing countries, 
China and Vietnam, reveal that five factors facilitate the transition of health insurance 
systems in a developing country to a social health insurance system: 1) an increase in 
level of income; 2) a sufficient administrative capacity by the government to run health 
insurance; 3) a sufficient level of solidarity within the society; -+) voices of the population 
towards their policy makers; and, 5) a strong political will (Carrin 2002). Based on the 
current situation and previous experience in these developing countries, predictions were 
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made that it would take another 35 to 50 years for Vietnam and China to achieve 
universal coverage (Carrin and James 2005). 
Private insurance is a private contract offered by an insurance company to exchange a 
set of benefits for a payment of a specified health insurance premium which is usually 
based on an individual's risk characteristics. In general, this kind of health insurance 
exists in the fonnal, urban sector, and largely serves richer groups of the population who 
can afford insurance premiums (Colombo and Tapay 2004; Sekhri and Savedoff 2005). 
In low-income countries, private health insurance fonns a very small part of the market. 
Major concerns over private health insurance are buyers' adverse selection, small scale 
dis-economies, and moral hazard (Hsiao and Liu 2001; Donaldson, Gerard et al. 2005). 
Creese and Bennett (1997) proposed a distinction between 'Type l' private health 
insurance which focuses on coverage of high cost expenditures with low frequency 
events, and 'Type 2' private health insurance which focuses on covering low cost 
expenditures with high frequency events. 
This type of voluntary insurance appears to be least conducive to achieving objectives of 
cost control within the health care system. Concerns by private insurance agencies about 
uncontrollable and rising costs of health services are illustrated by low-benefit ceilings 
and many excluded conditions, or highly differentiated packages in which only the most 
expensive cover 'catastrophic' medical services (Chollet and Lewis 1997). This implies 
a 'Type 2' focus and implicit reliance on the public sector as the insurer of last resort. 
Theoretically, depending on the nature of the market and insurers, competition of private 
health insurers certainly leads to concerns over inefficiency and adverse selection. The 
World Bank's Health, Nutrition and Population strategy concludes that: "Because of cost 
and the pronounced market failure that occurs in private health insurance, this is not a 
viable option for risk pooling at the national level in low- and middle-income countries" 
(World Bank 1997). 
Direct out-of-pocket payment is made by patients to either public or private health care 
providers at the time when health services are utilized. Although such payments have 
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always been used by private health care providers to obtain revenue, suggestions of the 
World Bank in the mid-1980s encouraged an increase in user charges for public services 
in low-income and developing countries. The proponents of user fees believed that the 
fees would increase revenue to improve quality of public health services and expand 
coverage (Litvack and Bodart 1993). However, the major objection raised to the 
implementation of user fees has been on equity grounds, in particular that the poor would 
not be able to afford to pay, and thus would not be able to access necessary health 
services when needed (Reddy and Vandemoortele 1996; Gilson 1997; Save the Children 
2005). 
In Asia, another World Bank study estimated that private health expenditure constituted 
580/0 of the total health expenditure in China in 2002 (Smith, Wong et al. 2004). In 
addition, results from the Equity in Asia-Pacific Health Systems (EQUIT AP) project 
revealed that health care finance of two least developed Asian countries, Nepal and 
Bangladesh, also relied heavily on out-of-pocket payments (O'Donnell, Doorslaer et al. 
2005). 
Experience with the introduction of user fees for public health services providers, as 
mentioned earlier, has been unsatisfactory in many countries around the world, and has 
resulted in a decrease in utilization of essential health services with public health 
implications. For example, user fees may be responsible for a resurgence of tuberculosis 
in China (World Bank 1993), the failure to raise significant revenue (Creese and Bennett 
1997), and the failure to protect the poor through exemptions (Gilson 1997). However, 
some evidence suggested that better experience with user fees could follow if user fees 
are part of effective civil service reform, budgetary reform, and introduction of market 
mechanisms into the public sector, and decentralization (Litvack and Bodart 1993; 
McPake 2000). 
Evidence from a comprehensive literature review on the economic burden of illness for 
households shows that direct payments for health care costs are regressive. imposing a 
greater burden on poor families than on better-off households (Fabricant, Kamara et al. 
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1999; McIntyre and Thiede 2003). Although the poor in general spend less on treatment 
than other income groups due to lack of access, inability to pay, and greater use of public 
services, this spending makes up a higher proportion of monthly and annual income for 
poor people than for those with higher incomes (Russell 2003). 
Community financing is a type of health insurance scheme characterized by three 
principles: community cooperation, self-reliance, and pre-payment (Hsiao and Liu 2001). 
Members of a community pay a contribution in advance, either in cash or in kind, to a 
community-organized entity for a health care benefit package. The community entity 
then organizes and provides preventive care, primary health care, and medication when 
members are in need. Community financing is organized and managed by the 
community, often by community-based organizations, although the government may 
subsidize or provide technical support to establish the program. Self Employed Women's 
Association (SEW A) in India and Dana Sehat in Indonesia are two examples of 
successful community health insurance schemes in the South-East Asia region (Ranson 
2002; Thabrany, Gani et al. 2004). 
It is clear from the literature review that a health system where individuals must payout 
of their own pockets at the time of health service use creates equity concerns. Such 
payments can lead to exclusion of the poorest members of society from the use of health 
services, restricting access to only those that can afford the fees. In contrast, a health 
system predominately funded by public sources, including general tax and social health 
insurance, can provide equitable access for all to basic and essential health services 
(though this goal is not always achieved). Public funding enables health risks and 
corresponding funds to be pooled together to serve as a safety net for members of health 
insurance schemes and avoids the need to pay at the time and point of health service use. 
Pre-payment based financing arrangements can reduce the financial burdens associated 
with medical care costs. 
Equity in the health care finance of a country depends not only on the incidence of 
individual financing sources, but also on the share of each financing source in total health 
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care finance (Mills 2007; O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008d). Countries where 
progressive health financing sources (e.g. general tax and SHI contributions) have a 
higher share than regressive financing sources (e.g. out-of-pocket payments and private 
health insurance premiums) will also have a progressive pattern of overall health care 
finance. 
2.2.3 Provider payment methods for universal coverage 
The provider payment method is one of the key elements in purchasing arrangements. 
An appropriate payment method is vital for achieving and sustaining universal coverage, 
since it can greatly affect the DC policy cost (Carrin and Hanvoravongchai 2003). The 
responses of health care providers often rely on incentives embedded in different types of 
payment methods. Evidence indicates that fee-for-service payment tends to encourage 
cost inflation through an increase in the volume of health services, which are sometimes 
unnecessary (K won 2002; Sriratanaban 2002). In contrast, payment methods offering 
greater control over costs when compared with fee-for-service include case-based 
methods, capitation, global budgets, and block contracts (Mills 2007). These provider 
payments have different advantages and disadvantages, which relate to their nature and 
the incentives they provide for over- or under-provision of health services, as well as 
quality of care. For example, in capitation payment where there is no direct link between 
the payment method and the costs of health services consumed by an individual, the 
incentive to provide excessive health services tends to disappear and there is clearly an 
incentive to provide less costly treatment (Tangcharoensathien, Supachutikul et al. 1999; 
Mills, Bennett et al. 2000; Carrin and Hanvoravongchai 2003). Experiences from many 
countries also show that using capitation with other close-ended payments including 
case-based payment methods, block grants, and global budgets, can contain costs and 
simplify administration which is a strong advantage, especially in developing countries 
(Dixon, Langenbrunner et al. 2002; Mills 2007). However, it is evident that paying 
health care providers is often one of the most sensitive issues in designing and 
implementing a universal coverage policy, since it affects the interests of some key 
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stakeholders such as Medical Associations, and public and private health care providers 
(Kwon 2002). 
2.2.4 Key challenges and the impact of universal coverage on equity in health 
In countries which have recently acquired developed country status, the issue of 
financing coverage for disadvantaged groups has been a major concern of health systems 
which rely heavily on mandatory insurance funding, since health insurance premiums can 
be collected easily only in the formal sector. To extend coverage of social health 
insurance towards those outside the formal sector and then achieve universal coverage 
has tended to take a considerable amount of time. However, it is argued that the speed of 
achieving universal coverage through social health insurance among developed countries 
has tended to increase, as compared to Germany which took approximately 127 years for 
achieving universal coverage (Carrin and James 2005). 
In low- and middle-income countries, to extend universal health care coverage through 
compulsion (i.e. mandatory contributions into a national health insurance scheme), is not 
feasible. Limits in the extension of compulsory contributions beyond salaried employees 
in the formal sector are mentioned in many studies (Ensor 1999). Difficulties in 
registration, assessing income levels, and collecting contributions, are found among 
developing countries whose economy relies mainly on the informal sector. Due to these 
limitations, policy-makers and social scientists have turned their attention to tax-funded 
health Insurance with appropriate supply-side cost sharing (Wagstaff 2006; 
Pannarunothai 2008). 
Apart from the scope of the benefit package, strategies to make health services equitably 
accessible are vital to achieve universal coverage. An adequate infrastructure of health 
services and human resources for health are key to the implementation of universal 
coverage in developing countries (Mills 2007). In addition, once the infrastructure of 
health services is in place, another concern to be addressed is access to health services for 
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marginalized groups of the population and in some settings, women are the most 
disadvantaged whom require special attention (Gideon 2007). 
Though evidence shows considerable and desirable improvements of health equity 
through the implementation of a UC policy, UC is not a panacea with respect to equity. 
For example, an assessment of universal coverage in Canada reveals disparities in health 
still persist (Veugelers and Yip 2003). Universal coverage of family physician and 
hospital services in Nova Scotia ameliorated the socio-economic differences in mortality, 
but specialist services were underused in lower socio-economic groups, bearing the 
potential to widen the socio-economic gap in health. 
2.2.5 Targeting vs. universal approach in reducing health inequity and poverty 
A key strategic choice of governments in redressing health inequalities is to decide 
whether limited health resources should be directly targeted to the poor and the 
disadvantaged or to universally provide for all, irrespective of their income or other social 
circumstances. The debate around these two choices aims to find the best way to raise 
the well-being of the poor and the disadvantaged by transferring health resources to them 
(Hanson, Worrall et al. 2008). Though these two approaches have a similar goal, they 
have distinctly different characteristics. Under a universal approach, all members of a 
given population are eligible to receive health benefits, while under a targeted approach, 
health benefits are restricted to specific sub-groups of the population. 
In general, policy makers in developing countries are often recommended to employ a 
targeted approach for providing health benefits to the population for three reasons: 
equity, efficiency, and sustainability. On equity, policy makers often commit themselyes 
to provide or finance essential health services for the entire popUlation, while health 
resources are very scarce. As a result, they are often unable to achieve such commitment 
due to a lack of resources, weak public administration, or having social and environment 
obstacles in reaching particular population groups. By focusing limited resources on 
those who are identified as being in need, a targeted approach allo\vs the needy to benefit 
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disproportionately, consequently resulting in improvements of health equity (Savedoff 
2007). On efficiency grounds, channelling health resources directly to those in greatest 
need ensures that these limited resources are most effectively used. In addition, a 
targeted approach can improve efficiency by reducing the overall costs of interventions. 
compared with universal benefits. The efficiency goal can also be enhanced if limited 
resources are used to induce behaviour which has positive externalities (Hanson, Worrall 
et al. 2008). On sustainability, fiscal sustainability can be achieved if limited health 
resources are used for those in greatest need only. In addition, political sustainability 
may be another achievement related to continued political commitment and support for 
targeting. 
However, Gilson (1997) has argued that using a targeted approach in health care delivery. 
compatible with the egalitarian perspective, may lead to the creation of a tiered and 
segmented health system. The withdrawal of public benefits from the middle and higher 
income groups in targeted approaches may create a vicious cycle in which the better off 
withdraw their political support for the public health system, which is known as the 
'paradox of targeting' (Besley and Kanbur 1993; Gelbach and Pritchett 1997). This 
could result in differences in access to and quality of health services obtained by different 
Income groups. As the poor tend to rely on health services subsidized by the 
government, a decline of support from higher income groups could lead to a decrease in 
financial support and a decline in quality of health services available to them, whilst the 
middle- and high-income groups move towards the private sector and a much larger 
benefit package (Gilson 1997). 
Arguments about drawbacks of the targeted approach compnse three categories: 
availability of good information for the targeting approach, importance of incentive 
effects created to providers and users, and the potential costs of targeting (Hanson. 
Worrall et al. 2008). The targeted approach usually requires good information on 
population distribution and indicators of deprivation for programme design and 
evaluation. Given that targeting mechanisms can create either a positive or negatin? 
impact on health care providers and users, monitoring the impact of the targeted approach 
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on the incentives of providers and users is essential. Finally, the costs of targeting must 
be compared with that of universal coverage in order to gain a complete understanding of 
the relevant trade-offs. 
2.3 Methods and potential databases for assessing equity in health 
Typically, health equity is the absence of systematic health differences between more and 
less socially advantaged groups. To document the existence or magnitude of health 
inequalities, data required for equity analyses include: 1) a measure of health; and. 2) a 
measure of social status or advantage, called an equity stratifier, which defines strata in a 
social hierarchy. The magnitude of health inequalities across different social strata can 
be summarized in many forms using simple calculations such as rate ratios and rate 
differences, or more complex calculations of the slope index of inequality including the 
concentration and the Kakwani index2, the Gini coefficiene, and the like. Potential 
database which provide data on health equity range from censuses to small-area databases 
and administrative data from health programmes. 
2.3.1 Health measures 
Many studies related to health equity indicate that core health indicators should cover a 
range of health-related categories including health status, health care and other 
determinants, as well as the social and economic consequences of ill health (Nolen, 
Braveman et al. 2005; Gwatkin, Rutstein et al. 2007). In general, useful health status 
indicators for equity analyses include mortality, morbidity, nutritional status. functional 
status or disability, and quality of life. Health care indicators often include access to and 
utilization of public health services, health insurance coverage and quality of health 
services obtained, and allocation of financial and human resources for health. Finally, 
2 The Kakwani index is defined as twice the area between the concentration curve of health payment and 
the Lorenz curve of household income. The value of the Kakwani index ranges from -2 to 1. A negative 
Kakwani index value indicates the regressive nature of health care payments. In contrast, a positive value 
indicates the progressive nature of health care payments. 
3 The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion used for measuring inequality of income 
distribution. It is defined as the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line of income equality. 
The value of the Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1. A low Gini coefficient indic~te~ m~re equal income 
or wealth distribution, while a high Gini coefficient demonstrates more unequal dIstributIOn. 
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there is an increasing focus on social and economic consequences from acute and chronic 
ill health among different socio-economic strata, which can cause or exacerbate 
household poverty among disadvantaged groups. It should be noted that there is no 
single population-based database containing all health-related categories. Therefore, 
each country must develop its own appropriate population-based databases including a 
wide range of health measures and equity stratifiers. In addition, the technical and 
political ability to use information in implementing pro-equity health interventions or 
policies is also necessary (Nolen, Braveman et al. 2005). 
2.3.2 Equity stratifiers 
In general, social advantage varies by four general equity stratifiers: socio-economic 
status, gender, ethnicity, and geographical areas (Evans, Whitehead et al. 2001; Gwatkin, 
Rutstein et al. 2007; Tangcharoensathien, Limwattananon et al. 2007). 
Socio-economic status can be reflected in economic resources (e.g. household income or 
expenditure), education, occupation, and more recently an asset index. Economists prefer 
household expenditure to income because household income, especially in developing 
countries, tends to vary over the course of a year, and a large proportion of household 
income is shared by the informal sector and the self-employed. Given the difficulty in 
measuring household income in developing countries, education and occupation have 
occasionally been used as proxies of economic status. Though these proxies are easier to 
measure, it is recognized that neither education nor occupation is purely economic. 
Given these limitations, household assets and an asset index are an increasingly 
meaningful measure of economic resources, especially in developing countries where 
accurate household income and expenditure is difficult to collect (Morris, Carletto et a1. 
2000; Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Gwatkin, Rutstein et al. 2007). Empirical evidence 
indicates that the asset index is robust, produces internally coherent results, and provides 
a similar result to other socio-economic indicators (Filmer and Pritchett 1998; 
Falkingham and Namzie 2001). International development agencies such as the World 
Bank use this measure to assess and monitor health inequalities in many developing 
countries (Gwatkin, Rutstein et al. 2007). 
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Gender is a meaningful equity stratifier for many health measures. For example, analyses 
of differences in prevalence rates of malnutrition between boys and girls in Bangladesh 
(Braveman and Tarimo 2002) indicate discriminatory treatment, and in Russia gender 
differences in life expectancy show differentials in health risk behaviour in alcohol 
consumption (Shkolnikov, Field et al. 2001). 
Disparities in health among different ethnic and racial groups are prominent and quite 
serious in some countries (Kubzansky, Krieger et al. 2001; Mayers and Couzos 2004). 
Indicators used in characterizing ethnicity include self-identification, social perception of 
race or ethnicity, religion, language spoken at home, and status as a native-born citizen. 
Finally, people can be advantaged according to the geographical area where they live or 
work (e.g. urban versus rural, or better- and worse-off provinces or districts). Resources 
are often allocated on a geographical basis, reflecting logistic and political power issues 
(Nolen, Braveman et al. 2005). Comparing allocations of health measures across 
different provinces and districts is useful, and such comparisons are easily understood by 
policy makers and non-specialists. 
2.3.3 Health equity and socio-economic classification 
At the heart of the debate surrounding equity in health lies the issue of how to define 
poqrer or more vulnerable groups. Typically, socio-economic status comprises two broad 
dimensions: socio-economic class and status (Krieger, Williams et al. 1997). The former 
refers to social groups arising from interdependent economic, social and legal 
relationships among a group of people, whilst the latter signifies diverse components of 
economic and social well being that differentiate persons of different social classes, 
including both resource-based and prestige-based measures (Morris, Carletto et al. 2000). 
In general, data on socio-economic class and status in developed countries are accessible. 
By contrast, such data in developing countries, especially in rural areas, are scarce. This 
leads to difficulties in evaluating and monitoring equity in health care in developing 
countries. 
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Criticisms have been made over the use of monetary measures, either income or 
consumption data, to assess household living status and socio-economic status in 
developing countries. One criticism is that using a monetary indicator does not take into 
account how money is earned and how much time is spent working (Piachuad 1987). 
Moreover, Sahn and Stifel illustrate five problems with using household income or 
expenditure as a tool for classifying socio-economic status in the developing world: 
1) the quality of income and consumption expenditure data is most likely to be 
poor, particularly in middle and low-income countries; 
2) data are collected on the basis of recall, usually for 14 days or one month, and 
recall data are prone to measurement errors; 
3) prices of goods, nominal interest rates and depreciation rates for semi-durable 
or durable goods are difficult to discern when constructing consumption 
aggregates; 
4) consumer pnce indices in developing countries are often unavailable or 
unreliable, especially when inflation tends to be high or variable. In addition, 
regional and seasonal price indices in most developing countries are widely 
variable and uncommon; and, 
5) although purchasing power parity numbers are widely used for inter-country 
comparison, these numbers are rough approximations and are subject to 
considerable error (Sahn and Stifel 2001). 
Furthermore, problems of sampling bias, under-reporting of income and difficulties in 
converting household products into monetary terms are also raised. Non-monetary 
indicators of household welfare, such as an asset-based index, have been introduced and 
developed as alternative methods for classifying household socio-economic status 
(Morris, Carletto et al. 2000; Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Sahn and Stifel 2001; Oakes and 
Rossi 2003). Advantages and disadvantages of different indicators for grouping 
household socio-economic status are discussed further in Annex 1. 
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2.3.4 Assessing government subsidies for health 
It is common for poor people to shoulder the greatest burden of disease but receive a 
smaller share of health care resources than the healthy and better-off (Diderichsen 2004). 
In other words, health care resources are distributed inversely in relation to health need, 
which is known as "the inverse care law" (Hart 1971). This is prevalent both from 
country to country and within countries across socio-economic groups. 
Subsidizing health care, as discussed above, is a major tool of governments in protecting 
the poor and reducing inequity in health. Public expenditure in health care generates 
transfers which improve the well-being of beneficiaries, and enhance their longer-run 
income-earning potential. Concerns over these transfers are; 1) who benefits from the 
government subsidy; and, 2) whether poorer groups obtain a fair share of government 
subsidies. It is vital that governments monitor this for their health systems, and in recent 
years methods have been developed to assist with these concerns. 
Aaron and McGuire (1970) set out as a basic principle in assessing how individuals 
benefit from public expenditures: that a rationed, publicly-provided service should be 
evaluated at the individual's own valuation of the services. According to this principle, 
such valuation will vary from individual to individual. However, the difficulties inherent 
in estimating these valuations has led to the adoption of less demanding approaches, in 
which publicly-provided goods and services are valued at their marginal cost and 
individual preference on use. Benefit incidence analysis (BIA) is an approach combining 
the cost of providing public services with information on who is benefiting from their 
use. BIA is not based on individual valuations, and does not take into account the 
behavioural responses of individuals and households to changes in public health 
spending. However, BIA can assess who benefits from public subsidies as well as the 
degree to which the poor predominate amongst the recipients of the subsidies (Pearson 
2002). 
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There are three principal steps to a health sector BIA. The first step is to estimate the unit 
subsidy of a particular service. The second step is to identify users of the service who in 
effect gain an in-kind transfer. The last step is then to aggregate users into sub-groups 
(e.g. by socio-economic status or gender) in order to compare how the subsidy IS 
distributed across such groups (Castro-Leal, Dayton et al. 2000; Demery 2000). 
The use of mean unit subsidies for calculating benefit incidence may mask inequality in 
public spending if the spending is unevenly distributed geographically. Demery supports 
the use of regional unit subsidies because they reflect variations in the benefit households 
derive from health services in different regions (Demery 2000). A study of benefit 
incidence in South Africa revealed that using aggregated and disaggregated unit subsidies 
made a significant difference in the BIA (Castro-Leal 1996). Therefore, variations in unit 
subsidies should be taken into account and disaggregated data should be used if such data 
are available. This will reflect inequality in the distribution of benefits which accrue 
from government spending. 
2.3.5 Inter-group and inter-individual differentials 
Measures for assessing equity in health fall into two main categories: inter-group and 
inter-individual differentials. The former refers to indicators of health inequalities across 
different socio-economic groups, while the latter includes descriptors of variations of 
health inequalities between individuals (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1: Two main categories of measures for assessing health equity 
Inter-group differentials 
Two groups More than two groups 
• Rate ratio • Slope index of inequality 
• Rate difference • Concentration index 
• Low to high ratio • Index of dissimilarity 
• Shortfall 
Inter-individ ual differentials 
• Gini coefficient 
• Relative mean deviation 
• Atkinson index 
Source: (Anand, Diderichsen et al. 2001) 
Much of the existing empirical literature on health equity is concerned with differences in 
health across different socio-economic groups. The classification by groups helps 
explain how differentials in health are related to socio-economic parameters. It has been 
suggested that inter-group differentials should be extended to include not just SOCIO-
economic status, but also gender, race, and geographical location (Anand 2002). These 
latter variables have been found to be powerful in identifying inter-group inequalities. 
Examples include race in South Africa (Gilson and McIntyre 2001), gender in 
Bangladesh (Bhuiya, Chowdhury et al. 2001), and region in China (Liu, Rao et al. 2001). 
Cross classifications of socio-economic and other variables also provide a deeper 
understanding of health inequalities. 
Apart from explanation, there are other two reasons for investigating inter-group 
inequalities in health. First, it allows us to identify groups that are at high risk or suffer 
from poor health or the inability to access health services. Therefore, public health policy 
may target them directly in order to improve their health status and health differentials. 
Second, it allows us to uncover those inequalities in health that are identified as unjust or 
avoidable. Inter-group differentials will help policy makers address socio-economic 
inequalities in health rather than inter-individual inequalities in health that are either 
undifferentiated or unconditional on information about individuals (Anand 2002). 
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2.3.6 Potential databases to provide data on equity in health 
There are five types of databases that are likely to provide useful data for monitoring and 
assessing equity in health: censuses, vital registration systems, household surveys, small-
area databases, and administrative data (Nolen, Braveman et al. 2005; 
Tangcharoensathien, Limwattananon et al. 2007). 
A census generally provides information about socio-economic status, ethnicity, and 
geographical area of the entire population, which is essential as denominator data. Given 
legal and ethical issues related to the confidentiality of data on individuals, census 
records generally do not have unique identifiers which results in an inability to link data 
at the individual level. Therefore, to employ census data for monitoring equity in health, 
legal frameworks for incorporating unique identifiers and sharing disaggregated data, 
while preserving anonymity and privacy, are urgently needed (Rogot, Feinleib et al. 
1983; Rogot, Sorlie et al. 1986; laro 1995). 
Vital registration systems, particularly birth and death registration, can reveal inequities 
in child mortality or differences in life expectancy according to socio-economic status, 
geographical area, gender, or occupation. A common disadvantage of vital registration is 
the coverage because in developing countries, the poor and disadvantaged tend to have 
the lowest registration coverage (Mathers, Ma Fat et al. 2005; Nolen, Braveman et al. 
2005). Improvements are aimed at expanding registries to cover the entire population 
including causes of death, birth weight and individual or small-area identifiers, and at 
least one additional socio-economic stratifier. 
Household surveys are useful in revealing health inequities, and are generally the primary 
source of health information for most developing countries. Surveys usually include a 
number of equity stratifiers as well as more health measures than censuses. Possible 
improvements of household surveys include a more regular repetition of surveys to track 
changes over time, and a harmonization of questions across countries and years to 
support comparative analyses (Tangcharoensathien, Limwattananon et al. 2007). In 
addition, an inclusion of additional health outcomes and an increase in the sample size 
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would allow for more extensive analyses of health inequities (O'Donnell, Doorslaer et al. 
2008c). 
Small-area data can be useful in the absence of micro-data, which provide information on 
individuals and households in terms of population, birth and death rates, and socio-
economic or demographic data for a province, country, or postcode. Small~area data are 
often derived from census data, but another source is demographic surveillance sites 
(DSS) (Nolen, Braveman et al. 2005). Although not nationally representative, the 
longitudinal data are extensive, complement the survey data, and allow for a streamlining 
of a facility-based health information system. 
Administrative data from various governmental sectors, for example, health care use or 
immunization, are rarely used in equity analyses due to a lack of coverage and socio-
economic stratifiers (Tangcharoensathien, Limwattananon et al. 2007). However, if the 
stratifiers and denominator data are available, administrative data information can be 
used for programme planning and an analysis of health inequalities and benefit incidence 
of a health programme. 
Health information systems incorporating both population and facility-based data are 
essential for helping governments to demonstrate, monitor, and address health 
inequalities in their countries. Better information on health inequalities alone is not 
sufficient to resolve the problems, but supporting equity-oriented decision-making, 
continuous monitoring of health inequalities, and the country-level capacity to use this 
information for effective planning are all required for progress to be made towards health 
equity and movement towards social justice in health (Bambas 2005). 
However, it is criticized that most national health information systems, especially in 
developing countries, lack the key information needed to assess and monitor health 
inequities at national and sub-national levels (Nolen, Braveman et al. 2005). Without 
reliable and representative data for monitoring and assessing such inequalities, policy 
interventions to improve health equity of the country are unlikely to be effective. 
Therefore, there is a need for urgent improvements in health information systems for 
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monitoring health equity in developing countries. In addition, a partnership among the 
statistics constituency of the country, the health system policy researchers, and policy 
makers, will serve to further strengthen the country's capability to use health information 
systems to address health equity challenges (Tangcharoensathien, Limwattananon et al. 
2007). 
2.4 Conclusions 
Equity in health is of increasing concern to health policy makers. Different philosophies 
on equity in health care can be associated with distinctive health care systems whose 
characteristics and organization differ from one other. Empirical studies on equity in 
health care reflect the apparently pro-egalitarian bias among policy-makers in Europe, in 
contrast to a pro-libertarian bias in the US and most countries in Asia. 
Most high income countries, with the exception of the United States, have achieved 
universal coverage which guarantees universal access to health services regardless of a 
person's income or social status. In contrast, very few low- and middle-income countries 
have been able to achieve UC due to limited resources and infrastructure. This means 
there is a limitation in the experience and existing literature regarding the development of 
UC among low- and middle-income countries. Moreover, evaluations of the impact of a 
UC policy on equity in health care, both health care financing and health service 
utilization, are scarce. Some empirical studies suggest that inequity in health service 
utilization may persist even after financial barriers are removed. 
This literature review has indicated several key challenges, including health financing 
arrangements, scope of the benefit package, and resource allocation methods, in the 
implementation of equitable universal coverage in developing countries. To assess the 
impact of universal coverage on equity in health requires appropriate databases 
containing health measures and socio-economic stratifiers. In addition, the capacity of 
governments to use health information systems to address health inequalities in the 
country is also needed. 
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The research in this thesis examines the impact of the UC policy introduced in Thailand 
on equity in health service use and health care finance, as well as the distribution of 
public subsidies on health. Its aim is to increase understanding of how the specific design 
of the Thai UC policy affected equity in health in that country. It also examines how the 
interventions covered in the UC policy can impact households. The impact of health 
policies at the household level in Thailand has been rarely evaluated, while such 
assessments have been shown to be important in other countries. Understanding the 
impact of UC at the household level may guide policy-makers to improve the 
effectiveness of UC during the operation of the current policy. Finally, the introduction 
of DC is an important step of health policy development in Thailand. Therefore, it 
requires an evaluation against a theoretical backdrop in order to understand two key 
components, equity in health care use and health care finance. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE THAI HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
AND THE UNIVERSAL COVERAGE POLICY 
The aim of this chapter is to describe in detail the Thai health care system and its 
major drawbacks prior to the introduction of the DC policy in 2001. The drawbacks 
focus on key issues related to inequity in the health system, including a lack of health 
insurance coverage, inequitable access to and utilization of health services, and 
inequity in health care finance and public subsidies for health. Objectives of the DC 
policy and details about health financing arrangements and provider payment methods 
of the DC scheme, including its benefit package and an exclusion list of health 
services, along with the reimbursement for expensive medical care, are also presented. 
Finally, existing studies evaluating the DC policy and evidence of its impact on the 
Thai health care system have been reviewed, to identify the knowledge base prior to 
this study. 
3.1 Development of the Thai health care system 
The Thai health care system has evolved from one of self-reliance using local wisdom 
and traditional medicine in providing health services to one of western medicine and 
modernized health technology, beginning with the first western medical school, the 
Siriraj Hospital, which was founded in 1889 (Kachondham, Winichagoon et al. 1992; 
Wibulpolprasert 2002a). With assistance from the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
Ministry of Public Health was established in 1942 and helped fuel the development of 
western medical services and the public health system throughout the country. At 
present, the Thai health care system is characterized as a public-private mix system, 
where the public sector plays a major role in providing health services to the 
population; the private sector, both for-profit and not-for-profit, is also actively 
involved. The expansion of modernized health services in both public and private 
sectors, accompanied by considerable economic growth, has lead to a shift in the 
health care seeking behaviour of Thais from self medication and traditional healing to 
western facility-based health care. During the past two decades, several national 
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household surveys have shown that the share of self-care and self-medication in the 
health seeking behaviour of Thais has considerably decreased, while the use of health 
centres I and public hospitals has significantly increased, particularly after the 
economic crisis in 1997 ( Table 3.l). Many national health policies on health sector 
reform and development have also influenced changes in the health seeking behaviour 
of the population. 
Table 3.1: Share of different health seeking behaviour of Thais from 1991 to 2003 (%) 
Health seeking behaviour 1991 1996 2001 2003 
Not seeking health care 15.9 6.9 5.1 5.4 
Traditional medicine and 
healing 5.7 2.8 2.9 2.6 
Self-medication 38.3 37.9 22.5 19.9 
Health centres 14.8 20.8 22.4 22.2 
Public hospitals 12.9 12.9 32.7 30.7 
Private clinics I hospitals 12.4 18.7 14.4 17.9 
Others 1.3 
Total 100 100 100 I 00 
Sources: modified from the Thailand Health Profile 1999-2000 (Wibulpolprasert 2002a) and 
the Report of the 2001 and 2003 Health and Welfare Survey (NSO 2003). 
The development of the health service system in Thailand has been guided since the 
early 1960s by the National Health Development Plan which is part of the National 
Economic and Social Development Plan. The first five-year national health 
development plan came into operation in 1961 with an emphasis on the construction 
and expansion of health facilities, especially at the provincial level. The Second and 
Third Plans put greater emphasis on maximization of resource use and reducing 
income gaps among the population. The coordination between planning at national, 
regional, and provincial levels was improved, which resulted in an increase in the 
resources available for public health facilities. A policy of free medical care for the 
poor was first implemented in 1975. Another crucial achievement, especially towards 
the end of the third plan (1972-1976), was an increase in the supply side capacity and 
training of qualified medical and health personnel. This was prompted by the need to 
expand the availability of public health facilities in rural areas. 
I A health centre is a public health facility at the sub-district level where health services are provided 
by health personnel (i.e. nurses, midwives, and sanitarians). Typically, a health centre is responsible 
for approximately 3,000 - 5,000 population. 
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The Fourth and the Fifth Plans aimed to reduce inequalities in access to public health 
services for the entire population. The goal of achieving "Health for All by the Year 
2000" through primary care strategies was country-wide and inaugurated in 1979, 
beginning with training village health volunteers (VHV) and village health 
communicators. Furthermore, a goal to establish community hospitals in all districts 
in Thailand was set up and corresponded with a considerable increase in the 
production of medical and nursing personnel. At the end of the Fifth Plan (1982-
1986), approximately 850/0 of all districts in Thailand had at least one community 
hospital and around 980/0 of all sub-districts were covered by at least one health centre 
(Kachondham, Winichagoon et al. 1992). 
The Sixth (1987-1991) and Seventh Plans (1992-1996) aimed to expand government 
health facilities to cover all targeted areas, especially in remote areas, with an 
emphasis on public participation in health development. A policy called the "Decade 
of Health Centre Development" was implemented, aiming to achieve the goals of 
"Health for All" through universal access to qualified primary medical care and public 
health services provided at health centres. Two crucial milestones in the expansion of 
health insurance coverage towards specific targeted population groups were: 1) 
enactment of the Social Security Act in 1990 covering private employees in the 
formal sector; and, 2) expansion of the Low Income Card Scheme to cover the elderly 
aged over 60 years and children aged less than 12 years. 
The Eighth Plan (1997-2001) focused on the development of human resources for 
health and the expansion of universal health insurance coverage to cover the whole 
population. The economic crisis occurred during the early stage of this plan and 
drastically restricted capital investment in the Thai health care system. However, with 
strong political support from the new government, universal coverage was 
implemented in 2001 through a tax-funded health insurance scheme, the UC scheme. 
Within the Thai health care system, health services provided by public and private 
facilities in Thailand are categorized into five levels which include self-care. primary 
health care (PH C), primary medical care (PMC), secondary medical care (SMC). and 
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tertiary medical care (TMC). Details of each health care level and type of health 
facility are summarized below. 
• Self care refers to health care which enhances people's capacity to provide self-
care and make their own decisions about better health. 
• Primary health care includes health services that are organized by the community, 
aimed at providing basic health care related to health promotion, disease 
prevention, simple curative care, and rehabilitation at the village level. Medical 
and health technologies relevant to a community's needs and culture are provided 
by village health volunteers (VHV) and staff from private not-for-profit or non-
governmental organizations (NGO). 
• Primary medical care entails health services provided by health personnel and 
general practitioners at the district and sub-district levels. In general, health 
centres and community hospitals are public health facilities; private clinics and 
drug stores are private facilities, all providing primary medical care at this level. 
Since the UC policy was implemented in 2001, the primary care units (PCU) 
located in health centres and community hospitals have also been identified as 
public health facilities providing primary medical care. 
• Secondary medical care involves health services provided by government-owned 
community hospitals and private clinics/hospitals at the district and provincial 
levels. Health service provision at this level typically includes higher medical 
knowledge and health technologies provided by medical doctors and other health 
personnel such as dentists, pharmacists, nurses, and the like. 
• Tertiary medical care refers to health services provided by specialized medical 
doctors and other health professionals at tertiary care facilities such as provincial 
and regional hospitals, general and other specialized hospitals, university 
hospitals, and some large private hospitals. Most public tertiary care facilities are 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), and some belong 
to other public agencies such as the Ministry of Defence, public universities, or 
state enterprises. These tertiary care hospitals are primarily located in large cities 
and the Bangkok Metropolis. 
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Thailand's public health care delivery system comprises nine university hospitals, 95 
regional or provincial hospitals, 725 community hospitals, 9,765 health centres, and 
69,331 community primary health care centres. Despite this impressive development 
of health infra-structure, it is evident that a mal-distribution of health facilities and 
human resources for health exists, especially with regard to availability of medical 
doctors, dentists and pharmacists, among different regions (Wibulpolprasert 2005). 
Bangkok and affluent provinces have considerably higher bed-population and doctor-
population ratios than provinces in more rural and remote areas. 
Referral of patients from basic to more sophisticated levels of health care, and from 
rural areas to urban areas, has been well developed for many years. The objectives of 
the referral system are to increase the efficiency of the health care system with regard 
to health resource use, and to ensure people's access to sophisticated health care at the 
tertiary medical care level. In general, patients must seek care from health centres or 
primary care units first, and are then referred to community hospitals if they have a 
severe illness or more complicated case. The next step within the referral system is to 
transfer patients to a provincial or regional hospital in that province. University or 
specialized hospitals in large cities and the Bangkok Metropolis are the highest level 
health facilities in the referral system (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1: Level of health care and type of health facility in the Thai health care system 
Type of health facility 
Provincial, 









Primary medical care 
Referral system 
Primary health care 
Source: modified from (Jongudoumsuk 2002b) 
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Prior to 2001, patients admitted to a government health facility could be referred to a 
higher level public health facility if they were in need. Beneficiaries covered by a 
public or private health insurance scheme did not have to pay user fees for health 
services if they were included in the benefit package of a health insurance scheme. 
However, beneficiaries had to bear costs of health care not included in their benefit 
packages, and those who were uninsured faced direct payments for health service user 
fees. This led to inequitable access to health care due to financial barriers, and 
sometimes high health care costs could consequently drive households into poverty 
(The Foundation for Consumers of Thailand 1999; Limwattanonon, 
Tangcharoensathien et al. 2005; Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007). 
3.2 Development of health insurance and social welfare prior to achieving UC 
Since the early 1970s, succeSSIve governments of Thailand have employed a 
piecemeal approach to increase health insurance coverage towards various targeted 
groups of the population. This aimed to gradually achieve a more equitable health 
care system, improving financial risk protection, and reducing catastrophic payments 
for health care costs (Towse, Mills et al. 2004; Pachanee and Wibulpolprasert 2006). 
The "Worker's Compensation Fund" and "Free Medical Care for the Poor" were the 
first two public health insurance and social welfare schemes implemented during the 
mid-1970s, followed by the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS), the 
Low Income Card (LIC), the Voluntary Health Card (VHC), the Social Security 
Scheme (SSS), and finally the UC scheme in 2001. The chronological events of the 
development of the health insurance system in Thailand are summarized in Table 3.2. 
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T bl 32 Ch a e . I rono oglca events 0 f the development of the Thai health insurance system 
Year Events Health insurance 
schemes 
SW FB CI VI 
1954 First Social Security Act (not implemented) X 
1974 Workmen's Compensation Fund X 
1975 Free Medical Care for the Poor X 
1978 First private health insurance company X 
1980 Royal Decree for CSMBS X 
1981 First issue of Low Income Card (LIC scheme) X 
1983 Maternal and Child Health Fund (Phase 1) X 
1984 Voluntary Health Card Project (Phase 2) X 
1990 Social Security Act covers enterprises with 20 or more 
employees X 
1991 Voluntary Health Card Project - insurance based pilot 
(Phase 3) X 
1992 Free medical care for the elderly X 
1993 Traffic Accident Victim Protection Insurance X 
1994 Social Security Act, extended to cover enterprises with 10 
or more employees X 
1994 Health Card Scheme (Phase 4), equal matching fund 
provided by the government X 
1994 Voluntary Health Card extended to cover community 
leaders and health volunteers, fully subsidized by the X 
government 
1994 Medical Welfare Scheme, expanded free medical care to 
cover other indigent groups, the elderly and children up to X 
12 years 
1998 New financial regulations for the LIC scheme X 
1998 CSMBS introduced co-payments by CSMBS beneficiaries 
(after econom ic crisis) X 
2000 Social Security Scheme expanded to cover old age pension X 
and child benefits 
2001 Implementation of universal health care coverage X 
2002 Social Security Act, extended to cover enterprises with X 
more than one employee 
Source: Adapted from (Tangcharoensathien, Srithamrongsawat et al. 2002) 
Note: SW = Social welfare, FB = Fringe benefit, CI = Compulsory health insurance, VI = 
Voluntary health insurance 
The policy of protecting the poor was first initiated by the Thai government through 
its 'Free Medical Care for the Poor' policy in 1975. This aimed to provide equitable 
access to health services for the poor and those in low-income households. In 1981, 
the Low Income Card (LIC) scheme was launched and aimed to provide tax-financed 
public health insurance for those who earned below the national poverty line, as well 
as those residing in poor households. A 'free card', which enabled the poor to obtain 
government health services free of charge, was issued through means testing, whereby 
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the community was involved in identifying eligible persons. Despite community 
involvement, local prejudice and nepotism was difficult to avoid (Kongsawat, 
Rodsawaeng et al. 2000). In 1994, the LIC scheme expanded its coverage to include 
more disadvantaged groups, namely the elderly aged over 60 years, children aged less 
than 12 years, and the disabled, with a low government subsidy relative to other 
public health insurance schemes. Evidence indicates that inadequate financial 
resources provided by the government led to poorer quality of health services 
obtained by LIC beneficiaries (Srithamrongsawat 1998; Wibulpolprasert 2002b). 
Moreover, public hospitals in Thailand collected user charges from those who were 
not free-card holders and from LIC members utilizing health services not included in 
the LIC benefit package, as well as payments for CSMBS beneficiaries, which were 
used in part to cross-subsidize the LIC scheme (Pannarunothai 2002; Towse, Mills et 
al. 2004). 
The SSS is a tripartite contributory scheme in which employers, employees, and the 
government, all pay equal contributions to the Social Security Fund. The amount of 
contributions depends on the employee's pay, health benefits, and non-health benefits 
received (e.g. child birth, child assistance, pension, and unemployment benefits). The 
Social Security Office (SSO) is responsible for purchasing health services from public 
and private health care providers by using a capitation contracting model. 
After using the piecemeal approach of targeted health insurance schemes for three 
decades, the health insurance system in Thailand comprised a number of different 
health insurance schemes with different scheme characteristics including: targeted 
population, benefit package, provider payment method, and the amount of 
government subsidy per capita (Table 3.3). This resulted in criticism about the 
ineffectiveness and disadvantages within the Thai health insurance system. 
Fragmentation and duplication in the Thai health insurance system, and a failure to 
expand health insurance to cover the poor and the disadvantaged, led to an ongoing 
effort to introduce a universal coverage policy to the entire population. With strong 
political support from the new government, and technical support from health 
reformists, policy analysts, and movements from many civic groups in Thailand, the 
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government succeeded in implementing a universal coverage policy in 2001 
(Tangcharoensathien, Srithamrongsawat et al. 2002; Tangcharoensathien and 
Jongudoumsuk 2004). 
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Table 3.3: Characteristics of different social welfare and health insurance schemes in 1999 
Characteristics The Low Income CSMBS SSS Workmen's Voluntary Health Private health Uninsured 
or Medical Compensation Card insurance 
Welfare scheme Fund 
Scheme nature Social welfare Fringe benefit Compulsory Compulsory Voluntary Voluntary None 
Targeted population The poor, elderly, Government Private Private Non-poor Better-off Marginal poor in 
children aged less employees employees in the employees in the households, households rural & urban areas, 
than 12 years formal sector formal sector ineligible for LIC self employed, 
employees in the 
informal sector 
Population coverage in 
1999, (in millions) 19.8 S.S 4.4 (same as SSS) 11.S 0.8 18.6 
% coverage 33% 9% 7% (same as SSS) 19% 1% 31% 
Sources of health care General tax General tax Payroll tax Payro II tax from Matching fund, Household Household out-of-
finance tripartite employers, general tax 1,000 health pocket payments 
contributions ranging from Baht and expenditure or 
(employer, 0.2-2% of wage household SOO employers 
employee, and with experience Baht 
the government) rating 
Government health subsidy 363 + additional 2,106 S19 Administrati ve 2S0 Through Through public 
per capita in 1999 (in Baht) subsidy (only government costs of income tax hospital subsidized 
contribution, Workmen's exemption for user charges 
does not include Compensation private 
employer or Fund office Insurance 
employee 
contributions) 
Provider payment methods Global budget Fee-for-service Capitation Fee-for-service Proportional Fee-for- F ee-for-service 
reimbursement service with 
among primary, ceiling 
secondary, and 
tertiary care 
Majority of health care Public providers Public Private providers Private providers Public providers in Private Both public and 
providers in MOPH providers MOPH ~oviders pri vate providers 
Benefit package Comprehensive Comprehensive Non-work related Work-related Comprehensive Depending on -
'--
2acka~e packa-.&e injuries & illness injuries & illness package premiums 
Source: (Tangcharoensathien, Srithamrongsawat et al. 2002) 
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3.3 Total health expenditure and health financing arrangements prior to UC 
Prior to the introduction of universal coverage in 2001, the Thai health care system was 
financed by a mixture of health financing sources, namely general taxes, social insurance 
contributions, private insurance premiums, and direct out-of-pocket payments. The share 
of these different health financing sources changed from time to time according to the 
country's economic status and the government's health policies. 
Between 1980 and 2000, total health expenditure for Thailand increased significantly at a 
rate higher than the GDP growth rate. Total health expenditure in actual values grew 
from 25.315 billion Baht or 3.8 % of the GDP in 1980 to 298.459 billion Baht or 6.1 % of 
the GDP in 2000 (Wibulpolprasert 2002a). Health expenditure per capita in nominal 
term rose from 545 Baht in 1980 to 4,832 Baht in 2000, a nearly nine-fold increase. 
During 1980-2000, total health expenditure in 1988 prices increased by approximately 
40/0 per annum, while the GDP growth rate averaged just 3.4% per annum (Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4: Total health expenditure and GDP for Thailand during 1980-2000 in actual values and 
1988 . prtces 
GDP Total health expenditure 
Value in Percent Actual Value in Percent Actual increase THE as 1988 1988 prices Increase value (%) in value (%) in %of Year (million prtces (million (million (million 1988 1988 GDP Baht) Baht) prices Baht) Baht) prices 
198O 662,482 913,733 -- 25,315 34,916 -- 3.8 
1982 841,569 1,019,501 11.6 34,873 42,246 17.4 4.1 
1984 988,070 1,138,353 11.7 52,241 60,187 29.8 5.3 
1986 1,133,397 1,257,177 10.4 66,060 73,275 17.9 5.8 
1988 1,559,804 1,559,804 24.1 89,968 89,968 18.6 5.8 
199O 2,183,545 1,945,372 24.7 125,302 111,635 19.4 5.7 
1992 2,830,914 2,282,572 17.3 157,965 127,368 12.4 5.6 
1994 3,630,805 2,695,054 18.1 206,489 154,867 17.8 5.7 
1996 4,598,288 3,095,041 14.8 265,486 177,781 12.9 5.8 
1998 4,567,904 2,680,695 - 13.4 280,530 164,630 - 8.0 6.1 
2000 4,904,725 2,825,302 5.4 298,459 171,923 4.2 6.1 
Average per annum 3.4 4.0 
Sources: Modified from Thailand Health Profile 1999-2000 (Wlbulpolprasert 2002a) 
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Health care financing sources in Thailand are grouped into two main categories: public 
and private health financing sources. The former comprises the following four types of 
financing sources: 1) central government health budgets for the Ministry of Public Health 
(MOPH) and other Ministries providing public health services; 2) government budgets 
for the CSMBS; 3) budgets for contracting health service provision of the SSS; and, 4) 
local government health budgets allocated for health-related activities. The latter 
comprises household out-of-pocket payments, private health insurance, traffic insurance 
premiums, and employee benefits. A recent study on the national health accounts (NHA) 
of Thailand indicates that the share of public financing sources has been increasing since 
1994, and has constituted the majority of total health expenditure since the economic 
crisis in 1997 (Figure 3.2). An increase in government spending on health for the poor 
through the LIC and VHC schemes after the economic crisis, along with a rise in public 
spending on the CSMBS are recognized as the main factor which led to increases in the 
share of public health care finance (Tisayatikom, Patcharanarumol et al. 2007). 
Figure 3.2: Shares of public and private health care finance of the Thai health care system during 
1994-2001 and total values in real tenns (1988 prices) 
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Sources: National Health Accounts in Thailand (International Health Policy Program 2007a). 
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The share of household out-of-pocket payments (OOP) for health, which has been an 
important health financing source of the Thai health care system, has consistently 
decreased since 1994 (Figure 3.3). Prior to DC, household OOP significantly dropped in 
1997 due to the economic crisis (Tisayatikom, Patcharanarumol et al. 2007). 
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Evidence from a series of household socio-economic surveys (SES) shows the fluctuation 
of household health expenditure according to the country's economy and national health 
policies. The 1988 to 2001 SES indicate that during the economic boom period, monthly 
household health expenditure reached the highest amount of 343 Baht per month in 1996, 
then decreased considerably after the economic crisis in 1997, and slightly dropped until 
the implementation of the DC policy in 2001. The monthly household health expenditure 
for health facilities significantly declined after the economic crisis, while the amount of 
household expenditure for self-medication slightly increased (Table 3.5). 
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Table 3.5: Monthly household health expenditure during 1988-2002 (Baht per month, nominal 
. ) prtces 
Health expenditure 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Health expenditure 143 185 226 262 343 287 273 263 264 per month 
Self medication 31 35 39 39 41 48 42 49 46 
Health facilities 112 150 187 223 302 239 231 214 218 
• Public facility 52 62 76 85 148 107 94 91 98 
• Private facility 51 75 96 117 134 115 122 108 110 
• Other 9 13 15 21 20 17 15 15 10 
Source: ThaIland Health Profile 1999-2000 (Wlbulpolprasert 2002a) and National Health 
Accounts in Thailand 1994-2005 (International Health Policy Program 2007a) 
The budget of the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), which took the largest share of the 
government health budget, rose significantly for nearly a decade prior to the economic 
crisis in 1997. Since 1991, the MOPH budget comprised over five percent of the annual 
government budget, reaching its highest level of 7.7% in 1998 because government 
budgets for other public sectors were cut during the economic crisis. However, the 
government allocated more public resources to other sectors after economic recovery in 
1999. This led to a decrease in the share of the MOPH budget relative to the overall 
national government budget during 1999-2001 (Figure 3.4). 
Figure 3.4: The MOPH budget as a percentage of the total government budget during 1984-2001 
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A recent study on health care finance in Thailand (International Health Policy Program 
2007b) shows a continuous increase in the total expenditure for the CSMBS from 1988 to 
2001, except for a couple of years after the economic crisis in 1997 (Figure 3.5). Apart 
from the increase in government health budget for the LIC and the VHC schemes, the 
consistent increase of the CSMBS expenditure is suggested to be another cause of the 
increasing share of the public health financing source (Tisayatikom, Patcharanarurnol et 
al. 2007). The provider payment method of the CSMBS, which is a fee-for-service 
reimbursement, is suggested to be a major cause of the considerable increase in CSMBS 
expenditure (Sriratanaban 2002; Tangcharoensathien, Srithamrongsawat et al. 2002). 
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In contrast, the close-ended provider payment method of the SSS, a capitation contracting 
model is credited with the success of the scheme in controlling health care costs , 
(Tangcharoensathien, Laixuthai et al. 1999; Srithamrongsawat 2007). Per capita public 
subsidy of the SSS increased slowly from 1998 to 2001 (Figure 3.6). A significant 
increase in the per capita expenditure was observed in 2000 due to an increase in the 
capitation rate, and an increase in payments for expensive health services (e.g. RRT for 
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ESRD patients and ARV for HIV/AIDS patients), and an additional payment for health 
care providers with high utilization rate. 
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3.4 Major drawbacks of the Thai health care system prior to UC 
As partly described in section 3.2, major drawbacks of the Thai health care system prior 
to UC can be categorized into four groups: 1) lack of health insurance coverage and a 
failure in targeting the poor; 2) inequitable access to and utilization of health services; 3) 
inequitable health care finance and household spending on health; and 4) high percentage 
of households facing catastrophic health expenditure. These drawbacks and the 
differences in payment methods for health care providers among different health 
insurance schemes were described as the major causes of inequity in health and health 
care use prior to the UC policy implementation (Nitayarumphong and Pannarunothai 
1998; Tangcharoensathien, Srithamrongsawat et al. 2002; Wibulpolprasert 2002a). 
3.4.1 Lack of health insurance coverage and failure to target the poor 
Prior to UC, the Thai health care system failed to achieve universal coverage by using a 
piecemeal approach to expand targeted public health insurance schemes, namely the Low 
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Income Card, the Voluntary Health Card, the CSMBS, and the SSS. Evidence from the 
MOPH revealed that in 2000 approximately 200/0 of the population or around 12 million 
Thais were still uninsured (Figure 3.7). Poor administrative capacity and inefficiency of 
the Thai government in issuing the Low Income Card, and difficulties in identifying the 
poor, were recognized as the main factors contributing to the high percentage of the 
uninsured (Wibulpolprasert 2002b). As a result, the Thai health insurance system prior to 
UC was characterized by fragmentation, duplication, and lack of health insurance 
coverage (Tangcharoensathien, Srithamrongsawat et al. 2002). 
Fi ure 3.7: Health insurance coverage for Thais during 1991-2000 
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2000 
In the LIC scheme, many studies revealed a high percentage of non-poor households 
obtaining the Low Income Card which aimed to assist only the poor and the 
disadvantaged in access to free government health services (Pannarunothai, Patmasiriwat 
et al. 2002). A household survey performed by Kongsawat et al. in 2000 showed that 
among 2,093 poor households, only 170/0 of them were covered by the Low Income Card 
(Kongsawat, Rodsawaeng et al. 2000). Furthermore, among 1,003 Low Income card 
holders, only 35% of them appeared to be genuinely poor, while 65% were non-poor 
(Table 3.6). 
91 
T bl 36Th d' t 'b t' a e .. e IS n u IOn 0 fth L I e ow ncome car dfi h or poor ouseholds in 2000 
Poor households Non-poor households Total Low Income card No. of % No. of % No. of % 
households households households 
Issued 353 17 650 12 1,003 13 Non-issued 1,740 83 4,942 88 6,682 8-
Total 2,093 100 5,592 100 7,685 100 
Source: (Kongsawat, Rodsawaeng et al. 2000) 
3.4.2 Inequitable access to and utilization of health services 
An analysis of the 2001 HWS shows a significant difference in health service use among 
beneficiaries of different health insurance schemes in 2001 (Table 3.7). In ambulatory 
service use, those who were the rest of the population and CSMBS beneficiaries had a 
higher rate of ambulatory visits than the SSS and private insurance beneficiaries because 
of a higher share of children and the elderly and different provider payment methods 
(Pannarunothai 2002). In hospitalization, the CSMBS and private health insurance 
beneficiaries had a significantly higher admission rate than the SSS beneficiaries and the 
rest of the population. It is thought that a provider payment method of fee-for-service 
reimbursement employed by the CSMBS and private insurance schemes is the key factor 
of such a high hospitalization rate (Srirattanaban 2002). In addition, many studies 
indicate that factors contributing to inequitable access to and utilization of health services 
prior to UC were likely to be different provider payment methods, beneficiary 
characteristics, and the amount of public subsidies for each health insurance scheme 
(Tangcharoensathien, Srithamrongsawat et al. 2002). 
T b a Ie 3.7: Ambu atory service use an d h . I' osplta IzatlOn 0 fTh . b h Ith' h . 2001 als 'yea Insurance sc erne In 
Private health Rest of the 
CSMBS SSS insurance population Total 
Number of population 5,341,264 4,537,172 802,933 52,189,646 62,871,015 
Ambulatory visits (no. of 
visits during last two weeks) 774,379 425,524 92,322 8,232,092 9.524,317 
Ambulatory visit rate (no. of 
visits per capita per year) 3.77 2.44 2.99 4.10 3.94 
Hospitalization (admissions 
during last year) 557,665 293,449 122,481 3,988,562 4,962,157 
Hospitalization rate 
ladmission per capita per year) 0.104 0.065 0.153 0.076 0.079 
Source: The 2001 Health and Welfare Survey (NSO 2001) 
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In Thailand, inequitable access to and utilization of health care among individuals of 
different socio-economic status were found in many studies. For example, an analysis of 
a multi-centre study on inequality in health care use and household spending on health 
revealed that richer groups of Thais had a higher probability to obtain health care when 
sick, and were more likely to be seen by a medical doctor as well as receive medicines 
when they were ill, than the poorer groups (Makinen, Waters et al. 2000). A survey by 
ABAC-KSC International Poll in 2000 found that approximately 44% of the sample 
population of Thais experienced high and unaffordable health care costs. Around 62.50/0 
of them were in debt and 17% had asked for an exemption for the poor and the 
disadvantaged (NSO 2002). In addition, Siamwala et. al. found that households with low 
education and income levels were likely to be unable to pay for health care costs when 
their family members became ill (Siamwala 2002). In some cases, people were denied 
medical treatment because they were uninsured, and could not afford medical care costs. 
A study in Songkla Province revealed that factors related to households facing 
catastrophic health expenditure were low educational level and low income (Sujariyakul 
and Chongsuwiwatwong 1999). 
However, studies on equity in access to and utilization of health services among different 
socio-economic groups of Thais are quite limited because there have been very few 
socio-economic parameters in the national household survey of health care use, the 
Health and Welfare Survey (HWS), or in other studies. 
3.4.3 Inequity in household spending and public subsidies on health 
Prior to UC, household spending on health in Thailand was inequitable, even given the 
increase in government spending on health and the rising share of public sources of 
health care finance. Disaggregated data of household spending on health among different 
income deciles during 1992-2000 show that the poorest decile of Thai households spent, 
on average, a higher percentage of their household income than the richest decile (Figure 
3.8). However, inequity in household spending on health has tended to improve because 
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the proportion of household spending on health to income of the first decile (the poorest) 
decreased from 8.17 % in 1992 to 4.58 % in 2000, whilst that of the richest decile has 
remained at 1.27% in the same period. The expansion of the LIC, the VHC, and the SSS, 
were key factors for improving inequity in household spending on health during 1992-
2000. It is noteworthy that inequity in household spending on health in Thailand differs 
from other low and low-middle income countries in this region as shown in a recent large 
scale study of health care finance in Asia (O'Donnell, Van Doorslaer et al. 2005). 
Figure 3.8: Household spending on health as a percentage of household income during 1992-2000 
Health Expenditure as Percent of Household Income 
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The gap of public subsidies on health between the SSS beneficiaries and the rest of the 
population who were transferred to the UC scheme decreased after the UC policy was 
introduced. The inequitable public subsidies among different insurance schemes prior to 
UC shown in Table 3.3 reduced because in the fiscal year 2002, the amount of public 
subsidy for the UC scheme was 1,202.4 Baht per capita, and the subsidy for SSS was 
1,2 17 Baht (Tangcharoensathien, Pitayarangsarit et al. 2002). 
3.4.4 Catastrophic health expenditure of Thai households prior to UC 
Data from the household Socio-economic Survey (SES) during 1996-2000 show that 
share of Thai households spending more than 25% of their non-food expenditure on 
health care decreased from 4.9 % in 1996 to 4.4% and 3.8 % in 1998 and 2000, 
respectively (Table 3.8). This indicates a decrease in the proportion of households 
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exceeding a commonly employed threshold of catastrophic health expenditure (Xu, 
Evans et al. 2003) prior to the UC policy implementation in 2001. In addition, it supports 
the previous findings of improvement in inequitable household spending on health during 
1992-2000. 
Table 3.8: Share of household non-food spending on health in Thailand during 1996-2000 
% of non food expenditure on health 1996 1998 2000 
o to 0.5% 31.9 33.2 34.5 
0.5 to 10%) 51.3 51.5 50.8 
10 to 25%) 11.9 10.9 1l.0 
25 to 50% 3.5 3.6 3.1 




Source: Socio-economic Survey of Thai Households, 1996 - 2000 





In 2001, the government of Thailand successfully implemented its universal coverage 
policy by introducing a tax-funded health insurance scheme, called the "UC scheme", to 
the entire population. This scheme provides public health insurance to approximately 47 
million people who are not beneficiaries of the CSMBS and SSS. Objectives of the UC 
scheme are: 
a) Universal coverage which means every Thai is entitled to equal access to quality 
care according to their needs, regardless of their socio-economic status; 
b) Single standard which refers to the same benefit package and quality of health care 
provided for all Thais; and, 
c) Sustainable system which states that the health care system under UC should be 
sustainable in terms of policy, financial, and institutional sustainability. An efficient 
system, both in terms of allocative and technical efficiency, as well as adequacy and 
stability of the budget are needed for financial sustainability. Legislation is used to 
ensure the policy sustainability. 
95 
The main characteristics of the Thai health care system under UC are: 
1) promoting the use of primary care as a gatekeeper; 
2) using a close ended provider payment method; 
3) ensuring quality of care by using accreditation; 
4) using a standard benefit package which includes curative health services, health 
promotion interventions, and disease prevention; 
5) attempting to harmonize with existing health insurance funds' and , , 
6) decentralization of fund management to the provincial level. 
3.5.1 Budget estimation for the UC scheme 
In April 2001, the MOPH proposed the budget requirement for the UC scheme. This 
proposal employed the morbidity rates and health service use of the population from the 
1996 HWS, and unit costs of health care service provision of different levels of health 
facilities, for the estimation. The MOPH also estimated the budget for high cost care and 
accident/emergency treatment by using evidence from the Social Security Scheme in 
order to add on to the budget per capita. The budget estimated by the MOPH for the UC 
scheme in 2001 was on average 1,202.40 Baht per capita (Box 3.1). The government 
accepted this figure as a starting estimate for implementation of the UC scheme in 2001. 
Box 3.1: Details of budget per capita (1,202.40 Baht) for the UC scheme in 2001 
Budget for curative care Budget for non-curative care 
• Ambulatory care 574 Baht • Disease prevention 
In-patient care 303 Baht and health promotion 175 Baht • 
High cost care 32 Baht • Capital investment 93.4 Baht • Administrative care = 10% of total budget Accident & emergency 25 Baht • • Contingency Fund 10% of total budget • = 
The public subsidy for UC beneficiaries increased from 1,202.4 Baht per capita in 2002 
to 1,899.7 Baht per capita in 2007 (Figure 3.9), due to an increase in health service use, 
costs of health services, and the expansion of the benefit package which was expanded to 
cover more expensive health services such as ARV for HIV / AIDS patients, arti ficial 
organs and prostheses, neonatal screening for iodine deficiency, and the like. 
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Types and scope of health services included in the UC benefit package are based on 
health services included in the SSS, VHC, and LIC benefit packages. The UC benefit 
package is comprehensive including primary, secondary, tertiary, and emergency health 
care, health promotion interventions, preventive health services, and a wide range of 
expensive health services. Diagnostic investigation, medicine and medical supplies 
whose quality is not below the quality of the National Drug List, hospitalization including 
general bed and nutrition, referral system in necessary cases, and health education and 
immunization according to the National Health Program, are also included in the UC 
benefit package. Details of the UC benefit package are shown in Annex 2. 
The exclusion list of the UC benefit package comprises: 
1. groups of medical services that are beyond the basic needs of the population such 
as infertility treatment, artificial fertilization, trans gender operation, cosmetic 
surgery without any medical indications, and excessive examination, diagnosis or 
treatment without any medical indication; 
2. groups of medical services for which a regular or specific budget from MOPH or 
other public organizations has been allocated such as mental illness requiring 
more than 15 days of hospitalization (as inpatient), drug-dependence treatment 
97 
and rehabilitation as required by law relating to narcotics, and road-traffic 
accident victims who are entitled to care under the traffic accident insurance law: 
and, 
3. other groups of medical services such as the same illness requiring more than 180 
days of hospitalization, except for the case that requires continuous care due to 
complications or medical indications, experimental medical treatment, peritoneal 
dialysis for the end-stage renal failure, haemodialysis with artificial kidney 
machine, and organ transplantation. 
To prevent health facilities from providing under-treatment for expensive health care, the 
National Health Security Office (NHSO) set up a centrally-managed fund, the "High Cost 
Reimbursement Fund", in order to provide appropriate compensation to tertiary health 
care providers who deliver specific types of expensive medical care included in the UC 
benefit package. The list of expensive health services and the upper limits of 
reimbursement are shown in Table 3.9. 
Table 3.9: Reimbursement rate for high cost care under the UC scheme in FY 2003 
List of medical treatments for high cost care Upper limit of reimbursement 
I. Treatments for acute renal failure 
• Haemodialysis 3,000 Baht per visit 
• Peritoneal dialysis 500 Baht per day 
2. Chemotherapy and/or radiotherapy for cancer 30,000 Baht per patient per annum 
patients 
3. Open heart surgery 100,000 Baht per patient 
Cost of prosthesis and instruments have 
4. Implantation of Prosthesis and Instrumentation been announced by Ministry of Public 
Health (MOPH) and NHSO 
5. Operations for disease related to brain 
• Open skull surgery excluding Burr hole 15,000 Baht per patient 
operation 
• Open skull surgery with complications such 30,000 Baht per patient 
as intra-cerebral infection, pneumonia, acute 
renal failure, etc. 
• Brain surgery with coma longer than 15 days 
30,000 Baht per patient 
• Operations for cerebro-vascular disease which 
30,000 Baht per patient 
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List of medical treatments for high cost care Upper limit of reimbursement 
require special instruments 
6. Coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery 100,000 Baht per patient 
7. Percutaneous Balloon Valvuloplasty 20,000 Baht per patient 
8. Treatments for cryptococcal meningitis 15,000 Baht per patient 
9. Treatments for coronary artery dilatation by a 30,000 Baht per visit, not more than 
balloon or by a rotator twice per patient 
10. Operation for epileptic patients 
• Investigation prior to operation for intractable 120,000 Baht per patient 
temporal lobe epilepsy 
• Open skull surgery 30,000 Baht 
Source. (NHSO 2003) 
Open heart surgery, which was formerly included in the LIC and VHC benefit packages, 
has also been included in the UC benefit package since the start of the UC policy in 2001. 
Despite the coverage by the LIC and VHC, government health facilities favoured 
providing such expensive health services to the rich and CSMBS beneficiaries due to 
inadequate reimbursement from the LIC and VHC schemes. The reimbursement rate for 
open heart surgery under the High Cost Reimbursement Fund, which is up to 100,000 
Baht per case, was intended to appropriately compensate tertiary health care providers for 
the expenses of such operations. 
3.5.3 Allocation of government health budgets to health care providers 
The UC scheme employs close-ended provider payment methods to achieve the 
objectives of the UC policy in improving equity and efficiency of the Thai health care 
system, and strengthening primary care of the country. The payment methods are the 
capitation contracting model for ambulatory care, and diagnostic related group (DRO) 
within a global budget for hospitalization. A contractor unit of primary care (CUP), 
which comprises all health centres in a district and a primary care unit set up in the 
community hospital, is contracted as the main provider to deliver health care for its 
registered population. At the beginning, the UC scheme employed a single rate of 
capitation to allocate government subsidies to health care providers throughout the 
country. However, the inequitable distribution of human resources and health infra-
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structure between rich and poor areas resulted in budget deficits of government health 
facilities in affluent provinces which often have higher staff-population and bed-
population ratio than the poorer provinces. As a result, from 2002, provinces were 
allowed to select an exclusive capitation payment where a CUP was paid using the 
capitation contracting model just for ambulatory care, and a DRG weighted global budget 
for in-patient care. In addition, since 2004, the salary of government staff at health 
facilities has been deducted from the overall government subsidies for the UC scheme 
before allocating it to health care providers. 
Apart from using the close-ended payment method, the government adopted a demand 
side intervention of cost sharing to prevent moral hazard of the UC scheme. A nominal 
co-payment of 30 Baht (approximately £0.43 or US$0.88) per health visit or hospital 
admission was introduced to UC beneficiaries who were not the elderly, poor, disabled, 
or children aged less than 12 years. However, it was argued that the amount of co-
payment was too small to prevent moral hazard, compared to the supply side 
interventions. Therefore, the government decided to terminate the policy on co-payment 
in November 2006 (Treerutkuarkul 2006). 
3.5.4 Health care providers of the UC scheme 
The majority of health care providers of the UC scheme have been public health facilities 
since the UC policy was introduced in 2001. Although the scheme allowed private 
providers to take part in health service provision in 2002, the low government subsidy 
was not attractive for private health care providers. In addition, the participation of 
private providers and the number of beneficiaries allocated to health care providers in 
each province had to be approved by the Provincial Chief Medical Officer (PCMO). A 
bias of the PCMO towards government health facilities was observed and experienced 
(Jongudomsuk 2002a). 
Health care financing arrangements of the Thai health care system after UC are presented 
in Figure 3.10. 
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Figure 3.10: Health care financing arrangements of the Thai health care system after 
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3.6 Policy context supporting the UC policy and health equity 
During the DC policy implementation in 2001, there were legislative documents and a 
policy context supporting the universal coverage policy and improved health equity of the 
Thai health care system. Such documents and policy context are summarized as follows. 
3.6.1 The 1997 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 
The 1997 Constitution (King Prajadhipok Institute 2004) was one of the most democratic 
constitutions in Thai history and indicated several statements and sections related to 
equity in peoples' rights and health. For example, Section 30 stated that every Thai, both 
men and women, would enjoy equal rights and would be protected equally under the law. 
In addition, unjust discrimination against a person on the grounds of differences in origin, 
race, language, sex, age, physical or health condition, personal economic or social status, 
religious belief, education or constitutionally political view, would not be permitted. 
Section 52 stated that a person would enjoy an equal right to receive standard public 
health services, and the poor would have the right to receive free medical treatments from 
public providers, as provided by law. Public health services would be provided 
thoroughly and efficiently and, for this purpose, participation of local governments and 
the private sector would be promoted as much as possible. The state would prevent and 
eradicate harmful contagious diseases for the public without charge. Moreover, Section 
82 revealed an important statement related to equity in health care delivery-that the 
state would thoroughly provide and promote standard and efficient public health services 
for the entire population. 
3.6.2 The 2002 National Health Security Act 
Objectives of the 2002 National Health Security Act (NHSO 2007c) were to ensure 
universal access to qualified health services, and to provide equal right for all Thais to 
achieve standard and effective health services according to the benefit package provided 
by the Act and their needs. Moreover, health resource allocation would be a method that 
achieved the policy objective of improving equity and efficiency of the Thai health care 
system. The Act also granted the status of statutory public organization to the National 
Health Security Office (NHSO), which is the state agency responsible for the 
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administration of the National Health Security Board and the Standard and Qualitv 
Control Board of the UC scheme. 
3.6.3 National public health policy of the Thai government 
The former Thai government, led by ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinnawatra, declared 
the government policies to the National Assembly in February 2001. Objectives of the 
government's social policies were to develop the country's human resources, physically, 
mentally and intellectually. The government attempted to strengthen the society and 
made it sustainable with the aim of developing Thailand into a moral and balanced 
society. For public health services, the government was determined to create a system 
that provided public health services and health insurance to the public, so that the people 
of Thailand could enjoy good health and obtained universal health insurance coverage. 
To this end, the government undertook to reform the public health system in order to 
reduce the country's total public health expenditure as well as to reduce health care 
expenses incurred by households. The government guaranteed and created opportunities 
for access to essential medical and health care services that met an appropriate standard 
for the entire population on an equal basis. 
3.6.4 Declaration of patient's rights 
A declaration of patient's rights issued III April 1998 was jointly approved by five 
professional organizations: the Council for Registration of Medical Practice - Ministry of 
Public Health, the Medical Council of Thailand, the Nursing Council of Thailand, the 
Pharmacy Council of Thailand, and the Dental Council of Thailand. The declaration 
contained ten crucial issues of patient's rights following the 1997 Thai Constitution and 
the principles of human rights. Equitable access to and utilization of health services, and 
an equitable chance to obtain complete information about patient's health and illness, 
were recognized as the right of patients and the public. 
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3.7 Existing studies on the impact of the UC policy 
After the UC policy implementation, several studies on the impact of the policy on the 
Thai health care system have been conducted. A couple of studies revealed a significant 
increase in ambulatory service use and hospitalization of the UC beneficiaries after the 
policy was implemented (Na Ranong and Na Ranong 2002; Pannarunothai, Patmasiriwat 
et al. 2002; Srithamrongsawat and Torwattanakitkul 2004; Suraratdecha, Saithanu et al. 
2005). Another observed a greater use of the UC scheme by the poor rather than the 
richer groups (Pannarunothai, Patmasiriwat et al. 2002). A recent study showed an 
improvement in health service provision of primary care facilities, and an increasing 
workload of the health workforce after the UC policy was implemented and financial 
barriers to health care were removed (Srithamrongsawat and Torwattanakitkul 2004). It 
was concluded that the UC policy has achieved its main objective of improving equitable 
access to and utilization of health services. However, these studies assessed the UC 
policy in only a few provinces or among beneficiaries of different health insurance 
schemes. Moreover, some studies were conducted shortly after the implementation of the 
policy, at a time in the implementation process was still evolving. 
Some studies have assessed the UC policy in terms of the policy process or a specific 
group of the population. For example, a study focused on policy formulation and the 
implementation process of the UC policy (Pitayarangsarit 2005) and another paid 
attention to policy formulation relating to anti-retroviral drug adoption in Thailand 
(Tantivess and Walt 2006). A study explored equity in health service use by the elderly 
after the UC policy was implemented (Srithamrongsawat 2004). 
On equity in access to expensive health services, a policy analysis study of universal 
access to RRT revealed inequitable access to RRT among beneficiaries of different health 
insurance schemes in Thailand (Tangcharoensathien, Kasemsup et al. 2000). An 
economic analysis of RRT showed that haemodialysis (HD) and peritoneal dialysis (PD) 
for ESRD patients were not cost-effective because costs of PD and HD per life year 
saved were much higher than the benchmark of three times the GNP per capita per life 
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year saved (Teerawattananon 2005). A budget impact analysis of universal access to 
RRT estimated that the government budget for universal access to RRT would increase to 
74,355 million Baht or around 12.2 % of total health expenditure by the sixteenth year of 
universal access to RRT, if the government played a passive role in controlling costs of 
RRT and in reducing the ESRD incidence (Kasemsup, Prakongsai et al. 2005). Another 
study argued that although neither HD or PD was cost-effective due to its expensive costs 
per life year saved, protecting households against financial catastrophe justified public 
funding for RR T, and to be feasible, rationing is unavoidable. The study advocated 
ESRD prevention and the provision ofRRT to every ESRD patient up to an age cut-off or 
to every patient with a fixed number of RRT years by providing more years to the 
younger patients (Prakongsai, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007). Anecdotal observation 
indicated RRT costs causing catastrophic health expenditure due to high costs of medical 
care and the chronic nature of the condition. 
On equity in health care finance, several studies on the assessment of household out-of-
pocket payments prior to and after UC revealed that the UC policy significantly reduced 
inequity in health care payments between the richest and the poorest deciles (Vasavid, 
Tisayatikom et al. 2005). Another study on the impact of the UC policy on equity in 
health care finance revealed that the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure (defined 
as out-of-pocket payments for health care more than 100/0 of total household expenditure) 
reduced from 5.4% in 2000 to 3.30/0 and 2.80/0 in 2002 and 2004, respectively 
(Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2005). A recent study revealed that 
households using in-patient services, especially at private hospitals, were more likely to 
face catastrophic health expenditure and impoverishment from health care payments 
(Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007). Use of health services not included in 
the UC benefit package and bypassing the designated health care providers were the 
major causes of catastrophic health expenditures and impoverishment after 
implementation of the UC policy. 
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3.8 Gaps in knowledge 
From the literature reviewed in this chapter, it is clear that there has been neither a 
nationwide nor large scale evaluation of UC using data from nationally representative 
household surveys, which will be used in this research. Also, the effect of the new 
financing arrangements on the distribution of public subsidies for different socio-
economIC groups of Thais, and the effectiveness of the UC policy in financial risk 
protection, has not yet been explored. An assessment on the impact of excluding RRT 
from the UC benefit package on poorer and richer ESRD patients would be useful for 
other developing countries moving towards universal coverage with limited health 
resources. Using the experience in Thailand, the design of the UC benefit package and 
the decision on which health services should be included in the UC benefit package of 
less developing countries can be discussed in greater detail. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AIMS, OBJECTIVES, AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter summanzes the alms and objectives of the thesis, and outlines the 
methodologies used. The overall approach and the study framework are described first, 
followed by a brief description of the research methods and data sources used to achieve 
the objectives. More detailed descriptions of the methods are provided in the separate 
chapters with additional information in the annexes. 
4.1 Aims and objectives 
The overarching aim of the thesis is to assess the impact of the DC policy on equity of the 
Thai health care system in terms of changes in health care use, health care finance, the 
distribution of public subsidies for health, and the financial burden of health care 
payments borne by households of different socio-economic status in Thailand. This is 
intended to provide lessons on improving equity in the health care system of a developing 
country through the introduction of a DC policy and health financing reform. Two levels 
of investigation were employed in order to understand the impact of the DC policy on 
several dimensions of the Thai health care system: 1) an assessment at the national level 
using secondary data from nationally representative household surveys for an analysis of 
changes in health care use, equity of different health financing sources, and the 
distribution of public subsidies on health, prior to and after universal coverage; and, 2) an 
investigation at the household level using qualitative approaches to assess the impact of 
excluding some expensive health services from the DC benefit package. 
With this overarching aim, the research has four main objectives which are to: 
1) analyze changes in health care use and the distribution of public subsidies 
on health obtained by different socio-economic groups of Thais prior to 
and after universal coverage; 
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2) explore changes in the progressivity of health care finance, financial 
burden for health care payments borne by households of different socio-
economic status, and the magnitude of households facing catastrophic 
health spending prior to and after universal coverage; 
3) describe the economic impact of the DC benefit package on poorer and 
richer households, which excluded some expensive health services; and, 
4) provide lessons learnt and policy recommendations on introducing the DC 
policy and health financing reform to foster an equitable health care 
system in other developing countries. 
4.2 Overall approach and study framework 
As described in the aims and objectives of this research, the assessment of the equity 
impact of the DC policy on the Thai health care system and households of different 
socio-economic status requires a comprehensive assessment in three areas: 
1) equity in health care use and the distribution of public subsidies on health; 
2) equity in health care finance and household payments for health; and, 
3) the effectiveness of the DC policy on protecting poorer and richer households 
from costs of health services. 
From the literature review, there are a number of ways to assess the equity impact of a 
health policy on households and the health care system (Anand, Diderichsen et al. 2001; 
Bowling 2002; Government Chief Social Researcher's Office 2003). Although a rigorous 
research approach is to assess the impact of a health policy between a control and an 
experimental group, the nationwide implementation of the DC policy in 2001 limited the 
feasibility to employ such a rigorous approach. With this limitation, this study employed 
another research design, a 'before-after' study, which has the potential to provide valid 
and reliable evidence to evaluate the impact of the DC policy on equity in health care use 
and health care finance, and financial risk protection. The assessment prior to policy 
implementation provided a baseline for comparing the impact of the UC policy on 
households of different socio-economic status in an assessment of a later period. In 
108 
addition, to address the drawback of the before-after approach in determining effects 
given confounding factors, a qualitative approach was employed as an additional 
investigation in order to shed further light on how the UC policy might have increased 
financial risk protection and improved equity in access to health care. 
As described in chapter 3, this research improved previous small scale assessments of the 
UC policy by employing a nationwide or a large scale evaluation of health care seeking 
behaviour and health payments of Thai households prior to and after UC. Two national 
household surveys, the Health and Welfare Survey (HWS) and the Socio-economic 
Survey (SES), were used as the main data sources for assessing the impact of the UC 
policy on households of different socio-economic status. The former is a biennial and 
nationally representative household survey containing data on types of health insurance 
and health seeking behaviour of individuals. The latter is also a nationally representative 
household survey comprising information on household income and expenditure, changes 
in household assets and liabilities, and ownership of durable and semi-durable goods. 
Given that the UC policy was implemented nationwide in October 2001, this study 
employed the 2000 SES and the 2001 HWS for the assessment of the situation prior to 
universal coverage, and the 2002 SES and the 2003 HWS for the appraisal after universal 
coverage, as well as data sources covering unit subsidies for health service use of 
CSMBS, SSS, and UC beneficiaries at public and private health facilities. 
As described in the literature review and elsewhere, socio-economic status is a crucial 
social determinant of health affecting inequity in access to and utilization of health 
services (Marmot 1999; Diderichsen, Evans et al. 2001). Lack of financial resources 
greatly prevent the poor from seeking and accessing health care, and also the financial 
burden of health care payments tends to create a greater negative impact on poorer 
households (Sauerbom, Ibrango et al. 1995; Kabir, Rahman et al. 2000; Russell 2005). 
With this evidence and the strong associations between an individual's socio-economic 
status and health inequality (Abel-Smith 1994; Macinko, Shi et al. 2003; Auger, Raynault 
et al. 2004), this study mainly focused on the impact of the UC policy on different socio-
economic groups of Thais, and did not examine the impact of other social determinants 
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on health equity. Given that the HWS included an estimate of household monthly 
income and the SES contained information about household income and expenditure, per 
capita household income with an adjustment for household size using the OECD-
modified equivalence scale (Hagenaars, de Vos et al. 1994; OECD Social Policy Division 
2005) was used as a socio-economic stratifier. The concept of the equivalence scale is 
based on the principle of economies of scale in household consumption, and different 
needs of individuals (e.g. children or the elderly) for consuming resources. 
Apart from per capita household income, an asset index was also used as an alternative 
measure to categorize households into different socio-economic groups, given its 
advantages (Annex 1). Potential errors from a single question on estimated household 
income, in cash and in kind, in the HWS also supported the decision to use the asset 
index as an alternative tool. The availability of information on household assets and 
housing construction in the 2003 HWS provided the possibility to compare results from 
the analysis of benefit incidence in 2003 between using per capita household income and 
the asset index as the socio-economic stnitifier. 
In this study, health service use was employed as a modified indicator for assessing the 
impact of the UC policy on equity in access to health care. Although various indicators 
of access to health care (such as availability of resources, waiting time, user charges, and 
other barriers to health services) might be assessed, the complex notion of access to 
health care is not easy to observe directly, especially in a national household survey. 
Given the availability of questions on health service use in the HWS questionnaire, the 
number of ambulatory visits and hospitalization of different income quintiles by type of 
health facility were employed as indicators for measuring the equity impact of the UC 
policy. Equity in health care use was assessed and quantified by using: 1) per capita 
ambulatory service use and hospitalization of different income quintiles; 2) the 
concentration index (O'Donnell, Doorslaer et al. 2008); and, 3) the concentration curve 
(O'Donnell, Doorslaer et al. 2008) of health service use by type of health facility. 
Changes in these indicators between 2001 (prior to UC) and 2003 (after UC) were 
analyzed and compared using the before-after approach. 
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Another assessment of the equity impact of the DC policy was the distribution of public 
subsidies for health or benefit incidence analysis - BIA (Castro-Leal, Dayton et al. 2000; 
Demery 2000). This analysis is widely used for assessing the links between public 
spending on health and consumption of health services as well as the distribution of 
public subsidies gained by different socio-economic groups, gender, or geographical 
areas. Benefit incidence is a powerful instrument, and can have a profound effect when 
presented to government officials or policy makers because it shows how equitable a 
given country is perceived to be and the results of BIA are easy to interpret by policy 
makers. There are four main steps to a BIA: 
• First, ranking individuals with an appropriate socio-economic parameter; 
• Second, linking individuals with health service use; 
• Third, multiplying unit subsidies for health service provision by the amount of 
health service use to achieve total public subsidies for health; and, 
• Four, estimating the net public subsidies for health across different SOCIO-
economic groups by deducting out-of-pocket payments for health from total 
public subsidies and analyzing the distribution by income quintiles. 
In this study, changes in the distribution of public subsidies on health by income quintile, 
and the concentration index of benefit incidence prior to and after UC, were used as the 
indicators for assessing the impact of the UC policy on equity in the distribution of public 
subsidies for health. Methods to analyze benefit incidence prior to and after UC are 
detailed in Chapter 6. 
Equity in health care finance and household payments for health were analyzed in order 
to present who paid for health care in Thailand prior to and after UC, and to what extent 
the DC policy had an impact on the health care finance of the Thai health care system. 
Given the various health financing sources of the Thai health care system as described in 
Chapter 3, per capita household payments for health including direct tax, indirect tax. 
out-of-pocket payments, social health insurance contributions, and private health 
insurance premiums, by income quintile, were explored. The concentration and the 
Kakwani indexes (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008) were used as tools to assess and 
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quantify equity in health care finance for different health financing sources prior to and 
after UC, which were likely to be the effects of health care financing reform strategies of 
the UC policy. 
To explore the effectiveness of the UC policy in protecting households against financial 
hardship from medical care costs, this study employed an assessment of households 
facing catastrophic health spending to evaluate the financial risk protection function of 
the UC policy. A level of household health expenditure over 100/0 of household income 
was used as a benchmark of catastrophic health expenditure. This threshold payment has 
been widely used in the literature (Prescott 1999; Ranson 2002) because households 
having healthcare payments above this level tend to have to cut their consumption of 
other minimum needs, trigger productive asset sales or high levels of debt, and become 
impoverished (Russell 2004). Though another idea of assessing catastrophic health 
spending is the use of household capacity to pay (World Health Organization 2000), 
where household payments for basic consumption such as food are first deducted from 
total expenditure; this approach is problematic for analysis of the progressivity of health 
care finance (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). With this framework, this research 
employed the payment threshold of over 10% of total household income to be the 
benchmark for the analysis of changes in the magnitude of catastrophic health 
expenditure prior to and after UC. 
The last dimension of the investigation is to explore the economic impact of excluding 
expensive health services (e.g. RRT for ESRD patients) from the UC benefit package on 
households of different socio-economic status. To explore a complex issue of access to 
and utilization of expensive health services and the economic impact on households, a 
case study approach was designed for this investigation. This is because a case study can 
explore a social event in a real-life context of selected households in an explanatory and 
exploratory manner which is irrelevant to a quantitative approach (Yin 1994; Russell 
2005). In addition, the case study approach can provide a deeper understanding of 
complex realities of household processes and contexts that are difficult to measure by a 
quantitative inquiry. 
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In this study, two expensive health services, RRT for end-stage renal disease patients and 
open-heart surgery for heart disease patients, were employed as the case studies because 
the fonner was not included in the UC benefit package, while the latter was. Poorer and 
richer households residing in rural and urban areas were selected for these case studies in 
order to reflect financial and geographical barriers to these expensive health services. 
The economic impact of accessing these health services, one included and the other 
excluded from the UC benefit package, was explored. Lessons from excluding expensive 
health services from the UC benefit package and the economic impact on households of 
different socio-economic status can be drawn for other developing countries moving 
towards universal coverage. In addition, findings of the case studies would reflect the 
effectiveness of the UC policy in Thailand in protecting households from high medical 
care costs. 
Table 4.1 shows the relationship between the objectives and methods of this study, and 
Figure 4.1 describes the study framework. 
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Figure 4.1: Study framework 
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4.3 Data sources 
In this study, three data sources were used for the secondary data analyses: the Socio-
economic survey (SES); the Health and Welfare Survey (HWS); and, unit subsidies for 
health service provision of public and private health facilities. 
4.3.1 Socio-economic Survey 
The Socio-economic Survey (SES), formerly known as "The Household Expenditure 
Survey", has been conducted by the National Statistical Office (NSO) in Thailand since 
1957. From the 1960s to late 1980s, this survey was conducted every five years, and 
after the rapid economic expansion, the survey was carried out every two years beginning 
in 1987. Objectives of the survey are to collect information on household income and 
expenditure, household consumption, changes in assets and liabilities, ownership of 
durable and semi-durable goods, housing characteristics, and household living conditions. 
The survey covers all private, non-institutional households residing permanently in 
municipal and rural areas of all regions in the country. A stratified, two-stage sample 
design has been adopted for the survey from 1988 until now. The number of sampled 
households in 2000 (prior to UC) and 2002 (after UC) were 24,747 and 17,489 
respectively. In general, the SES contains nine groups of information about household 
socio-economic status, except the 2002 SES in which data on morbidity and health 
service use of household members were collected as an additional record (Record 10) due 
to the economic crisis (Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2: Details of household data by record in the SES 
Record Household data 
01 
Household characteristics (e.g. household number, size), economic status, welfare 
and be~efits of household members, summary of household income and 
expendIture, and household weight 
Characteristics of household members (e.g. age, sex and marital status), medical 
02 welfare and type of health insurance, education, sources of income (e.g. wage and 
salary, profit from non-farm business, property income, etc.) 
03 Information about income from other sources (e.g. pensions, disability payments, 
worker's compensation, interest from saving accounts, loans, bonds, shares, etc.) 
04 Changes in household assets, liabilities, and debt 
05 Housing characteristics, household assets, computer and internet use 
06 Household consumption on goods and services 
07 Food consumption 
08 Summary of household income from various sources (impute from records 02-03) 
09 Summary of household expenditure (impute from records 06-07) 
10 Morbidity and medical care of household members (only the 2002 SES because of the economic crisis) 
From the SES, household monthly income adjusted with the modified-OEeD equivalence 
scale was estimated using data from Records 01 and 02. Data on household direct tax 
payments were available in Category 900 of Record 06. Household payments for indirect 
taxes were estimated from data on total household expenditure in Record 06 excluding 
V AT -exempt goods and services. Household payments for medical care costs, social 
health insurance contributions, and private health insurance premiums were also available 
in Record 06 with different categories and codes. Details of how to compute different 
types of household health care payments from the SES are presented in Chapter 7. 
4.3.2 Health and Welfare Survey 
The Health and Welfare Survey (HWS) is a nationally representative household survey 
on morbidity, health seeking behaviour, type of health insurance, and health service use 
of Thai households. This survey has been conducted by the NSO since 1974. Prior to 
2001, this survey was conducted every five years, when it was changed to a biennial 
household survey in 2001. In this household survey. every member of sampled 
households are interviewed on morbidity and ambulatory service use in the previous two 
weeks in 2001 (or previous month in 2003), and hospitalization during the year prior to 
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the interview. Data on health expenditure for the last health service use were also 
collected. 
Information about household socio-economic status in the HWS is quite limited because 
this household survey focused on health seeking behaviour and health care use of 
household members. There was only a single question on estimated monthly income, 
both in cash and in kind, in the 2001 and 2003 HWS questionnaires. A difference 
between the 2001 and 2003 HWS was the record of individual monthly income which in 
2001 was recorded in 15 income brackets, while that in 2003 was an open-ended 
question. In addition, a list of household assets and types of housing characteristics were 
available in the 2003 HWS, while such data were unavailable in 2001. This, therefore, 
provided an opportunity to compute the asset index as an alternative socio-economic 
stratifier in secondary data analysis of the 2003 HWS, compared to per capita household 
income. The differences between the 2001 and 2003 HWS are detailed in Chapter 5. 
Table 4.3 summarizes the availability of household data in the SES and HWS which were 
used for the secondary data analyses in this study. 
Table 4.3: A summary of household data in the 2000 & 2002 SES, and the 2001 & 2003 HWS 
Topics 2000 SES 2002 SES 2001 HWS 2003 HWS 
General HH characteristics X X X X 
Educational level X X X X 
Occupation X X X X 
X X 
Monthly HH cash income X X (in 15 income (an open-ended 
brackets) question) 
Monthly HH kind income X X X X 
Monthly HH expenditure X X 
Health insurance coverage X X X 
Illness and ambulatory visit X X X (last two weeks) (last month) 
Type of health care provider X X X for ambulatory visit 
Health expenditure for last X X 
ambulatory visit 
Chronic care & health X promotive services 
Types of health care X 
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Topics 2000 SES 2002 SES 2001 HWS 2003 HWS 
providers 
In-patient services during X X X 
last year 
Types of health care X X X providers for hospitalization 
Expenditure for last X X X hospitalization 
Dental health services X 
Housing characteristics and X X X household assets 
Household health X X X 
expenditure 
Household assets and X X X housing characteristics 
4.3.3 Unit subsidies for public and private health service provision 
Unit subsidies for health service provision used for the analysis of benefit incidence were 
estimated by using secondary data from the monthly input and output financial report of 
MOPH health facilities and annual reports of the CSMBS and the SSS. Government 
health facilities of the MOPH are requested to send in monthly financial reports including 
budgetary and non-budgetary revenues, expenditure, and outputs of health facilities in 
terms of numbers of ambulatory visits, hospital admissions, and number of admission 
days. These secondary input and output data of public health facilities were used to 
estimate the mean unit of subsidies for ambulatory visits and hospitalization of MOPH 
health facilities in 2001 and 2003. An average ratio between the unit cost of a hospital 
admission and an ambulatory visit by type of health facility was employed as a 
conversion factor to combine ambulatory visits and hospital admissions into an 
equivalent output. This approach for the estimate of unit subsidy was employed instead 
of using the actual unit cost of health service provision because public health facilities in 
Thailand have rarely conducted costing studies of their health service provision, and an 
analysis of actual unit costs would take time. Details of the methods used to estimate the 
unit subsidies for health service provision of MOPH health facilities are presented in 
Chapter 6. 
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The annual reports of the CSMBS in 2001 and 2003 were used as the secondary data for 
the estimate of unit subsidies for health service use of the CSMBS beneficiaries. Many 
studies on health care finance in Thailand have showed differences in the quality and 
costs of health service provision for beneficiaries of different health insurance schemes, 
suggesting CSMBS has higher quality and higher costs due, at least in part, to the 
provider payment method of fee-for-service (Mongkolchart 2001; Limwattananon, 
Limwattananon et al. 2003). With these disparities, there is a need to estimate the unit 
subsidies for health service use of beneficiaries of the different health insurance schemes, 
especially the CSMBS beneficiaries. Details of the method used to estimate the unit 
subsidies for the CSMBS beneficiaries are presented in Chapter 6. 
Finally, the annual report of the SSS was used as secondary data for the estimate of unit 
subsidies for health service provision of private health facilities. Given that the majority 
of SSS health care providers are private providers and the feasibility to access unit cost 
and financial data of private providers was low, estimating unit subsidies for health 
service provision of private providers was inevitable. From the annual SSS report, mean 
unit subsidies for health service use of SSS beneficiaries at private health facilities were 
estimated by using input and output data of the SSS in 2001 and 2003. The method to 
estimate the unit subsidies for SSS beneficiaries using health services at private health 
facilities is detailed in Chapter 6. 
The relationship between assessed variables and data sources used for secondary data 
analyses of health service use, unit subsidies for health service use among different health 
insurance beneficiaries (CSMBS, SSS, UC), benefit incidence analysis, health care 
finance and household health payments, are shown in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Relationship between secondary data analyses, assessed variables, and data sources 
Types of secondary data analyses 
Assessed variable Data source \ (prior to and after UC) 
• Ambulatory service use • The 2001 and 2003 HWS 
Health care use • Hospitalization • Household income per capita (from the HWS) 
• Individual socio-economic status adjusted by modified-OECD equivalence scale 
Unit subsidies for health service use ofUC • Unit subsidies for ambulatory visit and • Monthly input and output financial report of 
beneficiaries hospitalization by type of health facility MOPH health facilities 
Unit subsidies for health service use of SSS • Unit subsidies for ambulatory visit and The annual report of the SSS in 2001 and 2003 beneficiaries hospitalization by type of health facility • 
Unit subsidies for health service use of • Unit subsidies for ambulatory visit and • The annual report of the CSMBS in 2001 and 
CSMBS beneficiaries hospitalization by type of health facility 2003 
• The 2001 and 2003 HWS 
• The distribution of public subsidies on Unit subsidies for health service use by type of health • Benefit incidence analysis 
• Individual socio-economic status: per capita 
health facility and health insurance scheme 
• The estimated household income per capita and household income vs asset indexes household assets in the 2003 HWS 
• Household health payments by type of • The 2000 and 2002 SES I Health care finance and household health care finance • Household income per capita (from the SES) payments 
• Household socio-economic status adjusted by modified-OECD ~uivalence scale 
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4.3.4 Household case studies 
Two expensive health services, RRT for ESRD patients and open heart surgery for heart 
disease patients, provided the possibility to explore in a detailed case study the 
effectiveness of the UC policy in protecting households from medical care costs because 
the former was excluded from the UC benefit package, while the latter was included. 
The research design of the qualitative case studies relied on the hypotheses that poorer 
and richer households would face different financial burdens from health care costs, 
along with different financial or geographical barriers to access expensive health services 
excluded from the UC benefit package. So three areas which were explored in the case 
studies were: 1) access to and utilization of expensive health services; 2) financial burden 
of health care payments borne by households; and, 3) coping strategies for costs of 
illness. Based on these hypotheses, households recruited into the case studies had 
different socio-economic status and resided in both urban and rural areas. The method to 
select ESRD and heart disease households is detailed in Chapter 8. In addition, details of 
investigating tools to achieve the objectives of the qualitative case studies, data 
collection, and ethical considerations are also presented in Chapter 8. 
4.4 Units of analysis 
There were two types of unit of analysis in this research. For the analyses of health care 
use and benefit incidence, the 'individual' was the unit of analysis because data on health 
service use were recorded on an individual basis. In addition, the analysis of benefit 
incidence was the combination of health care use and unit subsidy. Therefore, the 
distribution of public subsidies on health was analyzed on an individual level. The socio-
economic status of individuals was categorized using per capita household income and 
the household asset index (in the 2003 HWS only). 
In the analysis of health care finance, the 'household' was the unit of analysis because 
data on income and expenditure in the SES were collected on a household basis. In 
addition, the costs of illness do not only fall on the sick, but are generally borne by other 
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household members. Therefore, household health expenditure, especially out-of-pocket 
payments, should be investigated at the household level. 
It is important to note that changes in the mix of health insurance schemes between 2001 
and 2003, and the existence of public subsidies to all public schemes, made it undesirable 
to assess the impact of the UC policy on the UC beneficiary population only. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the CSMBS and SSS schemes continued largely unchanged 
between 2001 and 2003, whereas those who became UC beneficiaries in 2003 were 
previously a heterogeneous mix of the uninsured, LIC, VHC and private health insurance 
beneficiaries. It was appropriate for the study to assess the equity impact of the UC 
policy on the entire population, whether covered previously by public or private health 
insurance schemes, or previously uninsured. 
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SECTION 2: SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS 
AND QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ASSESSMENT OF EQUITY IN HEALTH CARE USE 
PRIOR TO AND AFTER UNIVERSAL COVERAGE 
The aim of this chapter is to describe changes in health care use among different 
socio-economic groups of Thais prior to and after achieving universal coverage in 
200l. Since the policy objectives of universal coverage are to remove financial 
barriers to health care and ensure universal access to health services, an assessment of 
any changes in health care use of individuals between 2001 (prior to universal 
coverage) and 2003 (after universal coverage) would represent the impact of the U C 
policy on equity in health service utilization. Although there are some existing 
studies exploring the impact of the UC policy on access to and utilization of health 
services (Pannarunothai, Patmasiriwat et al. 2002; Suraratdecha, Saithanu et al. 2005; 
Srithamrongsawat 2007), these studies assessed the UC policy in only a few provinces 
or among beneficiaries of different health insurance schemes. There has been no 
assessment of the association between the UC policy and changes in health care use 
among individuals with different socio-economic status in a large-scale study or at the 
national level. Therefore, this study would fill the gap of knowledge about the impact 
of the UC policy on health care use by Thais, and show to what extent the UC policy 
has improved equity in utilization of health services. 
5.1 Specific aims 
The aims of this chapter are to: 
1) describe changes in health care use In terms of ambulatory servIces and 
hospitalization among different socio-economic groups of Thais prior to and 
after implementation of the UC policy; 
2) investigate changes in the concentration indexes and equity in health service 
use at different types of health care, namely health centres, community 
hospitals, provincial and regional hospitals, private clinics, and private 
hospitals, prior to and after the implementation of the UC policy; and, 
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3) explore the extent to which the UC policy has had an impact on health service 
use, and the association between the UC policy and changes in equity in health 
service utilization. 
5.2 Methods 
This section presents details of study design and data sources used for the analyses of 
health service use prior to and after implementation of the UC policy, classification of 
health care use, and how to categorize individual's socio-economic status using 
household survey data for 2001 and 2003. 
5.2.1 Study design and data sources 
This was a secondary data analysis of a cross-sectional household survey, the Health 
and Welfare Survey (HWS), which has been regularly conducted by the National 
Statistical Office (NSO) of Thailand since 1974. The HWS questionnaire comprises 
questions on general characteristics of respondents, types of health insurance 
enrollment, illness during two weeks or month prior to the interview, health seeking 
behavior, health expenditure, and monthly cash and kind income of all household 
members. During the past decade, the HWS has usually been carried out biennially in 
April of the survey year. It should be noted that five of the total 76 provinces of 
Thailand participated in a pilot project for the universal coverage policy beginning in 
April 2001. Therefore, the 2001 HWS can provide evidence on health service use of 
individuals prior to the UC policy. The 2003 HWS represents the status of health 
service use and health care seeking behaviour of individuals after the implementation 
of universal coverage. 
Sample sizes of the HWS are nationally representative, and every household member 
in a sampled household is interviewed about illness, morbidity, hospitalization in the 
preceding year, and types of ambulatory service use. In 2003, the recall period for the 
latter was one month, and in 2001 it was two weeks. Health expenditure for the last 
ambulatory care and hospitalization is also asked about. A proxy respondent is 
allowed if a targeted interviewee is not present. The number of sampled households 
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was 62,165 in 2001 and 19,952 in 2003, and the number of household members 
interviewed was 222,470 and 68,433 in 2001 and 2003, respectively. A special 
purpose of the 2001 HWS on the survey of disability and health risk behavior of Thais 
produced the significant difference in the number of sampled households between 
2001 and 2003. During data analyses, sampling weights were used to expand the 
results of the sample respondents to the entire population. 
In this study, equity in health care use among different socio-economic groups of 
Thais was assessed and quantified by using the concentration index (O'Donnell, 
Doorslaer et al. 2008a) and the concentration curve (O'Donnell, Doorslaer et al. 
2008b). The concentration index and related concentration curve are widely used in 
health equity literature and social science research as a means of quantifying the 
degree of income-related inequality within a specific health variable, for example, 
health service use, and government health subsidies. The concentration curve graphs 
on the x-axis the cumulative percentage of the sample ranked by living standards, 
beginning with the poorest, and on the y-axis the cumulative percentage of the health 
service use corresponding to each cumulative percentage of the distribution of the 
living standard variable. Accordingly, the concentration index is defined as twice the 
area between the concentration curve and the line of equality (the 45-degree line 
running from the bottom-left comer to the top-right). In the case where there is no 
income-related inequality, the concentration index is zero. The concentration index 
takes a negative value when the concentration curve lies above the 45-degree line of 
equality, indicating disproportionate concentration of health service use or other 
health variables among the poor, and a positive value when it lies below the 45-degree 
line of equality. In this research, a comparison of the concentration indexes and 
concentration curves of health service use between 2001 and 2003 was conducted to 
explore changes in equity in health care use prior to and after universal coverage. 
5.2.2 Types of health care use 
Analyses of health service use in this chapter are categorized into different types of 
health care according to answer choices available in the questionnaires of the 2001 
and 2003 HWS. These include ambulatory care and hospitalization of health centres, 
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community hospitals, provincial and regional hospitals, university hospitals, other 
public hospitals, private clinics, and private hospitals. Among these different types of 
health care, average health service use of individuals among different socio-economic 
groups is compared between the situations prior to and after UC. Likewise, the 
concentration indexes and concentration curves of health service use prior to and after 
UC are analyzed. 
Differences between the 2001 and 2003 HWS questionnaires pose a concern for a 
comparative analysis of health service use prior to and after UC. For example, there 
was no question on the frequency of ambulatory visits during the last two weeks in the 
2001 HWS. In addition, there were only four choices for the last hospital admission 
in the 2001 HWS, while seven choices of hospitals were provided in the 2003 HWS. 
Given these differences, this research could compare only those types of health 
service use that had similar answer choices in both the 2001 and 2003 HWS 
questionnaires. Table 5.1 summarizes differences in the questions on the duration of 
recall of illness, choice of ambulatory visits, and hospitalization, in the 2001 and 2003 
HWS questionnaires. 
Table 5.1: Differences in interview questions on illness and health service use between the 
2001 and 2003 HWS 
Topics 2001 HWS 2003 HWS 
Illness During two weeks prior to the During one month prior to the 
interview, did ...... get sick or feeling interview, did ... .... . get sick or feeling 
not well? not well? 
Ambulatory visits (No question on frequency of During one month before the interview, 
ambulatory visits during last two how many times did ..... get sick? 
weeks) 
Choice of Which type of ambulatory care Which types of ambulatory health care 
ambulatory visits did ... '" .. seekfor the first day of did ........ seekfor his/her last illness? 
last illness? (allowing answers on three O!J2es of 
ambulatorv care for last illness 
In-patient services During 12 months prior to the During 12 months prior to the 
(1) interview, was ..... ever hospitalized? interview, was ... ..... erer hospitalized 
(including delivery)? 
In-patient services Which type of in-patient health Which type of in-patient health services 
(2) services did ... .... seekfor his/her did ... .... seek for his/her last 
last hospitalization? (Four choices: hospitalization? (Seven choices: 
communi!J!.. hosI2Jtal; I2rovincial or communi!J!.. hosl2ital,'12rovincial or 
regional hosl2ital,' 12.rivate hosl2ital,' regional hosl2ital,' universi!J!.. hos12ital,' 
and others) other l2ublic hos12ital,' 12rivate 
Dolvclinic' private hosDital other.) 
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Given these differences, Table 5.2 shows which types of health care use can be compared 
directly. 
Table 5.2: Data on health service use by type of health facilities in the 2001 and 2003 HWS 
Types of health facilities Ambulatory visit Hospital ization Comparable Note Comparable Note 
• Health centre ./ X* 
• Community hospitals ./ ./ 
• Provincial and 
./ ./ 
regional hospitals 
• Other public hospitals 
A vailable choice in A vailable choice in 
outside MOPH X the 2003 HWS X 
the 2003 HWS 
only only 
A vailable choice in Available choice in 
• University hospitals X the 2003 HWS X the 2003 HWS 
only only 
• Private clinics ./ X* 
• Private hospitals ./ ./ 
* There are no beds for hospItal admIssIOns at health centres or private clinics. 
While differences in the questions on health service use between the 2001 and 2003 
HWS raise some concerns on the interpretation of the comparative analysis between 
2001 and 2003, the majority of choices for ambulatory care and hospitalization are 
comparable in both household surveys, as shown in Table 5.2. Almost all types of 
ambulatory service use, except at public hospitals outside MOPH and university 
hospitals, are comparable. Hospitalization at community, provincial and regional, and 
private hospitals is also comparable between 2001 and 2003, while that of the rest is 
incomparable due to limitations in the answer choices of the 2001 HWS, though that 
is not an issue for health centres and private clinics which do not admit patients. 
Moreover, ambulatory service use and hospital admissions between public and private 
health facilities were clearly separated in both household surveys. This allows the 
analysis to calculate health service use between public and private health facilities, 
and to estimate overall changes in equity in health service use, and the distribution of 
public subsidies on health which will be presented in the next chapter. 
5.2.3 Categorization of individual socio-economic status 
To assess changes in health servIce use among individuals with different 
socioeconomic status requires an appropriate parameter for grouping individuals into 
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different socio-economic groups. This research employs household income per capita 
as the socio-economic parameter for the analysis of changes in equity in health care 
use prior to and after universal coverage. This is because a short question on the 
estimate of monthly income, both in cash and in kind, of all household members was 
available in the 2001 and 2003 HWS questionnaires. In addition, a list of household 
assets and types of housing construction was obtained in the 2003 HWS. Hence, an 
analysis of equity in health service use in 2003, comparing the use of household 
income per capita and an asset index as socio-economic parameters is possible. 
In the 2001 HWS, the individual monthly income in sampled households was 
recorded in 15 income brackets with some additional socio-economic parameters (e.g. 
occupation, education levels, etc.). This research took the mid-point of each income 
bracket as the individual monthly income, except for the upper-end bracket (more 
than 20,000 Baht per month), where the lower bound of 20,000 Baht per month was 
used as the estimate (Table 5.3). Since all household members usually share their 
financial resources, total household income was estimated by combining the monthly 
income of all household members. An individual monthly income was then derived 
by dividing total household income by each household's size adjusted using the 
GEeD-modified equivalence scale 1 (Hagenaars, de Vos et al. 1994; OEeD Social 
Policy Division 2005). After that, individuals were ranked in different income 
quintiles according to their household income per capita. The first income quintile is 
the poorest group, and the fifth income quintile is the richest category. 
I "DEeD-modified equivalence scale" assigns a value of 1 to the household head, 0.5 .to each 
additional adult member, and 0.3 to each child (under 18 years old). The concept of the equIvalence 
scale relies on the principle of economies of scale in consumption, as well as different needs of 
different individuals (e.g. children or the elderly) for consuming resources. 
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Table 5.3: Income brackets and the mid-point of individual income estimated for each income 
bracket in the 2001 HWS 
Income brackets in the 2001 HWS Mid-point of individual income 
(Baht per month) (Baht per month) 
• Less than 750 Baht 500 
• 750 - 1,500 1,125 
• 1,501 - 2,000 1,750 
• 2,001 - 2,500 2,250 
• 2,501 - 3,000 2,750 
• 3,001 - 4,000 3,500 
• 4,001 - 5,000 4,500 
• 5,001 - 6,000 5,500 
• 6,001 -7,000 6,500 
• 7,001 - 8,000 7,500 
• 8,001 - 9,000 8,500 
• 9,001 - 10,000 9,500 
• 10,001 - 15,000 12,500 
• 15,001 - 20,000 17,500 
• more than 20,000 Baht 20,000 
Criticism over the accuracy of the income brackets in the 2001 HWS, led the NSO to 
change the questions on individual monthly income in the 2003 HWS to an open-
ended question on individual income both in cash and in kind, with a set of questions 
on household assets and housing characteristics. This allows for a better estimate of 
household and individual income in the 2003 HWS than in the previous 2001 
household survey. In this research, income both in cash and in kind for each 
household member was combined together as total household income. Then, 
individual monthly income was calculated by dividing total household income by the 
household size adjusted with the OEeD-modified equivalence scale, the same 
procedure as used for the 2001 HWS. After that, individuals were ranked in different 
income quintiles in accordance with the household income per capita. 
5.2.4 Variables and analytical methods 
To investigate the impact of the UC policy on any changes in equity in health care 
use, five areas related to health insurance and health care use were analyzed prior to 
and after universal coverage: 
• Health insurance coverage of individuals in 2001 and 2003: 





A verage ambulatory service use per capita per year at 
o health centres, 
o community hospitals, 
o provincial and regional hospitals, 
o private clinics, and, 
o private hospitals; 
Hospitalization per capita per year in community hospitals, provincial and 
regional hospitals, and private hospitals; and, 
Concentration indexes of health service use among different types of health 
care prior to and after UC. 
5.3 Results 
In this section, results from the secondary data analyses of the 2001 and 2003 HWS 
are presented in four subsections: 1) health insurance coverage among different 
income quintiles; 2) self-reported illness rate; 3) ambulatory service use; and, 4) 
hospitalization. 
5.3.1 Health insurance coverage prior to and after universal coverage 
In 2001, approximately 71 % of Thais were covered by a variety of health insurance 
schemes including the CSMBS, the SSS, the Voluntary Health Card (VHC), and the 
Low Income Card (LIC), while the rest of the population (29 %) was still uninsured. 
When the entire population was categorized into different income quintiles by using 
household income per capita, the fourth quintile contained the highest proportion of 
the uninsured (390/0), while the first (poorest) quintile had the lowest proportion (20%) 
(Table 5.4). The major health insurance scheme for the poorest and the second 
income quintile was the Low Income Card, while the majority of the fourth and the 
fifth quintiles were uninsured. When health insurance coverage by income quintile 
was explored, it was found that more than two-thirds of the first and the second 
quintiles were covered by two public health insurance schemes, the LIC and the VHC 
schemes. In contrast, the majority of beneficiaries of the CSMBS, employee benefits, 
the SSS, and private health insurance were in the fifth or richest quintile. 
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Table 5.4: Share of health insurance schemes by income quintile in the 2001 HWS 
Health insurance Quintiles of income per capita (%) 
schemes Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total 
No health insurance 20 24 31 39 34 29 
CSMBS 3 2 4 11 27 8 
Employee benefit 0 0 0 1 1 1 
SSS and WCS 0 1 5 12 20 7 
Voluntary Health Card 26 28 25 16 6 21 
Low Income Card 50 42 32 18 7 32 
Private health insurance 0 1 1 2 4 1 
Others 1 2 2 1 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
According to the 2003 HWS, approximately 950/0 of Thais were covered by public or 
private health insurance after the two-year implementation of the UC policy. Several 
studies indicate that approximately five percent of Thais were uninsured because of a 
lack of people's awareness, the absence of identification cards, and incorrect housing 
registration (Pannarunothai, Patmasiriwat et al. 2002; Health Systems Research 
Institute 2004). The UC scheme was the most comprehensive public health insurance 
scheme, covering around 75% of the population, while the proportion of those 
covered by the CSMBS and the SSS was only 90/0 each (Table 5.5). Private health 
insurance played a minor role, accounting for only one percent of the population in 
2003. The majority of all income quintiles were covered by the UC scheme, 
especially the first and the second quintiles where more than 90% of them were UC 
beneficiaries. In contrast, the majority of the CSMBS, employee benefit, and private 
health insurance beneficiaries were in the richest category (fifth quintile). 
Table 5.5: Share of health insurance schemes in different income quintiles in the 2003 HWS 
Health insurance Quintiles of income Eer caEita (%) 
Schemes Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total 
No health insurance 4 3 4 6 8 5 
CSMBS 4 3 4 10 26 9 
Employee benefit 0 0 0 1 1 1 
SSS and WCS 0 3 8 16 22 9 
UC scheme 92 91 83 66 40 75 
Private health insurance 0 0 1 3 I 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Analysis on the shift of health insurance scheme membership from 2001 to 2003 
indicates that more than 97% of the VHC and the LIC beneficiaries in 2001 
transferred to the UC scheme in 2003, and more than a half of the uninsured in 2001 
were UC beneficiaries two years later (Table 5.6). In addition, approximately 27% of 
those having private health insurance in 2001 shifted to the UC scheme in 2003. Only 
2-30/0 of the CSMBS and the SSS beneficiaries in 2001 transferred to be UC 
beneficiaries two years later. 
Table 5.6: Share of beneficiaries of different health insurance schemes in 2001 transferring to 
different health insurance schemes in 2003 
Health insurance in 2003 (%) 
Health insurance Uninsured CSMBS Employee SSS/ UC Private Other 
in 2001 (%) Benefit WCS Scheme Health Ins 
Uninsured 44 0 0 3 52 1 0 
CSMBS 0 98 0 0 2 0 0 
Employee Benefit 0 2 84 3 11 0 0 
SSS/WCS 1 0 0 95 3 0 1 
Private 
Health Insurance 3 0 0 6 27 64 0 
VHC 1 0 0 2 97 0 0 
LIC 0 1 0 0 99 0 0 
Other 15 0 0 3 67 0 15 
Total 5 9 1 9 75 1 0 
According to the 2003 HWS, more than 750/0 of the UC beneficiaries lived in rural 
areas, where most of the first quintile (860/0) resided. The northeast region contained 
the highest share of the poorest quintile. The majority of the fifth quintile lived in 
municipality areas, especially in Bangkok. 
Based on these findings, it can be summarized that: 
• after the implementation of the UC policy, health insurance coverage of Thais 
increased from 71 % in 2001 to approximately 950/0 in 2003; 
• health insurance coverage of those in the lower income quintiles mainly relied 
on government subsidized health insurance schemes, namely the Low Income 
Card and Voluntary Health Card schemes in 2001, and the UC scheme in 
2003; and, 
• the majority of beneficiaries of the UC scheme were in the first and second 












and SSS beneficiaries, and private health insurance members, were in the fifth 
quintile and largely resided in municipality areas. 
5.3.2 Self-reported illness prior to and after universal coverage 
In 2001, approximately 15.1 % of Thais were ill or not feeling well during the two 
weeks prior to the interview. The analysis of the 2001 HWS reveals that the poorest 
quintile had the highest incidence of self-reported illness at 18.5 %, whilst the richest 
quintile had the lowest rate of 11.9 %. The average illness rate for the entire 
population in 2001 was 3.94 episodes per capita per year (Table 5.7), and the highest 
rate was in the first quintile (4.81 episodes per capita per year). The incidence of self-
reported illness was lower in higher income quintiles, so self-reported illness was 
negatively associated with the socio-economic status in terms of income quintile. 
When the self-reported illness rate was plotted against the population ranked by 
household income per capita, the concentration curve of illness lay above the 45-
degree line of cumulative population. The concentration index also showed a 
negative value of -0.096, which meant that self-reported illness was more 
concentrated in the lower income quintiles than the higher income categories. 
In 2003, approximately 18.7% of Thais were ill or feeling unwell during the month 
prior to the interview. This figure is significantly higher than that of the 2001 HWS. 
Similar to the 2001 HWS, the first quintile had the highest proportion of illness 
(230/0), while the fifth quintile had the lowest proportion (14.30/0). The average illness 
rate for the entire population was 4.68 episodes per capita per year, an average 
increase of 18.80/0 compared to 2001. The first quintile also had the highest self-
reported illness rate of 6.44 episodes per capita per year, followed by the second and 
the third quintiles. The concentration curve of the self-reported illness rate in 2003 
lay above the 45-degree line, with a concentration index of -0.131. Similar to 2001. 
self-reported illness was more concentrated among the lower quintiles than the higher 
socio-economic groups. Furthermore, a larger negative value in 2003 compared to 
2001 shows that the incidence of self-reported illness in 2003 was more concentrated 
among the poor than prior to UC. 
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This analysis reveals a substantial increase in the self-reported illness rate among 
different income quintiles and changes in its concentration index prior to and after U C 
(Table 5.7). The first (poorest) income quintile had the highest increase in self-
reported illness at 34 0/0, followed by the second quintile, while the third quintile had a 
similar self-reported illness rate between 2001 and 2003. Using an unpaired t-test of 
unequal variances indicates statistical differences of the self-reported illness rate 
between 2001 and 2003 at the 1 % level in all income quintiles. 
Table 5.7: Percentage self-reported illness and mean illness rate per capita per year by income 
. '1 . h 2001 d 2003 HWS qumtI e m t e an 
Percent self-reported illness during prior Mean self-reported illness rate 
two weeks in 2001 and prior month and 95% CI 
Income in 2003 (episode per capita per year) 
quintiles 0/0 0/0 2001 2003 
change 2001 2003 chan2e 
1 18.5 23.0 24.3 4.81 6.44 33.9 * (4.72 - 4.91) (6.15 - 6.74) 
2 15.9 21.2 33.3 4.14 5.15 24.4 * (4.06 - 4.23) (4.90 - 5.40) 
3 15.1 17.3 14.6 3.91 3.95 1.0 * (3.83 - 4.01) (3.74 - 4.17) 
4 13.0 16.4 26.2 3.39 3.90 15.0 * (3.31 - 3.47) (3.68-4.12) 
5 11.9 14.3 20.2 3.09 
3.46 12.0 * (3.02 - 3.17) (3.25 - 3.68) 
Total 15.1 18.7 23.8 
3.94 4.68 18.8 * (3.90 - 3.98) (4.57 - 4.79) 
Note: The concentration index of self-reported illness was -0.096 in 2001 and -0.131 in 2003 
* unpaired t-test statistically significant at 0.00 
5.3.3 Ambulatory service use prior to and after UC 
The majority of health seeking behaviour for the first and the second quintiles in 2001 
was pnmary care at health centres, followed by self-medication and 
provincial/regional hospitals. Approximately 400/0 of those in the first income quintile 
sought ambulatory services from health centres and community hospitals, but the 
proportion using health centres and community hospitals decreased in higher income 
categories. In the fourth and fifth income quintiles, self-medication was the most 
common health care seeking behaviour, followed by ambulatory service use at 
provincial/regional hospitals and private clinics. Prior to UC. health centres \\"ere the 
most common ambulatory service used by the first and the second quintiles, whilst 
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self medication was the most frequent health seeking behaviour for other groups. The 
proportion using ambulatory services in the private sector was significantly higher in 
richer quintiles than poorer categories. 
In 2001, the analysis of ambulatory service use per capita per year by income quintile 
in public and private health facilities reveals that the poorer income quintiles utilized 
ambulatory services at public health facilities, including health centres, community 
hospitals, provincial and other public hospitals, more frequently than richer groups, 
and vice versa for ambulatory service use at private providers (Table 5.8). The 
concentration indices for all public health facilities present negative values which 
mean a pro-poor use of ambulatory services of government health facilities (Figure 
5.1). The index of health centres shows the highest negative value, while the 
concentration indices of private clinics and private hospitals had positive values and 
their concentration curves lay below the equitable line, indicating that ambulatory 
care use of private providers in 2001 was pro-rich. 
Table 5.8: Mean ambulatory service use at public and private health facilities by income 
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A similar analysis of the 2003 HWS also shows that the poorer quintiles utilized 
ambulatory services at the primary care level (health centres and primary care units -
peU) and secondary care facilities (community hospitals) more frequently than the 
better-off (Table 5.9). In contrast, those in the richer quintiles utilized ambulatory 
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services at the tertiary care level, such as university and other public hospitals, more 
often than the worse-off. The negative values of the concentration indexes for 
ambulatory service use at health centres, PCU, and provincial/regional hospitals 
indicate the pro-poor nature of the ambulatory service provision of these health 
facilities (Figure 5.2). The positive values of the ambulatory service use at university 
and other public hospitals, and private health facilities confirm the pro-rich nature of 
ambulatory care at the higher public health care levels and the private health care 
providers after the implementation of the UC policy. 
Table 5.9: Mean ambulatory service use of public health facilities among different income 
guintiles in the 2003 HWS 
Mean ambulatory service use 
(visits Eer caE ita Eer i:ear) 
Income 
Health Community Provincial Other University quintiles PCU and regional public 
centre hospital hospital hosEital hosEital 
1 1.728 0.042 1.650 0.306 0.188 0.008 
2 1.193 0.072 1.162 0.310 0.085 0.017 
3 0.641 0.028 0.832 0.307 0.109 0.022 
4 0.549 0.012 0.581 0.327 0.171 0.051 
5 0.181 0.011 0.250 0.239 0.376 0.059 
Total 0.906 0.034 0.935 0.299 0.184 0.030 
Similar to 2001, ambulatory service use of primary and secondary care facilities had a 
negative correlation with income quintiles, and vice versa for that of university and 
private hospitals. However, small income-related inequality in ambulatory service 
use at provincial and regional hospitals, other public hospitals, and private clinics, was 
observed. Figure 5.2 shows the pro-poor and pro-rich appearance of the concentration 
curves and the concentration indexes of ambulatory service use by type of health 
facility in 2003. 
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Figure 5.2: The concentration curves and indexes of ambulatory service use by type of health 
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Figure 5.3 compares ambulatory service use at different health facilities by income 
quintile between 2001 and 2003. Ambulatory service use at both public and private 
health facilities, except provincial and regional hospitals increased significantly after 
the implementation of the UC policy. The rate of increase was highest at community 
hospitals, particularly for the first to fourth quintiles. In contrast, the utilization rate 
of provincial and regional hospitals decreased in all income categories, reflecting a 
shift in ambulatory service use from tertiary care (provincial and regional hospitals) to 
primary and secondary care levels. Furthermore, larger negative values of the 
concentration indexes in all public health facilities reflect an improvement of equity in 
the utilization of ambulatory services at all types of government health facilities after 
the UC policy was implemented. The increase in utilization of primary care and 
secondary care levels of the lower income quintiles lead to a significant improvement 
of equity in ambulatory service use. It is noteworthy that ambulatory service use of 
private clinics and private hospitals also increased in all income quintiles, especially 
the lower categories, after the implementation of the UC policy. 
Figure 5.3: Ambulatory service use at different types of health facility by income quintile 
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Comparing the concentration indexes of ambulatory service use by type of health 
facility between 2001 and 2003 indicates that ambulatory service use at primary and 
secondary health facilities was more pro-poor after the UC policy was implemented 
(Figure 5.4). Although ambulatory service use at provincial and regional hospitals 
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was more pro-poor after UC, the degree of the pro-poor nature was significantly less 
than that of primary and secondary health care facilities. Private health care providers 
were less pro-rich after UC, especially private clinics. 
Figure 5.4: The concentration indexes of ambulatory service use by type of health c: 'I'h-' 
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5.3.4 Hospital admissions prior to and after universal coverage 
In 2001, approximately 6.40/0 of Thais were hospitalized during the 12 months prior to 
the interview. Those in the first quintile had the highest percentage of hospitalization 
at 7.4%, while those in the fifth quintile had the lowest proportion at 5.5%. On 
average, the hospitalization rate was 0.0789 admissions per capita per year and was 
negatively correlated to income quintile. The concentration index of hospitalization 
shows a negative value of -0.079, which means the overall hospitalization in 2001 was 
more concentrated among lower income quintiles than the richer groups. The first 
and second quintiles were more often hospitalized at community hospitals than the 
higher income categories. Hospitalization of the lower income quintiles at private 
hospitals was significantly lower than that of the richer groups. 
Table 5.10 presents the mean of hospitalization by income quintile in public and 
private health facilities in 2001. The hospitalization rate in provincial and regional 
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hospitals was highest with an average rate of 0.0466 admissions per capita per year. 
However, when the concentration indexes of hospitalization were analyzed, it was 
found that hospitalization in community hospitals had a higher negative value than 
other types of health facilities. Hospitalization in private health facilities was pro-
rich. 
Table 5.10: Mean hospitalization rate by income quintile of public and private health facilities 
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Figure 5.5 shows the concentration curves and the concentration indexes of 
hospitalization by type of health facility in 2001. The concentration curves of 
hospitalization at community, and provincial/regional hospitals lay above the 45-
degree line of equality, while the curves of private and other types of hospitals were 
below the equitable line. This is associated with the concentration indexes, which 
confirmed the pro-poor nature of hospitalization in public health facilities. 
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Similar to the findings from the 2001 HWS, the analysis of the 2003 HWS indicates 
that the first quintile had the highest proportion of hospitalization at 7.80/0, while the 
fifth quintile had the lowest. In addition, hospitalization per capita per year was 
highest in the poorest quintile (0.105 admissions per capita per year), while the lowest 
rate was observed in the richest group (0.0598 admissions per capita per year). A 
negative value of the concentration indexes of overall hospital admission in 2003 
indicates that hospitalization was more concentrated among the poorer quintiles than 
the richer categories. 
In 2003, the analysis of the last hospitalization by type of health facility and income 
quintile indicates that nearly two-thirds of the first quintile (650/0) utilized community 
hospitals, while the majority of the fifth quintile used private hospitals. The 
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proportion of hospitalization at community hospitals decreased when the income 
quintile increased, and vice versa for private hospitals. Admissions per capita per 
year were highest in community hospitals, and individuals in the first quintile had the 
highest use rate of hospitalization in community hospitals (0.0631 admissions per 
capita per year), while those in the fifth quintile had the lowest rate (Table 5.11). 
Table 5.11: Mean hospitalization rate by income quintile of different types of health facility in 
2003 
Hospitalization 
Income (admissions Eer caE ita Eer ~ear) 
quintiles Community Prov and reg University Other Private Private 
hosEital hosEitals hospital Eublic hosp pol~c1inics hosE 
1 0.0631 0.023 0.0016 0.0071 0.0006 0.0054 
2 0.0488 0.033 0.0010 0.0045 0.0001 0.0037 
3 0.0341 0.021 0.0012 0.0081 0.0010 0.0101 
4 0.0225 0.018 0.0016 0.0114 0.0007 0.0080 
5 0.0 III 0.012 0.0013 0.0077 0.0010 0.0220 
Total 0.0374 0.0216 0.00l3 0.0077 0.0007 0.0095 
Concentration curves and indexes of hospitalization in public health facilities, except 
other public hospitals, were pro-poor because the curves lay above the 45-degree line 
of equality and the concentration indexes show negative values (Figure 5.6). 
Hospitalization in community hospitals was the most pro-poor, compared to other 
government health facilities. In contrast, hospitalization in other public hospitals, 
private clinics, and private hospitals was pro-rich. Although, the position of the 
concentration curve for university hospitals was unclear, the value of its index was 
negative. 
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~~~e 5.6: The concentration curves of hospitalization by type of health facility in the 2003 
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Comparing hospitalization by income quintile in 2001 and 2003, after the UC policy 
was implemented, hospitalization in community hospitals increased significantly in all 
income quintiles with the highest rate of increase in the fifth category (Figure 5.7). In 
contrast, hospital admissions at provincial and regional hospitals significantly 
decreased in all income groups. When hospitalization of the poorer quintiles is 
explored, it is apparent that the increase in hospitalization was mainly caused by a 
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substantial Increase In hospital admissions at community hospitals, while the 
admissions In provincial and regional hospitals decreased. The reduction III 
hospitalization of the richest quintile was mainly the result of a decrease III 
hospitalization in provincial/regional and private hospitals, respectively. 
Fi~ur~ 5.7: The distribution of hospitalization at different types of health facility by income 
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Comparing the concentration indexes of hospitalization by type of health facility 
between 2001 and 2003 shows that hospitalization in provincial and regional hospitals 
was more pro-poor after UC, while that of community hospitals was less pro-poor. In 
addition, hospitalization in private hospitals was less pro-rich in 2003 (Figure 5.8). A 
greater increase in hospital admissions at community hospitals for the richer quintiles 
in 2003 is likely to be a major cause of the reduction in the concentration index of 
community hospital hospitalization. In contrast, the reduction in hospital admissions 
of the well-off quintiles resulted in the more pro-poor nature of hospitalization at 
provincial and regional hospitals in 2003. 
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5.4 Discussion and interpretation of findings 
0.3199 
0.3160 
This section presents a summary of research findings, discussion of data and 
methodological limitations in the analyses of health service use prior to and after DC, 
a general discussion on research findings, and conclusions on the impact of the DC 
policy on equity in health service utilization. 
5.4.1 Summary of research findings 
In this chapter, the results from the analyses of health insurance coverage and health 
service use prior to and after UC have been presented. Two years after the 
implementation of the UC policy, health insurance coverage increased from 
approximately 71 % in 2001 to 950/0 in 2003. The majority ofUe beneficiaries was in 
the first and the second income quintiles, and largely resided in rural areas. In 2003. a 
substantial increase in self-reported illness, particularly in the lower income quintiles, 
was observed. There was a significant increase in ambulatory service use of the first 
and the second quintiles, especially at primary and secondary care health facilities. In 
contrast, ambulatory service use at provincial and regional hospitals decreased in all 
income quintiles, reflecting a shift in health service use from tertiary care to primary 
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and secondary care levels. The concentration indexes showed the more pro-poor 
ambulatory service use at health centres and community hospitals, compared to 
provincial and regional hospitals, and private health care providers. The analysis of 
hospitalization prior to and after DC showed a similar picture to ambulatory service 
use. There was a significant increase in hospitalization in community hospitals in all 
quintiles, but a reduction in hospitalization in provincial and regional hospitals, and 
private hospitals after DC. The increase in hospitalization for the richer quintiles in 
community hospitals led to a decrease in the concentration index of hospitalization in 
such health facilities in 2003. 
5.4.2 Data and methodoiogicallimitations 
A limitation in the analysis of health service use prior to and after DC was the lack of 
a rigorous welfare indicator to categorize individuals into different socio-economic 
groups. In this analysis of health service use, a single question on household income 
in the HWS adjusted by the household equivalence scale was used as the proxy for 
individual welfare. This is likely to contain some errors for categorizing individuals 
into different income quintiles. In addition, using the mid-point of each income 
bracket in the 2001 HWS to estimate monthly income of individuals increases the 
degree of uncertainty in the analysis of equity in health care use prior to DC. These 
data limitations pose concerns on the comparisons and interpretation of changes in 
health service use and the distribution of public subsidies for health in the next 
chapter. 
Another difficulty in the analysis of health service use is the 2003 HWS questionnaire 
which allowed the interviewees to provide up to three instances of ambulatory service 
use for their illness during the last month before the interview. Since individuals may 
have sought more than one type of health care for their last illness, so an answer of 
more than one choice of health services for the last illness inevitably led to a problem 
in analyzing actual utilization of ambulatory services and benefit incidence. To deal 
with this problem. the researcher decided to drop the second and third choices of 
health care use, and employed only the first type of ambulatory service use for the 
analysis of ambulatory service use in 2003. 
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As stated in section 5.2.2, the differences in the interview questions between the 2001 
and 2003 HWS surveys hinder the comparative analysis of health service use prior to 
and after .UC. The absence of a question on the frequency of past illness and the 
number of ambulatory visits in the 2001 HWS would lead to under-reporting of illness 
and utilization of ambulatory services in 2001. However, the analysis of health 
service use prior to UC had to ignore this problem because there was neither strong 
evidence nor a relevant study to estimate the frequency of ambulatory service use in 
the two weeks prior to the interview. In addition, evidence from the analysis of the 
2003 HWS shows that approximately one-third of those reporting illness during the 
last month got sick more than once. Therefore, the magnitude of those reporting 
illness during the shorter period of two weeks in 2001 would be smaller than one-
third, and is likely to have had a slight impact on under-reporting of ambulatory 
service use in 2001. 
A factor that might affect the increase in the self-reported illness rate in the 2003 
HWS is the change in the recall period of past illness from "two weeks prior to the 
interview" in 2001 to "one-month prior to the interview" in 2003. This certainly 
would create some degree of recall bias in the data. In general, the interval of two 
weeks prior to the interview has been widely applied by various international 
household surveys such as the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) (Grosh 
and Glewwe 1998), or the health seeking behaviour of households in the 
Demographic and Health Surveys (ORC Macro 2006). The period of one month prior 
to the interview in the 2003 HWS would capture more incidence of illness. but is 
more prone to recall bias. 
As presented in section 5.2.2, details about the differences in the interview questions 
on types of health service use between the 2001 and 2003 HWS show that the 
majority of ambulatory service use and hospitalization in 2001 and 2003 are 
comparable. However, limitations in answer choices of health service use in the 2001 
HWS might lead to some errors in the data collection if interviewers from the NSO 
could not find a relevant answer choice such as an ambulatory visit at or 
hospitalization in a university hospital in the 2001 HWS. 
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5.4.3 General discussion 
The research findings of changes in health insurance coverage show that the poorer 
income quintiles mainly relied on public-subsidized health insurance schemes, namely 
the LIC and VHC schemes in 2001, and the UC scheme in 2003. The high percentage 
of LIC and VHC scheme membership in the first quintile in 2001 indicates that to 
some extent the government of Thailand had succeeded in providing public health 
insurance for the poor prior to UC. The transfer of almost 1000/0 of VHC and LIC 
beneficiaries to the UC scheme, with more than 90% of the first and second quintiles 
covered by the UC scheme in 2003, proved that the Thai government could achieve its 
policy goals in providing public health insurance and financial risk protection to the 
poor. The analysis also shows that private health insurance, the CSMBS and the SSS, 
were health insurance schemes for the better-off. High insurance premiums of private 
health insurance and the employment-specific nature of the SSS and CSMBS are 
limitations in employing these health insurance schemes as a means to achieve 
universal coverage. This is because the poor are largely in the informal sector and in 
rural areas, generally lack financial resources for paying either premiums or 
contributions, and are disadvantaged in access to the formal sector and civil service 
employment. 
The analysis of health service use shows that the Thai health care system was pro-
poor prior to the introduction of the UC policy in 2001. This pattern differs from 
other studies which have shown that health services in developing countries are 
generally pro-rich and poorly targeted (Selowsky 1979; Castro-Leal, Dayton et al. 
2000; Mahal, Singh et al. 2002). The former targeted health insurance schemes, 
namely the LIC and VHC, and the previous government policies on protecting the 
poor and disadvantaged groups, are likely to have contributed to this achievement. 
Though the poorest quintile could access and utilize government health services in 
2001, the UC policy has made further progress in expanding health insurance 
protection and improving equity in health service use by using the strategy of 
universal access to essential health services and the removal of financial barriers to 
health care. This has primarily benefited the poor and those in rural areas. 
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A substantial increase in self-reported illness for the first and second income quintiles 
in 2003, compared to 2001, can be interpreted in different ways. Apart from the 
changes in the recall period between the 2001 and 2003 HWS questionnaires. as 
previously mentioned, the removal of financial barriers to health care from the UC 
policy is likely to be another factor allowing individuals to express their illness or 
feeling unwell, and increase their demand for health care. Evidence indicates that 
lack of money and financial barriers to health care are the main reasons preventing 
people from seeking care, particularly in poor households (Russell 2005; Save the 
Children 2005). 
In 2003, changes in health seeking behaviour of ambulatory servIce use, which 
significantly shifted from tertiary to primary and secondary care levels, are explained 
by two key factors. The first one is the clear objective of the UC policy in promoting 
primary health care through resource allocation and the capitation contracting model. 
The UC scheme contracted a network of primary care units, known as the contracting 
unit of primary care (CUP), to be the main contractor and provide health services to 
the population registered with the network. According to the number of registered 
people, government resources are allocated to CUP through the capitation contracting 
model which is expected to improve efficiency and accountability of health care 
providers (Tangcharoensathien, Supachutikul et al. 1999; Srithamrongsawat 2007). 
The removal of financial barriers to health services at registered health facilities is 
likely to have encouraged UC beneficiaries to use primary and secondary care 
services as their first choice. As a result, UC beneficiaries who formerly decided to 
pay user fees for seeking health care from tertiary care facilities appear to have 
changed their health seeking behaviour to seek care from primary and secondary 
health care facilities, if they trust in the quality of health services provided. In 
addition, it is the design of the UC policy in using primary care as the gate-keeper and 
promoting the use of primary and secondary care at the district level to improve 
access to health care, especially for the poor in rural areas. Hence, this is likely to 
explain the more equitable and pro-poor health service system after the UC policy was 
implemented. 
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An increase in ambulatory service use of private clinics and private hospitals after UC 
by the first quintile can be explained by three hypotheses. The first one is an increase 
in individual income after the economic recovery in 2003. This could have led to an 
increase in individual and household ability to pay for user charges at private health 
servIces. This hypothesis is supported by findings of an analysis of average 
individual monthly income in the 2001 and 2003 HWS shown in Table 5.12. The 
second is the limitation of public health facilities to cope with the increase in health 
service use after implementation of the UC policy. Long waiting lists and over-
crowded health services might have led to a shift of health service use to the private 
sector, especially for those in the first quintile, who might be more at risk of financial 
losses from illness. The last explanation might be that larger costs of health service 
use (i.e. hospitalization) were covered by the public health insurance scheme, so 
households might be able to pay more for ambulatory care. This, therefore, would 
lead to the shift of health expenditure patterns of households. 
Table 5.12: Mean individual monthly income (in nominal terms) by income quintile in the 
2001 and 2003 HWS 
Mean individual monthly income (Baht) 
2001 2003 
Ql 510 735 
Q2 1,583 2,104 
Q3 2,804 3,445 
Q4 4,742 5,599 
Q5 10,543 14,266 
Total 3,726 4,964 
Source: from the analyses of the 2001 and 2003 HWS 
The shift in hospitalization for the richer quintiles from provincial/regional and 
private hospitals to community hospitals in 2003 could explain the decrease in the 
hospitalization rate of the well-off. More strict criteria for hospitalization in 
community hospitals and the better health status of the rich might be the factors 
influencing the decrease in hospitalization for the richer groups. In addition, 
differences in geographical distribution of public and private health facilities and 
household ability to pay for private health services are likely to playa vital role in the 
differences in hospitalization between the richer and poorer quintiles. 
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5.5 Conclusions 
An important goal of the UC policy in Thailand is to ensure an equal opportunity to 
access essential health services for those who are not beneficiaries of CSMBS and 
SSS through the tax-funded health insurance scheme, the UC scheme. After two-
years of implementation of the UC policy, several indicators such as the decrease in 
the proportion of the uninsured from approximately 290/0 in 2001 to 50/0 in 2003, and 
the increase in utilization of ambulatory services and hospitalization of those in the 
poorer quintiles, reflect crucial achievements of the UC policy in Thailand in 
improving equitable access to and utilization of health care. These achievements of 
the policy's objectives and the pro-poor nature of ambulatory service use and 
hospitalization, especially in public health facilities, appear to be related to three 
strategies: 
• the expansion of public health insurance to nearly universal coverage, 
especially benefiting those who were in the lower quintiles and previously 
uninsured; 
• the removal of financial barriers to health servIces which led to a 
significant increase in ambulatory care use and hospitalization, especially 
by those in the less well-off quintiles; and, 
• the promotion of primary care use and first level hospital use which is 
easy to access and utilize by the poor in rural areas. 
Ambulatory service use and hospitalization in government health facilities prior to 
and after UC was pro-poor, and its pro-poor nature had improved in 2003. Primary 
and secondary care public health facilities were more likely to serve those in poorer 
quintiles than the well-off because of their distribution in rural areas and the design of 
the UC policy. In contrast, health service provision of the private sector was pro-rich 
and served those in the better-off quintiles. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
BENEFIT INCIDENCE ANALYSIS 
PRIOR TO AND AFTER UNIVERSAL COVERAGE 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the distribution of public health spending for 
different socio-economic groups of Thais prior to and after implementation of the 
universal coverage policy. Since the objectives of the UC policy are to improve the 
efficiency and equity of the Thai health care system, three health financing strategies 
were employed as crucial tools for health financing reform. First, provider payment 
methods for public health facilities were changed from historical allocations to closed-
ended payments, a capitation contracting model for ambulatory services and diagnostic 
related groups (DRG) case payment within a global budget for hospitalization. Second, 
the use of primary care was promoted by contracting a district based health care network 
to provide health services for UC beneficiaries in a catchment area. Third, financial 
barriers to health services were removed by introducing a nominal fee or co-payment of 
30 Baht per ambulatory visit or hospitalization. From 2001-2006, the poor and 
disadvantaged, including the disabled, the elderly, and children less than 12 years old, 
were exempt from the co-payment, but the co-payment was abolished by the new 
military-appointed government in October 2006. With these health financing strategies, 
evidence indicates a major shift of government health resources to primary care and 
health facilities In rural areas (Jongudomsuk 2002a; Tangcharoensathien, 
Wibulpolprasert et al. 2003; Srithamrongsawat and Torwattanakitkul 2004). 
There has been some discussion as to who benefits from the universal coverage policy 
after the introduction of new health financing strategies (Na Ranong and Na Ranong 
2002; Siamwala 2003) since former governments provided government subsidized health 
insurance for the poor and disadvantaged. In addition, even though priority was intended 
to be given to establishing more government health resources in the UC scheme, there 
has been no clear evidence as to who benefits from the government's universal coverage 
policy and who gains more public health resources, when compared with the situation 
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before the introduction of health financing reform. With this knowledge gap, there is a 
need to investigate changes in the distribution of public spending on health, as well as 
any benefits gained by different socio-economic groups of Thais and those residing in 
different geographical areas. A comparison of the benefit incidence of public health 
subsidies prior to and after universal coverage should reflect the effectiveness of the UC 
policy on improving equity in the Thai health care system. 
6.1 Specific aims 
The aims of this chapter are to: 
a) describe changes in the distribution of public health spending on different socio-
economic groups of Thais and in different geographical areas prior to and after 
the implementation of the UC policy; 
b) estimate public subsidies for health service provision of public and private health 
care providers prior to and after universal coverage; 
c) demonstrate differences in unit subsidies for health service use at different types 
of health facilities and for different health insurance schemes; and, 
d) describe whether the distribution of public spending on health changes when an 
asset index is used to categorize the socio-economic status of individuals, rather 
than income per capita. 
6.2 Methods and data sources 
6.2.1 Study design of Benefit Incidence Analysis (BIA) 
This research was a secondary data analysis of cross-sectional household surveys on 
health service use of individuals, using the 2001 and 2003 HWS, along with public 
subsidies for health services provided by public and private health care providers in 2001 
(prior to UC) and 2003 (after UC). Benefit incidence analysis (BIA) (Castro-Leal, 
Dayton et al. 2000; Demery 2000) was employed as the main approach for assessing the 
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amount and share of public health resources gained by different socio-economic groups 
of Thais. 
To analyze the distribution of public subsidies for health, the four main steps of BIA were 
employed. In the first step, individuals are ranked by an appropriate socio-economic 
parameter. This research used equivalent, household income per capital, given the 
availability of monthly income of individuals in the 2001 and 2003 HWS. In addition, 
the availability of a set of questions on household assets in the 2003 HWS questionnaire 
provided an opportunity to compare the results when using household income per capita 
and the asset index to categorize individuals into different quintiles in 2003. In the 
second step, individuals and the amount of health service use are linked. Ambulatory 
visits and hospital admissions at public health facilities and government-subsidized 
private providers were used as the units of measurement due to the availability of data on 
health service use in the HWS and costs of health service provision in terms of unit costs 
per ambulatory visit and hospital admission. The third step involves the multiplication 
of unit subsidies for health service provision and the amount of health service use. The 
standard approach was employed by using the average unit cost of health service 
provision minus user fees paid to the government for that service. This produced the net 
public subsidy for health service use of individuals. To improve the accuracy of benefit 
incidence analysis, the unit subsidies and health service use were categorized into 
different levels of health facilities and health insurance schemes, given to variations in 
the quality and costs of health service provision in Thailand (Mongkolchart 2001; 
Limwattananon, Limwattananon et al. 2003). In the fourth and final step, the 
distribution of net public subsidies for health across different socio-economic groups is 
analyzed. This research used two approaches to describe the distribution of public health 
resources: the absolute value and the share of net public subsidies for health going to 
each income quintile. The analysis of the distribution of public health subsidies, using 
income per capita and an asset index to categorize the socio-economic status of 
individuals, was also conducted for 2003. 
I Equivalent household income per capita refers to total household income divided by household size and 
adjusted using an OEeD-modified equivalence scale. 
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the value of the total public subsidies for health imputed to group j 
the number of health visits of group j to health facilities at level i 
the total number of health visits at level i across all socio-economic groups 
the net public spending on health at level i 
the health facilities classified into different levels such as health centres, 
community hospitals, provincial and regional hospitals, university hospitals, 
private clinics, and private hospitals. 
6.2.2 Individual use of health services prior to and after universal coverage 
Secondary data from the 2001 and 2003 HWS were the two main data sources for the 
estimate of health service use in terms of ambulatory visits and hospital admissions of 
individuals prior to and after universal coverage. As presented in Chapter 5, apart from 
general characteristics of respondents, the 2001 and 2003 HWS questionnaires contain 
questions on ambulatory service use and hospitalization. Other vital information 
obtained includes individual out-of-pocket payments for health service use, and monthly 
income in cash and kind for all household members, along with household assets in the 
2003 HWS. Although there were some differences between these two nationally 
representative household surveys (see Chapter 5), health service use in terms of 
ambulatory service and hospitalization by income quintile in 2001 and 2003 were able to 
be comparatively analyzed, as described in detail in the previous chapter. In the analysis 
of benefit incidence, the health service use by beneficiaries of different health insurance 
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schemes prior to and after DC had to be examined separately, given differences in the 
quality and costs of the health services they received within each scheme. 
6.2.3 Socio-economic parameters of individuals in the 2001 and 2003 HWS 
As shown in Chapter 5, income per capita adjusted USIng the OECD-modified 
equivalence scale was the primary socio-economic parameter utilized in grouping 
individuals into different income quintiles in 2001 and 2003. The availability of data on 
housing characteristics and household assets in the 2003 HWS made it possible to 
compute an asset index, and use it as an alternative socio-economic parameter for the 
analysis of benefit incidence in 2003. 
To compute the asset index, secondary data from the 2003 HWS, including 28 variables 
on household assets and housing construction were used. Variables that are not 
dichotomous, such as types of housing construction material, were made dichotomous. 
Principal component analysis (PCA) was employed to calculate the asset index (Morris, 
Carletto et al. 2000; Filmer and Pritchett 2001). Weights of all asset variables in the first 
principal component were used to compute a factor score for each asset. 
Derived from the PCA, scoring factors of the first principal component (the efficient 
component) were used in constructing the asset index of each household. This means a 
new factor which had a linear correlation with the original variables was developed. A 
weight was assigned to each variable (asset) in order to maximize the variation of the 
new variable, subject to the number of constraints. 
All household members in each sampled household were assigned the same asset index 
score, and household members were assigned to asset quintiles. The details of the 
methods and results are provided in Annex 3. 
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6.2.4 Unit subsidies for public health care providers by health insurance scheme 
in 2001 and 2003 
Secondary data from the monthly input and output report of public health facilities were 
used to estimate unit subsidies for government health services. The MOPH requests 
every public health facility to send a report which includes budgetary and non-budgetary 
revenue, expenditure, and outputs in terms of the number of ambulatory visits and 
hospital admissions, and admission days. A conversion factor relating financial resources 
used for an ambulatory visit and a hospital admission was employed in order to combine 
ambulatory visits and hospital admissions into an equivalent output. For example, the 
average ratio of unit cost between a hospital admission and an ambulatory visit at a 
regional or a provincial hospital in 2003 was approximately 1: 19, and that of a 
community hospital was 1: 15 (Patcharanarumol, Vasavid et al. 2004). Based on these 
conversion factors, total expenditure of health facilities divided by total equivalent 
outputs could provide the unit cost of an ambulatory visit, and the unit cost of a hospital 
admission could be calculated by multiplying the unit cost of an ambulatory visit with 
these same conversion factors. In 2001 and 2003, the unit costs of health service 
provision by level of government health facility were calculated using the secondary data 
from more than 100 health centres, 280 community hospitals in 2001 (and 679 hospitals 
in 2003 because of improved reporting), 92 provincial/regional hospitals, and 7 university 
hospitals (in 2003 only). In addition, unit costs of government health services by region 
were used to compute the regional distribution of public subsidies in 2001 and 2003. 
In Thailand, many studies on health servIce prOVISIOn financed by different health 
insurance schemes indicate differences in the quality and costs of health service provision 
at public and private health facilities (Tangcharoensathien, Supachutikul et al. 1999; 
Mongkolchart 2001; Tangcharoensathien, Srithamrongsawat et al. 2002; Limwattanonon, 
Limwattanonon et al. 2003). The fee-for-service payment method employed by the 
CSMBS has been shown to result in a greater quantity and higher costs of health service 
provision, and possibly unnecessary care (Sriratanaban 2002). In contrast, the capitation 
payment method employed by the SSS and the LIe tends to result in fewer medical 
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servlces, reasonable prescribing, and lower health care costs (Tangcharoensathien, 
Supachutikul et al. 1999). 
With these disparities in the costs of health service provision among different health 
insurance schemes, there is a need to estimate the unit costs of health service provision 
for beneficiaries of different health insurance schemes. In this chapter, secondary data of 
the annual report on expenditure and outputs of the CSMBS were used to estimate unit 
subsidies for CSMBS beneficiaries. In addition, secondary data from the monthly input 
and output report of public health facilities were employed to calculate public subsidies 
for beneficiaries of the SSS and DC schemes because these two schemes employ similar 
close-ended provider payment methods, a contracting capitation model for out-patient 
and in-patient services for SSS beneficiaries, and a capitation model for ambulatory 
services of DC beneficiaries with DRG and a global budget for hospitalization. Such 
close-ended provider payment methods are less likely to create incentives for health care 
providers to provide a greater quantity and higher costs for health services. 
It is worth noting that there is a lack of secondary data on the input and output of other 
public health facilities outside the MOPH (e.g. military and specialized tertiary-care 
hospitals, and health facilities under the Bangkok Metropolitan Administrative (BMA)). 
Only a few specialized hospitals have studied their unit costs. Furthermore, health care in 
Bangkok, the capital of the country, is not mainly provided by public health facilities of 
the MOPH. Bangkok relies greatly on the private sector, specialized public tertiary-care 
hospitals, and university hospitals, whose secondary data are not easy to access. 
Limitations in access to these secondary data were addressed by replacing missing figures 
with the unit costs of tertiary-care and university hospitals obtained from a literature 
review and unpublished studies. 
6.2.5 Unit subsidies for private health service provision in 2001 and 2003 
To calculate public spending on health for SSS and CSMBS beneficiaries, data on public 
health subsidies allocated to private health care providers were needed. This is because 
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nearly a half of the main contractors for the SSS are private hospitals (Social Security 
Office of Thailand 2006). Moreover, CSMBS beneficiaries are allowed to utilize private 
health services in an emergency (Sriratanaban 2002). This research used the amount of 
SSS resources per capita allocated to all health facilities in 2001 and 2003 to calculate the 
average unit subsidies gained by SSS beneficiaries at private providers. Likewise, the 
annual reports in 2001 and 2003 on the expenses and outputs of the CSMBS for private 
providers were used to estimate unit subsidies gained by CSMBS beneficiaries when they 
utilized private health services. 
6.2.6 Out-of-pocket payments for health care use in 2001 and 2003 
Data on individual out-of-pocket payments for health services are necessary to estimate 
net public subsidies on health, which refer to public health resources gained by an 
individual minus out-of-pocket payments for health care when he or she utilizes that 
health service. This research employed data on out-of-pocket payments of individuals 
from the 2001 and 2003 HWS to deduct from the unit subsidies of health service 
provision. Two elements of the public subsidies for health were employed for this 
research: 1) unit costs of health services derived from recurrent spending without capital 
investment minus any user fees paid by individuals; and, 2) unit subsidies of public 
health resources allocated to private providers minus individual out-of-pocket payments. 
Pharmaceutical costs are also included in the unit costs of government health services and 
unit subsidies. If the user fees exceeded the unit cost (or subsidy) allocated to either 
public or private providers, the net gain of public subsidies for health was adjusted to 
zero. For instance, if the unit cost of an ambulatory service at a community hospital was 
400 Baht per visit and the user fee paid was 30 Baht, then the net government resource 
gained by the user would be 370 Baht. In contrast, if the user fee was as high as 500 
Baht, then the public subsidy for health in this case would be adjusted to zero. However, 
it is worth noting that the absence of a question on individual out-of-pocket payment for 
the last ambulatory visit in the 2001 HWS poses a limitation in the analysis of the net 
public subsidy for ambulatory care in 2001. This meant that user fees for ambulatory 
care could not be subtracted from the public subsidy in 2001. 
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6.2.7 The estimate of benefit incidence prior to and after UC and the 
concentration index for health equity 
After the mean unit subsidy by level of health facility and health insurance scheme was 
calculated, total public subsidies per year were estimated by multiplying the number of 
ambulatory visits and hospital admissions in one year by the net unit subsidies. Then the 
public health resources gained by each income quintile, both as a ratio and absolute 
value, were computed by accumulating the net public subsidies of individuals in each 
income or asset category. 
Finally, the concentration index was employed as a measure to quantify and assess 
changes in benefit incidence in 2001 and 2003. 
6.3 Results 
To demonstrate the distribution of public subsidies for health prior to and after universal 
coverage, several components of the benefit incidence, namely health service use (both 
ambulatory visits and hospitalization), unit subsidies for different types of health service 
use and different health insurance schemes in public and private health care providers, the 
net public subsidies for health by income quintile, and the concentration indexes, are all 
presented. Furthermore, the regional distribution of benefit incidence in 2001 and 2003, 
and the comparison of benefit incidence between using income per capita and the asset 
index as the socio-economic parameter, are also explored. 
6.3.1 Individual use of health services in 2001 and 2003 
Individual use of health services by income quintile in 2001 and 2003 were presented in 
Chapter 5. Ambulatory service use and hospitalization at government health facilities 
both prior to and after universal coverage were pro-poor. Primary and secondary care 
facilities were more likely to serve those in the poorer income quintiles than the better-
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off. In contrast, health service provision of the private sector and university hospitals was 
pro-rich and mainly served those in the richer categories. After two years of 
implementation of the DC policy, there was a significant increase in health service use, 
both ambulatory visits and hospitalization, of the poorer income quintiles compared to 
the better-off. 
Table 6.1 presents differences in ambulatory service use and hospital admissions by 
health insurance scheme in 2001 and 2003. DC beneficiaries in 2003, or the rest of the 
population in 2001, had the highest utilization rate of ambulatory services in both years. 
The hospitalization rate for private health insurance was highest in 2001, and that of 
CSMBS beneficiaries was highest in 2003. After implementation of the DC policy, 
ambulatory service use of all health insurance schemes increased with the highest rate of 
increase amongst CSMBS beneficiaries. In 2003, the hospitalization rate of all health 
insurance schemes, except the DC scheme, decreased compared to that of 2001. 
Table 6.1: Mean ambulatory service use and hospital admission (per capita per year) and percent 
h b h lth' h' 2001 d 2003 c anges ~ ea Insurance sc erne In an 
Ambulatory service use Hospitalization 
Health insurance scheme (visit per capita per year) (admission per capita per year) 
2001 2003 % change 2001 2003 % change 
CSMBS 3.770 4.903 30.1 0.104 0.102 - l.9 
SSS 2.438 2.985 22.4 0.065 0.064 - l.5 
The rest (2001) or the UC 
scheme (2003) 4.101 4.926 20.1 0.076 0.083 9.2 
Private health insurance 2.989 3.529 18.1 0.153 0.099 - 35.3 
Total 3.939 4.715 19.7 0.075 0.083 10.7 
6.3.2 Unit subsidies for public and private health service provision in 2001 and 
2003 
Using the secondary data of monthly financial and output reports of public health 
facilities and the conversion factor of an ambulatory visit and a hospital admission, the 
mean unit costs of an ambulatory visit and hospitalization by type of health facility in 
2001 were calculated and are presented in Table 6.2. The unit cost of health service use 
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for UC beneficiaries in 2003 and the rest of the population in 2001 were applied to SSS 
beneficiaries in both years because of the similarity in provider payment methods 
between the SSS and the UC schemes. 
For CSMBS beneficiaries, total expenditure for ambulatory services in 2001 was 8,123 
million Baht, and expenses for hospitalization in public and private providers were 9,775 
and 1,283 million Baht, respectively (Comptroller General's Department of Thailand 
2004). Analysis of the 2001 HWS indicates that total ambulatory visits of CSMBS 
beneficiaries at government health facilities was approximately 11.27 million visits, with 
hospitalization in public and private hospitals of around 479,592 and 78,073 admissions, 
respectively. With these secondary data, the average unit costs of ambulatory service use 
and hospitalization of CSMBS beneficiaries at public and private health facilities were 
computed. Analytical weights for the unit costs by type of health facility were adopted 
from the UC scheme (Tangcharoensathien, Teerawattananon et al. 2001), where the ratio 
of unit subsidies for ambulatory services between health centres, community hospitals, 
and provincial/regional hospitals was 1 : 4.2 : 6.l, and for hospitalization between 
community and provincial/regional hospitals was 1 : 1.86. 
Unit subsidies for the private health services of SSS beneficiaries were estimated by 
dividing the annual expenditure of SSS for private providers by the outputs of ambulatory 
care use and hospitalization. The number of SSS beneficiaries registered with private 
providers in 2001 was 3.46 million (Social Security Office of Thailand 2002), with an 
average ambulatory service use of private facilities at 2.60 visits per capita per year, and 
a hospitalization rate of 0.050 admissions per capita per year. Based on the amount of 
financial resources allocated to health care providers (l, 1 00 Baht per capita) adjusted by 
the proportion of 65:35 between OP and IP costs 2, the mean unit subsidy of the SSS for 
ambulatory service use at a private hospital was 277 Baht, and the mean unit subsidy for 
hospitalization at private hospital was 7,601 Baht (Table 6.2). 
2 This proportion was taken from the estimate of capitation payments for the UC scheme in 2001. 
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Table 6.2: Mean unit costs for ambulatory service use and hospitalization by type of health 
d h I h . facility an ea t Insurance scheme in 2001 
Mean unit cost of Mean unit cost of 
Type of ambulatory service use (Baht) hospitalization (Baht) 
health facility CSMBS SSS The rest of the CSMBS SSS The rest of the population population 
Health centre 149 62 62 
-- -- --
Community 
hospital 628 262 262 11,939 3,669 3,669 
Provincial and 
regional hospital 906 378 378 22,166 6,812 6,812 
Private hospital -- 277 
-- 16,433 7,601 
--
U sing a similar approach and sources of data, average unit subsidies for an ambulatory 
visit and a hospital admission by type of health facility and health insurance scheme for 
2003 were estimated, and results are shown in Table 6.3. It should be noted that, unit 
costs of health service use at university and other specialized public hospitals were 
obtained from the literature review and existing figures. 
Table 6.3: Mean unit costs of ambulatory and in-patient services by health insurance scheme and 
type of health facility in 2003 
Health 
Mean unit cost of ambulatory service Mean unit cost of hospital admission 
(Baht) (Baht) facilities 
UC scheme CSMBS SSS UC scheme CSMBS SSS 
Health centre 61 97 61 -- -- --
Community 
hospital 310 491 310 4,960 10,078 4,960 
Provincial and 
regional 525 832 525 9,974 20,266 9,974 hospital 
University 
hospitals 772 1,224 772 13,889 28,221 13,889 
Other public 
hospitals 772 1,224 772 13,889 28,221 13,889 
Private 
hospital -- -- 238 -- 20,266 9,686 
6.3.3 Public subsidies for ambulatory service use and hospitalization in 2001 and 2003 
On the basis of the mean unit subsidy for net out-of-pocket payments and the volume of 
ambulatory care, Table 6.4 shows, by income quintile, the mean per capita public 
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subsidy, percent changes between 2001 and 2003, and share of net public subsidies for 
ambulatory service use in 2001 and 2003. The consumer price indexes were used to 
deflate the value of public subsidies in 2003 to 2001 values. On average, the per capita 
public subsidy for ambulatory service use in 2003 increased by approximately 44% from 
that in 2001. The first quintile had the highest increase in per capita public subsidies. 
while the third quintile had the lowest. In addition, the poorest quintile gained the 
highest share of net public subsidies for ambulatory care in both years, while the fifth and 
third quintiles obtained the lowest share in 2001 and 2003, respectively. The share of 
public subsidies for ambulatory care gained by the first quintile in 2003 had increased 
compared to 2001, while the share of the third and fourth quintiles decreased. The 
concentration curves of the public subsidy for ambulatory services in 2001 and 2003 lay 
above the 45-degree line of equality, indicating that the public subsidies for ambulatory 
services prior to and after implementation of the UC policy were both pro-poor. An 
increase in the negative value of the concentration index from -0.062 in 2001 to -0.130 in 
2003 indicates a more pro-poor distribution of public subsidies for ambulatory services 
after the UC policy was implemented. 
Table 6.4: Per capita, share and amount of public subsidies for ambulatory service use in 2001 
and 2003 
Per capita public subsidy Public subsidy for ambulatory 
Income (Baht) service use (million Baht) 
quintile 2003 % 2001 2003 2001 (in 2001 prices) change (in 2001 prices) 
1 584 1,011 73% 8,955.84 15,081.39 
2 479 721 51% 6,365.05 9,550.00 
3 467 520 12% 5,338.71 6,109.64 
4 451 591 31% 5,222.95 7,108.16 
5 460 631 37% 5,170.24 7,545.16 
Total 494 711 44% 31,052.79 45,394.34 
.. Note: - The concentration index of publIc subSIdIes for ambulatory servIce use was -0.062 In 
2001 and -0.130 in 2003. 
- The consumer price index (CPI) in Thailand in 2002 and 2003 was 0.7 and 1.8, respectively. 
The analysis of net public subsidies for hospitalization in 2001 and 2003 shows a similar 
picture to the public subsidies for ambulatory care. Though the first quintile gained the 
highest per capita public subsidy in both years, the second quintile had the highest 
increase in the subsidy per capita for hospitalization (Table 6.5). In contrast, the public 
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subsidy per capita obtained by the fifth quintile decreased by approximately 120/0. In 
2001, the third quintile had the lowest share of public subsidies for hospitalization, but 
after UC the fifth quintile had the lowest. After two years of implementation, the share of 
public subsidies for hospitalization of the first and the second income quintiles had 
increased, while the share for the fourth and fifth quintiles had decreased. Also, an 
increase in the negative value of the concentration index from -0.023 in 2001 to -0.155 in 
2003 indicates the more pro-poor nature of public subsidies for hospitalization. 
Table 6.5: Per capita, share and amount of public subsidies for hospitalization in 2001 and 2003 
Per capita Public subsidy for 
Income public subsidy hospitalization 
quintile (Baht) (million Baht) 
2001 2003 % 2001 2003 (in 2001 prices) change (in 2001 prices) 
1 492 681 38% 7,538.42 10,159.05 
2 414 638 54% 5,500.58 8,440.27 
3 399 491 23% 4,560.37 5,761.40 
4 430 512 19% 4,972.09 6,151.32 
5 455 399 -12% 5,108.70 4,771.23 
Total 440 552 25% 27,680.16 35,283.27 
Note: The concentration index of the public subsidies for hospitalization was -0.023 in 2001 and 
-0.115 in 2003 
Total and per capita public subsidies for both ambulatory service use and hospitalization 
prior to and after UC, and changes in the public subsidy by income quintile, are 
summarized in Table 6.6. In 2001 prices, the public subsidy for all health services 
increased from approximately 58,733 million Baht in 2001 to 80,678 million Baht in 
2003, an increase of 370/0. Similar to the results of benefit incidence for ambulatory 
service use, the first quintile had the highest increase in the public subsidy per capita, 
followed by the second quintile; while the fifth quintile had the lowest increase. Further 
analysis reveals that a rise in ambulatory service use and hospitalization at primary and 
secondary care levels triggered the increase in the public subsidy for the poorer quintiles. 
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Table 6.6: Total and per capita public subsidies for ambulatory service and hospitalization in 2001 
and 2003 by income quintile 
Per capita Total public subsidy for 
Income 
public subsidy all health services 
quintile (Baht) (million Baht) 
2001 2003 % 2001 2003 (in 2001 prices) change (in 2001 prices) 
1 1,076 1,692 57% 16,494.26 25 ,240.44 
2 892 1,358 52% 11,865.63 17,990.27 
3 865 1,011 17% 9,899.08 11,871.04 
4 881 1,103 25% 10,195.04 13,259.48 
5 915 1,031 13% 10,278.94 12,316.39 
Total 934 1,263 35% 58,732.95 80,677.61 
An analysis of the share of public subsidies for all health services in 2001 and 2003 also 
shows the increasing share for public subsidies in the first and second quintiles (Figure 
6.1). In contrast, the share for the subsidies in other income quintiles decreased after the 
UC policy was implemented. The first quintile had the highest share of the public 
subsidies in both years, while the third quintile had the lowest. 


















6.3.4 Geographical distribution of public subsidies prior to and after UC 
This sub-section explores the distribution of net public subsidies across different 
geographical areas in Thailand. According to the government administrative structure 
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and cultural diversity, Thailand has been generally classified into five regions, namely 
North, Northeast, East, Central, and South. Given the regional variation in the 
distribution of health care infrastructure and health workforce, as well as economic 
developments, this sub-section employs this classification to assess changes in the 
geographical distribution of net public health subsidies prior to and after universal 
coverage. Given its distinctive health service infrastructure and economic development, 
Bangkok is categorized as another region in this analysis. 
The share of net public subsidies on health differed from region to region, and per capita 
public subsidies by region changed significantly after the UC policy was implemented. 
The Northeastern region, which has the largest land area and highest number of poor, 
gained the largest share of net public health subsidies in both years. The Eastern region, 
the smallest area, had the lowest share. In 2003, Bangkok and the North were two 
regions where the share of public subsidies increased, while the other regions had a 
decrease (Figure 6.2). When public subsidies per capita were analyzed, it was found that 
the South gained the highest subsidy per capita in 2001, while the North had the highest 
subsidy per capita in 2003 (Figure 6.3). In addition, the increase in per capita public 
subsidy after UC was highest in the North, followed by Bangkok and the Northeast, 
respectively. 
Figure 6.2: Geographical distribution of public subsidies for ambulatory services and 
hospitalization in 2001 and 2003 















~ f 1,000 
.c C1I 









BKK Central (excl. North Northeastern South East 
BKK) 
Region 
With a focus on the impact of the UC policy on the poorest (first) quintile, a further 
analysis of per capita public subsidy by income quintile and region in 2001 and 2003 was 
conducted. It was found that in 2001 the first quintile in the Central region had the 
highest public subsidy per capita, while their counterpart in Bangkok obtained the lowest 
(Table 6.7). After two years of UC implementation, the first quintile in Bangkok 
obtained the highest public subsidy per capita, while the poorest quintile in the Eastern 
region gained the lowest subsidy per capita (Table 6.8). 
Table 6.7: Mean Eublic subsid~ Eer caEita (Baht) b~ income guintile and re~ion in 2001 
Income Bangkok Central North Northeast South East Overall guintile (excl. BKK2 
QI 930.1 1,720.4 1,145.6 957.8 1,433.0 1,410.4 1,076.1 
Q2 551.4 859.4 894.1 892 .2 993.1 665.8 892.1 
Q3 773.4 927.0 839.8 822.1 912.5 810.2 865.3 
Q4 696.9 842.9 1,001.5 1,066.0 957.4 629.3 881.2 
Q5 527.4 939.7 1,299.4 1,475.2 1,402.7 820.7 915 .2 
Mean 613.2 960.6 995.6 970.7 1,066.6 786.2 934.2 
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Table 6.8: Mean Eublic subsidl: Eer caE ita (Baht) bl: income guintile and re~ion in 2003 
Income Bangkok Central North Northeast South 
guintile (excl. BKK) East Overall 
Ql 2,230.4 2,210.6 2,167.1 1,476.7 1,710.9 1,340.0 1,734.4 
Q2 1,144.2 1,440.6 1,517.6 1,394.9 1,226.3 1,286.0 1,392.0 
Q3 861.9 1,15l.9 1,325.7 923.9 893.1 804.3 1,036.5 
Q4 665.7 1,162.3 1,522.1 1,43l.8 1,087.4 667.4 1, l30.3 
Q5 1,029.8 901.8 1,540.4 1,134.7 1,233.9 540.3 1,056.4 
Mean 947.1 1,229.8 1,638.3 1,299.4 1,154.0 797.9 1,262.9 
Another analysis reveals that per capita public subsidies in all regions were pro-poor, 
except for the Northeastern region in 2001. Bangkok had the highest negative value for 
the concentration index, or the greatest pro-poor nature in 2001, while the Eastern region 
had the highest index in 2003 (Figure 6.4). In addition, the Eastern region had the 
highest increase in the pro-poor nature of public subsidy per capita. 
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6.3.5 Effect of using regional unit subsidies on BIA 
Inequality in the distribution of government health resources is usually a major factor 
contributing to disparities in benefit incidence by area and socio-economic group. An 
analysis of benefit incidence, using average unit subsidies for calculating benefit 
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incidence, may mask inequality if government health resources are unevenly distributed. 
Demery (2000) supported the use of regional data to reflect variations in public subsidies. 
Moreover, evidence from South Africa showed that the choice of aggregated or 
disaggregated unit subsidies made a significant difference to BIA (Castro-Leal 1996). 
This sub-section, therefore, analyzes and compares the difference in benefit incidence in 
2003 according to whether the analysis used average national unit subsidies or regional 
data. 
In general, the costs of public health services vary throughout the country because of 
differences in infrastructure, human resources, and types of health service provision. The 
analysis of benefit incidence in this sub-section employs unit subsidies by region for 
health centres, community hospitals, and provincial/regional hospitals, which were 
derived from secondary data of the input and output monthly reports from public health 
facilities under the MOPH. Figures of unit subsidies for health services at university 
hospitals, other public hospitals, private clinics, and private hospitals were collected from 
existing literature and previous studies. For CSMBS, the different weights of unit 
subsidies of the UC scheme by health care level and region were applied to differentiate 
the unit subsidies of CSMBS at the national level. Details of different unit subsidies for 
the UC scheme and CSMBS by health care level and region are presented in Tables 6.9 
and 6.10. The unit subsidies for SSS and UC scheme beneficiaries were assumed to be 
equivalent because these two schemes have similar provider payment methods. 
Table 6.9: Mean unit subsidy for ambulatory service use by type of health facility and region in 
2003 
Provincial and Other public and Priv Priv Health centre Community hosp 
regional hosp university hosp clinics hosp Region 
UC& UC& UC& UC& SSS SSS CSMBS CSMBS CSMBS CSMBS SSS SSS SSS SSS 
North 64 102 326 516 515 816 757 1,201 120 515 
Northeast 53 84 269 426 452 716 665 1,054 99 452 
East 75 120 382 605 565 895 831 1,317 140 565 
Central 67 107 343 543 559 886 822 1J03 126 559 &BKK 
South 62 99 315 499 551 873 810 1,285 116 551 
Total 61 97 310 491 525 832 772 1,224 114 525 
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Table 610 M b ean umt su sidy for hospitalization by type of health facility and region in 2003 
Community hosp Provincial and Other public and 
Region 
regional hosp university hosp Private hospital 
UC& UC& UC& 
SSS CSMBS SSS CSMBS SSS CSMBS SSS CSMBS 
North 5,216 10,598 9,787 19,886 13,629 27,692 9,787 19,886 
Northeast 4,307 8,751 8,593 17,460 11,966 24,314 8,593 17,460 
East 6,118 12,431 10,739 21,820 14,954 30,386 10,739 21,820 
Central & 5,489 1 1,153 10,616 21,570 14,783 30,038 BKK 
10,616 21,570 
South 5,040 10,241 10,476 21,286 14,588 29,641 10,476 21,286 
Total 4,960 10,078 9,974 20,266 13,889 28,221 9,974 20,266 
Table 6.11 shows the differences in the amount and share of net public subsidies gained 
by different income quintiles when comparing aggregated and regional unit subsidies. 
The use of regional unit subsidies did lead to a difference in the share of net public 
subsidies in some income quintiles, especially the fifth quintile. However, this would not 
have affected the ultimate conclusion on the change in the distribution of public subsidies 
between 2001 and 2003. 
Table 6.11: Amount and share of public subsidies by income quintile in 2003 using aggregated 
d . I . b 'd' an reglOna umt su SI les 
Public subsidies for ambulatory service and hospitalization 
Quintile Using aggregated unit Percent Using regional unit Percent 
subsidy (million Baht) subsidy (million Baht) 
Ql 25,861.99 31 23,235.18 28 
Q2 17,986.05 21 16,433.83 20 
Q3 14,178.19 17 13,550.16 16 
Q4 12,733.05 15 13,118.22 16 
Q5 13,849.07 16 16,367.32 20 
Total 82,704.72 100 82,704.72 100 
6.3.6 Impact of using an asset index as a socio-economic parameter on BIA 
This sub-section aims to explore differences in benefit incidence in 2003 based on 
whether or not income per capita or an asset index is used to group individuals into 
different quintiles. As stated earlier, the 2003 HWS questionnaire contains data on 
individual monthly income, housing characteristics, and a set of questions on household 
assets, all of which provide an opportunity to construct an asset index to categorize 
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individuals and households into different economic groups. Results of the factor scores 
and the mean of the top ten asset variables are presented in Table 6.12. 
Table 6.12: Factor score and mean value of the top ten asset variables by asset quintile using the 
2003 HWS 
Asset variables Overall F actor score 
mean 
Mean value of each asset quintile 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Washing Machine 0.2745 0.47 0.03 0.14 0.42 0.80 0.95 
Telephone 0.2615 0.33 0.01 0.06 0.20 0.51 0.89 
V ideo Recorder 0.2443 0.62 0.15 0.40 0.69 0.87 0.96 
Mobile Phone 0.2417 0.56 0.12 0.32 0.62 0.81 0.94 
Refrigerator 0.2404 0.86 0.41 0.91 0.98 1.00 1.00 
Electric Pot Boiler 0.2385 0.68 0.21 0.53 0.78 0.91 0.98 
Air Conditioner 0.2365 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.63 0.61 
Bed 0.2337 0.63 0.19 0.44 0.68 0.88 0.97 
Water Boiler 0.2298 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.59 
Electric Iron 0.2264 0.87 0.47 0.92 0.98 0.99 1.00 
Note: The correlation between individual quintiles classified by the asset index and income per 
capita was 0.52, after analytical weights were applied. 
Individuals in the 2003 HWS were categorized into different quintiles using the asset 
index, and health service use and public subsidies gained by different asset quintiles were 
calculated. Table 6.13 shows details of the total and share of public subsidies on health 
services by income and asset quintiles in 2003. 
From Table 6.13, the distribution of public subsidies for all health servIces is quite 
similar. The first quintile obtained the highest share of net public subsidies, followed by 
the second quintile. However, the third quintile had the lowest share of net public 
subsidies when the income quintile was used, while the fifth quintile obtained the lowest 
share when the asset index was employed. The share of public subsidies differed most 
for the third quintile. The concentration index of the public subsidy for all health services 
by asset quintile was less pro-poor than that of using income quintile. 
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Table 6.13: Amount and share of public subsidies for ambulatory services and hospitalization by 
d . '1 . 2003 income an asset qumtt es m 
Net public subsidies for ambulatory and in-patient services 
Quintile in 2003 
By income quintile Percent By asset quintile Percent 
(million Baht) (million Baht) 
Ql 25,874.63 31 24,569.18 30 
Q2 18,442.29 22 16,985.33 20 
Q3 12,169.31 15 16,547.60 20 
Q4 13,592.64 17 12,924.99 16 
Q5 12,625.85 15 11,677.63 14 
Total 82,704.72 100 82,704.72 100 
Concentration 
-0.123 -0.039 index 
In conclusion, these findings support the possibility for using the asset index as an 
alternative tool for classifying individual's socio-economic status in the analysis of 
benefit incidence, since results did not differ greatly. 
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6.4 Discussion and interpretation of research findings 
This section presents a summary of research findings, data and methodological 
limitations in the analyses of benefit incidence prior to and after UC, general discussion 
on research findings, and conclusions of the impact of the UC policy on changes in 
benefit incidence. 
6.4.1 Summary of research findings 
In this chapter, the results from the analyses of benefit incidence showed an increase in 
the pro-poor nature of net public health subsidies by income quintile and geographical 
area after two years of UC implementation. Regarding ambulatory service use, the first 
quintile obtained the highest share of net public subsidies in both years, and also attained 
the highest increase in public subsidies per capita. The fifth and third quintiles had the 
lowest shares in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Regarding hospitalization, per capita 
public subsidy increased in all income quintiles, except the fifth category, and the second 
quintile had the highest increase, followed by the first quintile. The share of total public 
subsidies in 2003 showed a more pro-poor nature of the Thai health care system because 
of the significant increase in per capita public subsidies for the first and second quintiles 
compared to 2001. Though per capita public subsidies for other quintiles also increased, 
the share of these quintiles decreased after two years of UC implementation. Regarding 
geographical distribution, per capita public subsidy significantly increased in the North 
and the Northeast where the poor primarily reside. The first quintile in the Bangkok 
region obtained the highest public subsidy per capita in 2003, while that of the Eastern 
region had the lowest. The sensitivity analyses of choice of socio-economic group 
indicator (income per capita or an asset index), and use of national aggregated or regional 
unit subsidies, showed similar conclusions on the share of public subsidies by different 
quintiles. 
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6.4.2 Methodological and data limitations 
As stated in Chapter 5, lack of a rigorous socio-economic parameter in the 2001 and 2003 
HWS led to limitations in the analyses of health care use and benefit incidence prior to 
and after UC. The income brackets used in the 2001 HWS questionnaire and a shortage 
of other socio-economic parameters resulted in the use of the mid-point of the brackets to 
estimate household and individual monthly income in 2001. Total household income was 
derived by combining the income earned by every household member, and individuals 
were placed in different quintiles according to the amount of household income shared 
out to each household member by the modified-OECD equivalence approach. Using this 
approach, there would inevitably be some errors in categorizing individuals into different 
income quintiles in 2001. Also, the open-ended question on individual monthly income 
in cash and kind in the 2003 HWS could not adequately address the drawback of lacking 
a robust socio-economic parameter to group individuals into different income quintiles. 
These data limitations, therefore, led to some degree of uncertainty in the analyses of 
changes in benefit incidence prior to and after UC. 
Another problem on the estimate of benefit incidence is the absence of the frequency of 
ambulatory service use in the 2001 HWS. Though the number of individuals utilizing 
ambulatory services more than once in two weeks prior to the interview tended to be low, 
this data limitation inevitably led to underreporting of ambulatory service use, and 
therefore fewer public subsidies gained by different income quintiles in 2001. In 
addition, an analysis of the 2003 HWS in Chapter 5 shows that individuals in poorer 
quintiles had a higher frequency of illness and ambulatory service use than richer 
categories. So, the absence of the frequency of ambulatory service use in the 2001 HWS 
is likely to have resulted in a less pro-poor nature of public subsidies for ambulatory care 
prior to UC than it tended to be. 
The absence of a question on user charges paid for the last ambulatory service use in the 
2001 HWS reduced the accuracy of the estimate on net public subsidies for ambulatory 
services prior to UC. It is likely that lack of out-of-pocket payment data would impact 
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the findings of benefit incidence in two different ways. On the one hand, if the amount of 
user fees per capita paid by those in the poorer quintiles to public health facilities was 
higher than that of the richer groups, then net public subsidies for ambulatory services in 
2001 would be less pro-poor than presented. On the other hand, if the poor paid fewer 
user fees for ambulatory services than the rich, then the pro-poor nature of public 
subsidies for health would be greater than the findings. Analysis of the 2000 SES 
indicates that the average household health expenditure for ambulatory services of poorer 
households was less than that of richer groups. The average household health 
expenditure for ambulatory care from the 2000 SES ranged from 46 Baht per capita per 
month in the poorest decile to 571 Baht in the richest (Vasavid, Tisayatikom et al. 2005). 
Although the exact amount of user fees paid at government health facilities in the 2001 
HWS was not quantifiable, the evidence from the 2000 SES suggests that if user fees had 
been deducted from public subsidies in BIA, net public subsidies for ambulatory services 
would have been even more pro-poor. 
As stated previously in Chapter 5, another problem the 2001 HWS encountered was the 
limitation in choices of ambulatory service use and hospitalization in the 2001 HWS 
questionnaire which also led to some degree of inaccuracy in the analysis of benefit 
incidence. For example, the absence of a choice for university hospitals in the 2001 
HWS questionnaire meant that health seeking behaviour at university hospitals had to be 
grouped with provincial or other public hospitals. The difference in unit subsidy between 
provincial or other public hospitals and university hospitals unavoidably led to 
uncertainty in the estimate of benefit incidence in 2001. 
Another major impact on the analysis of benefit incidence is the accuracy in unit costs of 
health services provided by government health facilities and private providers receiving 
public subsidies from the government. As shown in sub-section 6.3.2 and 6.3.4, existing 
studies on unit costs of health services in public health facilities were very limited, and 
the analysis of benefit incidence in this chapter had to use many assumptions and 
estimations to compute unit costs of health services provided by public providers outside 
the MOPH and private health care providers. The main problem was the inability to 
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access secondary data on financial input and output of other public health facilities 
outside the MOPH (e.g. military and university hospitals) and private health facilities, 
while access to such data for public health facilities under the MOPH was not 
problematic. In addition, the estimate of unit costs of health services among different 
health insurance schemes in the analysis greatly relied on limited secondary data and 
many assumptions. These, therefore, led to limitations and uncertainty in the analysis of 
benefit incidence gained by beneficiaries of different health insurance schemes. 
6.4.3 General discussion 
From the research findings, the pro-poor nature of public subsidies on health in 2001 and 
2003 can be explained by different patterns of health services used by richer and poorer 
quintiles. The analysis of health service use in the 2001 and 2003 HWS shows that the 
higher use rate by the poorer quintiles at health centres and community hospitals was a 
significant factor contributing to the pro-poor nature of public subsidies on health both 
prior to and after UC. Since the majority of the poor in Thailand reside in the rural areas, 
particularly in the North-eastern region, health centres and community hospitals are 
government health facilities that the poor can have a better access to health care and 
benefit from government health resources. Prior to UC, the poor could obtain public 
subsidies on health through targeting public health insurance schemes, namely the LIC 
and the VHC schemes, and after UC they gained public subsidies through the UC scheme 
which ·contracts the district-based health care network to provide health services for its 
beneficiaries. The considerable increase in per capita public subsidies of the first and 
second income quintiles in 2003 compared to other income categories (Table 6.6) reflects 
the success of the UC policy in providing more equitable distribution of public subsidies 
on health. It is noteworthy that though the pattern of ambulatory service use and 
hospitalization between the rich and the poor at provincial and regional hospitals tended 
to be more pro-poor after UC, health service use at these higher levels of health care 
slightly contributed to the pro-poor distribution of public subsidies due to a lower use rate 
per capita, compared to that of health centres and community hospitals. 
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The different geographical distribution of public health facilities is another reason whv 
~ 
those in the poorer quintiles utilized ambulatory services at health centres and community 
hospitals more frequently than the rich. In general, health centres and community 
hospitals serve as the main government health facilities providing primary and secondary 
health care at the sub-district and district levels where the poor primarily reside. In 
contrast, the rich can better access and utilize ambulatory services and hospitalization at 
provincial and regional hospitals, private clinics, and private hospitals, which are mostly 
located in urban areas. So the increase in public subsidies and the allocation of public 
resources to health centres and community hospitals where the poor had already derived 
significant benefits could increase public subsidies obtained by the poor and the 
disadvantaged. The strategy to promote the use of primary care through contracting PCU 
as gatekeepers also supported the re-allocation of government health resources to the 
poor in rural areas. 
Changes in geographical distribution of public subsidies for all health servIces 
(ambulatory visits and hospitalization) between 2001 and 2003 show a considerable 
increase in per capita public subsidy of those in the North and Bangkok. An increase in 
health service use of people in these two regions tended to be the main factor resulting in 
the significant changes in per capita public subsidy in 2003 because the number of 
population in each region and unit subsidy for health service provision between 2001 and 
2003 were quite similar (Table 6.2 and 6.3). Better access to government health services 
of the poor and those who were previously uninsured in Bangkok (Vasavid, 
Tangcharoensathien et al. 2004), and the high prevalence rate of HIV / AIDS in Bangkok 
and the Northern region of Thailand (WHO Regional Office for South-East Asia 2007), 
which requires more health service use of people in this region, tended to be main factors 
contributing to the significant increase in per capita public subsidy in 2003. It is 
noteworthy that findings from the geographical distribution of public spending on health 
in 2003, especially public subsidies for Bangkok, are likely to be under-estimated 
because of the absence of unit subsidy data for specialized health facilities and university 
hospitals in Bangkok. 
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From Table 6.7 and 6.8, a considerable increase in per capita public subsidy of the first 
income quintile in 2003 confinns the success of the DC policy in improving the 
distribution of public subsidies on health to the poor in all regions of the country. 
Although the Northeastern region gained the highest share of public subsidies on health 
in 2001, higher income quintiles obtained a larger share of such public subsidies and this 
resulted in a positive value of the concentration index in this region. However, after 
implementation of the DC policy, poorer quintiles in the Northeastern region gained a 
larger share of public subsidies which resulted in a negative value of the concentration 
index and a more pro-poor nature of the public subsidy distribution in 2003 (Figure 6.4). 
It should be noted that the DC policy helped improve the distribution of public subsidies 
in all regions to be more equitable in 2003, particularly in the Eastern and the Central 
regIOns. 
In this analysis, there was no change in the conclusion of the distribution of public health 
subsidies by income quintile when the aggregate and regional unit subsidies were used 
for the estimate of benefit incidence. The first quintile consistently gained the highest 
share of net public health subsidies, followed by the second quintile; the distribution of 
public subsidies was still pro-poor. Moreover, using the asset index to categorize 
individuals into different quintiles did not provide a significant change in share of 
government health resources among different welfare categories. 
The analysis of benefit incidence shows that not only the poor benefited from public 
health subsidies prior to and after DC, but those in richer quintiles also gained public 
subsidies, but to a smaller extent. Given that public health resources are scarce, many 
policy analysts and policy makers in developing countries prefer using a targeted 
approach to maximize the use of public health resources to achieve policy objectives of 
poverty reduction and improving equity. However, evidence shows that the targeted 
approach also faces the problem of resource leakage, while narrow targeting often incurs 
high hidden costs (Van de Walle 1998). In contrast, a universal approach generally 
results in equal opportunities and access to similar services, but often has high costs from 
waste and leakage of health resources. Therefore, the debate over whether a health sector 
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should employ targeted or universal coverage has been widely discussed (Health 
Financing Task Force 2007). However, results from the analysis of benefit incidence 
prior to and after UC show that the UC policy was more pro-poor than the previous 
situation even though the universal approach was used. Health financing arrangements of 
universal coverage in terms of using the PCU as the main contractor for providing health 
services, a comprehensive and generous benefit package, and the nationwide distribution 
of government health facilities, are likely to be the major factors contributing to the pro-
poor nature of the UC policy in Thailand. 
6.4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that net public health subsidies for the Thai health care system 
were pro-poor prior to and after UC, and the pro-poor nature of the public subsidies was 
greater in 2003. The first quintile gained the highest share and highest per capita public 
subsidy in 2001 and 2003, while the third quintile had the lowest in both years. The 
increase in the negative values of the concentration indexes and geographical distribution 
support the research findings of the more pro-poor distribution of public subsidies after 
the UC policy was implemented. The continuous development of pro-poor strategies for 
health sector reform, the nationwide distribution of government health facilities to district 
and sub-district levels, and the design of health financing arrangements under the UC 
scheme, were all crucial factors contributing to the more pro-poor nature of public 
subsidies. Limitations in the secondary data of health service use in the HWS surveys 
and unit costs of health services led to a cautious interpretation of the BIA results. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EQUITY IN HEALTHCARE FINANCE AND FINANCIAL RISK PROTECTION 
PRIOR TO AND AFTER UNIVERSAL COVERAGE 
7.1 Introduction 
Health care finance in Thailand was greatly affected by the introduction of the new health 
financing strategies under the UC policy (Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 
2005; Tisayatikom, Patcharanarumol et al. 2007; International Health Policy Program 
2007b). As stated in previous chapters, the financing strategies comprised: 1) changing 
provider payment from historical allocations to close-ended payments; 2) promoting the 
use of primary care by contracting a PCU to serve as the main contractor and gatekeeper; 
and, 3) removing financial barriers to health services through greatly increased general 
tax funding and introducing a nominal co-payment of 30 Baht per ambulatory visit or 
hospital admission. With these financing strategies, the main source for financing 
healthcare in Thailand has gradually shifted from individual out-of-pocket payments to 
public finance because the UC scheme covers more than 75% of the population and this 
scheme is mainly financed by general tax revenue (Tisayatikom, Patcharanarumol et al. 
2007). Though beneficiaries of the UC scheme had to initially bear costs of co-payment, 
the nominal fee of 30 baht per health care visit was abolished by the military-appointed 
government in November 2006 due to its inability to prevent moral hazard, compared to 
supply-side interventions (Treerutkuarkul 2006). 
Apart from the impact on health financing arrangements, evidence indicates that the UC 
policy also affected household spending on health. For example, a study on the impact of 
the UC policy on Thai households shows a decrease in household spending on health. 
especially in poorer deciles (Vasavid, Tisayatikom et al. 2004). An analysis of equity in 
health care finance demonstrates a reduction in the incidence of catastrophic health 
expenditure after the UC policy was implemented (Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien 
et al. 2005). In addition, analyses of health service use in Chapter 5 and benefit incidence 
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in Chapter 6 indicate that individuals in poorer income quintiles could better access 
health services and benefited more from net public subsidies on health. Though the Thai 
health care system achieved universal coverage in 2002 and household spending on 
health tended to decrease, some Thai households still faced catastrophic health spending 
from medical care costs (Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2005; 
Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007). 
Given that the objectives of the UC policy are to ensure equitable access to health 
services and protect households from expensive medical care costs, an assessment of 
equity in overall health care finance prior to and after UC, along with the magnitude of 
households facing catastrophic health expenditure by income quintile, would reflect the 
effectiveness of the UC policy in health financing reform and financial risk protection. 
7.2 Specific aims 
The aims of this chapter are to: 
a) explore equity in all types of household spending on health of different income 
quintiles prior to and after UC; 
b) analyze the magnitude of households facing catastrophic health expenditure by 
income quintile prior to and after UC; and, 
c) describe the impact of the UC policy on changes in equity of health care finance 
of the Thai health care system, household spending on health, and financial risk 
protection for households from medical care costs. 
7.3 Methods 
This was a secondary data analysis of the Socio-economic Survey (SES), a nationally 
representative and cross-sectional household survey on income, expenditure, and 
household socio-economic status. The SES is a biennial household survey comprising 
data on monthly income and expenditure, health expenditure, household debt and assets, 
ownership of durable and semi-durable goods, housing characteristics, and other 
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household living conditions. To assess changes in equity in household spending on 
health, per capita expenditure of all types of household health payments by income 
quintile prior to and after UC was analyzed. Given that the UC policy was implemented 
in 2001, the 2000 SES was appropriate to use as the data source for an analysis of 
household spending on health and equity in health care finance prior to UC, and the 2002 
SES was appropriate for an analysis of the situation after UC. Regarding household 
ability to pay, this study employed household income per capita adjusted using the 
modified DECD-equivalence scale as a means test to categorize households into different 
income quintiles. 
In general, analysis of equity in health care finance comprises two stages of computation 
(O'Donnell, Doorslaer et al. 2008). The first is to compute the progressivity of each type 
of health care financing source. The second is to establish the overall progressivity of the 
system by weighting the progressivity of the separate health financing sources. Analysis 
of equity in each household health payment type can be assessed through the 
concentration index and the concentration curve. This should be assessed against the 
household ability to pay (either household per capita income or expenditure), which is 
usually presented as the Lorenz curve. 
The Lorenz curve of household income or other measures of household ability to pay 
serves as a graphical representation of the cumulative distribution of household wealth. 
The Lorenz curve graphs on the x-axis using the cumulative percentage of households 
ranked by living standards, starting from the poorest, and on the y-axis the cumulative 
percentage of household income or expenditure corresponding to each cumulative 
percentage of the distribution of the living standard variable. In this analysis, the 
sampled households were ranked on the x-axis by household income per capita adjusted 
by a modified-OECD equivalence scale, and on the y-axis by cumulative household 
Income. 
The progressivity of health care finance was assessed graphically through a comparison 
of the concentration curve of health payments, with the Lorenz curve of household 
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income representing household ability to pay. Both curves were plotted against the 
cumulative proportion of the sampled households ranked by household income per capita. 
Typically, the Lorenz and health payment concentration curves are proportional if they 
coincide. The concentration curve lies outside the Lorenz curve if the health payment is 
progressive, and vice versa for a regressive health payment. 
The Kakwani index, another indicator for measuring the progressivity of health care 
payments, is defined as twice the area between the concentration curve of health payment 
and the Lorenz curve. The index can be calculated as, n K =C-G, where C is the health 
payment's concentration index and G is the Gini coefficient of household income or 
expenditure. The value of the Kakwani index (n J ranges from -2 to 1. A negative 
Kakwani index value indicates the regressive nature of health care payments, and the 
concentration curve lies inside the Lorenz curve. In contrast, a positive value indicates 
the progressive nature of health care payments, and its concentration curve lies outside 
the Lorenz curve. 
In this chapter, catastrophic health expenditure is defined as a situation where household 
out-of-pocket payments for health are higher than 100/0 of household income. This 
threshold payment has been widely used because it is accepted that households having 
healthcare payments above this level would have to cut food consumption, go into debt, 
and become impoverished (Prescott 1999; Ranson 2002). Though there is another 
indicator of catastrophic health expenditure using 'household capacity to pay', where 
household payments for basic consumption needs such as food are firstly deducted from 
household income or total expenditure (World Health Organization 2000), this approach 
is problematic for analyzing the progressivity of health care finance (O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008). 
It should be noted that at the time the research was planned, there were no available 
studies on financing incidence prior to and after universal coverage in Thailand. Since 
then, however, the author was involved in several studies on the impact of the UC policy 
on equity in health care finance and the Thai health care system led by Dr. Viroj 
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Tangcharoensathien, Dr. Supon Limwattananon, and other researchers (Limwattananon, 
Tangcharoensathien, Prakongsai 2005; Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien, Prakongsai 
2007). This chapter, in part, replicates those analyses, but with some differences 
compared with already published work, namely: 
• analyzing various types of household payments for health (i.e. direct and indirect 
tax payments, out-of-pocket payments, social health insurance contributions, 
private insurance premiums), while the other studies merely focused on 
household out-of-pocket payments; 
• using a modified-OECD equivalence scale to adjust household size in producing 
per capita household income; other studies used the total number of household 
members; and, 
• using monthly household income per capita adjusted with the modified OECD-
equivalence scale as the socio-economic parameter and the indicator of 
household ability to pay; Limwattananon et al (2005) used household 
consumption expenditure per capita as the socio-economic parameter. 
7.3.1 Types of household health care payments and data sources 
Typically, an assessment of equity in health care finance requires examination of all 
sources of health care funding and should include household payments that are not 
exclusively for health care. As shown in Chapter 3, the Thai health care system is 
financed by a mixture of health care financing sources, namely general tax, social health 
insurance contributions, out-of-pocket payments, and private health insurance premiums. 
Therefore, to assess the impact of the UC policy on equity in health care finance, the 
analysis of household health payments for different income quintiles should include: 
• direct taxes; 
• indirect taxes; 
• household out-of-pocket payments for health; 
• social health insurance contributions; and, 
• private health insurance premiums. 
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The SES contained data on household income and health-related expenditure that could 
be used for the analysis of equity in health care finance and household spending on health 
by income quintile. Regarding household income, data on the variety of cash income 
(e.g. basic salary, bonuses, over-time earnings, profits from business, interest received 
from bank accounts, etc.) earned by all household members during the last month and last 
year were collected. In addition, in-kind income from agricultural products of 
households located in rural areas, self-employed businesses, and household produced 
commodities, was assessed as household earnings. Regarding health related 
expenditures, information about out-of-pocket payments for healthcare and social health 
insurance contributions in the previous month, and household payments for direct taxes 
and private health insurance premiums in the previous year, were recorded. Data on 
household consumption expenditure for various kinds of goods and services during the 
month prior to the interview were also available for the estimate of household indirect tax 
payments. Moreover, data on changes in household assets and liabilities, ownership of 
durable and semi-durable goods, housing characteristics, and household living conditions 
were also collected. The number of sampled households in the 2000 and 2002 SES were 
24,747 and 17,489 households, respectively. 
Information about direct tax payments is located in Category 900, Record 06 of the SES 
and comprises household payments for personal income taxes, and other direct taxes such 
as house and land tax during the previous year. Before 2004, those who with annual 
incomes of less than 80,000 Baht were exempt from paying income tax; this income tax 
exemption ceiling was later raised to 100,000 Baht in 2004. In Thailand, the personal 
income tax rate is progressive, ranging from 00/0 to 370/0 (Table 7.1). In this analysis, 
expenditure for personal income tax by all household members and other direct tax 
payments such as house and land taxes, were combined and calculated to determine the 
household direct tax payments. 
189 
Table 7.1 : Personal income tax rates in Thailand 
Taxable income 
(Baht) 
0- 80,000 (before 2004) 
0- 100,000 (2004 onwards) 
100,001 - 500,000 
500,001 - 1,000,000 
1,000,001 - 4,000,000 









Source: The Revenue Department, Ministry of Finance, Thailand 
Value Added Tax (VAT), or taxes imposed on the value added of each stage of 
production and distribution of goods and services in Thailand, comprised the majority of 
indirect tax. V AT was first introduced in Thailand in 1992, and traders with gross 
incomes of 300,000 Baht in any single month or more than 1.8 million Baht per year are 
required to register for VAT. The VAT tax rate has been fixed at 70/0 since its 
introduction. Goods and services exempt from VAT include: 
• unprocessed agricultural products and related goods such as fertilizers, animal 
feeds, pesticides; 
• newspapers, magazines, and textbooks; 
• healthcare services provided by government and private hospitals as well as 
clinics; 
• educational serVIces provided by government and private schools and other 
recognized educational institutions; 
• medical and auditing services, litigation services and other similar professional 
serVIces; 
• rent of immovable property; 
• cultural services such as amateur sports, libraries, museums and zoos; 
• services related to employment of labour, research and technical services and 
services of public entertainers; and, 
• other services such as religious and charitable services, services of government 
agencies and local authorities. 
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With this list of V A T exemptions, data on household consumption expenditure in the 
SES were classified into two groups: VAT-exempt and VAT-taxable goods and services. 
The former (e.g. expenditures for education and textbooks, renting properties, 
transportation and cultural services, household expenditures on health, and payments for 
private health insurance premiums) was deducted from total household consumption 
expenditure. Then, household indirect tax payments were estimated at 70/0 of the rest of 
household consumption expenditure which was presumed to be V AT-taxable goods and 
servIces. 
Regarding household out-of-pocket payments for health care, the SES contained data on 
household payments for health care during the previous month in three categories: self-
medication for medical supplies; expenditure for out-patient services; and expenditure for 
in-patient care. Information about different levels of health care (e.g. health centre, 
community or provincial hospital, or private hospital) and types of health facility (public 
or private facility) was also obtained for utilization of out-patient and in-patient health 
services. As stated earlier, household expenditure for health care is exempt from tax 
payments. Therefore, in this analysis household expenditure in these three categories was 
combined to determine household out-of-pocket payments for healthcare during the 
previous month. 
Information about private health insurance premiums was available in Group 930, Record 
06 of the SES. This was recorded as expenditure for life insurance premiums of private 
insurance companies, and cremation fees (which are widely organized by many 
communities in the rural areas of Thailand). Household expenditure for these two items 
was identified as expenditure for private health insurance premiums. 
Information about social health insurance contributions in the SES was available as Code 
4 in Group 920 of Record 06. SSS beneficiaries who earned more than 1,650 Baht per 
month had to pay monthly contributions at a rate of 50/0 of their basic salary to the Social 
Security Fund, while SSS beneficiaries who earned less than that benchmark were 
exempt from SHI contributions. The Fund collected the social insurance contributions 
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from three parties: employers, employees, and the government. Contributions from SSS 
beneficiaries are capped at 15,000 Baht per month or 180,000 Baht per year. 
Finally, all types of household payments for health were computed by income quintile 
both prior to and after UC, using the 2000 and 2002 SES. 
7.3.2 Measuring progressivity by type of household payments for health 
As stated earlier, the concentration index and concentration curve are widely used for 
quantifying the degree of income-related health inequality, and in this chapter, they were 
employed as measures to assess the progressivity of each type of household health 
payments. Similar to the Lorenz curve, in this analysis the concentration curve of each 
type of household health payment graphs on the x-axis the cumulative percentage of 
households ranked by income per capita, and on the y-axis the cmTIulative percentage of 
the distribution of household health payments per capita. The concentration index is 
defined as twice the area between the concentration curve and the line of equality (the 45-
degree line running from the bottom-left comer to the top-right). 
To analyze equity in health care finance, the concentration curve of household spending 
on each type of household health payment and the Lorenz curve of household income 
were analyzed and compared in order to demonstrate the redistributive impact of 
household healthcare payments. The Kakwani index, which shows a difference between 
the Gini coefficient of household income and the concentration index of household 
payment for health, was calculated. Changes in the concentration and Kakwani indexes 
for each type, as well as overall household health payments prior to and after UC, were 
also calculated. In addition, changes in the incidence of households facing catastrophic 
health expenditure by income quintile were investigated. 
192 
7.3.3 Measuring catastrophic health expenditure and impoverishment 
In this analysis, household out-of-pocket payments for health in excess of 100/0 of 
household income were used as an indicator for identifying households facing 
catastrophic health expenditure. The share of households facing catastrophic health 
expenditure by income quintile prior to and after UC, in 2000 and 2002, was analyzed. 
In addition, the distribution of household health expenditure as a percentage of household 
income in 2000 and 2002 was estimated. 
7.4 Results 
In this section, results from the secondary data analyses of the 2000 and 2002 SES are 
presented in eight sub-sections including: 1) monthly household income; 2) direct tax 
payments; 3) indirect tax payments; 4) out-of-pocket payments for health; 5) social health 
insurance contributions; 6) private health insurance premiums; 7) the progressivity of 
overall health care finance; and, 8) households facing catastrophic health payments. 
Analyses of these eight sub-sections are presented by income quintile and compared 
using the situation prior to and after UC in 2000 and 2002, respectively. The Lorenz 
curves of household income in 2000 and 2002 are presented in sub-section 1, and the 
concentration curves of household health payments in both years are presented in sub-
sections 2-6. 
7.4.1 Monthly household income 
Analyses of monthly household income from the 2000 and 2002 SES show a large gap 
between the first and the fifth quintiles and an increase in nominal household income in 
all income quintiles in 2002. The ratio of household income between the first and the 
fifth quintile was approximately I: 11 in both years (Table 7.2). However, the first 
quintile had the highest rate of increase in household income from 2000 to 2002, while 
the fourth quintile had the lowest. 
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Table 7.2: Mean monthly household income and percent changes by income quintile in 2000 and 
2002 
Income Mean monthly household income % 
quintiles (Baht Eer month) change 2000 2002 
I 3,284.93 3,534.53 7.6 
2 5,900.70 6,267.41 6.2 
3 9,198.33 9,517.50 3.5 
4 14,426.42 14,777.99 2.4 
5 36,432.94 38,590.78 5.9 
Overall 11,987.63 13,414.99 11.9 
The Lorenz curves and Gini coefficient of monthly household income indicate that 
household income in Thailand was regressive in 2000 and 2002. The Lorenz curves lay 
below the 45-degree line of equality and the Gini coefficient showed a considerable 
positive value in both years (Figure 7.1). However, a very small decrease in the value of 
the Gini coefficient of household income meant that household income in 2002 was 
slightly less inequitable than that in 2000. 
Figure 7.1: Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient of household income in 2000 and 2002 
The 2000 SES The 2000 SES 
o ~ ____ ~ __ ~ ____ ~ ____ ~ ____ ~ o ~ ____ ~ __ ~ ____ ~ ____ ~ ____ ~ 
o .2 .6 o .2 ·~um . Pop. Prop~ .6 
1-- Lorenz(hh inc) ----- Cum. Pop . Prop. 1 1--- Lorenz(hhJnc) ----- Cum. Pop . Prop . 1 
Gini coefficient = 0.4980 Gini coefficient = 0.4892 
7.4.2 Direct tax payments 
Analyses of household direct tax payments using the 2000 and 2002 SES show that Thai 
households paid a small amount of direct taxes to the government. In both years, the first 
quintile had the least payment for direct taxes, while the fifth quintile had the highest 
(Table 7.3). Households in all income quintiles, except the fifth quintile, spent on 
average less than I % of their household income on direct tax payments. In 2002, the 
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second quintile had the highest rate of increase in direct tax payments compared to 2000, 
followed by the fifth quintile. Other quintiles had a decrease in direct tax payments in 
2002. 
Table 7.3: Mean direct tax payment and percent changes by income quintile in 2000 and 2002 
Income Mean direct tax payment As % of monthly household income (Baht) quintiles 
2000 2002 % change 2000 2002 
1 0.40 0.21 -48 0.01 0.01 
2 1.04 1.49 43 0.02 0.02 
3 5.22 2.44 -53 0.06 0.03 
4 29.02 21.88 -25 0.20 0.15 
5 382.53 412.07 8 1.05 1.07 
Overall 66.18 76.18 15 0.55 0.57 
The concentration curves of direct tax payments lay outside the Lorenz curves in both 
years which means that household direct tax payment in Thailand was progressive in both 
2000 and 2002. This is confirmed by positive values of the Kakwani index in both years 
(Figure 7.2). The higher positive value of the Kakwani index in 2002 indicates that 
household direct tax payment in 2002 was more progressive than that in 2000. Given the 
policy on personal income tax exemption for the poor, the more progressive household 
direct tax payment was likely caused by an increase in monthly income and subsequent 
higher direct tax payments of households in higher income quintiles. In addition, 
increased effectiveness of tax collection from the Revenue Department may be another 
factor affecting increased direct tax payments for the fifth quintile. 
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Figure 7.2: Lorenz and direct tax payment concentration curves, including the concentration 
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Analyses of V AT-taxable household consumption expenditures in the 2000 and 2002 
SES show a similar picture of household payments for indirect tax by income quintile for 
both years. Though the first quintile paid the least amount of indirect tax, households in 
this quintile on average had the highest percentage share of indirect tax payments when 
compared to household income for both years (Table 7.4). In contrast, the fifth quintile 
had the lowest percentage share of indirect tax payments to household income. In 2002, 
the fifth quintile had the highest rate of increase in household indirect tax payments, 
approximately 10%, while other quintiles had a minimal change of between 0-30/0. The 
higher ability to pay and greater consumption of goods and services of the fifth quintile 
are likely to be the main reasons for the increase in indirect tax payments in 2002. 
Table 7.4: Mean indirect tax payments and percent changes, and as a percentage of household 
. b' . '1 . 2000 d 2002 Income >y Income qUIntJ e In an 
Income Mean indirect tax payment As % of household income 
quintiles (Baht) 
2000 2002 % change 2000 2002 
1 84.83 84.68 -0.2 2.58 2.40 
2 12l.94 123.08 0.9 2.07 l.96 
3 178.65 179.29 0.4 l.94 l.88 
4 257.85 265 .84 3.1 1.79 1.80 
5 583.06 641.96 10.1 1.60 1.66 
Overall 216.96 241.06 11.1 1.81 1.80 
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In both 2000 and 2002, the indirect tax payment concentration curves lay inside the 
Lorenz curves, which means household payments for indirect taxes in 2000 and 2002 
were regressive. A slightly higher concentration index of indirect tax payments in 2002 
compared to 2000 indicates a more progressive nature of indirect tax payments. 
However, a nearly zero Kakwani index value indicates that the concentration curve for 
household indirect tax payments coincided with the Lorenz curve. A comparison of 2000 
and 2002 shows that differences in the Kakwani and concentration indexes of indirect tax 
payments are similar to the difference in the Gini coefficient for the same two years. 
This means there was a minimal change in the progressivity of household indirect tax 
payments between these two years. The difference in the Gini coefficient between 2000 
and 2002 partially led to the difference in the Kakwani indexes of indirect tax payments. 
Figure 7.3: Lorenz curve and indirect tax payment concentration curve, including the 
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7.4.4 Household out-of-pocket payments for healthcare 
Results from the analyses of the 2000 and 2002 SES show a decrease in household out-
of-pocket payments for health in all income quintiles, except the fifth category. The first 
quintile had the highest decrease in out-of-pocket payments, followed by the third and 
second quintiles, respectively (Table 7.5). The gap in out-of-pocket payments as a 
percentage of household income between the first and fifth quintiles decreased from 
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2.03% (3.82 - l.790/0) in 2000 to 0.940/0 (2.74 - l.80%) in 2002. However, the first 
quintile still had the highest percentage share of out-of-pocket payments in household 
income, which meant that household out-of-pocket payments for health were regressive 
in both years. 
Table 7.5: Mean household out-of-pocket payment and percent change by income quintile in 
2000 and 2002 
Income Mean out-of-pocket payment As % of household income 
quintiles (Baht) 2000 2002 % change 2000 2002 
1 125.35 96.67 -23 3.82 2.74 
2 158.45 147.79 -7 2.69 2.36 
3 227.99 196.24 -14 2.48 2.06 
4 301.10 292.23 -3 2.09 1.98 
5 653.43 692.91 6 1.79 1.80 
Overall 263.30 266.08 1 2.20 1.98 
The concentration and Kakwani indexes show a less regressive household out-of-pocket 
payment for health after the UC policy was implemented. In both years, the 
concentration curves lay in~ide the Lorenz curves, and the Kakwani indexes have 
negative values (Figure 7.4). However, the gap between the concentration index and the 
Lorenz curves in 2002 is less than that in 2000, and the Kakwani index in 2002 
demonstrates a less negative value, which means household out-of-pocket payments for 
health after UC were less regressive, compared to 2000. 
Figure 7.4: Lorenz curve and out-of-pocket payment concentration curve, including the 
concentration index and Kakwani index in 2000 and 2002 
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The 2002 SES 
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7.4.5 Social health insurance contributions 
Analyses of social health insurance contributions in the 2000 and 2002 SES show that the 
fifth quintile paid the highest amount of social health insurance contributions, while the 
first quintile paid the least (Table 7.6). Household payments for social health insurance 
contributions in 2002 increased in all income quintiles, compared to 2000, with the 
second quintile having the highest rate of increase, followed by the first quintile. These 
patterns can be explained by the extension of the social health insurance scheme which 
covered enterprises with employees more than 10 workers in 1994, to more than five in 
2001, and finally to more than one worker in 2002 (Tangcharoensathien, Prakongsai et al. 
2005). Most low-earning workers were employed in small enterprises. However, the 
contribution as a percentage of household income was less than 1 % in all income 
quintiles in both years because the share of SSS beneficiaries was approximately 9% of 
the total population and most of them were in higher income quintiles (Chapter 5). 
Table 7.6: Mean social health insurance contribution and percent change by income quintile in 
2000 and 2002 
Income Mean social health insurance contribution As % of household income 
quintiles (Baht) 
2000 2002 % chanze 2000 2002 
1 1.24 1.93 56 0.04 0.05 
2 7.44 12.07 62 0.13 0.19 
3 28.82 34.70 20 0.31 0.36 
4 69.06 82.79 20 0.48 0.56 
5 162.95 174.30 7 0.45 0.45 
Overall 44.27 55.28 25 0.37 0.41 
Analysis of the concentration curves and Kakwani indexes show a progressive nature of 
household payments for social health insurance contributions in 2000 and 2002. The 
concentration curves lay outside the Lorenz curves in both years, with positive Kakwani 
index values. However, the gap between the concentration and Lorenz curves in 2002 
decreased with a lower positive Kakwani index value, compared to 2000. This means 
household payment of social health insurance contributions was less progressive in 2002. 
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Figure 7.5: Lorenz curve and social health insurance 
concentration index and Kakwani index in 2000 and 2002 
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7.4.6 Private health insurance premiums 
o .2 .4 .6 Cum. Pop Prop .8 
-- Lorenz(SHI_contrib) - - - - - Lorenz (hhjncome) 
......... . Cum, Pop Prop. 
Concentration index = 0.6013 
Kakwani index = 0.1121 
Results from the analyses of the 2000 and 2002 SES show that mean household payment 
for private health insurance premiums did not vary greatly between the two years of 
analysis. In both years, expenditure for private health insurance premiums as a 
percentage of household income was highest in the first income quintile, while that in the 
fifth quintile was lowest (Table 7.7). In 2002, the third quintile had the highest increase 
in household payments for private health insurance premiums, followed by the first and 
second quintiles. In contrast, household payments for private health insurance premiums 
in the fourth and fifth quintiles decreased in 2002. 
Table 7.7: Mean household payment for private health insurance premiums and percent change 
b . . '1 . 2000 d 2002 >y mcome qumtl e In an 
Income 
Mean household payment for private health As % of household income 
quintiles 
insurance premiums (Baht) 
2000 2002 % change 2000 2002 
I 74.86 81.71 9 2.3 2.3 
2 91.70 95.57 4 1.6 1.5 
3 83 .19 92.96 12 0.9 1.0 
4 88.27 80.14 -9 0.6 0.5 
5 160.35 145.67 -9 0.4 0.4 
Overall 95.75 97.48 2 0.8 0.7 
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The concentration curves and Kakwani indexes in 2000 and 2002 confirm that household 
payments for private health insurance premiums were regressive in both years. The 
concentration curves lay inside the Lorenz curves with negative Kakwani index values in 
both 2000 and 2002. An increase in the negative Kakwani index value in 2002 means 
that household payments for private health insurance premiums was more regressive in 
2002, compared to the situation in 2000. 
Figure 7.6: Lorenz curve and private health insurance premium concentration curve, including the 
concentration index and Kakwani index in 2000 and 2002 
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The 2002 SES 
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7.4.7 Equity in overall health care finance prior to and after UC 
The progressivity of overall health financing can be measured by a weighted average of 
the Kakwani indexes for the sources of health care finance, where weights are equal to 
the proportion of total payments accounted for by each financing source (O'Donnell, van 
Doorslaer et al. 2008). Thus, equity in overall health care finance depends on the 
progressivity of the different sources of finance and on the proportion of revenue 
collected from each type of these health financing sources. 
An analysis of the Thai National Health Accounts (NHA) in 2001 showed that general 
government revenues from tax and non-tax sources accounted for 55.50/0 of overall health 
care finance, followed by household out-of-pocket payments of 33.7% for total health 
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expenditure (International Health Policy Program 2007a). The share of social health 
insurance contributions and private health insurance premiums was 5.30/0 and 5.6%, 
respectively. Data on the national income of Thailand analyzed by the National Accounts 
Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) showed that 
indirect tax comprised 61 % of the general government revenues in 2001, which is 
equivalent to 31 % of total health care finance (National Accounts Office 2006). The 
share of corporate taxes, personal income tax, and income from property and 
entrepreneurship, in general government revenues was 180/0, 11.6%, and 6.50/0, 
respectively. With these figures of health care finance and general government revenues, 
the macro-weight of each health financing source and overall Kakwani indexes in 2000 
and 2002 were calculated and are shown in Table 7.8. In this analysis, it was assumed 
that the distribution of other general government revenues without Kakwani indexes (e.g. 
corporate tax and income from property and entrepreneurship) was similar to that of 
direct and indirect taxes. So, the adjusted macro-weight of indirect tax, for example, was 
inflated from its actual value of 0.310 for all health care finance to a value of 0.502 
(=[31.0/34.3]*0.555) to reflect the distribution of other government revenues for which 
the Kakwani index was not available. The same process was applied to calculate the 
macro-weight of direct tax. 
Results from the analysis of the equity of overall health care finance show that the 
negative Kakwani index value for overall health care finance decreased from -0.0898 in 
2000 to -0.0540 in 2002, which means that health care finance in Thailand was less 
regressive after the UC policy was implemented. 
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Table 7.8: Share and Kakwani index by source of overall health care financing in 2000 and 2002 
Health financing Share of health care Kakwani index of health finance * payment Macro-weights 
source 2001 2000 2002 
General government 55.5 
revenues 
• Direct tax 3.3 0.3913 0.4159 0.053 
• Indirect tax 31.0 -0.0964 -0.0691 0.502 
• Corporate tax 9.2 
• Income from 
property and 5.9 
entrepreneursh i p 
• Others 6.1 
SHI contributions 5.3 0.1650 0.1121 0.053 
Private health 5.6 insurance premiums -0.3623 -0.3906 0.056 
Household OOP 33.7 -0.1502 -0.0755 0.337 
Total 100.0 1.000 
Kakwani index for overall health finance -0.0898 -0.0540 
Source: * General government revenue in Thailand 1999-2006 (National Accounts Office 2006) 
and National Health Accounts in Thailand 1994-2001 (International Health Policy Program 2007a) 
7.4.8 Households facing catastrophic health expenditure in 2000 & 2002 
Table 7.9 presents the share of households having different levels of out-of-pocket 
payments for health compared with household income in 2000 and 2002. With 
catastrophic health expenditure defined as out-of-pocket payment for health over 100/0 of 
household income, it was found that households in Thailand facing catastrophic health 
expenditure decreased from 6.11 % in 2000 to 4.65% in 2002. Moreover, the number of 
households with a high percentage of out-of-pocket payments for health tended to 
decrease in 2002. 
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Table 7.9: Share of households of different levels of out-of-pocket payments for health in 2000 
and 2002 
Out-of-pocket payments as 
% of household income 
Share of households having different levels of out-of-pocket 


















Analysis of households with out-of-pocket payments over 100/0 of household income by 
income quintile show that the share of households facing catastrophic costs of illness 
decreased in all income quintiles, except the fourth category (Table 7.10). The first 
quintile had the highest share of households facing catastrophic health expenditure in 
both years, while the fourth and fifth quintiles had the lowest share in 2000 and 2002, 
respectively. On average, the share of households facing catastrophic spending on health 
decreased by approximately 24% from 2000 to 2002. The first quintile had the highest 
rate of decrease in the proportion of households facing catastrophic health expenditure, 
followed by the fifth and the second quintiles. 
Table 7.10: Share of households facing catastrophic health expenditure by income quintile in 










Percentage of households having out-of-pocket 
















This section presents a summary of research findings, data and methodological 
limitations in the analyses of equity in health care finance prior to and after UC, and a 
general discussion about the research findings, especially focusing on the impact of new 
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health financing arrangements under the UC policy overall, as well as for each source of 
health care finance. 
7.5.1 Summary of research findings 
In this chapter, the results from the analyses of equity in health care finance prior to and 
after universal coverage showed a progressivity in terms of changes in the Kakwani index 
for each health financing source. After implementation of the UC policy, household 
direct tax payment was more progressive, as shown by the increase in the positive value 
of the Kakwani index, and household spending on health and indirect tax was less 
regressive. In contrast, the negative value for Kakwani index of private health insurance 
premiums increased in 2002, which means household payment for private health 
insurance was more regressive after UC implementation. Though household payment for 
social health insurance contributions was progressive in 2000, the positive Kakwani 
index value decreased after the UC policy was implemented. The analysis of equity in 
overall health care finance showed that health care finance in Thailand was less 
regressive in 2002. The incidence of households facing catastrophic health expenditure 
decreased from 6.11 % in 2000 to 4.650/0 in 2002. The first quintile had the highest rate of 
decrease in households with out-of-pocket payments over 100/0 of household income. 
7.5.2 Methodological and data limitations 
The accuracy and completeness of the SES data on household income and expenditure 
are vital for assessing equity in health care finance since the SES was the main data 
source for the analysis. During the past couple years, the appropriateness of the SES 
questionnaire was questioned by researchers and policy makers in Thailand because of 
the large number of questions on household income and expenditure, which may 
undermine the accuracy of the household survey. For household income, the 
questionnaire contained more than 20 pages of questions with approximately 100 
questions on income of all household members during the previous month and previous 
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year. Information for both cash and in-kind income for all household members was 
gathered in the SES. Regarding household expenditure, there were around 30 pages of 
the SES questionnaire with more than 200 questions on household expenditure in the 
previous month for all household members. It is estimated that it took approximately two 
to three hours to interview each sampled household, depending on the number of 
household members. Therefore, interviewers and interviewees were likely to be 
exhausted by the process, which could affect the intention to provide accurate 
information about household income and expenditure which may have decreased, 
especially in the last parts of the interview. Over the past couple of years, this issue has 
been discussed between the data producer, the National Statistical Office of Thailand 
(NSO), and data users, namely the MOPH, Mahidol University, and the Thailand 
Development Research Institute (TDRI) (Boonperm 2004). 
Another concern regarding the SES data was the process of the actual interview which 
allowed proxy respondents to answer questions about income and expenditure of other 
household members. Though the survey aimed to interview the household head of the 
sampled households, it was likely that the household head would not be well informed 
about goods or services purchased by other household members during the previous 
month. Therefore, data on individuals' income and expenditure for sampled households 
in the SES are likely to have some degree of error. In addition, as stated elsewhere (ORC 
Macro 2006; Xu, Ravndal et al. 2007), using a recall period of one month prior to the 
interview is likely to have created some degree of recall bias in consumption and 
expenditure data. 
An issue around whether household income or expenditure should be used as a socio-
economic parameter should be mentioned as this is a common issue in analysis of equity 
in health. This analysis differed from the analyses of equity in health care use and benefit 
incidence in earlier chapters because this analysis employed the SES, while earlier 
analyses used the HWS as the main data source. In the SES, data on household income 
and expenditure were available and could be used as the socio-economic parameter, or 
the indicator of household ability to pay. This analysis decided to use household income 
206 
for two reasons: 1) to avoid duplication of the analysis of changes in health care finance 
prior to and after UC in existing literature; and, 2) because the magnitude of household 
expenditure could be affected by household coping strategies such as being in debt, 
taking loans, or reducing spending on flexible items of household consumption. 
However, reluctance to disclose actual cash income of interviewees is a major concern 
when using household income as the socio-economic parameter. 
In this analysis, difficulties in the estimation of V AT -taxable household consumption 
expenditure were experienced. As stated earlier, some goods and services in Thailand are 
exempt from V AT. In addition, luxury goods (e.g. perfume, private cars, imported 
liquor, and other imported products), petrol, and products harmful to one's health (e.g. 
tobacco and alcohol) have a different tax rate. Given that the SES questionnaire collected 
data on household consumption expenditure categorized by type of goods or services, it 
was problematic to classify goods and services purchased by households into different 
groups with different tax rates. In this analysis, goods and services purchased by 
household members were classified into only two groups, V AT-taxable and V A T-
exempt. A single tax rate of 7% was applied to the former group to estimate the V A T 
paid by each sampled household. This was assumed to be the household expenditure for 
indirect tax payments. From this approach, it is likely that V A T paid by richer 
households was underestimated. Another minor issue of V A T was that the government 
allowed small traders earning less than 300,000 baht a month or less than 1.8 million baht 
a year to be exempt from VAT. The SES questionnaire did not collect data on where 
household members purchased goods or services. With these limitations, therefore, 
household indirect tax payment for V A T is likely to have been under-estimated, 
especially in richer categories. 
Another concern is about the accuracy of data on household expenditure for social health 
insurance contributions which was collected in Group 920, Record 06 of the SES 
questionnaire. Typically, household expenditure for social health insurance contributions 
and other occupational expenses were collected in this data category. Though 
expenditure for social health insurance contributions comprised the majority of household 
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expenditure data in this category, it also contained other types of household occupational 
expenses. Therefore, it was likely that household expenditure for social health insurance 
contributions in the SES were over-estimated. 
Given that some types of general government revenues such as corporate taxes, and 
revenues from property and entrepreneurship of the government, did not lend themselves 
to computing the Kakwani index, the decision to inflate the distribution of direct and 
indirect taxes which did have Kakwani indexes created some degree of error and 
uncertainty in assessing equity in overall health care finance. However, this approach has 
been widely used in the literature (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999; Limwattananon, 
Tangcharoensathien et al. 2005; O'Donnell, Doorslaer et al. 2005) and other alternative 
approaches have provided little difference in conclusions on progressivity of overall 
health care finance (O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008). 
The last drawback of this analysis is the use of 2001 data on share of health care finance 
and the composition of general government revenues to estimate the macro-weights of 
each financing source and the Kakwani index of overall health care finance in 2000 and 
2002. The results from the analysis would be closer to the actual situation if data on 
National Health Accounts (NHA) and general government revenues in 2000 and 2002 
could have been used for the estimate of equity in health care finance in each year. 
However, the unavailability of 2002 NHA data led to the decision to use 2001 data which 
fell in between the two years of analyses. 
7.5.3 General discussion 
The analysis of equity in health care finance in 2000 and 2002 indicates that the overall 
health care finance of the Thai health care system was less regressive after the UC policy 
was implemented. The analysis of changes in the Kakwani index of each health 
financing source indicate more progressive direct tax payments and less regressive 
household out-of-pocket payments for health, as well as the changes in indirect tax 
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payments in 2002, were all primary factors involved in improving equity in overall health 
care finance after UC implementation. Though household payment for private health 
insurance premiums was more regressive and payment for social health insurance 
contributions was less progressive in 2002, these two household payments were not 
major financing sources of the Thai health care system. From these findings, it can be 
concluded that improving the progressivity of the major health financing sources, 
especially out-of-pocket payments for health, can greatly impact equity in overall health 
care finance of the country. 
Results from the analysis of equity in health care finance in 2000 and 2002 showed a 
similar pattern in the progressivity of each health financing source found in other 
countries in Asia (e.g. Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Bangladesh) (O'Donnell, Doorslaer 
et al. 2005). For example, direct tax payments and social health insurance contributions 
in Thailand were progressive, while indirect tax payments, out-of-pocket payments for 
health and private health insurance premiums were regressive. The progressive tax rate 
of personal income tax and the income tax exemption policy for the poor by the Thai 
government resulted in the progressive nature of direct tax payments. The distribution of 
SSS beneficiaries, which were typically concentrated in higher income quintiles (see the 
analysis in Chapter 5), also led to the situation where social health insurance 
contributions were primarily paid by households in higher socio-economic groups. Thus, 
the Kakwani index of social health insurance contributions was progressive, both prior to 
and after UC implementation. Regarding indirect tax and out-of-pocket payments, which 
are generally regressive in many countries, this analysis also showed the regressive 
nature of these health care financing sources in Thailand. The same V A T tax rate paid by 
households of different income quintiles also led to the regressive nature of indirect tax. 
Analysis results indicate that the new health care financing arrangements of the UC 
policy improved the progressivity in overall health care finance in Thailand through two 
strategies: 1) reducing household out-of-pocket payments for health which was the major 
regressive health care financing source; and, 2) increasing the share of direct tax 
payment, which was a progressive financing source, in overall health care finance. 
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Though general government revenues came from both progressive (direct tax) and 
regressive (indirect tax) financing sources, the Kakwani index of the indirect tax payment 
did not significantly change between the two years of analysis. Therefore, the increase in 
the progressivity of household direct tax payments in 2002 affected the increase in the 
progressivity of the general government revenues and overall health care finance after 
UC implementation. Most importantly, the decrease in regressivity of household out-of-
pocket payments, which shared approximately one-third of overall health care finance in 
2001, was a significant cause of the higher progressivity of overall health care finance. 
The reduction in the share of households facing catastrophic health expenditure in 2002, 
especially the significant decrease of such households in the first quintile, reflected the 
effectiveness of the UC policy in protecting households from medical care costs. Though 
the number of households facing catastrophic health expenditure in Thailand have tended 
to decrease over the past decade due to several targeted health insurance policies (e.g. the 
LIC and the VHC), the further reduction in households having high health expenditure in 
2002 was likely to be due to the impact of the UC policy on reducing household out-of-
pocket payments on health. Although the UC policy employed a universal strategy, the 
design of the system which promoted the use of primary care at the district and sub-
district levels and the comprehensive benefit package of the UC scheme appears to have 
greatly reduced the financial burden of health care costs on the poor. It should be noted 
that the fifth quintile also benefited from the financial risk protection of the UC policy. 
The share of households facing catastrophic health expenditure in the fifth quintile was 
down from 4.26% in 2000 to 3.41 % in 2002. Apart from better access to health services 
and greater benefit from public subsidies on health, the poor also benefited more from the 
financial risk protection of the UC policy; the highest decrease in the share of households 
facing catastrophic health expenditure was in the poorest quintile. 
210 
7.6 Conclusions 
The analysis of equity in health care finance in 2000 and 2002 indicates that overall 
health care finance of the Thai health care system was less regressive after the UC policy 
was implemented. The negative Kakwani index value of overall health care finance 
reduced from -0.0506 in 2000 to -0.0347 in 2002. In addition, the share of households 
facing catastrophic health expenditure decreased from 6.11 % in 2000 to 4.650/0 in 2002, 
with the highest decrease in the first quintile. The analysis of equity in health care 
finance showed that the reduction in household out-of-pocket payments, which made up 
one-third of overall health care finance, was the main factor contributing to the more 
equitable health care finance after UC implementation, and that there was indeed 
improved financial risk protection under the UC policy. The increase in progressivity of 
household expenditure for direct tax payment and less regressive indirect tax payment 
were two other factors improving equity in overall health care finance. Though 
household payment for social health insurance was less progressive and payment for 
private health insurance premiums was more regressive after UC, these two financing 
sources were minor financing sources in the Thai health care system. 
Two crucial factors affecting the picture of equity in health care finance are: 1) the 
progressivity of each health financing source; and, 2) the share of each financing source 
in overall health care finance. The Thai government can further improve equity in 
overall health care finance by increasing the share of progressive health financing sources 
(such as direct tax payments and SHI contributions in this analysis), and decrease the 
share of health financing sources which are more regressive (e.g. household out-of-
pocket payments and private health insurance contributions). 
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SECTION 3: CASE STUDIES 
AND QUALITATIVE APPROACHES 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE UC BENEFIT PACKAGE 
ON THAI HOUSEHOLDS OF DIFFERENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS 
8.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the economic impact of the high costs of expensive 
health services, which were not included in the UC benefit package, on Thai households 
of different socio-economic status. In general, costs for expensive health services 
excluded from the benefit package of a public health insurance scheme can lead to 
financial barriers to such health services and a financial burden borne by households 
(Kutzin 1998). Poor households are likely to have more difficulties in access to health 
care than richer families, and some of them face the possibility of financial catastrophe if 
health care payments are much greater than their ability to pay (Ranson 2002; Xu, Evans 
et al. 2003; Russell 2005; Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007). In contrast, 
patients tend to have better access to and utilization of expensive health services if such 
services are included in the benefit package and financial barriers are removed. With the 
importance of the benefit package, the types of health services that should be included in 
the package of a public health insurance scheme, and whether the package should be an 
essential or a catastrophic package, have been widely discussed among social scientists 
and health reformists (Nitayarumphong 1998; Kutzin 2001; Mills 2007). 
The U C scheme launched by the Thai government in 2001 provides a very 
comprehensive benefit package with an exclusion list of only a few expensive health 
services. During the inception phase, two expensive health services, renal replacement 
therapy (RRT) for end-stage renal disease (ESRD) patients and second-line antiretroviral 
drugs (ARV) for HIV patients were excluded from the UC benefit package due to their 
high costs, not being cost-effective for public investment, and long-term financial burden 
on the government health budget (Jongudoumsuk 2002; NHSO 2002; Teerawattananon 
2005). The decision not to include these expensive health services in the UC benefit 
package led to a public debate over the appropriateness of the UC benefit package and 
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the policy objectives of financial risk protection (Tangcharoensathien, Kasemsup et al. 
2005). The government decision meant that access to RRT and ARV mainly depended 
on household ability to pay and type of health insurance coverage. In the light of this 
public debate, there is a lack of evidence on the impact of the government's decision on 
Thai households, especially those in poorer families. 
Due to this knowledge gap, objectives of this chapter are to explore the impact of costs of 
expensive health services excluded from the UC benefit package in three areas: 1) access 
to and utilization of expensive health services; 2) financial burden of health care 
payments borne by households; and, 3) coping strategies for costs of illness among 
households of different socio-economic status. Hence, the specific aims of this chapter 
are to: 
a) describe differences in access to and utilization of RRT between richer and 
poorer patients; 
b) appraise the financial burden of health care payments for RR T and its impact 
on Thai households of different socio-economic status; 
c) explore coping strategies for the financial burden adopted by poorer and richer 
households; and, 
d) assess the impact of the limited benefit package of the UC scheme on 
households of different socio-economic status. 
Apart from using RR T as a tracer, this research employed another expensive health care 
technology, open heart surgery, as another tracer in order to elaborate the impact of the 
UC benefit package on Thai households. This is because open heart surgery is also an 
expensive health service which requires a huge amount of financial resources and 
specialized care from medical specialists, along with sophisticated medical equipment in 
a tertiary care hospital, as does RRT. Most importantly, open heart surgery has been 
included in the UC benefit package since the start of the UC policy in 2001, while RRT 
has not. Hence, the opportunity to compare the three areas of investigation stated above 
between two expensive health services, one included and one not included, in the UC 
benefit package. It is expected that research findings will elaborate and generate a deeper 
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understanding of different coping strategies for costs of illness adopted by poorer and 
richer households, and the financial burden of households for those health services 
included and not included in the UC benefit package. Furthermore, the investigation of 
access to and utilization of these two expensive health services and their economic 
impact on richer and poorer households can reflect the effectiveness of the UC policy in 
providing financial risk protection and equitable access to essential health care. 
It should be noted that open heart surgery was formerly included in the benefit package 
of the LIC and the VHC scheme, and has been included in the UC benefit package since 
the start of the policy on universal coverage in 2001. Despite the coverage of the LIC 
and the VHC, public health facilities favoured providing such operation to the rich and 
CSMBS beneficiaries due to inadequate reimbursement from these two health insurance 
schemes. In addition, during the inception phase of the UC policy, the UC scheme 
allowed tertiary care hospitals to be directly reimbursed for cardiac operation from 
pnmary and secondary care hospitals, which was likely to result in a reluctance to 
transfer heart disease patients from primary and secondary care to tertiary care hospitals 
(Pannarunothai 2001). To prevent such consequences from health financing 
arrangements, NHSO set up a centrally-managed fund for providing appropriate 
compensation to health care providers, particularly tertiary care hospitals. Upper limit of 
reimbursement for open heart surgery from this centrally-managed fund was 100,000 
Baht per patient (NHSO 2003). 
The chapter contains six main sections. Apart from the introduction in section 8.1, 
section 8.2 details the methodology, selection criteria of those needing RRT and open 
heart surgery, namely end-stage renal disease (ESRD) and heart disease patients, and 
investigating tools. Section 8.3 describes the context of health service provision at the 
study site, Nakom Ratchasima province, and general characteristics of selected cases of 
ESRD and heart disease patients. Section 8.4 demonstrates research findings of ESRD 
patients divided into three areas: 1) access to and utilization of RRT between poorer and 
richer ESRD patients; 2) financial burden for costs of RR T among households of 
different socio-economic status; and, 3) coping strategies between richer and poorer 
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ESRD patients. Section 8.5 details research findings of heart disease patients in the same 
three areas. Finally, section 8.6 summarizes limitations of the research, discussion and 
interpretation of research findings, and a comparison between RR T and open heart 
surgery. 
8.2 Methodology 
To explore the complex issue of access to and utilization of health services and the 
economic impact of a limited benefit package on households of different socio-economic 
status, a case study approach was chosen for this investigation. This is because the case 
study approach can explore a social event in a real-life context of selected households in 
an explanatory and exploratory manner which a quantitative approach can not (Yin 1994; 
Russell 2005). It also allows the attempt to measure multiple variables by using a variety 
of research methods. Moreover, this research approach can deepen the understanding of 
complex realities of household processes, and other contexts that are difficult to measure 
with a quantitative inquiry (Coast 1999; Keen and Packwood 1999; Russell 2005). 
Figure 8.1 presents a framework to explore differences in access to and utilization of two 
expensive health services, those included and those not included in the UC benefit 
package, and the financial impact on Thai households of different socio-economic status. 
Financial and geographical barriers to RR T and open heart surgery were two variables 
that the research aimed to explore. This is because costs of both health services were 
high, and these health services could only be provided by a tertiary care hospital. 
Differences in ability to pay for costs of health care among households of different socio-
economic status lead to the decision to explore financial burden and the economic impact 
on poorer and richer patients. As RR T and open heart surgery were provided by health 
facilities primarily located in municipal areas, patients residing in rural and urban areas of 
the study site were symmetrically selected in order to explore the influence of 
geographical barriers on access to and utilization of these two expensive health services. 
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To select poorer and richer households, this study employed three mam sources of 
information for assessing patients' characteristics and socio-economic status. The first 
source of information was about residential areas and possible socio-economic status of 
all registered ESRD and heart disease patients, which were collected from public and 
private providers in the studied province. The second source was the assessment of 
household socio-economic status, financial problems related to health care costs, housing 
characteristics, and household assets, which were collected and observed by the 
researchers and research assistants during an introductory household visit. The 
introductory visit was arranged for every target household aiming to collect information 
about household socio-economic status and patients' willingness to participate in the 
study. The final source was a consensus on socio-economic status of each targeted 
household among the researcher and the research assistants, in order to classify targeted 
households to richer, middle, or poorer groups. Selected households were then contacted 
after the decision was made. The patients and their household members then signed a 
written informed consent form indicating they understood the objectives of the study and 
were willing to participate. 
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Figure 8.1: The framework for exploring differences in access to and utilization of expensive health services and the financial impact on poorer 
and richer households 
Expensive health services not included Expensive health services included in 
1. Different in the UC benefit package the UC benefit package 
financial barriers (Renal replacement therapy - RR T) (Open heart surgery) 
(included in the UC 
benefit package or i 
not) 
Having financial barriers No financial barrier to 
to health services health services 
2. Different / ~ geographical 
barriers (residing in Having geographical No geographical Having geographical No geographical 
rural or urban 
areas) barriers barriers barriers barriers (residing in rural (residing in the (residing in rural (residing in the 
areas) municipality area) areas) municipality areas) 
3. The impact on 
households of Richer Poorer Richer Poorer Richer heart Poorer heart Richer heart Poorer heart 
different socio- ESRD ESRD ESRD ESRD disease disease disease disease 
economic status patients patients patients patients patients patients patients patients 
-- ~---
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Selection criteria for ESRD and heart disease patients included the following: 
• willingness of patients and their household members to participate in the research; 
• residing in the studied province; 
• seeking health care from health facilities in the studied province; and, 
• heart disease patients having a cardiac operation not longer than three months 
prior to the household visit in order to avoid recall biases about health service use 
and financial consequences from health care payments. 
Exclusion criteria for ESRD and heart disease patients were: 
• patients or their household members not willing to participate in the study; 
• residing or seeking health care from health facilities outside the studied province; 
• patients who died in the first month of the household visit; and, 
• being beneficiaries of the SSS or the CSMBS. 
To achieve the study's objectives, twenty ESRD patients and thirteen heart disease 
patients of different socio-economic status and geographical areas were selected. Details 
of the participant selection process for ESRD and heart disease patients are presented 
below. It is worth noting that the research intended to confirm participation from ESRD 
and heart disease patients of different socio-economic status and different residential 
areas. However, poor participation from richer patients and those residing in 
municipality areas led to a bias of household selection which favored poorer households 
in rural areas. 
The study was conducted in Nakorn Ratchasima (Korat) province, the largest province in 
Northeastern Thailand, for two reasons. First, poorer households were the target of the 
study, and this province contained the highest number of households below the poverty 
line in 2000 (NESDB 2002). Second, the public health service system in this province 
comprised comprehensive health care ranging from primary care at a health centre to 
tertiary care at regional hospital, namely Maharat Hospital. So, the capacity to pro\'ide 
RRT and open heart surgery at the regional hospital allowed the researcher to follow up 
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the situation of financial barriers and access to these two expensive health services, and 
the economic impact on the selected households. 
8.2.1 Selection of ESRD households 
Health care providers in both public and private facilities provided useful information to 
help identify poorer ESRD patients. Common manifestations of poorer patients observed 
by health care providers were: a) frequently failing to keep an appointment for the use of 
RRT; b) often complaining about financial problems with either nurses or other ESRD 
patients; and, c) occasionally being in debt for the RR T costs. Since ESRD patients using 
haemodialysis had to receive the treatment twice or thrice a week, health care providers 
(e.g. nurses and nephrologists) who met with patients regularly were often the most 
informed about patients' financial problems and could estimate economic status for each 
ESRD patient. 
After approximately 50 introductory visits to targeted ESRD patients were carried out, 
ESRD patients covered by the UC scheme were classified as poorer, richer, and middle 
(unclassified) cases by using a consensus among the researcher and the research 
assistants drawing on informal interviews during the introductory visit, direct observation 
of the researcher and research assistants, and details about patients' socio-economic 
status from other data sources such as information from health care providers. A patient 
in a household owning a lot of assets, earning regular or substantial income, or having a 
profitable business, was classified as a richer ESRD case. In contrast, a patient who lived 
in a family with irregular income, dependent on agricultural products, or having fewer 
assets and savings, was grouped as a poorer patient. Willingness to participate in the 
study of the patients and household members was the most important selection criteria for 
ESRD patients. In addition, the researcher attempted to symmetrically select poorer and 
richer households residing in municipal and non-municipal areas as the selected cases. 
With these selection criteria, eligible ESRD patients and their family members were 
selected and informed in greater detail about objectives of the research, frequency of the 
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visits, and scope of the in-depth interviews. Finally, twenty ESRD patients equally 
distributed to urban and rural areas with different socio-economic status were chosen, and 
consented to participate in the investigation. 
8.2.2 Selection of heart disease households 
A similar selection process to that of the ESRD patients was applied to identify heart 
disease patients in richer and poorer households. The researcher collected secondary data 
for heart disease patients who had received a cardiac operation at the regional hospital 
three months prior to commencement of the household visits. The period of three months 
was chosen in order to avoid recall biases about utilization of health services, medical 
care costs, and financial consequences for the patients. Then, around 30 patients covered 
by the UC scheme were contacted and asked permission for the introductory visits. The 
number of heart disease patients receiving introductory visits was less than ESRD 
patients because the average number of patients being operated at the regional hospital 
was around 10 cases per month. 
Similar methods to classify household economic status were applied to the heart disease 
patients, as had been previously used to identify ESRD patients. Information about 
households' socio-economic status attained by direct observation and informal interviews 
during the introductory visits was mainly used for categorizing selected households into 
different economic groups (richer, poorer, and middle income households). The selection 
process for heart disease patients differed from that of ESRD patients in that health care 
providers could not assess economic status of heart disease patients, since the cardiac 
operation has been included in the UC benefit package. So, public providers did not have 
to recognize a household's ability to pay, and only a few heart disease patients choose to 
seek care from private providers with out-of-pocket payments. As a result, the researcher 
and research assistants used the assessment of household socio-economic status from two 
data sources (direct observation and informal interviews) to categorize heart disease 
patients into different economic groups. After the consensus was made, thirteen heart 
disease patients in richer and poorer households were selected and contacted for 
221 
willingness to participate in the study. Similar to the ESRD patients, there was an 
intention to include the heart disease patients residing in urban and rural areas 
symmetrically. However, this failed because some richer patients sought cardiac 
operations at private or university hospitals in Bangkok, and some refused to participate 
in the investigation. Therefore, the majority of the selected heart disease patients were in 
poorer households residing in rural areas ofNakom Ratchasima province. 
After both ESRD and heart disease patients were selected, a formal invitation letter 
containing a summary of the study's objectives, research protocol, and the informed 
consent forms for the patient, care givers, and household head, were sent to every 
selected household. Two heart disease patients changed their mind and decided not to 
participate in the investigation; they were then substituted with other eligible patients. 
8.2.3 Data collection and investigating tools 
A range of qualitative methods was used for collecting data from the selected households. 
According to the study's objectives, social and economic aspects of poorer and richer 
patients, as well as the household context, were investigated. Several qualitative 
approaches including semi-structured and in-depth interviews, direct observation, and 
illness narratives, were employed and integrated into four investigating tools developed 
for the inquiry. 
A longitudinal approach was employed for three months. This aimed to collect 
household information about changes in financial burden from medical care costs, access 
to expensive health services, and coping strategies for illness costs. Compared with a 
cross-sectional approach, the longitudinal household study was more appropriate for the 
investigation because it could provide valuable time-referenced information about costs 
of illness, and household members' behaviors and relationships, all of which significantly 
influenced changes in household livelihood and coping strategies for health care costs 
(Phillips, MacLeod et al. 2000; Russell 2001). In addition, changes in other contexts 
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related to household livelihood and financial consequences of medical care costs were 
also observed with the longitudinal approach. 
Four investigating tools addressing the objectives of the study were employed during the 
fieldwork process which ran from January to March 2005 (see details of the investigating 
tools in Annex 4). The first tool (Tl) was used to identify all family members and their 
relationships in selected households. This was intended to illustrate interdependence and 
interpersonal relationships between patients and other household members, specifically as 
they related to care-giving, perception of illness, and decision making about resource use 
for health care. Furthermore, information obtained from Tl was useful in more deeply 
understanding health care seeking behavior and household coping strategies for costs of 
illnesses. The second tool (T2) was the "life line and life history" which aimed to 
understand a patient's life history and key events happening in the selected households. 
Data collected from T2 provided background information to further understand 
household contexts, and patients' and household members' perceptions of extraordinary 
or unpleasant events, such as an accident or illness affecting a household member. The 
next tool (T3) was "illness narratives" which aimed to portray an overall picture of how 
the patients and their household members responded to illness, the consequences of direct 
medical care costs, and the inability to access health care. Information from T3 also 
illustrated details of the patients' and household members' interactions with the health 
service system and their coping strategies for health care costs. The last tool (T4) aimed 
to explore the proportion of household health expenditure with total household income 
and expenditure. T4 was designed to help understand the financial burden of health 
expenditure and the economIC consequences of these expenditures on household 
livelihood and other activities. Prior to the actual household investigation, pilot 
interviews were conducted with ESRD and heart disease patients who were not selected 
for official case studies to test the process. 
Table 8.1 presents the frequency of use of each investigating tool and the time frame of 
the longitudinal study. The selected households were visited every two weeks and 
various aspects of household information were collected by using different investigating 
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tools. The two-week revisits aimed to avoid recall biases on health seeking behavior, 
household health expenditure, and health service use. The interval of two weeks prior to 
the interview has been widely applied by various international household surveys on 
household income and expenditure such as the Living Standards Measurement Study 
(LSMS) (Grosh 1995), or health seeking behavior of households in the Demographic and 
Health Surveys (USAID 2003). 
Table 8.1: Frequency and time frame for using four investigating tools with the ESRD and heart 
disease households 
Investigating Wk Wk Wk Wk Wk Wk Wk Wk Wk Wk Wk Wk Wk 
tools 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





T 1 = tool for exploring household members and their relationships 
T2 = tool for exploring patient's life history and drawing a life-line 
T3 = tool for in-depth interviews to obtain illness narratives 
T4 = tool for collecting data on household income and expenditure 
8 9 10 11 
./ ./ 
./ 
When and how often each investigating tool was used in the household inquiry depended 
on the extent of data collected and sensitivity of the issues investigated. For the first tool, 
details of interpersonal relationships between patients and other household members were 
collected from the first and second visits in order to develop a trusting relationship 
between the investigators (the researcher and the research assistants), and the entire 
household. It was found that information about relationships between the patients and 
other household members did not emerge during the first visit; this often did not emerge 
until subsequent conversations. The second tool which attempted to explore the life 
history and draw 'a life-line' of the patients was subsequently applied after trust in the 
investigators was gradually developed. Details of household contexts and responses of 
household members towards either a pleasant or an unpleasant event was expected to be 
achieved by the third visit. After that, a wide range of information about illness, health 
seeking behavior, and health service use of the selected households was explored by 





allocated for this sort of exploration due to its importance and the magnitude of such 
information about each household. However, the investigative process for heart disease 
patients required fewer visits for the illness narratives because medical services for heart 
disease patients did not require long-term medical care. Most information about illness 
narratives for heart disease patients was collected within one or two visits. The last tool 
(T4) was applied in the final two household visits because it contained sensitive 
information on household economic status and financial consequences from medical care 
costs. The participating households suffering from costs of illness or inability to access 
health services would likely be uncomfortable revealing such private information before 
developing a trusted relationship with the investigators. So, it was expected that the 
continuous development of a mutually trusting relationship between the investigators and 
the selected households would facilitate a deep exploration of this issue. 
It is noteworthy that some selected ESRD patients died during the household 
investigation. If a selected patient died during the first month of the household visit, a 
new case with the same socio-economic status and residential area was selected. 
However, if the selected patients died after the first month of household visit, the 
researcher and the research assistants decided to continue visiting these households for a 
period of time in order to share the household's grief. Financial and moral support was 
also provided to household members in need. Moreover, information about feeling and 
perception of the patient's death, and future arrangements for household members, was 
also collected. 
8.2.4 Roles of the researcher and the research assistants 
Regarding a wide range of activities that had to be carried out at the same time during 
fieldwork, the researcher and two research assistants had different roles in the 
longitudinal household inquiry. The researcher was primarily responsible for 
coordinating the Provincial Health Officers and communicating with the hospital 
administrators at both public and private health facilities in order to get permission to 
conduct the research. All of the introductory visits for both ESRD and heart disease 
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patients were conducted by the researcher and the two research assistants in order to get 
overall information about household economic status and make a decision on household 
selection. At the first visit to every household, the researcher participated in the 
introductory process and tried to develop a good relationship between the research team 
and the patients, as well as with other household members. After concluding the first 
round of household visits, all of the selected households were divided into three groups 
and each household was then assigned one person to do the rest of the visits for the 
parallel three-month investigation. 
All household data collected by the research assistants were later transferred to the 
researcher. Data was collected by tape recording household interviews, jotting field 
notes, producing two-week reports, and attending debriefing meetings every two weeks. 
Both research assistants had a Bachelor Degree in Social Science and Rural 
Development, along with some experience in social science research. Before 
commencement of the household investigations, the research assistants were trained in 
several techniques for qualitative approaches such as direct observation, in-depth 
interviews, and illness narratives; The four investigating tools were pre-tested by them. 
The researcher also supported the research assistants in solving any unexpected problems 
during the household visits and helped answer questions raised by patients of household 
members that the assistants were unable to answer. 
8.2.5 Data analysis 
Data from the transcribed interviews, field notes, fieldwork diaries, and two-week reports 
produced by both the researcher and research assistants were analyzed using manual 
coding techniques. "Thematic content analysis" was employed to analyze the content of 
the data and then categorize common themes for households in both poorer and richer 
households. Key elements related to the three areas of the case study'S objectives as they 
related to poorer and richer households for both ESRD and heart disease patients were 
explored and grouped. Different salient issues between richer and poorer patients, and 
between ESRD and heart disease patients, were also categorized. To maintain principles 
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of confidentiality, patients' and interviewees names and other identifying information 
which are presented in this thesis and elsewhere have been changed to protect the privacy 
of participants. 
8.2.6 Ethical considerations 
After the selected patients and their household members agreed to participate in the 
study, an information sheet and written informed consent form were given to all selected 
patients and their household members to officially obtain their consent. Participation in 
the study was strictly voluntary and no incentives were offered. Research findings and 
results would be anonymous and confidential. Respondents were allowed to skip any 
question or stop the interviews at any point and for any reason. Before taking a 
photograph or recording a tape cassette during an interview, respondents were first asked 
if they consented. Before using patient photographs for publication or presentation in 
research or for academic purposes, patients provided their consent and signed a patient's 
consent form for photography (Appendix 5). 
The research assistants were trained to judge and appropriately deal with a critical or 
difficult situation (e.g. the death or suffering of ESRD patients). In addition, guidelines 
to deal with such situations were developed by the researcher. Researchers were also 
trained in techniques for answering difficult questions and how to react to other 
household members. Fundamental knowledge about ESRD, heart disease, choice of 
medical treatment, illness complications, and health service provision in Nakom 
Ratchasima province were studied and prepared by both the researcher and research 
assistants. The research assistants were encouraged to listen and express their sympathy 
to households in serious need. 
The research proposal and the investigating tools were approved by the Ethical Review 
Committee for Research in Human Subjects of the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), 
Thailand and the Ethical Committee of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical , 
Medicine (LSHTM). 
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8.3 RRT and open heart surgery context in Korat province 
This section provides infonnation about the RRT service and open heart surgery context 
in Nakorn Ratchasima (Korat) province, along with general characteristics of selected 
ESRD and heart disease patients in the research. The distribution of ESRD patients, 
different user charges for haemodialysis between public and private health facilities, and 
the estimated costs of RRT borne by ESRD patients using different health insurance 
programs are all presented in greater detail. 
8.3.1 General characteristics of RRT service in Korat province during 2004-2005 
Like in other provinces in Thailand, access to RRT in Korat province was inequitable 
among beneficiaries of different health insurance schemes. CSMBS beneficiaries could 
access and utilize all types of RRT including peritoneal dialysis (PD), haemodialysis 
(HD), and kidney transplantation, without any co-payments in government health 
facilities, while SSS beneficiaries received a subsidy of 1,500 Baht for HD, for not more 
than two sessions a week. ESRD patients who were beneficiaries of the UC scheme had 
to pay all user fees for RRT by themselves. 
In Korat, haemodialysis machines and health personnel in public facilities were very 
limited and far less than the actual demand for RRT. There were two government health 
facilities providing RR T for ESRD patients, the Maharat Hospital and the Military 
Hospital. Both government health facilities gave priority to civil servant beneficiaries, 
and therefore most HD machines were occupied by CSMBS beneficiaries (Figure 8.2). 
With the shortage of public services, five private haemodialysis centres were established 
by private providers in the province and staffed by nephrologists who work in public 
hospitals. Nearly all ESRD patients of the SSS and UC scheme had to receive RRT 
services provided by these private providers, and only the UC beneficiaries had to pay 
user fees for HD, as these fees were not subsidized by the UC scheme. 
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Figure 8.2: An ESRD patient receiving heamodialysis at Maharat Hospital 
Nephrologists and health care providers in Korat preferred HD to PD for three reasons. 
First, user charges for HD were higher than PD, and the government allowed public 
health facilities to charge up to 3000 Baht per session for HD during 2004-2005. All HD 
machines in government health facilities were occupied by civil servant ESRD patients 
because public hospitals were reimbursed for their health services. Second, ESRD 
patients using PD must be well-educated and capable of facilitating self-care and self 
management since PD requires the exchange of peritoneal fluid from patient's peritoneal 
cavity four to six times a day using a safe and clean technique. Lastly, ESRD patients 
with PD had a higher risk of mortality and morbidity than HD. If patients are not well-
trained, there is a high risk that PD will cause peritoneal infection. This is another reason 
why most nephrologists do not support PD, compared to HD. However, it is argued that 
the quality of life (QOL) of ESRD patients using PD is higher than those using HD 
because they do not have to visit HD centres twice or thrice a week, and costs of medical 
care and transportation are less than HD (Kusoom and Lapjaroenwong 2004; 
Teerawattananon 2005). 
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8.3.2 Share of ESRD patients by type of health facility in Korat province 
A census of ESRD patients conducted by the research team during July and August 2004 
showed the unequal distribution of ESRD patients between public and private health 
facilities in Nakom Ratchasima province. From the facility-based secondary data, the 
total number of ESRD patients residing in Nakom Ratchasima province were 233 cases, 
which was equivalent to a prevalence rate of 91 per million. More than two-thirds (72%) 
of the patients residing in the province received haemodialysis from private providers; 
while less than one-third (280/0) utilized this health service at public facilities (Table 8.2). 
The regional hospital, Maharat Hospital, cared for just 100/0 of the ESRD patients 
residing in Nakom Ratchasima province, while the three private providers provided more 
HD services for the remaining patients. 
Table 8.2: Number and percent distribution of ESRD patients among public and private HD 
t . K t . cen res In ora provmce 
ESRD patients ESRD patients residing Total ESRD 
Health facilities residing in Korat outside Korat patients 
No. % No. % No. % 
Public facilities 66 28 7 18 73 27 
Maharat hospital 23 10 2 5 25 9 
Military hospital 43 18 5 13 48 18 
Private facilities 167 72 31 82 198 73 
Ratchasima-Thonburi 82 35 11 29 93 34 
Saint Mary's 39 17 10 26 49 18 
Korat Memorial 32 14 6 16 38 14 
Por Path 8 3 3 8 11 4 
Chalerm-Chai 6 3 1 3 7 3 
Total 233 100 38 100 271 100 
Source: A census on public and private haemodialysis services m Korat durmg July-August 2004 
8.3.3 User charges for haemodialysis in public and private health facilities 
The user charge for haemodialysis at the two government health facilities, Maharat 
Hospital and Military Hospital, was higher than that of private providers. A charge of 
3,000 Baht per HD session at the regional and military hospitals was fully reimbursed for 
ESRD patients because all patients accessing HD in these two public hospitals were 
CSMBS beneficiaries. 
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User charges for HD at private providers depended on types of ownership and the 
decision of the nephrologists. In Korat province, two types of private facilities providing 
haemodialysis were observed: 1) a private facility invested in or owned by nephrologists 
who were working at the government hospitals; and, 2) an HD unit owned by a private 
hospital that paid nephrologists per case-visit. The former tended to have more flexibility 
to adjust user charges for RR T than the latter. Most nephrologists at public hospitals 
were invited to visit their ESRD patients, who were unable to access haemodialysis 
machines in public facilities, at private hospitals and were paid at a rate of 300-500 Baht 
per case per visit. The user fee for HD at private providers (including doctor fees) was on 
average 2,000 Baht per session. However, a private facility owned by a nephrologist who 
worked at Maharat Hospital allowed ESRD patients who were SSS beneficiaries to pay a 
rate of 1,700-1,800 Baht because the Social Security Office gave a subsidy for SSS 
beneficiaries of not more than 1,500 Baht per a HD session. SSS patients had to pay the 
doctor fee of 200-300 Baht per visit on their own. An exemption for the doctor fee for 
some poor SSS beneficiaries was also observed. 
8.3.4 Estimated costs of RRT borne by ESRD patients of different health 
insurance schemes 
Secondary data collected at public and private health facilities and information from 
introductory visits to selected households revealed differences in health expenditure for 
RRT borne by households of different health insurance schemes. ESRD patients who 
were CSMBS beneficiaries could be reimbursed for nearly all RR T costs paid at 
government health facilities, except travelling costs (Table 8.3). In contrast, SSS 
beneficiaries obtained financial assistance of 1,500 Baht per HD session or 3,000 Baht 
per week from the Social Security Office (SSO); they had to bear other costs which were 
excluded from the SSS benefit package. ESRD patients covered by the UC scheme were 
the worst-off group. They had to directly pay nearly all costs for RRT, except laboratory 
investigation and oral medication which were included in the UC benefit package. 
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Table 8.3: Estimated costs for haemodialysis per week among beneficiaries of different health 
insurance schemes in Korat in 2005 
Mean health expenditure (Baht) per week and 
ability to be reimbursed from the government 
Health expenditure UC scheme for RR T on a weekly basis CSMBS reimbursa SSS reimbursa reimbursa ble ble and ble 
uninsured 
I. Haemodialysis services 
./ ./ "'1 (twice a week) 6,000 3,000 >- 4,000 X 
2. Doctor fees -- -- 400 - 600 X 
3. Erythropoietin injection 3,000 ./ 3,000 X 3,000 X 
4. Transport 100 - 400 X 100 - 400 X 100 - 500 X 
Included Covered 
5. Laboratory investigation ./ in SSS by the UC 300 - 500 200 - 300 capitation 200 - 300 
payment scheme 
Included Covered 
6. Oral medication ./ in SSS by the UC 500 - 1,000 300 - 500 capitation 300 - 500 
scheme payment 
Sources: From several interviews with health care providers and ESRD households during the 
introductory visits 
8.3.5 Open heart surgery in Nakorn Ratchasima province 
In Korat, characteristics of health service provision for open heart surgery and its user 
charges considerably differed from those of RRT for ESRD patients. In 2005, Maharat 
Hospital was the only health facility in this province providing open heart surgery, with a 
range of user charges from 150,000 to 300,000 Baht per case. There was no private 
hospital providing such an operation in the province. Since the implementation of the 
UC policy, the waiting list for open-heart surgery at Maharat Hospital has been fully 
booked by patients who are beneficiaries of the UC scheme and SSS, with an average 
wait time of three to four months before the operation (a head nurse in the Maharat 
operating room, personal communication). An interview with a surgeon at Maharat 
Hospital indicated that those who could afford a cardiac operation at a private or 
university hospital sought such an expensive health service in larger Bangkok hospitals. 
Therefore, cardiac operations at Maharat Hospital primarily served heart disease patients 
from the SSS and UC schemes. 
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8.3.6 Characteristics of selected ESRD and heart disease patients 
Twenty ESRD patients, along with their household members, agreed to participate in the 
investigation. Twelve out of 20 (600/0) were male and the remaining eight were female 
(Table 8.4). Among the ten ESRD patients residing in municipal areas, half of them were 
in richer households, while three were in poorer families. The majority of the richer 
ESRD patients lived in municipal areas, while most poorer patients resided in the rural 
areas. ESRD patients' age ranged between 23 and 84 years with an average of 53.5 
years. Before the end of the three-month investigation, three patients in the rural area and 
one in the municipal area had died. Patients no. 8 & 10 died in the second month, and 
patients no. 9 & 19 passed away during the last month of investigation. 
Table 8.4: Characteristics of ESRD patients 
No. Sex Age Residence HH economic Occupation 
status ** 
1 M 62 Rural Richer Owning a lot of land and crops 
2 F 84 Rural Richer Unemployed 
3 M 26 Rural Middle Unemployed 
4 F 45 Rural Middle Unemployed 
5 M 23 Rural Poorer Collecting and selling recycled materials 
6 F 42 Rural Poorer Unemployed 
7 F 48 Rural Poorer Unemployed 
8 * M 40 Rural Poorer Unemployed 
9* F 61 Rural Poorer Unemployed 
10* M 71 Rural Poorer Farmer 
11 M 56 Urban Richer Wood carving business 
12 M 61 Urban Richer Owning an apartment to rent 
13 M 62 Urban Richer Having six trucks for goods transportation 
14 M 65 Urban Richer Owning a lot of land and houses 
15 F 42 Urban Richer Selling motorcycle accessories 
16 M 63 Urban Middle Unemployed 
17 M 46 Urban Middle Selling the swings and other metal accessories 
18 M 33 Urban Poorer Selling raw chicken 
19 * F 59 Urban Poorer Unemployed 
20 F 70 Urban Poorer Unemployed 
Note * died during fieldwork 
** as judged by the researcher and the research assistants 
The number and characteristics of selected heart disease patients differed from those of 
ESRD patients. The majority of the heart disease patients were in poorer households 
residing in rural areas. Nine out of 13 were female. Only three patients lived in an urban 
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area and all were poorer. There was no richer patient in the municipal area and only one 
richer patient in the countryside who agreed to participate in the study. The heart disease 
patients were aged between 26 and 72 years with an average of 48.3 years (Table 8.5). 
Table 8.5: Characteristics of heart disease patients 
UU Occupation 
No. Sex Age residence economic Previous occupation (after the operation) 
status * 
1 F 26 Rural Poorer Unemployed Farming worker 
2 M 41 Rural Poorer Driving motorcycle taxi Singer / farmer 
3 M 41 Rural Poorer Farmer Farmer 
4 F 47 Rural Poorer Unemployed Farmer 
5 F 52 Rural Poorer Farmer Farmer 
6 M 72 Rural Poorer Farmer Contracted construction projects 
7 F 50+ Rural Poorer Farming and planting Farmer and factory worker 
8 F 48 Rural Middle Unemployed Selling goods in a retail shop 
9 F 61 Rural Middle Unemployed Farmer 
10 F 56 Rural Richer Unemployed Farmer and own a retail shop 
11 F 28 Urban Poorer Selling vegetables A house keeper in a computer office 
12 M 52 Urban Poorer Driving a motorcycle Worker / goods transportation for transporting goods 
13 F 55 Urban Poorer Unemployed Selling food along the street 
Note * as judged by the researcher and the research assistants 
8.4 Findings from the ESRD patients 
This section provides research findings comparing the poorer and richer ESRD patients in 
three different areas: 1) access to RRT; 2) cost burden of RRT and its financial impact on 
households; and, 3) household coping strategies for health care costs. 
8.4.1 Access to RRT between richer and poorer ESRD patients 
Regularity and adequacy of achieving haemodialysis and injected medication 
(erythropoietin) can be used as an indicator for assessing the implications of the non-
inclusion of RRT in the UC benefit package on equity in access to RRT between poorer 
and richer households. This is because ESRD patients generally need on average two 
sessions of haemodialysis a week in order to effectively remove waste products from 
their bodies. Moreover, they also require erythropoietin injections to stimulate red blood 
cell formulation, which is a major deficiency among ESRD patients. 
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Table 8.6 presents disparities in access to haemodialysis and erythropoietin injection 
between the richer and poorer ESRD patients in rural and urban areas. On average, richer 
ESRD patients received hemodialysis twice a week, except patient no. 1 who had a better 
health status and good kidney function with a need for haemodialysis only once a week. 
In contrast, poorer patients received hemodialysis on average once a week, except 
patients no. 5, 18, and 20. This is because these poorer ESRD patients still received 
financial support from their relatives for access to RRT. Almost no poorer ESRD 
patients received expensive erythropoietin injections, except case study no. 18 who 
received financial support from his relatives. There appeared to be no financial barrier to 
erythropoietin injection in richer and middle class ESRD patients. Despite being richer, 
patient no. 2 did not receive injected medication due to his good health status, thus there 
was no need for erythropoietin injection. 
Table 8.6: Average number of haemodialysis received per week and access to erythropoietin 
injection amon~ ESRD Eatients of different socio-economic status and residential areas 
Household Average no. of No. of months Access to No. sex Age Residence 
economic status haemodialysis receiving erythropoietin Eer week dialysis injection 
F 84 Rural Richer 1 10 ./ 
2 M 62 Rural Richer 2 36+ x 
3 M 26 Rural Middle 2-3 40+ ./ 
4 F 45 Rural Middle 2 72+ ./ 
5 M 23 Rural Poorer 2 24+ x 
6 F 42 Rural Poorer 4 x 
7 F 48 Rural Poorer 1 20 x 
8 * M 40 Rural Poorer 0.75 35 x 
9* F 61 Rural Poorer 30+ x 
10* M 71 Rural Poorer 15 x 
11 M 56 Urban Richer 2 40+ ./ 
12 M 61 Urban Richer 2 24+ ./ 
13 M 62 Urban Richer 2 24 ./ 
14 M 65 Urban Richer 2 12 ./ 
15 F 42 Urban Richer 2 40 x 
16 M 63 Urban Middle 2 10 x 
17 M 46 Urban Middle 2 14 ./ 
18 M 33 Urban Poorer 2 24+ ./ 
19 * F 59 Urban Poorer 1 24 x 
20 F 70 Urban Poorer 2 68+ x 
Note * died during the investigation. 
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Differences in accessing adequate haemodialysis and erythropoietin injection between 
richer and poorer ESRD patients in rural and urban areas are shown in Figure 8.3. 
Adequacy in treatment was judged by the number of haemodialysis and erythropoietin 
needed per week for each ESRD patient. This was suggested by nephrologists who 
looked after each ESRD patient. The selected households were categorized into six 
groups: richer; middle; and poorer households in urban area, and those three groups in 
rural areas, according to their socio-economic status and residential area. This 
assessment revealed that 56% and 880/0 of poorer patients in the rural and municipality 
areas, respectively, received adequate access haemodialysis. None of the poorer patients 
in rural areas received erythropoietin injection and only 250/0 of poorer patients in urban 
areas did. In contrast, all ESRD patients in the richer and middle households accessed an 
adequate number of haemodialysis and erythropoietin injection. 
Figure 8.3: Percentage of ESRD patients accessing adequate haemodialysis and erythropoietin 
in·ection b socio-economic rou and residential area 
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Urban rich (n=4) Urban middle Urban poor (n=4) Rural rich (n=2) Rural middle (n=2) Rural poor (n=6) 
(n=2) 
Socio-economic status and residential areas of ESRD patients 
Inequitable access to haemodialysis between richer and poorer ESRD patients due to 
financial barriers was also supported by comments from a poorer patient. 
236 
"Now I have received the dialysis just one time, and rarely two times a week. The 
money that I can get together is not enough, so I don't want to continue with the 
treatment. If I don't have money, I am not going to continue. " 
(No. 10, a poorer ESRD patient) 
A richer patient and his/her caregiver also supported the situation of inequitable access to 
RR T caused by financial barriers. 
"I saw a lot of poorer patients who came from rural areas. At the beginning, they 
could afford to pay for the treatments because they sold their land and cattle. But 
since they sold everything and their money was running out, I have not seen them 
coming back to get treatments from the hospital. " 
(Caregivers for No. 12, a richer ESRD patient) 
"This disease is intolerable because it costs a lot of money. If you are rich, you 
can live longer than others. On the contrary, if you are poor, your life will end 
when your money runs out. I can afford costs of haemodialysis because I have a 
business transporting goods and commodities from Nakorn Ratchasima province 
to Bangkok. " 
(No. 13, a richer ESRD patient) 
It is noteworthy that some poorer ESRD patients died because they could not afford user 
charges for haemodialysis and other expenses (Box 8.1). 
Box 8.1 
Infrequent access to haemodialysis 
Chan was a poorer ESRD patient residing in a rural area of Korat province, around 80 
kilometres from the city. He died in February 2005 after suffering from ESRD for nearly 
three years. Due to his irregular income and poor economic status, he struggled to find money 
to pay for user charges for haemodialysis. He received haemodialysis just once a week, and 
sometimes less than once a week, depending on availability of money. He never had any 
chance to receive erythropoietin injection. 
Before his death, he developed several complications caused by infrequent access to 
haemodialysis. These included: 1) fluid overload shown by his puffy eyelids and legs and 
swelling abdomen; 2) frequent fatigue and exhaustion; and, 3) uncomfortable breathing. In 
the days before he passed away, his health condition became worse, and his sister had to pay 
more than 700 baht to rent a private car to go to Maharat Hospital. Then, they did not have 
enough money left to pay the user charges for haemodialysis. Finally, he died at Maharat 
Hospital after being hospitalized for a few days. 
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In terms of access to erythropoietin injection, only one-fourth of the poorer patients in the 
municipality area achieved this medical treatment, while none of the poor in the rural 
areas could attain this expensive medication (Figure 8.3). In contrast, 830/0 of all richer 
ESRD patients could ~fford and did receive this treatment. Only one-sixth of the richer 
patients did not attain injected medication, and this was because of the good condition of 
their health. 
"After retiring from the government in 2003, 1 moved to a private hospital to get 
haemodialysis because its cost was cheaper than Maharat Hospital's and 1 can 
not reimburse the expenses from the government anymore. At present, my health 
condition is quite good, and now 1 have no need for injected medication. " 
(No.2, a richer ESRD patient) 
Apart from the financial barriers, differentials in access to erythropoietin injection can be 
explained by the priority to health care given by patients and the availability of an 
alternative to the expensive injected medication. Poorer patients appeared to give higher 
priority to the treatment of haemodialysis than erythropoietin injection because the 
former was life-saving. Hence, they generally allocated their financial resources for 
haemodialysis as the first priority. Furthermore, blood transfusion was an alternative to 
erythropoietin injection, and was usually provided free of charge for poorer ESRD 
patients at government health facilities. 
"Now, my three sons have to earn to pay for the expenses of my illness. Each of 
my two older sons has to give me 800 baht a week, and the youngest son gives 
only 500 baht. This is only enough for haemodialysis once a week and 
transportation costs. 1 can not afford the injected drug because it is costly. So, 
the doctor usually gives me a blood transfusion as a substitute to improve my 
blood concentration. " 
(No.9, a poorer ESRD patient) 
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poorer ESRD patients experienced adverse consequences from blood transfusions, but 
they had no choice because of their limited financial resources. In addition, they 
sometimes decided to reduce the frequency of haemodialysis to once a week if the health 
condition of patients improved. This differed from richer ESRD patients who could 
afford the costs of both haemodialysis and erythropoietin injection. 
"After being diagnosed with ESRD, my mother received haemodialysis twice a 
week without erythropoietin injection. When her symptoms improved after 
receiving haemodialysis twice a week for several months, then we decided to 
reduce the frequency of haemodialysis from twice to once a week because of our 
limited financial resources. However, we would temporarily resume the 
frequency of haemodialysis to twice a week if her symptoms became worse... My 
mother has to receive a blood transfusion because we can not afford the injected 
medication. Although she usually develops itchy skin and a rash after the blood 
transfusion, we have no choice. " 
(The eldest daughter of No. 19, a poorer ESRD patient) 
"I could not receive a blood transfusion because after taking blood, my body 
often developed a rash and my skin was all itchy. So, I decided to pay for the 
injected medication in order to treat my anaemic symptoms. The cost of 
haemodialysis is 2, 000 baht per session, and injected medication costs 1,600 baht 
per visit. So, I have to pay approximately 7,200 baht per week or around 30,000 
baht per month including other related costs such as transportation and food. " 
(No. 18, a richer ESRD patient) 
Apart from financial barriers, poorer ESRD patients in rural areas had to overcome 
transportation costs and geographical barriers to haemodialysis services available at the 
regional hospital (Figure 8.4). 
"We have to travel approximately 74 kilometres from our home to the hospital to 
receive haemodialysis once or twice a week, depending on availability of money. 
The trip takes around one hour when we take public transportation. During a 
long holiday or 'Songkran' Festival, public buses are always overcrowded. This 
is definitely uncomfortable and unsuitable for the poor condition of my father, but 
we have to bear it. I often accompany my father because sometimes his condition 
is not good and he often feels motion sickness or faint on the bus. Costs of public 
transportation are 200 baht per round trip for two people. If my father's 
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condition is rather bad, we will have to rent a private vehicle in the village to take 
him to the hospital and it costs 600 baht for a round trip. " 
(Daughter of No. 10, a poorer ESRD patient) 
Figure 8.4: An example of a local road from the village of a poorer ESRD patient to the main road 
In contrast, richer ESRD patients could generally afford the transportation costs and 
sometimes they could rent a house in the city to attain regular haemodialysis. 
"During the first year after being diagnosed with ESRD in 2004, I had to receive 
haemodialysis twice a week. The distance between my home and the hospital is 
approximately 90 kilometres, so my daughters and other relatives decided to rent 
a house in the city which cost around 1,600 baht per month for me. So, I did not 
have to travel back and forth from my home to the hospital every week. However, 
I felt very lonely even though one of my siblings always took care of me. When 
my symptoms were getting better, I decided to go back home after the frequency 
of haemodialysis was reduced to only once a week. At present, I spend 800 baht 
for renting a private car from my house to the hospital. " 
(No.2, a richer ESRD patient) 
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F our poorer ESRD patients who died during the investigation reveal a correlation 
between infrequent access to RR T and the death of ESRD patients. Information about 
illness and suffering from their household members indicates that the major cause of the 
deaths of poorer ESRD patients was infrequent access to haemodialysis and 
erythropoietin injection (Box 2). 
Box 8.2: 
An example of the death of a poorer ESRD patient 
Mr. Hom, a poorer ESRD patient who lived in the northern area of Korat province 
approximately 74 kilometres from the city, was diagnosed with ESRD in 2003. Since being 
diagnosed, he had trouble finding money to pay for the user fees of haemodialysis and other 
related costs. He died in late February 2005 due to his inability to find sufficient financial 
resources for the essential medical services. 
About one month prior to his death, he had to move to receive haemodialysis at a private 
hospital in Korat, Saint Mary's Hospital. This was because there was a queue for the dialysis 
machine at the private hospital where he formerly registered, and he was unable to make an' 
appointment due to lack of financial resources. At the new hospital, he still could not receive 
regular haemodialysis due to his irregular income and inadequate financial support. He faced 
difficulties in finding an available haemodialysis machine again after he missed an appointment 
at the new hospital. The frequency of achieving haemodialysis at the new hospital varied from 
7 to 10 days for a session. Then, his symptoms considerably worsened and he had to be 
hospitalized at Maharat Hospital with an emergency condition caused by prolonged, infrequent 
haemodialysis. 
At Maharat Hospital, the patient and his relatives still could not pay the user charges for 
haemodialysis. So, the doctor tried to flush the patient's kidneys by way of his abdomen 
instead, but failed. Finally, his wife and daughters were instructed by the doctor to take him 
back home because his overall condition was very poor and he was in his final days. 
Mr. Hom went back home and was in pain for a couple of days before his death. He suffered 
for one year and three months with ESRD from the time he started receiving haemodialysis until 
his death. He had to spend all of his savings, sell much of his assets such as rice, land, and 
cattle, and borrowed money from his relatives and money lenders in the village to access the 
medical treatment. By the end, he had sold everything and his money was running low. When 
his six daughters could not further provide financial support, he could no longer survive. 
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In summary, access to haemodialysis and erythropoietin injection for ESRD patients 
covered by the UC scheme greatly relied on household ability to pay and degree of 
financial barriers (user charges). Due to limited household financial resources, patients in 
poorer households suffered from infrequent access to expensive health services much 
more than those in better-off households. Geographical barriers also played a significant 
role in preventing poorer ESRD patients in rural areas from accessing RR T. The 
availability of alternative treatments such as blood transfusion in place of the 
erythropoietin injection could help reduce the impact of inequitable access to expensive 
health care between richer and poorer households, even though the less expensive option 
comes with side effects. 
8.4.2 Cost burden of RRT and its economic impact on ESRD households 
Share of RR T health expenditure to household income and to total expenditure were used 
as indicators to measure the cost burden of RR T among poorer and richer ESRD patients. 
This approach aimed to reflect concerns about opportunity costs of household spending 
on health care and potential consequences of this health expenditure for ability to meet 
other basic needs of household members. 
Table 8.7 presents the share of health, food, and other household expenditure to total 
monthly income of ESRD patients where completed data were available. Catastrophic 
health expenditure is defined as the situation where household health expenditure is 
above 10% of income (Prescott 1999; Ranson 2002). All ESRD patients shown in Table 
8.7, except patient no. 1 I , faced catastrophic health care costs. Poorer ESRD households 
had a proportion of health expenditure ranging from 250/0 to 680/0 of their monthly 
household income. Middle income and. richer households also faced high health 
expenditure, but it was a lower proportion of household earnings. It should be noted that 
richer patient no. 1 had a high proportion of health expenditure because he was a retired 
government officer. Although he had a low average monthly income, he had a lot of 
household assets and a large amount of savings in his bank accounts. 
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Table 8.7: The proportion of health and other household expenditure to total monthly income of 
ESRD patients of different socioeconomic status and residential areas 
Average A verage household expenditure Household expenditure as % of total 
Se HH monthly (Baht) monthll: income No. econ. income * Health Food x status Other hh Health Food Other (Baht) expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure 
M RR 17,000 8,750 3,150 3,525 51 19 21 
4 F RM 30,000 22,240 3,000 4,130 74 10 14 
5 M RP 27,000 18,400 3,000 14,400 68 11 53 
6 F RP 25,730 9,600 1,600 19,840 37 6 77 
7 F RP 20,000 8,000 3,500 4,970 40 17 25 
9 F RP 36,150 9,000 3,000 11,340 25 8 31 
I 1 M UR 300,000 25,850 21,000 132,950 8 7 44 
15 F UR 94,700 16,560 4,500 128,555 17 5 136 
16 M UM 50,000 20,000 10,000 13,200 40 20 26 
17 M UM 145,000 24,240 2,530 3,975 17 2 3 
19 F UP 23,000 10,000 5,000 4,000 43 22 27 
20 F UP 45,200 16,000 4,500 11,875 35 10 26 
Note: RR = rural richer, RM = rural middle, RP = rural poorer, UR = urban richer, UM = urban middle, UP = urban poorer 
* Average monthly income was calculated over the three months of investigation. 
In Table 8.8, a comparison between household spending on health and total household 
expenditure presents a similar picture to household income, showing all ESRD patients 
suffered from catastrophic health expenditure caused by RRT. All poorer and middle 
income ESRD households had health expenditure above 250/0 of their total household 
expenditure, and a half of the richer households faced a cost burden for RRT above that 
level. Given the fluctuation of household income from agricultural products and the 
irregular earnings of households in rural areas, health expenditure for RRT and other 
household expenditure in some months of poorer households might be higher than 
monthly household income. 
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Table 8.8: Share of health and other household expenditure to total monthly expenditure of ESRD 
Eatients of different socioeconomic status and residential area 
HH Average A verage household expenditure Household expenditure as % of total 
No. Se 
monthly (Baht) monthly expenditure 
econ. 
expenditure x 
status Health Food Otherhh Health Food Other (Baht)* expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure 
1 M RR 15,425 8,750 3,150 3,525 57 20 23 
4 F RM 29,370 22,240 3,000 4,130 76 10 14 
5 M RP 35,800 18,400 3,000 14,400 51 8 40 
6 F RP 31,040 9,600 1,600 19,840 31 5 64 
7 F RP 16,470 8,000 3,500 4,970 49 21 30 
9 F RP 23,340 9,000 3,000 11,340 39 13 49 
11 M UR 179,800 25,850 21,000 132,950 14 12 74 
14 M UR 42,000 30,000 5,000 7,000 71 12 17 
15 F UR 149,615 16,560 4,500 128,555 11 3 86 
16 M UM 43,200 20,000 10,000 13,200 46 23 31 
17 M UM 30,745 24,240 2,530 3,975 79 8 13 
19 F UP 19,000 10,000 5,000 4,000 52 26 21 
20 F UP 32,375 16,000 4,500 11,875 49 14 37 
Note: RR = rural richer, RM = rural middle, RP = rural poorer, UR = urban richer, UM = urban middle, UP = urban poorer 
* Average monthly expenditure was calculated over the three months of investigation. 
The high financial burden ofRRT, especially for poorer households, is exemplified by Box 8.3. 
Box 8.3: 
Cost burden for RRT in poorer households 
Mrs. Nam was diagnosed with ESRD in August 2004. She was selected as a poorer ESRD 
patient because of her low and irregular household income. Before becoming sick with ESRD, 
Nam could work in the fields with her husband and brother. However, her husband and other 
household members (i.e. her nephew and niece who lived in the house) had to work harder and 
bear the cost burden for Nam's illness when she was sick and could not work. 
Nam's husband earned approximately 120 baht a day. He occasionally had additional income 
from a temporary contracting job in the neighbour's field or selling seasonal agricultural 
products. Nam's daughter had just graduated from a vocational school and still could not find a 
job, and her son aged 12 years was too young to earn any money. 
Regarding cost burden for illness, Nam had to pay approximately 2,400 baht per week for one 
session of haemodialysis (2,000 baht), petrol cost for her nephew's car (300 baht), and oral 
medication (1 00-IS0 baht). Although she tried to minimize the cost burden for RRT by 
reducing the frequency of haemodialysis to once a week, the illness costs of 9,600 baht per 
month accounted for 9S% of her actual household income in January 200S. She had to deal with 
the household deficit by borrowing money from her relatives and withdrew household savings 
to pay for costs ofRRT and other household expenditure. In February 200S, her husband earned 
3,500 baht from selling maize. So the share of health expenditure to household income 
decreased to 23%. Furthermore, Nam spent part of the earnings in February to pay loans and 
other household expenditure. During the household visit, Nam revealed that the amount of her 
household debt was 8S,000 Baht with an annual interest rate of Il.S %. 
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Although all ESRD patients had to face a high level of health expenditure for the costs of 
RRT, richer ESRD patients tended to have less financial burden for RRT than those in the 
middle income and poorer groups because of their higher earnings. In richer households 
where data were available, health expenditure as a percentage of household income 
ranged from 9% to 510/0, while that of the middle group was between 170/0 to 74%, and 
the poorer group ranged from 25% to 680/0 (Figure 8.5). Based on these findings, it can 
be concluded that the cost burden for RR T was greater for middle and poorer income 
groups than richer households. 
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The implications of the cost burden of RR T on ESRD households differed between 
households of different socio-economic status. In poorer households, the cost burden for 
RR T tended to force many households into impoverishment due to their low and irregular 
household income. As shown in Box 8.3, health expenditure for RRT of a poorer patient 
was as high as 900/0 of household income. The long-term, high cost nature of RR T often 
force poorer households to sell assets, fall into debt and become impoverished. 
245 
"For cover the expenses for haemodialysis and transportation costs, I firstly used 
my savings to pay for these expenses. After my savings was depleted, I began to 
sell some gold necklaces (weight around 1.96 troy ounce), and approximately 1.6 
acres of land; the sale of these items brought in 80, 000 baht. In addition, I sold 
some property near my home which brought in an addition of 1 00, 000 baht, all of 
which I spent for haemodialysis and other costs for accessing the medical 
treatment. " 
(No.9, a poorer ESRD patient) 
The cost burden for RRT did not only generate a financial impact on ESRD patients, but 
it also created an economic burden for household members and other relatives who had to 
provide financial support for the patient (Figure 8.6). Apart from costs for haemodialysis 
and injected medication, other access costs such as transportation, food expenditure, and 
time spent by caregivers were also needed. 
"From my work I can make 5, 000 baht a month. My house rental is more than 
1, 000 baht. I also have to pay for my children's school costs, water and utilities, 
my vehicle loan payment, and I'm the head of the household so I need to provide 
food. So where does the money comefromfor my mother? I need to give her 800 
baht per week, sometimes 1, 000. So where do I get all this money? I have no 
savings; I have to give everything to my mother. " 
(The eldest son of No. 9, a poorer ESRD patient) 
"This disease is serious. Everybody in our family must help and share this 
financial burden. Normally, if my mother is well, then I will have some money in 
my wallet. But since she has been sick, I don't have any money in my wallet. 
With this disease, if you don't have any money then you die because this disease is 
also a "rich person's disease." And "rich person's disease" makes us all poor 
(because we have to spend all we have on treatment). " 
(The younger son of No. 9, a poorer ESRD patient) 
"The costs in our household are increased at times and lower at other times 
because I am not regularly employed. I have to spend much of my time to take my 
father to the hospital and to see the doctor. " 
(The daughter of No. 10, a poorer ESRD patient) 
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Figure 8.6: A poorer ESRD patient receiving financial support from his wife and mother 
In contrast, health expenditure for RR T in richer ESRD patients had less financial 
consequences for household living standards (Boxes 8.4 - 8.5). 
Box 8.4: 
Economic impact of costs for RRT on a richer household 
Trisit, aged 62 years, was a richer ESRD patient who had various kinds of business with 
his family members. He owned six big trucks which were used for transporting 
commodities between Korat and Bangkok. Moreover, his wife and daughters also had a 
home-based business of making dry Thai desserts from rice powder. From his 
transporting business, he could earn more than 40,000 baht a month . The amount of 
earnings from the home-business was not disclosed, but they were partly used for 
household consumption and other household expenditure. 
Trisit was diagnosed with ESRD in 2002. For five years previously, he was sick with 
diabetes, gouty arthritis, and high blood pressure. After he ESRD developed, he always 
received haemodialysis twice a week with erythropoietin injection and oral medication at 
a private hospital. The average cost for RRT was approximately 32,000 baht a month . He 
could afford haemodialysis and other medical care for his illness by using the profits of 
his transportation business. His wife and other family members did not have to bear costs 
of his illness because he earned sufficient amount of money from his own business . 
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Box 8.5: 
Cost burden for RRT in a richer household 
Adisak, aged 56 years, was a rich ESRD patient who had a wood carving business in Korat 
province. He owned a big woodcarving factory which could earn more than 300,000 baht a 
month. He was diagnosed with diabetes in 1978 when he was only 29 years old. Then, he 
developed ESRD as a consequence of diabetes in 2001. 
Before being diagnosed with ESRD, he had a cost burden for medical care of his diabetes of 
approximately 1,000 baht a month. After becoming sick with ESRD, he had to pay for costs 
of haemodialysis, injected medication, and other medical services in the amount of 
approximately 30,000 baht per month. He used the earnings from his business to pay for 
these medical costs. The cost burden for RRT accounted for 9% of his monthly income. He 
could afford this and there was no impact on living standards for his family. 
Adisak had two sons and two daughters. All of them are married and had their own 
businesses. However, they did not give Adisak financial support for costs of haemodialysis 
because their earnings were just sufficient for the living costs of their own families. 
Evidence from illness narratives of most ESRD patients also reveals that, apart from the 
financial burden for haemodialysis and other accessing costs, most ESRD patients had to 
bear sporadic costs for emergency medical care at the time of diagnosis and acute 
complications which frequently occur with ESRD patients. The richer ESRD patients 
generally had sufficient resources to cope with such sporadic and high costs of illness, 
while poorer households usually struggled to deal with the additional financial burden. 
"1 had symptoms of nausea and vomiting with swollen legs, and could not take 
any food before being diagnosed with ESRD in early 2004. After being 
hospitalized at the private hospital (Ratchasima- Thonburi Hospital) for almost 
one month, 1 had to pay costs for hospitalization and dialysis of nearly 200, 000 
baht. Fortunately, my daughter, who married a French businessman, can give me 
financial support for such expenses. She also regularly sends an amount of 
money from France to pay for costs of haemodialysis and other household 
expenditure every month. " 
(No.2, a richer ESRD patient) 
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Emotional stress and depression from inability to find financial resources for costs of 
medical care was observed among poorer ESRD households. Stress occurred in both 
ESRD patients and other household members. 
"I am so sorry to inconvenience my children so much. I am so sorry that my 
children's finances are all gone. 1 am so troubled, especially when 1 think of my 
daughter in Bangkok and my family here. All of my children are helping and 
giving all that they can. But there is no one in the family who can help a lot. " 
(No. 10, a poorer ESRD patient) 
"Sometimes 1 feel so stressed because we have to find money to pay for the 
household expenses and my father's treatment. 1 wonder why life no longer has 
happiness. " 
(The daughter of No. 10, a poorer ESRD patient) 
"Before when she was well I wasn't that tired. I would go home, rest, and feel 
relaxed. Wherever I went, whatever 1 did, 1 felt good. Now every day I am 
distressed because my mother is not well. And in every family, it is the head of 
the household who has to come up with the money. Aye... This is what it means 
to help. Aye ... /I 
(A son of No. 9, a poorer ESRD patient) 
"Things that make me feel bad in life are this illness and anything related to it. 
Why must it be like this? Previously, everything was good. But now the money 
that my children earn which used to bring them happiness now is a source of 
sadness. Now they must use their money, not for themselves, but for me. The 
money that my children get, they cannot use for themselves and I am very sorry 
for that. " 
(No.9, a poorer ESRD patient) 
8.4.3 Coping strategies for costs of RRT between poorer and richer households 
Poorer ESRD patients employed many coping strategies to deal with the implications of 
the high cost burden for RRT, while richer patients rarely used such strategies because of 
their greater financial resources and less implications (Box 8.6). 
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Box 8.6: 
Coping strategies for costs ofRRT in a richer household 
Chalong was a retired government employee who was diagnosed with ESRD in 2002. The 
socio-economic status of Chalong's family was wealthy. He owned a lot of land in many 
provinces, with a number of cars and houses. When he had to pay for costs of 
haemodialysis by himself, he decided to sell 12 acres of land which brought in over 2 
million baht. He kept this amount of money to pay for medical care costs and other 
household expenditure. Furthermore, he also had a retail shop business with his wife, which 
earned approximately 15,000 baht a month. He usually used recurrent household income to 
pay for dialysis and other medical care. If the revenue was not sufficient, he would use his 
savings from selling land. 
Details of coping strategies for costs ofRRT in poorer households are as follows. 
Reducing the frequency of haemodialysis and denial of erythropoietin injection 
The most common strategy employed by poorer ESRD patients was a reduction in the 
frequency of haemodialysis and a denial of erythropoietin injection. Reducing 
haemodialysis from twice to once or less than once a week reduced the cost burden for 
RRT from approximately 16,000 to 8,000 baht per month. Furthermore, a denial of 
erythropoietin injection saved household financial resources for about 10,000 - 12,000 
baht per month. Although this strategy employed by poorer ESRD patients effectively 
reduced household health expenditure, patients had to suffer the health consequences of 
infrequent access to haemodialysis. In contrast, richer households seldom used this type 
of coping strategies. 
Borrowing or taking loans 
Poorer ESRD households often employed a coping strategy of borrowing or taking loans 
to cope with costs of RRT. All poorer patients had some extent of household debts 
associated with costs of RRT, while one-fourth of the middle income and one-seventh of 
the richer groups struggled with such household debts (see Table 8.9). The magnitude of 
debts among poorer households ranged from 20,000 to 800,000 Baht, and three cases had 
a ratio of debts to household monthly income of more than 10: 1. Fewer richer and 
middle income households faced household debts and their debts were smaller. 
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Table 8.9: Household debt compared to monthly income by ESRD patient with different 
economic status and residence 
Household No. of Amount of Ratio of debt 
No Sex Age 
months debt related to monthly 
The purposes of debt economIC 
receiving to costs for household 
status dial~sis RRT (Baht) Income 
1 F 84 RR 10 None 0 
2 M 62 RR 36+ None 0 
3 M 26 RM 40+ 300,000 5: 1 His mother took a loan from 
the school's union as a 
preparation for his kidney 
transplantation 
4 F 45 RM 72+ None 0 
5 M 23 RP 24+ 300,000 1 1 : 1 Loans for his new pick-up 
car used for his business 
6 F 42 RP 4 85,000 3: 1 For agricultural investment 
and costs of illness 
7 F 48 RP 20 500,000 25: 1 Debt from mortgaging her 
car and house for costs of 
haemodialysis and other 
household expenditure 
8 M 40 RP 35 100,000 NA F or patient's illness costs 
9 F 61 RP 30+ 70,000 2: 1 F or patient's illness costs 
10 M 71 RP 15 230,000 NA Debt of his two daughters 
used for his illness costs 
I 1 M 56 UR 40+ None 0 
12 M 61 UR 24+ None 0 
13 M 62 UR 24 None 0 
14 M 65 UR 12 None 0 
15 F 42 UR 40 1,000,000 11: 1 Debt for two machines used 
for the family's business 
16 M 63 UM 10 None 0 
17 M 46 UM 14 None 0 
18 M 33 UP 24+ 50,000 NA For patient's illness costs 
19 F 59 UP 24 800,000 35: 1 Debt of the patient's 
daughter for housing 
reconstruction and patient's 
costs of illness 
20 F 70 UP 68+ 20,000 0.44: 1 For patient's illness costs 
DiversifYing financial resources from relatives 
To diversify household financial resources to cope with costs for RRT was commonplace 
in many poorer ESRD patients. Some patients' relatives had to work for longer hours or 
find extra work during out-of-office hours. The quotations below and details in Box 8.7 
demonstrate this type of coping strategy adopted by poorer and middle income 
households. 
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"So I have to get the money. 1 look for special work, but it's not easy. It's 
difficult to find work in the evenings and late night hours. But 1 have to make 
adjustments for my mother. If 1 don't, then where will my mother get what she 
needs? So 1 have to find it here or there-anywhere 1 can. " 
(The younger son of No. 9, a poorer ESRD patient) 
Box 8.7 
Diversifying financial resources from relatives in a poorer household 
Thip's younger sister was the main person who provided financial support for Thip's 
haemodialysis costs. In 1999, Thip's sister had to quit a job as a government officer in 
Bangkok to go home an take charge of Thip's sweet soya milk business because of her illness. 
At her home in Sea Keaw district, she could earn approximately 700-800 baht ( £ 10-11 ) a 
night from selling sweet soya milk. This income was sufficient for Thip's health expenditure 
and other household consumption. 
Thip's sister had to prepare the ingredients of the soya milk every afternoon. When the soya 
milk was finished, she sold it from 10 p.m. in the evening until 9 a.m. the following morning. 
Due to Thip's financial requirements, her younger sister had to work seven days a week, and 
she could not go anywhere for five or six years. She also informed us sadly that she could not 
get married because she was in charge for her sister's illness and her father was too old to 
work. This was her responsibility. 
Using savings and selling assets 
Some poorer households withdrew money from their savings, as early coping strategies 
before other strategies were adopted (i.e. selling assets). In the meantime, other 
strategies such as reducing other household expenditure, or taking loans were also 
employed. 
"Before this, 1 had about 40, 000 - 50, 000 baht, but it is all gone. 1 planned to 
keep it for food and housing when 1 was old. 1 sold my cattle; 1 sold rice; 1 sold 
anything 1 had. My dialysis cost me everything. " 
(No. 10, a poorer ESRD patient) 
"So now 1 have to live day to day. But before I had gold necklaces, I had 
everything. Now it is all gone. Aye... (rising laughter) Gone ... It's all going 
away." 
(The eldest son of No. 9, a poorer ESRD patient) 
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IIApart from my younger sister's financial support, I usually receive some amount 
of money from my younger brother. Sometimes, revenue earned by my younger 
sister is insufficient, so I have to withdraw some amount of savings to pay for 
costs of haemodialysis and other household expenditure. During the past two 
months, I withdrew 6, 000 baht from my bank account because our regular income 
was not enough for total household expenditure. " 
(No, 4, a middle class ESRD patient) 
Reducing household expenditure 
Reducing flexible items of household expenditure was another common coping strategy 
among poorer ESRD households. Cutting household expenditure for food and education 
for children was experienced by a few poorer ESRD patients. 
IIOthers in our household helped in bringing food to eat, which helped to decrease 
the household budget. Furthermore, we eat conservatively, eating primarily 
vegetables and spicy sauce. But my youngest daughter needs to eat fairly well as she 
is still quite young and developing. " 
(A daughter of No. 10, a poorer ESRD patient) 
"My wife and I decided to move our children from a private secondary school to a 
new public secondary school. This is because we want to reduce our household 
expenditure and costs since the public secondary schools are cheaper than those in 
private settings. Although, we are both concerned over the quality of the public 
school, in this situation we have to reserve some money for costs of haemodialysis 
and other health care costs. " 
(No. 17, a poorer ESRD patient) 
253 
8.5 Findings from heart disease patients 
This section provides research findings from poorer and richer heart disease patients in 
the three different areas: 1) access to open heart surgery; 2) cost burden for cardiac 
operations and its financial impact on households; and, 3) household coping strategies. 
8.5.1 Access to open heart surgery between richer and poorer households 
Interview data of heart disease patients revealed that poorer households did not face 
direct payments for costs of open heart surgery. Both poorer and richer heart disease 
patients paid only a nominal fee of 30 Baht for operation costs and other medical services 
during their hospitalization (Boxes 8.8 & 8.9). As shown in the following quotation, 
most heart disease patients were satisfied with the new policy on universal coverage and 
they felt very happy because after the operation they could work again and live as a 
healthy person (Figure 8.7). 
"If I didn't have the UC card, the doctor said he probably wouldn't be able to 
operate because I didn't have any money. The cost of the operation was 
approximately 100, 000 baht and the UC card was very good and could help a lot. 
If I didn't have this card, he probably couldn't accept to do my operation. " 
(No. 11, a poorer heart disease patient) 
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Box 8.8: 
Access to a cardiac operation of a poorer heart disease patient 
Aung was a 55-year-old heart disease patient residing in a poor urban area of Korat. She 
became ill from a leakage of her heart valves in 2000. When she was first diagnosed, she 
did not have any type of health insurance card. So, she spent around 300-500 baht for a 
hospital visit when she received her medication at Maharat Hospital. After achieving the 
Low Income card from the government a year later, she did not have to pay for oral 
medication. The Low Income card was changed to the UC card in 2002. 
In 2004, her heart disease symptoms were getting worse. She was frequently fainting and so 
fatigued that she could not go anywhere. After fainting on the street in September 2004, the 
doctor indicated that she could not postpone the operation any longer, and it would now be 
possible for her to have the operation. This was because Maharat Hospital could provide 
the cardiac operation and the expenses would be covered by the UC scheme. So, she 
received the open heart surgery at the end of 2004, and paid only 30 Baht for the operation 
and other medical expenses. 
During the household visits in January 2005, her health condition was very well and she 
could breathe easily. She did not have any trouble with walking and could go out anytime 
without weariness. She felt very happy because the UC scheme helped her to access the 
operation, and then she could live longer with her young grandson. 
Case study box 8.9: 
Access to a cardiac operation of a richer heart disease patient 
Dokmai, aged 56 years, was a richer heart disease patient who received open heart surgery 
at Maharat Hospital at the end of 2004. She was first diagnosed with coronary artery 
obstruction and a leakage of heart valves early in the 1980s. Then, she had her first cardiac 
operation at the Rama Thibodi hospital, Bangkok in 1983 because at that time there was no 
open heart surgery at Maharat Hospital. After the operation, her health condition was quite 
good for twenty years. Later, she started developing some symptoms of heart disease such 
as fatigue, difficulty breathing, weariness, and inability to walk or sleep. When these 
symptoms were getting worse, she went to Maharat Hospital to receive physical 
examination and further investigation. Because of deterioration of the artificial valve and 
the function of her heart, she had to receive a second heart surgery in 2004 using benefits of 
the UC scheme. She paid only 30 baht for the operation and other hospital services at 
Maharat Hospital. After the second operation, she could work and do normal activities 
without weariness. She was quite satisfied with the quality of the operation and other 
services provided by medical staff at Maharat Hospital. 
The economic status of Dokmai's family was quite wealthy. Her family had plenty of land 
and could earn more than 120,000 baht per year from planting rice. She also had a retail 
shop, which generated approximately 9,000 baht per month in revenue. She gave an 
opinion that if she could not use the UC scheme card for the operation, it was not a problem 
for her to afford costs of the operation in a bigger public or a private hospital in Bangkok. 
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Figure 8.7: A poorer heart disease patient who could work in the fields after receiving a cardiac 
operation 
Although financial barriers to open heart surgery were removed, heart disease patients 
residing in rural areas faced a barrier to health services caused by the referral process 
between community hospitals and the regional hospital. In practice, a patient who 
registered as a beneficiary of the UC scheme with a community hospital had to get a 
referral document from the community hospital before receiving health services at the 
tertiary care hospital. Box 8.10 and the following quotation reveal barriers to open heart 
surgery caused by delay in the referral process. Concerns over the expenses that the 
community hospitals had to pay to reimburse the regional hospital seemed to be a crucial 
factor influencing reluctance of medical doctors to refer the heart disease patients from 
community hospitals to the tertiary care level. 
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Box 8.10: 
Referral barriers to cardiac surgery of a poorer heart disease patient 
lonn, a poor farmer from Chakarat district, became ill with heart disease in 2003. She 
first took oral medication at a private clinic of a medical doctor who was working at the 
community hospital. After being treated with oral medication and sometimes injected 
drugs for six months, her symptoms were getting worse. Then, she decided to go to the 
regional hospital for further investigation and treatment. The medical doctor at the 
community hospital was not willing to refer her to Maharat Hospital. He tried to persuade 
her to get further medical treatment at his private clinic and the community hospital. She 
had to travel back and forth for several times before achieving the referral document from 
the community hospital. The medical doctors and the hospital staff seemed to be 
unwilling to give her the referral document. 
The medical doctor at Maharat Hospital found that two blood vessels of lorm's heart were 
almost totally obstructed. After a thorough examination and waiting in the queue for 
surgery, she received her open heart surgery at the end of 2004, and paid only 30 Baht for 
costs of the operation and other hospital services. 
Another example of a poorer heart disease patient facing referral barriers to open heart 
surgery from the community hospital that she registered as the UC beneficiary is shown 
as follows. 
"Since I was diagnosed with heart disease in 2001, I took medication from the 
district hospital every month for three years. The medical doctor at the district 
hospital only gave me oral medication and he sometimes asked me about the 
symptoms and examined my blood pressure or my heart beat. The oral 
medication that he gave was always the same. When I asked him for a referral 
document to Maharat Hospital because I was not getting better, he asked me the 
reason why I wanted to go to the regional hospital. He did not have any plan to 
refer me to the regional hospital, even though my symptoms were getting worse. 
Finally, I got the document after visiting the community hospital for several times. 
The doctor at Maharat Hospital told me that I must have a cardiac operation 
quickly because there was severe leakage of my heart valves" 
(No.7, a poorer heart disease patient) 
Interviews about utilization of open heart surgery and perception of health servIces 
among the heart disease patients revealed a common concern over the quality of cardiac 
operations provided to the UC beneficiaries. Before receiving the operation, both richer 
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and poorer patients expressed their concerns about the quality and the expected outcome 
of open heart surgery at Maharat Hospital. 
"Some villagers argued that the quality of government health services provided 
by the UC scheme is not good, and I might be at risk from the consequences of the 
operation if I use its benefit. Although I was quite worried about this warning, I 
had no choice. My symptoms were getting worse and I could not work or do 
anything. It was impossible for me to find 150, 000 Baht to cover the costs of 
operation at a bigger public or private hospital in Bangkok. So, I decided to 
receive the operation at Maharat Hospital and the outcome of the operation was 
very good. I paid only 30 Baht for the costs of operation, medication, and other 
hospital services. " 
(No.5, a poorer heart disease patient) 
"My daughters and sons did not want me to get the operation because they 
experienced a neighborhood patient who had a bad experience after a back 
operation at Maharat Hospital. At first, they suggested I avoid the operation, but 
I wanted to get better. I was so tired and could do nothing when I was sick with 
heart disease. I told them that I wanted to get better because I wanted to take 
care of my grandsons and would like to work again as a healthy person. " 
(No.9, middle income heart disease patient) 
In Nakorn Ratchasima province, the relatively short experience of the cardiac operative 
team at Maharat Hospital, which was established in 2002, posed a public concern over 
the quality of the cardiac operations. Furthermore, there was a widespread perception 
that the quality of health services provided by government health facilities under the UC 
scheme was poor due to inadequate financial support of the government (Kittikanya 
2004). As a result, some richer heart disease patients sought the operation at a private or 
university hospital in Bangkok. In contrast, poorer heart disease patients had no choice 
and had to obtain the operation provided by cardiac surgeons at Mahatrat Hospital. To 
some extent, concerns about the quality of health services among the poorer patients 
affected their decision to access and utilize essential health services, despite having 
health needs. 
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8.5.2 Cost burden for open heart surgery on poorer and richer households 
Table 8.10 presents share of health expenditure to average household income of heart 
disease patients where data were available during the three month period of investigation. 
Health expenditure of the heart disease households was quite low, compared to their 
household income. Most households did not have any health expenditure during the 
three-month period of household visits. The highest proportion of health expenditure was 
only 5 % which was found in heart disease patient number 1. 
Table 8.10: Share of health and other expenditure to household monthly income by heart disease 
Eatient of different socioeconomic status and residential area 
Average A verage household expenditure Household expenditure as % of total 
HH monthly (Baht) monthl~ income 
No. sex econ. household 
Health Food Otherhh Health Food Other 
status income* 
(Baht) expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure 
F RP 7,100 330 2,770 2,317 5 39 
2 M RP 5,300 150 3,475 1,645 3 66 
3 M RP 9,925 0 1,750 2,456 0 18 
4 F RP 8,000 275 1,000 6,714 3 13 
6 M RP 45,358 0 3,000 7,426 0 7 
8 F RM 7,250 0 3,600 3,710 0 50 
10 F RR 455,000 0 11,000 358,080 0 2 
11 F UP 12,350 70 2,850 6,577 1 23 
12 M UP 8,100 0 3,300 5,410 0 41 
Note: RR = rural richer, RM = rural middle, RP = rural poorer, UP = urban poorer 
* Only heart disease households where data are available 
As demonstrated by Boxes 8.8 & 8.9, there was no significant direct medical care cost of 
open heart surgery for either richer or poorer households. However, some poorer patients 
experienced financial burden for transportation costs and food for villagers and 
neighbours who visited the patient at the regional hospital. 
"Although I had to pay only 30 baht for costs of my cardiac operation and other 
medical services at Maharat Hospital, I still had to borrow 15,000 baht ·with an 
annual interest rate of 5%. This money was spent on food and transportation 
costs for villagers and those ·who visited me when I was admitted to Maharat 
Hospital. " 











8.5.3 Household coping strategies for costs of open heart surgery 
From the research findings, heart disease patients of the UC scheme did not experience 
significant payments for health care costs of open heart surgery due to the well 
functioning financial risk protection of the UC scheme. Although a few poorer 
households had a financial burden for transportation costs and food expenditure of their 
relatives during hospital admissions, they could manage this financial burden by using 
their savings or taking loans. 
8.6 Discussion 
8.6.1 Summary of research findings 
The research findings show that access to haemodialysis and erythropoietin injection of 
ESRD patients covered by the UC scheme greatly depended on household's ability to pay 
and degree of the financial barriers (user charges). ESRD patients in poorer households 
suffered from infrequent access to RR T much more than those in better-off households 
because of their limited household financial resources. Infrequent access to 
haemodialysis and inability to obtain essential and expensive medication (erythropoietin) 
was a major cause of patients' death. In addition, geographical barriers played a 
significant role in preventing poorer ESRD patients in rural areas from accessing RRT. 
Although all ESRD patients faced a high level of health expenditure caused by RRT, 
poorer patients tended to suffer from the financial burden of RR T much more than their 
richer counterparts, and a high proportion of them faced financial catastrophe from health 
care costs. Poorer patients adopted various financial strategies to cope with high health 
care expenditure, which impacted not only ESRD patients, but also household members 
and patients' relatives who had to provide financial support for the costs of RRT. 
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The research findings from heart disease patients showed that neither poorer nor richer 
patients under the DC scheme experienced significant payments for health care costs of 
open heart surgery due to the well functioning financial risk protection of the DC scheme. 
Although a few poorer households had a financial burden for transportation costs and 
food expenditure for their relatives, they could manage this financial burden by using 
their savings or taking out loans without a great financial impact on household living 
standards. Most heart disease patients were happy with the universal coverage policy 
because it allowed them to access and utilize expensive health services. 
8.6.2 Methodologicallimitations 
Difficulties in conducting the qualitative study on poorer and richer ESRD and heart 
disease patients were different. Poorer ESRD patients were difficult to find because most 
of them die in a short period of time if they can not afford the costs of RR T or can not 
bear the long-term financial burden. In contrast, poor co-operation of richer ESRD 
patients led to difficulties in encouraging them to participate in the study. In this 
research, richer heart disease patients were rarely found because most of them did not 
choose to have their cardiac operations at Maharat Hospital. Richer patients had more 
choice in determining their medical care than poorer patients, and they preferred to seek 
the operation from a university or big hospital in Bangkok. Hence, using secondary data 
of patients receiving cardiac operations at Maharat Hospital provided a limitation to reach 
patients in richer households. Similar to ESRD households, most heart disease patients in 
better-off households also refused to participate in the investigation because they did not 
want to waste their time contributing to the study. 
How to achieve accurate data on household income and expenditure was another 
limitation in the assessment of the cost burden for RR T and its financial impact on richer 
and poorer households. In this study, richer households were reluctant to reveal their 
actual income and household assets, while poorer households were distressed to disclose 
their household income and expenditure due to their suffering and grief from illness 
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costs. With this limitation, findings of the financial burden for costs of RR T on ESRD 
households of different socio-economic status should be interpreted with care. 
The interpretation of the cost burden for RRT as a percentage of household income faced 
two limitations on poorer ESRD households. First, poorer ESRD patients generally tried 
to minimize their household spending on health care by reducing the frequency of 
accessing haemodialysis and declining to obtain expensive injected medication 
(erythropoietin injection). As a result, the proportion of health expenditure to household 
income in poorer ESRD patients was lower than it would otherwise be. Second, there 
was seasonal variation of monthly household income, especially households in rural 
areas. In some poorer households, earnings from agricultural products were high in one 
month and low in another month. Moreover, some poorer households smoothed out their 
income deficit by using coping strategies such as taking loans, selling assets, or 
withdrawing from their savings. With these variations of household income and financial 
coping strategies, a comparison of household health expenditure and average household 
income across different time periods should be interpreted with caution. 
In addition, difficulties in classifying ESRD patients into different socio-economic 
groups pose a concern over the interpretation of the cost burden for RR T between richer 
and poorer households. A problem was created by the mismatch between using the 
amount of household monthly income and consensus among the investigators to classify 
households into different socio-economic groups. Although the investigators tried to 
assess household economic status by using multiple data sources (i.e. information from 
health care providers, informal interview during the introductory visits, and direct 
observation of household assets), information about household monthly cash income 
revealed a poor to moderate correlation with the assessment on household economic 
status made by the researchers, especially in richer and middle income households. The 
money-metric approach (household income or expenditure) also resulted in a problem of 
assessing poorer household socio-economic status because their monthly income varied 
according to the agricultural season, and other financial sources such as temporary 
employment, taking loans, and selling assets. Different means testing approaches could 
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lead to different groups of household socio-economic categories. Using different tools to 
classify household socio-economic status could result in different pictures and findings of 
cost burden for RRT between richer and poorer households. 
8.6.3 General discussion 
These case studies on ESRD and heart disease patients show the economic impact of the 
limited benefit package of the UC scheme on poorer and richer households in three 
different ways. First, the inclusion of open-heart surgery in the benefit package of the 
UC scheme provided largely equitable access to this expensive health service for poorer 
heart disease patients, which some patients previously could not access. The absence of 
financial barriers to open heart surgery promoted a greater possibility of poorer patients 
accessing this expensive health service when needed. In contrast, the exclusion of RRT 
from the UC benefit package resulted in considerable financial barriers in accessing RRT, 
and a substantial, negative financial impact on poorer ESRD patients and their household 
members. Infrequent access to haemodialysis and inability to receive injected medication 
(erythropoietin) due to limited financial resources appeared to be a major cause of the 
death of four poorer ESRD patients in this study. It is likely that the decision not to 
include an essential but expensive health service in the benefit package of a public health 
insurance scheme can affect poorer households, in terms of infrequent access to health 
services and considerable financial barriers, much more than their richer counterparts. 
Second, the financial barriers to an expensive health service not included in the UC 
benefit package indirectly led to the situation that richer patients and CSMBS 
beneficiaries could benefit more from government health services than poorer patients. 
The investigation of ESRD patients indicated that CSMBS beneficiaries were the 
majority of ESRD patients who benefited from RR T services in public facilities, whereas 
poorer patients covered by the UC scheme had to seek health care from private providers. 
In contrast, when an expensive health service such as a cardiac operation was included in 
the benefit package, a greater proportion of poorer heart disease patients could access the 
operation. The waiting list for cardiac operation was significantly occupied by UC and 
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the SSS beneficiaries, while many richer heart disease patients opted to seek care from a 
university or large private hospital in Bangkok. These findings indicate that the benefit 
package of the public health insurance scheme is a factor affecting access to government 
health resources of poorer patients. Also, as shown in the case study of RR T and open 
heart surgery, a difference in the inclusion in the DC benefit package resulted in 
differences in ability to access and utilize these two expensive health services of poorer 
households as clearly shown in the case of RRT. In addition, changes in the design of 
provider payment methods and reimbursement pre- and post-DC for open heart surgery 
influenced the supply-side responses of public health care providers and access to health 
care of poorer heart disease patients. 
Third, financial burden of RR T forced poorer households to face financial catastrophe 
and poverty due to the high and ongoing costs for RRT. The low and irregular income of 
poorer households and a lack of a social safety net resulted in a greater catastrophic 
impact on the poorer households than the richer families. Poorer patients adopted some 
financial strategies to reduce household expenditure such as reduction in the frequency of 
haemodialysis, food expenditure, and transportation costs, but these strategies greatly 
affected their quality of life. In contrast, richer households experienced less financial 
burden from RRT due to their higher income and the availability of a safety net for 
medical care costs. It is also evident that the economic burden of RR T did not only 
impact on ESRD patients, but also created a financial impact on household members and 
other relatives who had to provide financial support for the ESRD patients. In some 
poorer patients, health care costs for RRT posed a catastrophic impact on other families 
whose members were in charge of providing financial support for ESRD patients. 
Geographical barriers to expensive health services provided by tertiary care hospitals 
posed a greater problem of inequitable access to health services of poorer patients, 
especially those in rural areas. Apart from difficulties in travelling from a rural or 
remote area to seek health care in the city, poorer ESRD patients had to bear higher 
expenditure for transportation and other related costs for accessing health services. 
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The referral process from community hospitals to the regional hospital appeared to be the 
major barrier to cardiac operations experienced by some poorer heart disease patients. 
Although financial barriers to open heart surgery are reduced by the inclusion of cardiac 
operations in the benefit package of the UC scheme, some heart disease patients faced 
difficulty in getting referred from the district facilities to the regional hospital. Concerns 
over the expenses that the community hospitals had to pay to reimburse the regional 
hospital seemed to be a crucial factor influencing reluctance in referring the heart disease 
patients to the tertiary care level. 
From the research findings of the referral barriers to open heart surgery, adequate 
government health resources to finance health facilities and appropriate health financing 
arrangements are necessary for the government to protect households against expensive 
medical care costs and improve equitable access to health services. The system design 
which allows tertiary care hospitals to be directly reimbursed for health care expenses 
from primary and secondary care facilities can lead to a reluctance to transfer patients to 
obtain appropriate medical treatment at the higher level of care. It should be noted that 
not only the inclusion of health services in the UC benefit package, but appropriate 
financing arrangements, the availability of qualified health service systems with skilful 
human resources, and fair reimbursement of healthcare providers, are also needed for 
protecting households and individuals for health care costs. 
Many coping strategies for costs of RRT adopted by poorer households are similar to 
those reported in the literature. The strategy for reducing the frequency of medical 
treatments or denial of health services such as erythropoietin injection was also 
experienced in some previous studies about the cost burden for illness in developing 
countries (Kabir, Rahman et al. 2000; Russell 2004; McIntyre and Mooney 2007). Other 
strategies such as taking loans, diversifying household resources from other relatives, 
selling household assets, and reduction in other household expenditure are also illustrated 
in other studies (McIntyre and Mooney 2007). 
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Using RRT as a tracer to assess the impact of excluding an expensive health service from 
the benefit package of public health insurance shows a greater economic impact of such a 
policy decision on poorer households and the disadvantaged. Financial barriers to health 
services and inequitable access to health care can lead to a higher incidence of mortality 
and morbidity in poorer households. In addition, greater financial consequences not only 
impact patients, but also their relatives and other household members. Poorer households 
tended to have lower capacity of using different household strategies to cope with costs 
of illness. With these research findings, if the government has a policy objective on 
protecting households and individuals from catastrophic health payments, the policy 
decision to exclude expensive health services from the UC benefit package using 
economic evaluation perspective requires further consideration. 
8.7 Conclusions 
This chapter aimed to describe the economIC impact of costs for expenSIve health 
services included and not included in the UC benefit package on Thai households of 
different socio-economic status. Three areas of the impact explored were: 1) access to 
and utilization of expensive health services; 2) financial burden for health care payments; 
and, 3) coping strategies for costs of illness between poorer and richer households. Two 
expensive health services, renal replacement therapy (RR T) for end-stage renal disease 
patients (ESRD) and open-heart surgery for heart disease patients, were used as tracers 
for this investigation because the former has not been included in the UC benefit package 
since the instigation of the UC policy, while the latter was included. Poorer and richer 
patients in both urban and rural areas of Nakom Ratchasima province were selected as 
the unit of analysis in order to assess the different economic impact of these two 
expensive health services on households of different socio-economic status. Four 
investigating tools addressing the objectives of the research were employed through a 
longitudinal household approach which lasted for three months. 
Results revealed that the decision not to include RRT in the UC benefit package posed 
considerable financial barriers and a substantial economic impact on poorer ESRD 
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patients. Infrequent access to haemodialysis and inability to obtain essential and 
expensive injected medication (erythropoietin) due to limited household resources was 
likely to be a major cause of the death of poorer ESRD patients. In contrast, the inclusion 
of open-heart surgery in the UC benefit package significantly facilitated access to cardiac 
operations for poorer heart disease patients. Financial barriers to RRT prevented poor 
ESRD patients from accessing government health services, and RR T services in public 
and private facilities primarily served CSMBS beneficiaries and richer ESRD patients, 
respectively. The financial burden for RRT meant all poor patients faced financial 
catastrophe and possibly impoverishment because of its high costs and the low income of 
poor families. Various financial strategies to cope with high costs of RRT include 
reduction in the following areas: frequency of haemodialysis, food consumption, and 
using private transportation, as well as taking loans with a high interest rate, all of which 
were generally adopted by poorer ESRD patients. The financial burden for costs of RRT 
did not only impact on ESRD patients, but also created an economic impact on household 
members and patients' relatives who had to provide financial support for the costs of 
RRT. 
Apart from financial barriers to RR T, geographical barriers were also an important factor 
in that they prevent poor ESRD patients in rural areas from accessing expensive health 
services which are solely available in the city. Also, the referral system of the UC policy 
hindered access to cardiac surgery, even though this expensive health service has been 
included in the UC benefit package. 
Limitations of this study were: 1) difficulties in identifying poorer and richer ESRD and 
heart disease patients; 2) difficulties in achieving accurate information on household 
income and expenditure for assessing financial burden for medical care costs; 3) 
behavioural responses of poorer households for health care costs which changed the 
patterns of household spending and the degree of financial burden for expensive health 
services; and, 4) the mismatch of household living standards between data obtained by 
interviews on monthly income/expenditure and the judgement of the researchers. 
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Research findings from this chapter raise a question on the appropriateness of the UC 
benefit package and whether a non-cost-effective medical intervention like RRT should 
be included into the benefit package of universal public health insurance, given the two 
objectives of universal coverage which are: 1) to guarantee universal access to essential 
health services when needed; and, 2) to protect households against expensive medical 
care costs. Issues of the benefit package will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter. 
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SECTION 4: DISCUSSION, 




METHODOLOGICAL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
This chapter discusses methodological strengths and weaknesses of the study including 
use of a before-after approach, secondary data analyses of nationally representative 
household surveys, analysis of benefit incidence, and the case studies of two expensive 
health services, for assessing the impact of the DC policy. Drawing on the empirical 
findings and literature review, the research findings are then summarized and discussed. 
9.1 Methodological strengths and weaknesses 
9.1.1 Strengths and weaknesses of the before-after study uSing multi-method 
approaches 
As stated in chapter 4, this study employed a research design using a before-after study 
because of the nationwide implementation of the DC policy in Thailand, which prevented 
the use of a rigorous approach of an experimental study comparing a control and an 
experimental group. Though experimental studies, especially the randomized controlled 
trial (RCT), have been identified as strong research designs for investigating cause and 
effect in health-related research, these research designs are not always practical or 
ethically acceptable to conduct in real life settings (Bowling 2002), particularly in a 
situation like the nationwide implementation of the DC policy. Some social scientists 
also suggest that experimental studies may be inappropriate for social science and health 
policy research because sometimes the research not only aims to predict the effect of a 
variable (e.g. gender, age, or diagnosis), but rather, aims to describe social phenomena or 
explore individual or organizational behaviour affected by a health policy or an 
intervention (Green and Browne 2005). Therefore, a range of other research approaches 
including before-after study, after only study, and time series studies, have been widely 
used as alternatives to experimental studies. Though conclusions from these alternative 
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approaches tend to be more tentative than experimental studies, these methods have much 
to offer if carefully used and interpreted. 
This study analyzed nationally representative household surveys, the SES and the HWS, 
using a multi-method approach in order to address weaknesses of the before-after study 
design. As two major drawbacks of using the before-after approach without a 
randomised control group are sample selection biases and the inability to distinguish 
effects from extraneous factors (Bowling 2002), secondary data analyses of the nationally 
representative household surveys of the SES and the HWS can be utilized to address the 
issue of sample selection bias. Given that the unit of analysis is a country or an entire 
health care system, using the before-after approach with these two nationwide household 
surveys allows for the exploration of any changes at the national level with 
implementation of the DC policy. Though the absence of the control group in the before-
after study results in limitations in excluding the effect of extraneous factors, this study 
attempted to overcome this shortcoming by using multi-method approaches (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori 2003; Green 2005) which include both quantitative and qualitative 
investigations to describe and explore in greater detail the impact of the DC policy on 
equity of the Thai health care system. 
In social sCIence research, multi-method approaches have been increasingly used to 
explore social phenomena because such approaches provide a better understanding of the 
complex web of factors affecting health and health service use (Green 2005). There 
appear to be three areas in which these approaches are superior to single approach 
designs: 1) being able to answer research questions that the other methodologies cannot; 
2) providing better and stronger inferences; and 3) providing the opportunity for 
presenting a greater diversity of divergent views (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003). With 
these advantages, the multi-method approach is relevant to this study because 
implementation of the DC policy greatly impacted on the Thai health care system in 
various dimensions, especially health financing arrangements and financial barriers to 
health services. In addition, to address the drawback of the before-after study on 
excluding confounding factors affecting equity of the Thai health care system, multi-
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method approaches enable researchers to answer both confirmatory and explanatory 
questions, and explain the relationship between the studied variables. In this thesis, 
qualitative and quantitative investigations were employed in tandem to help validate the 
impact of the UC policy on equity of the Thai health care system, and to offset the 
weaknesses of each research approach. 
9.1.2 Assessing the impact of the UC policy on the entire health care system, not 
on the UC scheme 
As described in Chapter 3, the universal coverage arrangement of the Thai health care 
system comprises three main public health insurance schemes: the CSMBS; the SSS; and 
the UC scheme, since the UC policy was implemented in 2001. These three schemes 
have different sources of health care finance, provider payment methods, characteristics 
of health insurance beneficiaries, and benefit packages. The UC policy involved a major 
shift of beneficiaries of previously government subsidized health insurance schemes, the 
LIe and the VHC schemes, to the UC scheme two years later. In addition, it was 
anticipated (and borne out by the results) that a certain proportion of the uninsured and 
private health insurance beneficiaries in 2001 might have shifted their health insurance 
coverage to the UC scheme by 2003. It was therefore thought to be problematic to 
analyze changes in health care use and benefit incidence only for the UC scheme 
population. In addition, the UC policy introduced health financing arrangements which 
greatly affected the workload and provider responses of both public and private health 
care providers, and all three schemes within the UC policy entail public subsidies. 
Therefore, it was thought appropriate to assess the impact of the UC policy on health 
equity with respect to the entire health system, not just the UC scheme. 
9.1.3 Secondary data analyses of nationally representative household surveys 
Assessing the impact of the UC policy on the Thai health care system through secondary 
data analyses of the SES and the HWS aimed to improve previous small scale 
assessment, and to avoid sample selection bias in assessing the impact of the UC policy 
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on equity. The SES contains data on different types of household health payments and 
household living standards, and the HWS comprises information on health seeking 
behaviour, health service use, and health insurance coverage, plus limited data on 
household living standards. The existence and regularity of these two nationally 
representative household surveys, especially during the period prior to and after 
implementation of the UC policy in 2001, provides an opportunity to use their data to 
assess the impact of the UC policy on socio-economic health inequalities. Moreover, 
analysis was facilitated by continuous improvements, such as a shift from using income 
brackets in the 2001 HWS to an open-ended question of household cash and kind income 
in the 2003 HWS, and improved choices of health facilities in the questions on health 
care use of the HWS questionnaire. 
Basically, data required for health equity analysis comprise two main elements: 1) health-
related behaviour and outcomes; and 2) household living standards or socio-economic 
status. From the Thai experience, the availability of data in the SES on household 
Income and consumption expenditure including direct tax payments, out-of-pocket 
payments for health care, social health insurance contributions, and private health 
Insurance premIums, provides a possibility to analyze different types of household 
payments for health compared to income. Also, data on household income and 
expenditure can be used as socio-economic stratifiers to group households into different 
economic quintiles. This household survey in Thailand is similar to the Living Standards 
Measurement Study (LSMS) established by the World Bank which is widely 
implemented in many developing countries (Grosh and Glewwe 2000). In Thailand, 
information about health seeking behaviour, health care use, and health insurance 
coverage at the national level was usually obtained from the HWS. A health section in 
the SES was only available in the 2002 SES due to an objective to assess the impact of 
the economic crisis on health. 
The SES is vital and pertinent to be the mam data source for assessmg equity m 
household health payments and the impact of a health policy on equity in health care 
finance because of the availability of the two elements for assessing equity in health care 
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finance, household health payments and living standards. However, this thesis indicates 
that the analysis of equity in health care finance prior to and after DC was problematic in 
computing household indirect tax payments from the SES data because some goods and 
services in Thailand are V A T exempt, and data on household expenditure in the SES are 
not collected in accordance with V AT-taxable or V AT -exempt items. An approximation 
for computing V AT payments had to be used and this approach, therefore, makes an 
estimate of household indirect tax payment from the SES data complicated and prone to 
errors. 
Lack of a rigorous welfare indicator is a challenge in using secondary data from the HWS 
to assess socio-economic inequalities in health service use. Though a single question on 
household cash and kind income was included in the HWS questionnaire beginning in 
2003, the accuracy of this socio-economic parameter is questionable. Some attempts to 
improve the survey data appear not to have been successful - for example recent attempts 
of the NSO to add more questions on household income in the HWS, and to merge the 
2006 and 2007 HWS into the SES, appear to have jeopardized the quality of health 
information previously obtained from the HWS (Limwattananon S, personal 
communication). Given the difficulties of adding more questions on household living 
standards into the HWS, analysis in this thesis of benefit incidence in 2003 shows the 
possibility of using the asset index as an alternative socio-economic parameter to assess 
equity in health care use and benefit incidence from the HWS or other household surveys, 
which lack an appropriate socio-economic parameter. This has also been demonstrated in 
the international literature (Morris, Carletto et al. 2000; Filmer and Pritchett 2001). 
Another attempt of the NSO to improve the quality and value of national household 
surveys in Thailand was to initiate a pilot of panel household surveys for the SES. From 
2005 to 2007, a number of sampled households in the SES were sub-sampled for the 
panel household study (Boonperm 2004). Though a great strength of panel data is to 
enable household specific factors to be identified and taken into account of factors that 
are lost in the analysis of repeated cross sections, problems of being a costly household 
survey and difficulties in maintaining study samples or sample attrition have been 
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reported (Norris, Richter et al. 2007). As the panel household survey in Thailand was 
first piloted in 2005, there was no panel household data for assessing the impact of the 
UC policy at the time this study commenced. In addition, it can also be argued that the 
before-after study using nationally representative household surveys, the SES and the 
HWS, can represent the whole population of Thais prior to and after implementation of 
the UC policy if the unit of analysis is a country or the whole health care system, as is the 
case here. 
As stated in chapter 6, differences in details between the 2001 and 2003 HWS, for 
example, the absence of the frequency of ambulatory service use and user charges paid 
for the last ambulatory service use in the 2001 HWS, posed difficulties in comparing the 
analysis of benefit incidence between 2001 and 2003. Moreover, differences in choices 
of ambulatory service use and hospitalization between the 2001 and 2003 HWS 
questionnaires resulted in a difficulty in analysing changes in health care use prior to and 
after UC. Experiences from this study indicate that researchers and policy analysts 
should be aware in using secondary data from different years of household surveys that 
there might be some changes in details of the questionnaires. The continuous 
improvements of the SES and the HWS questionnaires due to the close relationship 
between the data producer (the NSO of Thailand) and the data users (e.g. the MOPH, 
universities) in Thailand greatly affected changes in the household survey questionnaires 
in the later years, and therefore, will limit an attempt to conduct comparative analyses of 
household surveys in different years. 
9.1.4 Assessing the distribution of public subsidies for health by using benefit 
incidence analysis (BIA) 
In this study, the distribution of public subsidies on health was assessed by using an 
analysis of benefit incidence. Two factors influencing the benefit incidence of public 
spending on health are: 1) government spending allocations and 2) household health 
seeking behaviour. These two determinants are combined to generate the distribution of 
public subsidies on health and to answer the question of who benefits from public 
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spending. However, it is argued that benefit incidence cannot be adequately explained if 
there are any changes in the fundamental determinants of these two components (Demery 
2000). With this limitation, BIA has been criticized as being helpful in identifying a 
cross-sectional situation, but not being particularly useful in providing a solution or 
explanation on why public subsidies on health among different socio-economic groups 
might differ. However, analysis of benefit incidence in this thesis was done in great 
detail starting from the component of health service use by income quintile and the 
component of unit subsidy by health insurance scheme and region. Findings from the 
research, therefore, show that changes in the distribution of public subsidies on health 
after UC were mainly caused by changes in health service use and seeking behaviour of 
those in different quintiles, particularly poorer income quintiles with greater use of health 
services at primary and secondary care levels, rather than changes in the unit subsidies 
for public or private health services. The analysis also indicates that public subsidies on 
health in the Thai health care system were pro-poor prior to UC and the pro-poor nature 
was greater after UC due to a significant increase in per capita public subsidy gained by 
the first and second quintiles, compared to 2001. 
Another major limitation of BIA is the use of average unit costs or subsidies as valuation 
tools. It has been suggested that using average costs of health services to analyze benefit 
incidence ignore differences in values across households and individuals (Demery 2000). 
In addition, using mean unit cost as a proxy for value of health services faces a problem 
of inefficiency of the public sector which was clearly shown in regional and provincial 
hospitals in Thailand prior to and during the implementation of the UC policy 
(Puenpatom and Rosenman 2008).· Also, using aggregate or mean unit costs at the 
national level may mask inequality in the distribution of public subsidies on health 
(Demery 2000; Mahal, Singh et al. 2000). In this thesis, however, analysis of benefit 
incidence in 2003 using national and regional unit costs revealed similar conclusions on 
the share of public subsidies on health obtained by different income quintiles. This 
differs from findings in the literature because there was not a big difference in unit costs 
of health services provided by health care providers at the same healthcare level among 
different regions in Thailand. This can be explained by the ability of public hospitals in 
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Thailand to partially improve technical efficiency and their improved capacity to use 
limited resources after the economic crisis in 1997 (Valdmanis, Kumaranayake et al. 
2004), and the success of the UC policy in equitably allocating public resources to health 
care providers in different regions. 
Another concern in the analysis of benefit incidence as it related to this thesis is the 
accuracy in unit costs of health services provided by government health facilities and 
private providers receiving public subsidies from the government. As a result of limited 
information available on unit costs of health service provision from public health 
facilities inside and outside the MOPH and private health care providers, the analysis of 
benefit incidence in this thesis relied on some assumptions of unit cost computation, 
particularly for tertiary care health facilities and private providers, and has some degree 
of uncertainty. 
9.1.5 Using the case study approach at household level to assess the UC policy 
Lessons from conducting a case study approach using two expensive health services, 
RR T for ESRD patients and open heart surgery for heart disease patients, as tracers to 
assess the impact of the UC policy, can be summarized into three areas. First, the case 
study approach is relevant for investigating households with ESRD patients because the 
dynamics and complexity of access to health care, financial barriers to health services, 
and the financial burden of health care costs borne by household members, require a 
qualitative approach with the flexibility to collect data from patients and household 
members in different household contexts. Second, though the advantage of using these 
two particular expensive health services is that one was included in the UC benefit 
package and the other was not, their characteristics are different, making them difficult to 
compare. ESRD is a chronic condition of poor kidney function which requires the long-
term medical care of RR T such as haemodialysis or peritoneal dialysis or kidney 
transplantation, while open heart surgery is a one-off medical service which tends to 
require less time and less long-term financial resources. Therefore, financial and 
geographical barriers to RR T access tended to be greater than those for cardiac operations 
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because ESRD patients had to receive haemodialysis twice or thrice a week from health 
facilities located in the municipality until they died or had a kidney transplantation, while 
heart disease patients faced geographical and financial barriers only when they received 
the cardiac operation and medical follow up. Any comparison of access to RRT and open 
heart surgery as expensive health services included or excluded from the UC benefit 
package needs to be aware of such differences. Third, though this study intended to 
describe differences in access to expensive health services and financial burdens borne by 
richer and poorer households, the classification of selected households into different 
socio-economic groups was problematic. As stated in Chapter 8, researchers encountered 
a mismatch between using reported household monthly income and the researcher's own 
assessment. Using a money-metric measure such as household income to assess 
household economic status was problematic because the monthly income of poor 
households varied according to the agricultural season and other financial sources such as 
temporary employment, taking loans, or selling assets. In addition, some ESRD patients 
were retired government officers who earned a small pension but had a large amount of 
available assets such as land, cars, and money in their bank accounts. Therefore, using 
only the money-metric measure in terms of monthly household income may be 
misleading in judging patients' socio-economic status in household research. 
In the household qualitative investigation, difficulties were faced in identifying richer and 
poorer ESRD patients as well as richer heart disease patients. For poorer ESRD patients, 
most of them died within a short period of time as a result of their lack of access to RRT. 
This is because they could not afford the costs of RRT or could not bear the long-term 
financial burden for RR T. In contrast, the poor cooperation of richer ESRD patients led 
to difficulties in encouraging them to participate in the study. In this thesis, richer heart 
disease patients were rarely found because most of them did not choose to have the 
cardiac operation at the local Maharat hospital, as they preferred to seek the operation 
from a university hospital or other large hospitals in Bangkok. Hence, using secondary 
data of patients receiving cardiac operations at the Maharat hospital was limited in that 
there were very few richer patients who had received their operations there. Similar to 
ESRD households, most heart disease patients in better-off households also refused to 
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participate in the investigation because they felt unhappy to reveal their income and did 
not want to waste their time contributing to the study. 
A common concern about a case study is whether findings from the study based on 
selected households are relevant beyond the sample and context of research itself, or 
whether the finding can be generalized (' generalization'). There are three levels of 
generalization: 1) theoretical generalization; 2) inferential generalization; and 3) 
representational generalization (Lewis and Ritchie 2003). Theoretical generalization 
aims to draw theoretical propositions and principles from the findings of a study for a 
more general application, while inferential generalization determines whether the 
findings from a particular study can be generalized or inferred to other settings or 
contexts beyond the sample. Representational generalization aims to answer whether 
what is found in a research sample can be generalized to or held to be equally true of the 
parent population from which the sample is drawn. Given the validity and reliability of 
the case study approach used in this thesis, findings about the case study of ESRD and 
heart disease patients in Nakorn Ratchasima province can be generalized in the sense of 
representational generalization to other ESRD and heart disease patients in other 
provinces in Thailand because the UC policy has been implemented nationwide since 
2001 and all provinces in Thailand employ the same UC benefit package. In terms of 
inferential generalization, the issue of financial barriers to RR T and household coping 
strategies for costs of expensive health services, especially RRT, can be generalized on 
the basis of inferential generalization because findings of household coping strategies are 
similar to those from other studies in the international literature (Kabir, Rahman et al. 
2000; McIntyre and Thiede 2003; Russell 2004). Though the UC benefit package is 
currently quite comprehensive, some expensive health services such as second-line drugs 
for HIV / AIDS patients, medical services for chronic mental illness patients, and most 
organ transplantation, are still excluded from the UC benefit package (NHSO 2007a). 
Knowledge about the impact of excluding RRT from the UC benefit package on poorer 
and richer households can be used by policy makers in making decisions on including 
other expensive health services in the benefit package in the future. 
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9.2 Discussion on the research findings 
In this section the research findings are summarized and discussed starting with a 
summary of impacts the UC policy had on changes in health insurance coverage, equity 
in health care use, and the distribution of public subsidies for health. This is followed by 
a discussion on changes in equity in health care finance and the economic impact on 
poorer and richer households of excluding RRT from the UC benefit package. 
9.2.1 Changes in health insurance coverage 
In chapter 5, an analysis of health insurance coverage showed that poorer income 
quintiles in Thailand mainly relied on publicly subsidized health insurance schemes both 
prior to and after UC. In 2001, approximately 75% of the first quintile were covered by 
the two public health insurance schemes, the LIC and the VHC, and in 2003 more than 
900/0 of them were covered by the UC scheme. These findings indicate the success of the 
Thai government prior to UC in using a piecemeal approach to provide public health 
insurance for the poor, and using the universal approach to achieve further progress in 
coverage in 2003. Evidence from the MOPH prior to UC indicates the limitations of the 
piecemeal approach in achieving universal coverage because approximately 200/0 of Thais 
were still uninsured in 2000 (Wibulpolprasert 2005). In addition, a study in 2000 showed 
that only 17% of poor households obtained the Low Income Card (LIC) and only 35% of 
the Low Income Card holders were genuinely poor (Kongsawat, Rodsawaeng et al. 
2000). The piecemeal approach also led to some negative consequences in terms of 
inefficiency, duplication, and fragmentation of the public health insurance system in 
Thailand (Tangcharoensathien, Srithamrongsawat et al. 2002). 
Analysis on the shift of health insurance scheme membership from 2001 to 2003 
indicates the roles of the UC scheme in providing health insurance for the poor and the 
uninsured. The analysis of the 2003 HWS showed that more than 97% of beneficiaries of 
the VHC and the LIC, the two main health insurance schemes for the poor and vulnerable 
groups in 2001, transferred to the UC scheme, and more than a half of the uninsured in 
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2001 were UC beneficiaries in 2003. In addition, approximately 27% of those having 
private health insurance in 2001 shifted to be UC beneficiaries in 2003. Only 2-3% of 
the CSMBS and the SSS beneficiaries in 2001 had transferred to be UC beneficiaries two 
years later because their benefit packages were likely to be better than that of the UC 
scheme. This detailed analysis confirms the important role of public health insurance 
schemes in providing health insurance coverage for the poor and disadvantaged. It also 
confirms the value of the national level analysis as opposed to a scheme-specific analysis, 
in assessing the impact of the UC policy on the Thai health care system. 
The Thai experience of using the two steps of targeted and universal approaches to 
achieve universal coverage might be useful for other developing countries with 
fragmented public health insurance schemes which are seeking to move towards 
universal coverage. Though this strategy differs from policy recommendations of the 
Health Financing Task Force, which suggest developing countries should employ a 
targeted approach as the main strategy to reform health care finance and improve 
financial risk protection (Savedoff 2007), this suggestion seems to be irrelevant in the 
Thai context because Thailand has progressed beyond that stage. As stated in the 
literature review, Thailand employed the strategy of using the targeted approach for 
almost three decades before achieving universal coverage in 2001. The Thai government 
first introduced the targeted approach for the Low Income Scheme in 1975, followed by a 
gradual extension of health insurance coverage to the non-poor through the VHC in 1983, 
and to the formal sector private employees through SHI in 1990. Many studies suggest 
that the introduction of the capitation contracting model of the SHI provided experience 
in using a close-ended payment method of capitation to pay health care providers with 
acceptable quality of health care (Itivaleekul 2002; Tangcharoensathien, Prakongsai et al. 
2005), while cost escalation of the CSMBS USIng a fee-for-service reimbursement 
discouraged this as a payment method for the UC scheme (Tangcharoensathien, 
Prakongsai et al. 2007). The introduction of the VHC scheme also contributed to 
achieving universal coverage in terms of strengthening the administrative capacity of 
provincial health officers and improving financial management of public health care 
providers (Srithamrongsawat 2002). 
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Many key factors have been identified helping to explain the success in the 
implementation of the UC policy in Thailand (Tangcharoensathien and Jongudoumsuk 
2004; Tangcharoensathien 2006). Apart from the strong political commitment of the 
government, rapid economic growth from the mid 1980s to 1997 (before the economic 
crisis) and a large scale investment in public health service infrastructure in the previous 
two decades fuelled the capacity of the Thai government to gradually expand health 
insurance coverage to several targeted groups, and ultimately achieve universal coverage 
in 2001 (Tangcharoensathien, Prakongsai et al. 2007). In addition, the strong 
administrative capacity of the Thai health care system (Russell, Bennett et al. 1999) and 
the low per capita resource requirement for the UC scheme (International Labour Office 
2005) provided the possibility and financial feasibility for a middle income country like 
Thailand to implement a policy on universal coverage. 
On the issue of real life implementation, achieving 100% coverage is not easy even 
though the Thai government had a strong commitment to provide universal coverage and 
equitable access to health care. Approximately 50/0 were still uninsured after 
implementation of the UC policy due to a lack of people's awareness, the absence of 
registration, or incorrect registration and identification. In addition, people having private 
health insurance or ability to pay for health care costs were unwilling to join the public 
health insurance scheme. In such a situation, governments have a vital role in providing 
a specific strategy to expand health insurance coverage for those uninsured who are poor 
and disadvantaged. Barriers to public health insurance such as people's ignorance and 
unawareness, and problems of registration or identification, should be addressed. 
9.2.2 Changes in health service use and access to health care 
Analyses of health service use in 2001 and 2003 indicate that overall health care use in 
Thailand was pro-poor prior to and after UC, and its pro-poor nature was greater in 2003. 
A significant increase in ambulatory service use by the first and second quintiles, 
especially at primary and secondary health care facilities, appears to be a significant 
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factor contributing to the further progress in more equitable health care use after ue. In 
addition, analysis of hospitalization prior to and after ue shows a similar picture in 
ambulatory service use. In 2003, there was a considerable increase in hospitalization at 
community hospitals by all income quintiles, but a reduction in hospital admissions at 
provincial and regional hospitals, as well as private hospitals. The removal of financial 
barriers to health services and the promotion of primary care use as a gate-keeper and the 
main contractor of the ue scheme appear likely to be the main factors contributing to a 
shift in health care use from tertiary care to primary and secondary care levels. In 
addition, requirements of the ue scheme for ue beneficiaries to register with a peu and 
the nationwide distribution of primary and secondary care to the sub-district and district 
levels are likely to have encouraged the increase in health care use at health centres and 
district hospitals by ue beneficiaries the majority of whom were in the first and second 
income quintiles. This, therefore, facilitated improvements of equity in access to and 
utilization of health services, especially for the poor, because most health centres and 
district hospitals are located in the rural and remote areas where the less well-off reside. 
It should be noted that during the first two years of the UC policy implementation, there 
was no significant investment in new public health facilities in either urban or rural areas 
of Thailand (Wibulpolprasert 2005). Therefore, improvements in access to and 
utilization of health services after universal coverage were not influenced by an increase 
in the number of health facilities, but were more likely to be affected by the ue policy 
itself. 
Though financial barriers to health services were greatly reduced after the UC policy was 
implemented, evidence from the household qualitative study in Korat shows some degree 
of geographical barriers to health care, especially for poor patients in rural areas, and a 
delay in referrals. Limited geographical distribution of some specialized and expensive 
health services, and inappropriate provider payment methods in which financial risks for 
expensive medical care costs were transferred to primary and secondary health care 
facilities during the inception phase of the UC policy, appeared to be the main factors 
contributing to such barriers. 
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9.2.3 Changes in the distribution of public subsidies for health 
Results from the analyses of benefit incidence in 2001 and 2003 indicate that the 
distribution of public subsidies on health for the Thai health care system was pro-poor 
both prior to and after UC, and the pro-poor nature was greater in 2003. The greater pro-
poor nature of benefit incidence in 2003 was mainly produced by an absolute increase in 
health service use by lower income quintiles, and a shift from tertiary care to primary 
and secondary health care levels. These findings differ from those found in other 
developing countries where public subsidies on health have been found to be pro-rich 
(Selowsky 1979; Castro-Leal, Dayton et al. 2000; Mahal, Singh et al. 2000; Pearson 
2002). The pro-poor nature of public health subsidies prior to UC can be explained by 
the continuous development of pro-poor strategies in health sector reform of the Thai 
health care system, along with the implementation of targeted public health insurance 
schemes. A long-term investment in the nationwide infrastructure of government health 
facilities and the availability of a qualified health workforce (e.g. medical doctors, 
dentists, pharmacists, nurses, etc.) at the district and sub-district levels through 
community hospitals and health centres, allow the poor to have relatively good access to 
government health services and benefit more from public health subsidies. 
The research findings on more equitable distribution of public health subsidies after UC 
are consistent with suggestions made by Pearson (2002) about the strategies for 
improving the distribution of public resources to the poor and disadvantaged. An 
increase in funding allocations to health services that the poor can both access and derive 
significant benefit from is the strategy that the UC policy in Thailand employed for 
improving equity in the distribution of public subsidies on health. Since the majority of 
the poor in Thailand live in the rural areas, the promotion of primary care use by 
contracting the district-based health care network and PCU to provide health services for 
DC beneficiaries in their catchment area helps the poor to access and benefit from 
government health services and public subsidies provided by the UC policy. 
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As stated in Chapter 3, the Thai experiences in using a piecemeal approach to extend 
public health insurance for a targeted group of the population showed both successes and 
limitations in achieving the policy objectives of universal coverage. In 2000, prior to 
VC, though the Thai health care system comprised many targeted health insurance 
schemes for various groups of the population, approximately 200/0 of Thais were 
uninsured. The Thai health care system was, therefore, characterized by fragmentation, 
duplication, and lack of health insurance coverage. Evidence also shows a failure of 
targeting public subsidies to the poor through the mismatch between the LIC 
beneficiaries and those who were below the poverty line (Kongsawat, Rodsawaeng et a1. 
2000; Pannarunothai 2002), and inequitable access to health services among beneficiaries 
of different health insurance schemes or those of different socio-economic groups (The 
Foundation for Thai Consumers 1999; Makinen, Waters et a1. 2000). However, given the 
continuous increase in the share of the population covered by public health insurance 
schemes (e.g. the LIC, the VHC, the SSS, and the CSMBS) prior to UC, the overall 
success of the piecemeal approach in expanding health insurance coverage to the 
population should be recognized. In addition, evidence on the pro-poor nature of the 
Thai health care system prior to UC, and a decrease in inequity in household spending on 
health, shows the successes of the targeted approach during the transitional period. 
Although Thailand is now viewed as having universal coverage, it should be recognized 
that this is made up of three public health insurance schemes: the CSMBS; the SSS; and 
the VC scheme. There has been an attempt to harmonize the benefit packages and 
provider payment methods among these three schemes in order to reduce inefficiency and 
inequity in the quality of health service provision (Jongudomsuk 2006). However, 
different historical development and solidarity perspectives as well as different sources of 
health care finance, particularly given the contributory scheme of the SSS, led to 
difficulties in harmonizing two existing public health insurance schemes, the CSMBS and 
the SSS, with the UC scheme. Differences therefore persist in the quantity and quality of 
services provided to the different scheme populations, as well as in the public subsidies to 
each scheme. The intention is to achieve greater harmonisation of benefit package, 
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public subsidies, and provider payment methods among the three public health insurance 
schemes over time (Health Care Reform Project 2005). 
Historical expenence from Thailand in expanding health insurance coverage usmg a 
targeted approach to universal coverage is consistent with the model of 'transition to 
universal coverage' proposed by WHO (Figure 9.1). In low- and middle-income 
countries, it is presumed that health insurance systems will require a number of years to 
achieve universal coverage. In addition, countries moving towards universal coverage 
need a transition from a targeted approach to universal coverage. Choices of health 
financing arrangements of a country depend on health system development, the 
proportion of the formal and informal sectors, and administrative capacity of the country. 
Figure 9.1: The transition to universal coverage for developing countries 
Tax-based financing 
Social health insurance 
Intermediate stages of 
coverage 
Mix of tax-based financing and 
various types of health insurance 
Absence of financial 
protection 
Out-of-pocket spending 
for health care 
Mixes of community- and 
enterprise-based health insurance, 
other private health insurance, SHI-type 
coverage for specific groups and tax-based 
financing 
Source: (World Health Organization 2005) 
The Thai expenence of using the two steps of targeted and universal approaches to 
achieve universal coverage may be useful for other developing countries which have 
fragmented public health insurance schemes and seek to move towards universal 
coverage. Strong political support coupled with the active participation of academic and 
civic groups were significant factors contributing to the success in the implementation of 
the UC scheme (Tangcharoensathien, Prakongsai et al. 2007). However, for other low-
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and middle-income countries, the decision on which strategy between a targeted or a 
universal approach is pertinent to a particular country depends on the country's strategy 
for its health care system, the availability of resources, the character of health problems, 
and political and institutional feasibility. 
From Thai experience, the analysis of benefit incidence shows that not only the poor 
benefited from public subsidies on health prior to and after UC, but those in richer 
quintiles also gained a public subsidy, but to a smaller extent. Given that public health 
resources are scarce, many policy analysts and policy makers in developing countries 
prefer using a targeted approach to maximize the use of public health resources for 
achieving policy objectives of poverty reduction and improving equity. However, 
evidence shows that the targeted approach also faces the problem of resource leakage, 
and narrow targeting, often with high hidden costs of targeting (Van de Walle 1998). In 
contrast, a universal approach generally results in equal opportunities and access to 
similar services, but often has high costs from subsidising the non-poor. Therefore, 
whether a health sector should employ targeting or universal coverage has been widely 
discussed (Health Financing Task Force 2007). Experience from Thailand has shown 
that the UC policy was more pro-poor than the previous arrangements, even though the 
universal approach was used. 
Findings from the BIA show that rich and middle-income groups of Thais benefited from 
public health subsidies under the UC policy, which reflects their trust in the quality of 
health services provided by public health care providers. In addition, utilization of health 
services by the rich and middle-income groups indicates a sense of belonging and 
ownership of the UC scheme which should foster the principle of solidarity in the public 
health insurance system. In the Thai experience, apart from financial sustainability, the 
UC policy also needs the principle of solidarity as well as political and social support 
from the society. 
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9.2.4 Changes in equity in health care finance 
The analysis of equity in health care finance in 2000 and 2002 indicates that the overall 
health care finance of the Thai health care system was less regressive after the DC policy 
was implemented. This is evident by a decrease in the negative value of the Kakwani 
index of overall health care finance in 2002, compared to 2000, and a decrease in the 
share of households facing catastrophic health expenditure from 6.11 % in 2000 to 4.65% 
in 2002. The reduction in household out-of-pocket payments, which made up one-third 
of overall health care finance, appears to be the main factor contributing to the less 
regressive health financing arrangements after DC, and improvements in financial risk 
protection. The increase in the progressivity of household expenditure for direct tax 
payment and less regressive indirect tax payment were two other factors improving 
equity in overall health care finance. Although household payment for social health 
insurance was less progressive and payment for private health insurance premiums was 
more regressive after DC, these two financing sources were minor financing sources in 
the Thai health care system. 
From analysis of equity in health care finance prior to and after DC, two crucial factors 
affecting equity in health care finance comprise: 1) the progressivity of each health 
financing source; and 2) the share of each financing source in overall health care finance. 
Findings from the thesis indicate that the policy to abolish user fees for health services 
and the decision to finance the DC scheme using general tax revenues have shifted the 
major source of health care finance from out-of-pocket payments at points of health 
service provision to general taxation. The design of the DC scheme has increased the 
share of progressive health financing sources (direct tax payment), and decreased the 
share of regressive health financing sources (e.g. household out-of-pocket payments and 
private health insurance premiums), in overall health care finance. 
The significant impact of the DC policy on the Thai health care financing system is 
evident from the series of National Health Accounts Study, data shown in Figure 9.2. 
Data from the 2002-2005 NHA were added to Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3 to show changes in 
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the share of different health financing sources. The share of health financing from the 
central government increased significantly from approximately 33% in 2001 to 
approximately 43% of total health expenditure in 2002 and 2003. Since the UC scheme 
is financed by general taxation, an increase in the share of progressive health financing 
sources (i.e. direct tax and SHI contributions) have improved the overall progressivity of 
health care finance. 
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As a result of the increase in the share of central government health spending, the share 
of public financing sources in total health expenditure increased significantly from 56% 
in 2001 to 640/0 in 2004 and 2005 (Figure 9.3). The implementation of the UC policy 
appears to be the main factor contributing to the significant increases in share of public 
financing sources to total health expenditure. The percent share of other public financing 
sources (e.g. the CSMBS, the SSS, and the local government) slightly increased after the 
UC policy was implemented in 2001 (Figure 9.2), and did not contribute to the significant 
increase in the share of public financing sources. Prior to and after UC, the share of the 
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CSMBS ranged from 11 % to 13% and that of the SSS ranged from 5% to 8%. There 
was no significant increase in the number of beneficiaries and public subsidy per capita 
of these two public health insurance schemes during the period of prior to and after DC. 
Figure 9.3: Share of public and private health care finance of the Thai health care system during 
1994-2005 
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Sources: National Health Accounts in Thailand 1994-2005 (International Health Policy Program 
2007a). 
As stated in Chapter 3, the DC scheme employs close-ended provider payment methods: 
capitation payment for ambulatory care and DRG case payment within a global budget 
for hospitalization. Such close-ended payment methods have resulted in financial 
sustainability, and some degree of cost containment for the DC scheme. Experience on 
the health financing arrangements of the DC policy in Thailand can be useful for other 
developing countries where administrative and technical capacity as well as public health 
resources are quite limited. 
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9.2.5 Benefit package design and the impact on Thai households 
Research findings from the case studies show that the decision to exclude RRT from the 
UC benefit package generated considerable financial barriers to access for RRT, and a 
substantial economic impact on poorer ESRD patients. Infrequent access to RR T and 
inability to obtain essential and expensive injectable medication due to limited household 
resources appeared to be a major cause of death for poorer ESRD patients. Health 
expenditure for RR T captured 25-68% of household income and 31-52 % of household 
expenditure, which meant ESRD patients in poorer households faced catastrophic health 
spending. In contrast, richer ESRD patients could access and utilize RRT regularly and 
effectively, resulting in a higher survival rate and quality of life than their poorer 
counterparts. Various coping strategies were used by poorer ESRD patients to manage 
the high costs of RRT, including reducing the frequency of haemodialysis, reducing food 
consumption, using only public transportation, and taking loans with a high interest rate. 
The financial burden of RR T forced poorer households to face financial catastrophe and 
fall into impoverishment due to its long-term and high costs. This not only impacted on 
ESRD patients but also on other household members and relatives who had to provide 
financial support for patients. As found in studies of other diseases (Sauerbom, Adams, 
et al. 1996; Kabir, Rahman, et al. 2000; Russell 2005), the low and irregular income of 
poorer households and lack of a financial safety net resulted in a greater catastrophic 
impact on poorer households than on richer families. 
Overall, RR T household cost burdens were considerably higher than those for other 
diseases reported in similar studies and are likely to have greater economic impact at the 
household level, particularly for poorer patients and households. The exclusion of RR T 
from the UC benefit package on cost effectiveness grounds has, therefore, both 
compromised the access of ESRD patients to life saving treatment and put poorer ESRD 
patients at considerable financial risk. In these ways it has, for this group of patients, 
compromised the UC policy goals of promoting equitable access and ensuring risk 
protection against medical care costs. Given that richer ESRD patients covered under 
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other public insurance schemes continue to get subsidised RR T treatment, there also 
remains significant inequity between health insurance schemes. 
These findings from two case studies of expensive health services contribute to debates 
about the benefit package design and the criteria to use in selecting interventions for their 
inclusion. There are no easy answers to the questions of which interventions to include 
and exclude, or on what basis decisions should be made. On the one hand, Thai evidence 
shows that RRT is not only cost ineffective relative to other interventions and has no 
public health externalities (Teerawattananon 2005), but also that its inclusion in the UC 
benefit package would have considerable long-term budgetary implications for the 
government (Kasemsup, Prakongsai et al. 2005). On the other hand, evidence from the 
household investigation shows that the exclusion of RRT from the UC benefit package 
has catastrophic consequences for poorer ESRD patients and their households, both in 
economic terms and in terms of morbidity and mortality as well as compromising the UC 
goal of equitable access. It is clear that a middle income country like Thailand cannot 
afford to include all expensive health services into the UC benefit package. However, 
considering the objectives of the UC policy, these findings suggest that the Thai 
government should at least re-consider its decision not to support RR T. In the light of the 
global epidemic of diabetes and an aging society which will inevitably increase the 
number of ESRD patients, the issue of inequity in access to RR T and how to achieve 
equity in access to RRT, especially for ESRD patients in low- and middle-income 
countries, has been raised and is of increasing concern to social scientists and policy 
analysts (White, Chadban et al. 2008). Education and prevention of end-stage renal 
disease, and the development of good public policy, are suggested to be key objectives 
for improving equitable access to RR T in developing countries. 
9.2.6 Health information system for monitoring and evaluation 
From the Thai experience, it is clear that the availability of well-functioning large-scale 
databases of national household surveys provides a solid platform for monitoring and 
evaluating the impact of the UC policy on equity of the Thai health care system. The 
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existence of nationally representative household surveys on household health payments 
and health seeking behaviour prior to and after implementation of the UC policy provides 
an opportunity to assess the impact of the UC policy on several dimensions of the Thai 
health care system by using a before-after investigation. The continuous development 
and strengths of the National Statistical Office of Thailand help contribute useful 
information to analyze and monitor changes in health equity affected by the UC policy at 
the national and household levels. A genuine partnership and a regular dialogue between 
the national data producer and data users such as the Ministry of Health and researchers 
in research institutes and universities should be further developed and fostered. A good 
relationship between the NSO of Thailand and the MOPH is an example for other 
developing countries to implement as a means of developing and strengthening their 
health information systems to monitor and assess the equity of the health care system. 
9.3 Conclusions 
From the research findings of this study, the UC policy in Thailand has improved equity 
in health care use and health care finance, and the distribution of public subsidies, 
through using the following three health care financing strategies: 1) the expansion of 
public health insurance to nearly universal coverage; 2) the removal of financial barriers 
to health services; and 3) the promotion of primary care use which is preferentially 
accessed and utilized by the poor in rural areas. Also, the UC policy has improved 
financial risk protection for Thai households through its comprehensive benefit package 
and the nearly universal coverage of health insurance, even though some expensive 
health services such as RRT for ESRD patients were excluded from the UC benefit 
package. Using the close-ended provider payment methods provides some degree of 
financial sustainability and cost containment of the UC scheme. The Thai experience in 
achieving universal coverage can be an example for other developing countries moving 
towards universal coverage. A proper mix of health financing arrangements, a 
comprehensive benefit package which ensures depth and breadth of health insurance. an 
effective provider payment method, and a health information system for monitoring and 
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evaluation, are all lessons that the Thailand case study provides for other developing 




POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND RESEARCH PRIORITIES 
The aim of this thesis was to assess the impact of the UC policy on equity of the Thai 
health care system by using a before-after approach to investigate any changes at national 
and household levels. The thesis comprises four main objectives which are: 1) to analyze 
changes in health care use and the distribution of public subsidies gained by different 
income quintiles of Thais prior to and after UC; 2) to explore changes in the progressivity 
of health care finance and financial burden for health payments borne by households of 
different socio-economic status; 3) to describe the economic impact of the UC benefit 
package on poorer and richer households; and 4) to provide lessons and policy 
recommendations on introducing the UC policy and health financing reform for other 
developing countries. 
In this chapter, the research findings are all brought together in order to discuss the 
implications for policy at the national and international levels, and to make 
recommendations for further research. 
10.1 Conclusions of findings 
The implementation of the UC policy in 2001 greatly impacted health insurance coverage 
and equity in health care use of the Thai health care system. The UC policy did expand 
health insurance coverage to nearly all Thais, and led to a significant increase in 
ambulatory service use of the first and second income quintiles, especially at primary and 
secondary health care facilities. The analysis of hospitalization showed a similar picture 
to ambulatory service use: hospitalization in community hospitals increased significantly 
in all quintiles, while hospitalization in provincial and regional hospitals, and private 
hospitals decreased after the UC policy was implemented. The concentration indexes 
showed a more pro-poor nature of ambulatory service use at health centres and 
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community hospitals, compared to provincial and regional hospitals, while a decrease in 
the concentration index of hospitalization in community hospitals in 2003 was caused by 
a rise in hospital admissions of richer quintiles. The findings indicate that these 
achievements and the more pro-poor nature of health service use appeared to be related to 
three strategies of the DC policy: 1) the expansion of public health insurance to nearly 
universal coverage, especially benefiting those in the lower income quintiles and 
previously uninsured; 2) the removal of financial barriers to health services; and 3) the 
promotion of primary care use and first level hospital use which is easy to access and 
utilize by the poor in rural areas. 
On the distribution of public subsidies, results from the analyses of benefit incidence 
showed an increase in the pro-poor nature of public subsidies on health by income 
quintile and geographical area in 2003 due to a significant increase in per capita public 
subsidies for the first and second quintiles compared to 2001. Though per capita public 
subsidies for other quintiles also increased, the share of these quintiles had decreased 
after two years of DC implementation. Regarding geographical distribution, per capita 
public subsidy significantly increased in the North and the Northeast regions where the 
poor primarily reside. The first quintile in Bangkok obtained the highest public subsidy 
per capita in 2003, while that of the Eastern region had the lowest. The sensitivity 
analyses of choice of socio-economic group indicator (income per capita or an asset 
index), and use of national aggregated or regional unit subsidies, showed similar 
conclusions on the share of public subsidies by different quintiles. The continuous 
development of pro-poor strategies for health sector reform, the nationwide distribution 
of government health facilities to district and sub-district levels, and the design of health 
financing arrangements under the DC scheme, appear to be all crucial factors 
contributing to the more pro-poor nature of public subsidies for health. 
The analysis of equity in health care finance in 2000 and 2002 indicates that the overall 
health care finance of the Thai health care system was less regressive after the UC policy 
was implemented. The negative Kakwani index value of overall health care finance 
reduced from -0.0506 in 2000 to -0.0347 in 2002. In addition, the share of households 
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facing catastrophic health expenditure decreased from 6.11 % in 2000 to 4.650/0 in 2002, 
with the highest decrease in the first quintile. The analysis indicates that the reduction in 
household out-of-pocket payments was the main cause, and that there was indeed 
improved financial risk protection under the UC policy. The increase in progressivity of 
household expenditure for direct tax payment and less regressive indirect tax payment 
were two other factors improving equity in overall health care finance. 
On assessment at the household level, results from the case studies of two expensive 
health services revealed that the decision of the Thai government to exclude RR T from 
the UC benefit package posed considerable financial barriers to RRT and a substantial 
economic impact on poor ESRD patients. In contrast, the inclusion of open-heart surgery 
in the UC benefit package significantly facilitated access to cardiac operations for poor 
heart disease patients. Financial barriers to RR T prevented poor ESRD patients from 
accessing government health services, and RR T services in public and private facilities 
primarily served CSMBS beneficiaries and richer ESRD patients, respectively. 
Geographical barriers were also an important factor in that they prevented poor ESRD 
patients in rural areas from accessing expensive health services which are solely available 
in the city. Also, the referral system of the UC policy hindered access to cardiac surgery, 
even though this expensive health service has been included in the UC benefit package. 
Research findings from the case studies raise a question on the appropriateness of the UC 
benefit package and whether a non-cost-effective, but expensive medical intervention like 
RRT should be included into the benefit package of universal public health insurance. 
10.2 Policy implications and lessons learnt for other countries 
10.2.1 Health care financing arrangements for achieving universal coverage 
As stated in the literature reVIeW chapter, achieving universal coverage In low- and 
middle-income countries is a desirable goal of policy makers and international 
organizations because a large segment of the population in these countries rely heavily on 
out-of-pocket payments instead of risk-sharing arrangements. In general, the poor and 
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the disadvantaged in developing countries lack health insurance coverage and have to 
face direct out-of-pocket payments for health care costs which often lead to 
impoverishment and catastrophic health expenditure. To protect poor households in 
developing countries from catastrophic health payments, the governments have an 
important role in introducing a health financing arrangement to reduce the proportion of 
people relying on out-of-pocket payments and provide more financial risk protection for 
the population. The policy of universal coverage either via tax-based health insurance or 
SHI has been suggested to be a means and end by academic institutes and international 
development organizations. 
The essence of financing arrangements for universal coverage is to ensure protection 
against the financial costs of ill-health for everyone. In the context of low- and middle-
income countries, financing universal coverage means a substantial reduction in 
household out-of-pocket payments for health care with a significant increase in the share 
of health financing funded by general tax or social health insurance contributions. In 
Thailand, the research findings from this study show the vital roles of the health 
financing strategies of the Thai UC policy in reducing household out-of-pocket payments 
in lower income quintiles and in decreasing the percentage of households facing 
catastrophic health expenditure. The key financing strategies were the introduction of a 
tax-financed health insurance scheme and removal of user fees at point of health service 
provision. Since low income households in Thailand and other developing countries 
usually spend more on health relative to household income, a decrease in household out-
of-pocket payments in lower income quintiles significantly reduces the number of 
households facing catastrophic health expenditure, as shown in the research findings of 
Chapter 7. In addition, the shift of health financing from a regressive source, for 
example, household out-of-pocket payments, to a progressive source such as general tax, 
improves equity in overall health care finance. The findings from this study which show 
less regressive overall health care finance after the implementation of the tax-financed 
UC scheme support the policy recommendation of shifting health financing arrangements 
from out-of-pocket payments to pre-payment systems (World Health Organization 2005; 
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Mills 2007) and are consistent with evidence from other countries such as the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, and Malaysia (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999; Savedoff 2004). 
Social health insurance is another progressive health financing source that can be used for 
expanding health insurance coverage and improving the overall equity of health care 
finance. A recent study indicates that worldwide, 27 countries have achieved universal 
coverage via SHI (Carrin and James 2005). Achieving universal coverage through SHI 
took 127 years to achieve in Germany, 118 in Belgium, 79 in Austria, 72 in Luxembourg, 
48 in Costa Rica, 36 in Japan, and 26 in the Republic of Korea. Carrin and James (2005) 
also show that it took 40 years in Austria (from 1890 to 1930) for population coverage to 
grow from 7 to 60 percent, and then another 35 years to reach 96 percent of the 
population. Hsaio concludes that a country's level of economic development and its 
economic structure influence how many people can be covered and how rapidly SHI can 
expand toward universal coverage (Hsaio 2007). In low- and middle-income countries, 
many factors including a low per capita income, a small formal sector, a high prevalence 
of poverty, and a high dependency ratio, are challenges to initiate and scale up SHI in 
these countries. 
In the Thai context where formal sector employment is quite small, achieving universal 
coverage through SHI appears to be difficult and not feasible. This circumstance is 
similar to many low- and middle-income countries where the possibility to expand health 
insurance coverage through compulsory contributions beyond formal sector employees 
tends to be low (Ensor 1999; Mills 2007). Though SHI in Thailand has been established 
since 1990, the expansion of health insurance coverage through SHI has been very slow 
and the scheme covered only 10% of Thais both prior to and after universal coverage. 
Substantial costs with regard to difficulties in collecting health insurance contributions 
from those in the informal sector, and concerns about the financial sustainability of the 
SSS Fund, tended to be the major concerns of the SSO in not expanding social health 
insurance to cover people in the informal sector or even spouses and dependants of SSS 
beneficiaries, even though the latter was suggested by ILO and several academic 
institutes (Tangcharoensathien, Prakongsai et al. 2005; Social Security Office of Thailand 
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2006). With these limitations coupled with strong political support in 2001, the Thai 
government decided to achieve universal coverage through employing a mix of health 
financing sources, namely social health insurance contributions from the formal sector 
and general taxation for the rest of the population. This strategy of using a proper mix of 
financing sources was feasible and practical to achieve universal coverage in the Thai 
context, and could avoid conflict from a merger of existing health insurance schemes 
with the new UC scheme. Developing countries having a similar context in terms of a 
small formal sector and different targeted health insurance schemes with a variety of 
health financing sources, can learn and adapt the Thai experience to their own when they 
have strong political support and a window of opportunity for health sector reform. 
Although shortcomings in achieving universal coverage in developing countries include a 
number of factors (Nitayarumphong 1998; Mills 2007), findings from this study indicate 
that a crucial success factor in achieving universal coverage in Thailand is the nationwide 
availability of health care facilities and a qualified health workforce in rural and remote 
areas. Without these, universal coverage would only be rhetoric. Therefore, long term 
public investment in health service infrastructure and human resources for health are 
important requirements for countries moving towards universal coverage. 
Another interesting experience in Thailand is the willingness of the rich and middle-
income groups to participate in the UC policy, and not to opt out. The benefit incidence 
analysis shows that people in richer quintiles increased health service use at public health 
facilities and had a certain share of public health subsidies both prior to and after 
implementation of the UC policy. This therefore led to political support for the UC 
policy from the richer quintiles and encourage the principle of solidarity of public health 
insurance. Participation of the richer quintiles also forces health care providers to ensure 
and improve the quality of health care because they are well-educated and have voice, 
compared to the poor. A strategy to make equitable access to health care a matter of 
basic human rights, not a social assistance policy for the poor, obtained political support 
from people of all socio-economic groups (Siamwalla 2002). This can be seen as 
equitable when funding for health care is derived from general taxes paid by everyone, 
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and in tum everyone can access and benefit from health services when he or she is in 
need. The Thai experience in using such strategies would be useful for countries moving 
from targeted health insurance schemes to universal coverage and who need political 
support from the rich and middle-income groups. 
10.2.2 Universal coverage benefit package 
Typically, public health insurance provides financial risk protection against medical care 
costs through a list of health services included in its benefit package, which also indicates 
types of health services funded by either direct out-of-pocket payments or public 
subsidies. Also, the benefit package is a key factor in making UC financially feasible. In 
practice, no country is able to provide universal coverage of all health services that 
technically are available, and therefore a criteria for rationing is inevitably needed. 
There are two conflicting principles of the benefit package, an essential or a catastrophic 
package, which are used for judging health services to be included in the benefit package. 
With these two principles, countries often have difficulty in choosing between health 
services which are highly cost-effective but perhaps relatively cheap to buy (an essential 
package), and those which may be less or not cost-effective but very expensive to 
purchase for those who are in need (a catastrophic package). In the case of universal 
coverage in Thailand, RRT for ESRD patients was an example of expensive health 
services excluded from the UC benefit package because it was not cost-effective and its 
inclusion in the UC benefit package would have considerable long-term budgetary 
implications for the government. However, it was clear that poor households with ESRD 
patients were impoverished by the costs of RRT. From these research findings, it can be 
concluded that it is inappropriate to justify which health services should be included in 
the UC benefit package on only cost-effectiveness grounds. The decision on whether the 
benefit package should be an essential or a catastrophic package needs careful 
consideration by policy makers and stakeholders in the light of both the availability of 
public resources and the economic consequences for vulnerable groups in society. 
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Although the inclusion of health services in the UC benefit package can remove financial 
barriers to such health services, achieving equity in access to and utilization of health 
care cannot solely rely on the extent of the benefit package. Other barriers such as 
geographical barriers to health services have to be addressed by policy makers. The Thai 
experience from the household qualitative study indicates that even though poor heart 
disease patients had improved access to cardiac operations due to the inclusion of such 
operations into the UC benefit package, they still encountered geographical barriers 
because such medical interventions were not available in secondary health care facilities, 
and were provided by tertiary health care facilities mostly located in the city, or by a 
large health facility in Bangkok. In addition, geographical barriers are substantial for 
patients residing in rural areas who have to regularly receive health services in a tertiary 
care hospital, like ESRD patients. Strategies to address geographical barriers to health 
services such as a provision of financial assistance for transportation to poor heart disease 
patients residing in rural areas, or substitution of haemodialysis (HD) by peritoneal 
dialysis (PD) for well-educated ESRD patients, will improve equity in access to and 
utilization of health care. 
However, provider payment is another important influence on access to expenSIve 
treatments. Evidence from the Thai qualitative household study shows that although 
open heart surgery was included in the UC benefit package, poor heart disease patients 
residing in rural areas experienced a delay in referral due to inappropriate health 
financing arrangements. Paying health care providers by transferring financial risk to 
primary and secondary health care facilities may affect health provider decisions to refer 
patients to the higher level of health care. Also, experiences from cardiac operations 
within the VHC prior to UC demonstrate that inadequate health financing led to 
inequitable access to such operations favouring the CSMBS beneficiaries and those who 
could pay by using out-of-pocket payments, while VHC beneficiaries had to join a long 
waiting list for cardiac operations. Hence, to ensure equitable access to health care, 
policy makers should not only include appropriate health services in the benefit package, 
but also ensure adequate health financing and appropriate provider payment methods. 
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Another interesting experience from health financing arrangements of the Thai UC is a 
centrally-managed fund for expensive health services which employed a point system for 
'pricing' each procedure with a ceiling for reimbursement and a global budget (NHSO 
2007b). This financing arrangement at the national level was intended to share financial 
risk for expensive health services provided by tertiary or specialized care hospitals. The 
arrangement could address the problem of community hospital's disincentive to refer 
patients to tertiary care hospitals by using this centrally-managed fund to pay 
compensation for the cardiac operations and other expensive health services. However, 
the amount of reimbursement per point was quite low due to a considerable increase in 
the volume of procedures provided. As a result, tertiary care providers in some big cities, 
especially university hospitals, made a loss on these services and had a disincentive to 
provide them (Srithamrongsawat 2007). 
10.2.3 Health financing arrangements for achieving equity in health care finance 
Evidence from the literature review indicates that countries or territories where general 
tax funding makes up a higher share (e.g. Sri Lanka, Thailand, Hong Kong SAR) appear 
to have a more progressive pattern of health financing than those dependent on 
mandatory social health insurance financing (O'Donnell, Doorslaer et al. 2005). The 
pattern of a less progressive financing system in countries relying on mandatory health 
insurance is often the result of a cap on social health insurance contributions and 
substantial co-payments required from SHI beneficiaries such as in the Republic of 
Korea. Based on current knowledge and existing evidence, international organizations 
encourage countries to move from regressive health financing sources (e.g. out-of-pocket 
payments or private health insurance premiums) to a pre-payment health care system 
which is financed by progressive health financing sources namely general tax revenues, 
SHI, and community-based health insurance (Savedoff 2004; World Health Organization 
2005; Wagstaff2006). 
Experience from this study indicates that the decision to use general tax revenue to 
finance the UC scheme and to remove user fees led to less regressive health care finance 
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of the Thai health care system. Although an alternative to improve equity in health care 
finance was to use SHI to expand health insurance coverage, this route to achieve 
universal coverage was hampered by difficulties in collecting SHI contributions from the 
large informal sector of the Thai population and reluctance of the SSO to expand social 
health insurance coverage. 
10.2.4 Value of BIA and analysis of equity in health care finance 
Since objectives of the DC policy are: 1) to ensure equitable access to health services, 
regardless of individual income or social circumstance; and 2) to protect households from 
expensive medical care costs, analyses of equity in health care finance or financial 
incidence analysis (FIA), equity in health care use, and household health payments 
focusing on catastrophic health expenditure, are pertinent to reflect the achievements and 
objectives of the DC policy. In addition, analysis of benefit incidence provides further 
evidence on the distribution of public subsidies gained by different socio-economic 
groups. 
This thesis has demonstrated that BIA and FIA provide powerful information to policy 
makers about the impact of the DC policy on equity of the Thai health care system. The 
FIA indicates who pays for health care and the progressivity of household health 
payments, while BIA provides another dimension of information about who benefits from 
public subsidies on health. However, both approaches demand good information from 
national household surveys and unit costs of health service provision at different types of 
health facilities. In many countries, the development and improvement of national 
household surveys on health seeking behaviour and household health payments as well as 
data on unit costs of health service provision in public and private health facilities are 
needed. 
Considering changes in the benefit incidence of public health spending, it is apparent that 
BIA can trace the problem of inequitable distribution of public subsidies, but does not 
provide itself the explanation. This must be found in an understanding of the allocation 
304 
of government health resources and changes in health seeking behaviour. In short 
benefit incidence is very effective in crystallizing the nature of the problem, but not the 
solution. 
However, it is argued that there have been cases where the problem of weak targeting to 
the poor clearly lay in inappropriate allocation of the government health budget. For 
example, the BIA of Vietnam showed that the well targeted subsidy went to the poorest 
individuals in commune health centres only (Demery 2000). Also, findings from this 
thesis shows that the analysis of benefit incidence in greater detail can explain causes of 
inequitable distribution of public subsidies. For example, an increase in the share of 
public subsidies of the lower income quintiles in 2003 was caused by a significant 
increase in health care use at health centres and community hospitals. 
10.2.5 Information systems for monitoring the impact of a UC policy on equity 
The Thai expenence emphasizes the importance of appropriate health information 
systems to monitor and assess changes in access to health care and household health 
payments. In this study, the use of two nationally representative household surveys, the 
HWS and the SES, biennially conducted by the NSO, provided an opportunity to employ 
secondary data of national household surveys to assess changes in health seeking 
behaviour and household health payments after the UC policy was implemented. Health 
seeking behaviour in the HWS and household health payments in the SES as well as 
socio-economic stratifiers were key variables for assessing changes in health care use and 
health payments among different socio-economic groups. 
From Thai experience, an advantage of using secondary data analysis of the nationally 
representative household surveys is that they provide good sources of reliable data at the 
national and household levels which can be used for assessing changes in health seeking 
behaviour and household health payments related to implementation of the UC policy. 
However, experience from Thailand shows changes in surveys across years hampered 
comparative analysis of health seeking behaviour prior to and after UC. So, a 
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questionnaire designer of national household surveys needs to ensure basic comparability 
across years. 
Countries in Asia have different types of household surveys on health service use, and 
household income and expenditure, which can be useful for the analysis of benefit and 
financial incidence and changes in equity. Examples include the LSMS in Nepal, the 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey in Bangladesh and Hong Kong, or the 
Consumer Finance Survey in Sri Lanka (O'Donnell, Doorslaer et al. 2005). To formulate 
the UC policy and strengthen health policy assessment, countries need to develop and 
maintain their national health information systems. In addition, experience from 
Thailand indicates that a good relationship between data producers (e.g. NSO) and data 
users (e.g. MOPH, NESDB, and other research institutes) fosters continuous 
improvement of health-related questions in the nationally representative household 
surveys which are useful for policy monitoring and evaluation (Tangcharoensathien, 
Limwattananon et al. 2007). 
The Thai experience in the analysis of equity in health care finance shows limitations in 
using secondary data from national household surveys. In general, household survey data 
in many countries are unlikely to provide complete information on household health 
payments, particularly income tax payments and social insurance contributions 
(O'Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008d). In addition, household payments through sales 
taxes are almost certainly unavailable. To address this problem, it is suggested to employ 
various approximation strategies to estimate household health payments if such data in 
the national household surveys are unavailable. This study used an approximation to 
estimate household indirect tax payments, while data on household payments for direct 
taxes, social insurance contributions, private health insurance premiums, and out-of-
pocket payments for health, were available in the SES. This thesis indicates that 
improved household survey questionnaires on health-related payments would be useful 
for improving the accuracy and utility of the financial incidence analysis and to assess the 
impact of a major health policy change on equity in health care finance. 
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Three vital components of household survey data required for BIA are often problematic 
and deserve particular consideration. First, data on health care use of individuals and 
some measures of household living standards must be available in the household survey. 
This thesis found that changes in choices of health service use in different years of the 
HWS questionnaires and the absence of frequency of ambulatory care use in the 2001 
HWS posed difficulties in the comparative analysis of health service use between 2001 
and 2003. In addition a single question on household income and income brackets used 
in the 2001 HWS did not provide a strong economic parameter for the analysis of benefit 
incidence. Second, health service use between public and private care must be clearly 
distinguished, so public subsidies through public and private health care can be separately 
calculated. In this thesis, it is fortunate that data on public and private health service use 
in the HWS were clearly separated. Finally, data on user charges or out-of-pocket 
payments for health care use must be available to compute net public health subsidies 
gained by different socio-economic groups. Analysis of benefit incidence in this thesis 
shows that the absence of information on user charges for ambulatory care paid by 
individuals and households in 2001 resulted in difficulties in comparing changes in 
benefit incidence between 2001 and 2003. From Thai experience, countries needing to 
assess the impact of a health policy change using BIA should take care in the design of 
the health seeking behaviour questionnaire, particularly in relation to these vital 
components. Any changes in national household surveys should be taken into account 
when conducting a comparative analysis across different years. Continuous improvement 
of national household surveys on health seeking behaviour and health service use through 
close dialogue between data users and data producers will improve the accuracy and 
value of the benefit incidence analysis. 
Household living standards in the national household survey on health seeking behaviour 
and health service use are often limited or sometimes unavailable in many countries. 
However, increasing the number of questions on household living standards may 
jeopardize the quality of information on health seeking behaviour. Using an asset index 
as an alternative tool for classifying individuals into different economic groups seems to 
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be feasible for countries where data on household income or expenditure are difficult to 
collect. 
Unit cost data for health services are vital for the analysis of benefit incidence, but these 
data are quite limited or unavailable, particular for the private sector. Countries needing 
to employ BIA to assess the impact of a health policy have to develop a strategy to 
establish unit cost data of health service provision at least at the national level. Data at 
the regional level would be useful for further analysis of regional benefit incidence in a 
context where allocation of health resources is very inequitable. This thesis estimated 
unit costs of health service provision by using a conversion factor between unit cost of a 
hospital admission and an ambulatory service. However, such an approach contains 
uncertainty and errors, and countries should employ this approach only as a temporary 
measure while better unit cost data are being developed. 
10.2.6 Methodological lessons from Thai studies 
The objective of this subsection is to draw experiences and lessons on methodological 
approaches from this thesis to an international audience and other countries which intend 
to employ similar approaches to those of this study to assess the impact of a major health 
policy change on their health care systems. 
• Using multi-method approaches to assess health policy interventions 
Since health behaviour is complex and is influenced by many factors, social scientists and 
public health researchers have increasingly employed a range of methodological 
strategies to address the complexity of factors influencing health and health care use. It is 
widely accepted that using different research designs and data collection methods, along 
with drawing on the perspectives of different disciplines, or a multi-method approach, 
can add to existing understanding of the relationships between factors influencing health 
and health seeking behaviour (Green 2005). 
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In this study, using secondary data analyses of financial and benefit incidence allowed for 
the general assessment of the positive impact of the DC policy on equity of the Thai 
health care system. However, using a qualitative approach at the household level as a 
multi-method approach provided a different perspective on the impact of the DC policy 
on richer and poorer households. Countries wishing to assess a major policy change may 
consider to employ such a multi-method approach to obtain a richer picture of the impact 
of the policy on the health care system. 
• Using an asset index as an alternative socio-economic indicator 
In developing countries, data on socio-economic status of households and individuals are 
scarce, and this leads to difficulties in assessing and monitoring changes in health equity. 
In addition, using a money metric measure, either household income or expenditure, as a 
tool to categorize socio-economic status of individuals in these countries has faced the 
problem of unreliable household income and expenditure data, the possibility of recall 
biases, and unavailability of consumer price indexes to compute household consumption 
expenditure. Given these limitations, this study employed an asset index as an alternative 
socio-economic parameter to assess the impact of DC policy on equity in the distribution 
of public subsidies in 2003. It was found that asset indexes can be used as an alternative 
tool to categorize household economic status. The merits of the asset index, in terms of 
its ease of collection and greater validity than household income or expenditure data, 
provide an opportunity for countries with difficulty in collecting household income and 
expenditure data to use asset indexes as an alternative tool to classify households into 
different economic groups. 
• Improving unit cost data of public and private health facilities for BIA 
Experiences from the analysis of benefit incidence indicate that data on unit costs of 
health service provision at public and private health facilities are vital for the accuracy of 
BIA. In general, health facilities in developing countries lack data on unit costs of health 
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service provision, and this problem has to be addressed if the BIA approach is to be used 
as a tool to assess the distribution of public subsidies. 
In this study, it was found that using aggregate or regional unit costs to analyze benefit 
incidence provided similar conclusions on the share of public subsidies on health 
obtained by different quintiles. This is because there was no significant difference in unit 
cost of health service provision among health facilities in different regions in Thailand. 
However, in countries where inequality in the distribution of public health subsidies is 
substantial, using regional unit costs to analyze benefit incidence is likely to be 
worthwhile (Demery 2000; Mahal, Singh et al. 2000). 
10.3 Policy implications and lessons for Thailand 
10.3.1 Maintaining and fostering achievements of the UC policy in improving 
health equity 
With the policy objectives of achieving health equity and financial constraints given a 
limited government health budget and public demand for health, policy makers need to 
ensure adequate finance of the overall UC scheme, and strategically allocate sufficient 
resources to the district health system (DHS), namely health centre and community 
hospital. In the Thai context, the DHS is a crucial strategic hub to provide 
comprehensive health services and foster achievements of the UC policy in improving 
equity in health care use and the distribution of public subsidies because the DHS is 
preferentially accessed and utilized by the poor in rural areas. 
To maintain the achievements of more equitable health care finance and financial risk 
protection, the Thai government should continue to finance the UC scheme with general 
tax revenue and improve efficiency of the Thai health care system through the use of 
public health interventions to promote disease prevention and health promotion activities. 
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SHI coverage should be expanded to include spouses and dependants of the SSS 
beneficiaries, in line with the government's intention. 
10.3.2 Improving referral system to achieve equity in access to health care 
Appropriate financing arrangements which can avoid negative incentives to delay the 
referral process from community hospitals, and sufficient reimbursement for specialized 
medical interventions provided by tertiary hospitals, are likely to be a solution for the UC 
scheme in sustaining the policy objectives of equitable access to health care and 
minimizing negative consequences in accessing expensive health services given limited 
resources. The centrally managed Fund for expensive health services is intended to 
partly address such negative consequences, but its reimbursement rates need to be 
adequate. 
10.3.3 Reconsidering the UC benefit package 
Using only a cost-effectiveness approach to identify medical interventions to be included 
in the benefit package seems to be inappropriate for the situation of achieving universal 
coverage. Ethical dimensions and the objective of the UC policy to protect households 
from catastrophic health payments should be taken into account. 
Research findings from RR T suggest that at a minimum, the Thai government should re-
consider its decision not to support RRT, in the light of the UC goals. If the government 
insists to exclude RRT from the UC benefit package, means of providing targeted 
financial support to those most severely affected by illnesses outside the package are 
needed. In addition, other policy interventions should be simultaneously implemented 
including primary and secondary prevention of ESRD, an efficient provision and 
nationwide distribution of RR T services, an establishment of central purchasing and 
negotiation system for erythropoietin injection, a mandatory report from the Thai 
Registry of RRT, and incentives for providing more cost-effective health care for ESRD 
e.g. peritoneal dialysis and kidney transplantation .. 
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10.3.4 Improving data for monitoring health equity and the UC policy 
From the experience of this study, it is suggested that a continuous dialogue between data 
producer (NSO) and data users in the MOPH and other research institutes both inside and 
outside the university in Thailand should be further developed and fostered. Adjustments 
of the SES and the HWS questionnaires should be made in order to improve the utility of 
these two nationally representative household surveys and serve the objectives of 
monitoring and assessing any government policies on Thai households. 
To achieve better and more accurate analysis of benefit incidence, improvements in 
accuracy of unit costs of health service provision among public and private health care 
providers are needed. Apart from using unit cost data to analyze benefit incidence, the 
estimate of budget requirements per capita of UC beneficiaries also requires better unit 
cost data of all levels of health care facilities. A large number of unit cost data of health 
facilities would minimize uncertainly in unit costs. In addition, a regional benefit 
incidence could be done if regional unit costs of health service provision are available 
and the sample of health facilities is adequate. 
10.3.5 Clarifying health equity ideologies among Thai policy makers 
It is unclear which philosophy of health equity has been used by Thai policy makers for 
guiding health policy related to health equity in the country. There is neither a clear 
policy statement, nor consensus on the ideology of health equity. Given lack of a 
consensus on health equity perspectives, there is a need to discuss and clarify which 
philosophy or ideology of health equity is appropriate for the Thai health care system and 
widely accepted by Thai policy makers and Thai society. This would be useful for 
underpinning the direction of health equity related policies of the country. 
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10.4 Recommendations for research priorities 
10.4.1 Equity in health outcomes and health status 
Findings from the analyses of equity in health care use and the distribution of public 
health subsidies raise a question as to whether the DC policy has improved equity in 
health outcomes and health status for those in different economic groups. Health care 
and public subsidies on health are crucial factors contributing to the health status of the 
population, but there are other factors also influencing overall population health. If the 
ultimate goal of a health policy is to improve health status and maximize the health of the 
population, an assessment of the impact of the DC policy on health outcomes and health 
status of the population would be useful. 
10.4.2 Improving health equity according to health needs 
Though this study shows that the DC policy improved equity in health service use and the 
distribution of public health subsidies, it was not assessed whether or not improvements 
of such health equity were relevant to the health needs of the population. In addition, it is 
not known whether an increase in health service use by poorer income quintiles was 
pertinent to the health needs of those groups in the population. Household survey data 
used in this study are limited for an analysis of health needs and other dimensions. 
Improved design of national household surveys could address the gap in knowledge of 
health needs of the population. This information could then be used to explore further the 
impact of the DC policy. 
10.4.3 Equity in quality of health care 
The impact of the DC policy on equity in quality of health services received is another 
area which requires further investigation. The close-ended payment method may lead to 
poor or low quality of health service provision if the regulation and monitoring system is 
weak. It is worth investigating whether or not the DC policy with a specific health 
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financing arrangement impacts equity in quality of health services provided by health 
care providers. 
10.4.4 Financial risk protection 
There are two relevant approaches to measure financial protection in health: catastrophic 
and impoverishing expenditures (Wagstaff 2008). In this study, the impact of the UC 
policy on catastrophic health expenditure was explored, but in a quite limited way. There 
are different approaches and definitions on catastrophic health expenditure that would 
benefit from further assessment. In addition, using the impoverishing expenditure 
approach may provide different findings from the former approach. 
10.4.5 Using panel household data to assess the UC policy 
Another interesting area for further investigation is to assess the impact of the UC policy 
at the household level using panel household data. Such an approach will differ from this 
study because sampled households in the panel household surveys will be the same, while 
sampled households in the cross-sectional household surveys were different, but 
nationally representative. An advantage of using panel household data is that it could 
provide for an assessment of the dynamics of household well-being and changes in 
household health seeking behaviour due to health shocks or other health related factors. 
This sort of study will provide a deeper understanding of the impact of health policy 
interventions on households with different socio-economic status and contexts. However, 
problems of cost and sample attrition are to be expected. 
10.4.6 Assessing the impact of UC policy on other dimensions of equity 
Finally, equity in health can be assessed using different dimensions such as by gender, 
race, educational level, and other socio-economic parameters. It is worth investigating 
whether or not the UC policy helps reduce inequity among different socially 
disadvantaged groups. 
314 
10.5 Final conclusions 
This thesis started by describing the importance of the DC policy in ensuring universal 
access to health care of the population and protecting households from medical care 
costs. Though low- and middle-income countries have high demand for financial risk 
protection because the majority of their population rely heavily on out-of-pocket 
payments, these countries face several key constraints in achieving universal coverage. 
Thailand, a lower middle income country, achieved universal coverage in 2001 by 
introducing a tax-funded DC scheme to approximately 47 million people who were not 
beneficiaries of the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) or the Social 
Security Scheme (SSS). The implementation of the DC policy resulted in a significant 
change in health care financing arrangements and financial barriers to health services. 
This research explored the impact of the DC policy in tenns of equity in health care 
finance, changes in health care use, distribution of public subsidies on health, and 
household financial protection in health. 
The DC policy did expand health care coverage to include nearly all Thais and increased 
the pro-poor nature of the Thai health care system, as well as the distribution of public 
health-related subsidies. Ambulatory service use and hospitalization of poorer quintiles 
significantly increased after the DC policy was implemented. The poorest quintiles 
gained the highest amount and proportion of public subsidies both prior to and after 
implementation of the DC policy. There was a reduction in the regressivity of overall 
health care finance, a greater decrease in household expenditure for health care among 
poorer quintiles, and a decrease in catastrophic expenditure. 
Achievements of the DC policy in Thailand were most likely caused by three financing 
strategies: 1) the expansion of public health insurance to nearly universal coverage; 2) the 
removal of financial barriers to health services; and 3) the promotion of primary care use 
which is preferentially accessed and utilized by the poor in rural areas. Other 
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contributing factors appeared to be well-developed infra-structure of health services and 
the availability of a qualified health workforce in rural and remote areas. 
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Annex 1 - Advantage and disadvantage of different household socio-economic 
indicators 
In general, methods for measuring household socio-economic status can be categorized 
into two major groups, money-metric measures and alternative approaches. The first 
category is traditionally used by economists because it is easy to measure in a monetary 
definition and is widely well understood by the public. Its concept relies on the 
assumption that a person's material standard of living largely determines their well-being. 
Thus, the poor are defined as those who engage in a material standard of living as 
measured by income and expenditure below a certain level - the poverty line 
(Falkingham and Namzie 2001). However, practical problems associated with accuracy 
in quantifying income or expenditure, especially in developing countries have arisen and 
led to a search for non-monetary proxies of household welfare. The second category or 
alternative approach is non-monetary measures, which aim to assess household welfare in 
a comprehensive and broader concept. This category comprises various approaches such 
as household asset indexes, the occupational status score (OSS), the Household Prestige 
(HHP) score, and the capital socio-economic status (CAPSES). Each non-monetary 
method has different strengths and limitations due to its objectives and pattern of data 
used. Therefore, policy analysts should realize the limitations of each measure and use 
appropriate methods which are relevant to their objectives and existing data. 
Money-metric measures 
Economists traditionally prefer to use an indicator in money terms - income or 
consumption expenditures - to assess household poverty and living status. Although the 
best indicator of welfare is the actual consumption of an individual on food and other 
goods as well as consumption of services such as health and education, individual or 
household welfare is difficult to quantify. In practice, income and consumption 
expenditure data are therefore commonly used to proxy the level of consumption utilized. 
A decision to use income or consumption expenditure is dependent on the conception of 
well-being employed. If the standard of living concept is employed for measuring an 
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individual's well-being, consumption expenditures will be focused on. On the other 
hand, if the right to a minimum level of resources is the concept used, income is favoured 
(Atkinson 1989). 
However, economists generally prefer expenditure to income. This is because income 
tends to vary over a course of a year, especially in developing countries where income 
highly depends on seasonal agriculture. Moreover, a large proportion of household 
income in developing countries is shared by the informal sector and self employment 
both inside and outside agriculture. This makes the accuracy of income problematic. 
Furthermore, people tend to smooth out their fluctuation of income via expenditure. For 
example, if a person receives a bonus, they do not necessarily spend the whole bonus, but 
save part of it. Similarly, if income falls in a particular year, a person may use savings to 
compensate for the transient short fall. Thus, consumption expenditure seems to be a 
better proxy for individual or household well-being than income. 
Some arguments arise about the drawback of using monetary measures, both income and 
consumption expenditure, in developing countries. Using a monetary indicator does not 
take into account how that money is earned and how much time is spent for working 
(Piachuad 1987). 
Asset index 
Since 1998, an alternative method for estimating household socio-economic status called 
an asset index has been introduced (Filmer and Pritchett 1998). This method uses 
household assets such as durable and semi-durable goods to describe household welfare 
instead of using household income or consumption expenditure. Its concept relies on 
evidence that the money metric measure is too narrow for defining household welfare. 
Other reasons are that asset indexes are less data intensive and subject to smaller 
measurement error. Moreover, an asset-based measure is most likely to be consistent 
with the financial means and technical capabilities of government statistical offices. 
Filmer and Pritchett constructed an asset index from the National Family Health Survey 
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(NFHS) in Indian states by using principal component analysis (PCA). They found that 
the asset index was robust, produced internally coherent results and provided a close 
correspondence with State Domestic Product (SDP) and poverty rate data (Filmer and 
Pritchett 1998). Sahn and Stifel used factor analysis (FA) to construct weights for each 
asset instead of PCA, for the reason that FA forces all of the components to explain the 
correlation structure between the assets accurately and completely. In FA, all of the 
common factors are not forced to explain the entire covariance matrix. Moreover, they 
preferred using the asset-based indicator to income or consumption-based indicators in 
accordance with three advantages. Firstly, household assets are fewer and easier to 
measure than income and consumption expenditure. Secondly, the accuracy and validity 
of asset data are better than that of income or consumption expenditure data. Finally, the 
asset data are less likely to contain reporting bias and are valid to be assessed by 
interviewers through a checklist upon inspection (Sahn and Stifel 2001). 
However, one criticism levied against the use of asset indexes is that the components of 
the index are taken from a generic list of commodities, despite the fact that those better 
off usually have better quality or technologically advanced equipment than those less 
well off (Moser 1998). For example, the better off may have a colour television rather 
than black & white or be able to receive satellite and digital transmissions rather than a 
normal broadcast. Moreover, the asset indexes are generally poor proxies for current 
income or consumption expenditures, even though they may be a good proxy for long 
term or permanent income. Above all, it is necessary to be aware that the asset indexes 
provide a relative analysis of welfare but say nothing about levels of absolute poverty. 
Therefore, they can be used to monitor changes in poverty or household ownership over 
time, but are not able to translate changes into a reduction in money terms or material 
poverty. 
Other non-monetary indicators of household welfare 
Other non-monetary approaches for identifying socio-economic status (SES) of 
households have been developed and debated for a long time. However, SES 
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measurement research lacks attention whilst the demand for this research related to health 
is increasing. Oakes and Rossi stated in their paper that this suggested that everybody 
has put the cart before the horse (Oakes and Rossi 2003). Interesting household SES 
indicators are, for example, the occupational status score (OSS), the Household Prestige 
(HHP) score, and the capital SES (CAPSES). 
The first index was proposed by Nam and Powers in 1965 (Nam and Powers 1965). This 
method used an occupational status score or OSS, which was calculated by using a 
combination of median education and median income level of all US census occupations. 
The scoring process was done by using average midpoints of the two cumulative intervals 
divided by the total number of persons in all occupations. About ten years later, Green 
(1970) developed a composite measure for stratifying health behaviour based on income, 
education and occupation. These weights were derived from a state-wide sample of 
1,592 California families. He claimed that his scale was occasionally used for measuring 
SES in applied health behavioural research. This measure was criticized that because the 
weights were estimated by a regression equation predicting health behaviour, it could not 
use for measuring SES outside applied health behavioural research (Green 1970). 
The second index is a method for assessing household status called a household prestige 
or HHP score. Rossi and colleagues demonstrated this method in 1974 (Rossi, Sampson 
et al. 1974). This index used a rating of household social standing comprising husband's 
occupation and education, along with wife's occupation to infer the relative influence of 
the social characteristics of families. The measure assigned status scores to households 
based on occupation, educational level, and ethnicity of spouse. Unfortunately, this 
method has not received widespread attention. 
The last index named capital SES or CAPSES was proposed by Oakes and Rossi in 2003 
(Oakes and Rossi 2003). This measure comprises three principal domains: material; 
human; and social capital. The first domain or material capital means material 
endowments under an individual's control. It is more than just earning, income, or 
tangible assets. Material endowments of all sorts such as trust fund, stocks, and an 
340 
expensive house, need to be measured since they are controlled resources potentially used 
for acquiring good housing, health care or education. The second domain or human 
capital refers to the education, skills, abilities and knowledge which are mutable through 
investment of time and labour. Finally, the last domain or social capital describes 
resources that are a function of the social system. A pilot study of CAPSES showed a 
level of consistency in social structure and measures thereof such as SEI, OSS and HHP. 
British researchers have also developed and debated SES measures. Two scales are 
available the Cambridge Scale (CS) (Prandy 1990) and the National Statistics Socio-
economic Classification (NS-SEC) (Rose and Pevalin 2001). The first method relies on 
data from survey respondents who are asked to name the occupation of four friends. 
Then, the occupational rankings of the respondents and friends are analyzed with 
multidimensional scaling techniques which yield a continuous ordinal CS score for each 
respondent which is the CS ranking. The second relies on employment theory and groups 
persons into typically eight nominal classes or strata. However, this effort of British 
researchers focuses on occupational relationship, not status ranking. 
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Annex 2 - The benefit package of the UC scheme in 2006 
Curative and rehabilitative care 
I-- General examination, curative and I. 
rehabilitative services 
1.1 Medical examination, diagnosis, 
treatment and rehabilitation until the 
treatment ends, including alternative 
medical care as recognized by the 
Medical Registration Committee. 
1.2 Childbirth delivery services, totaling 
for no more than 2 deliveries. 
1.3 Meals and room charges for ~ 
inpatients in common rooms. 
1.4 Dental services: extraction, filling, 
scaling, plastic-based denture, milk-
tooth nerve-cavity treatment, and 
placement of artificial palate in 
children with harelip and cleft palate. 
1.5 Medicines and medical supplies 
according to the national essential 
drug list. 
1.6 Referrals for further treatment among 
health facilities. 
2. High-cost medical services, including 
artificial organs and prostheses (both 
inside and outside the body), as per the 
payment criteria set by the National 
Health Security Board (NHSB). 
3. Care for accident and emergency 
illnesses: any accident or emergency case 
can go for medical care at any health 
facility (participating in the scheme) 
located nearest to the scene; the medical 
expenses incurred within the first 72 hrs 
can be reimbursed from the central health 
insurance fund *; after that the contracted 
unit of care shall cover the costs as per 
the established criteria. 
* abolished in FY 2004 
Source: (NHSO 2007b) 
Health promotion and 
disease ~revention services 
l. Having and using personal health record-books 
in providing health care for individuals. 
2. Examination and pre-natal care for pregnant 
women for health promotion purpose. 
3. Services related to child health, child 
development and nutrition, including 
immunizations according to the national 
immunization program. 
4. Annual physical check-up for the general public 
and high-risk groups (according to the Medical 
Council guidelines for medical checkups of 
2000, as recommended by Royal Medical 
Colleges). 
5. Antiretroviral medication for the prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV, as per the 
guidelines set by the National Health Security 
Board (NHSB). 
6. Family planning services. 
7. Home visits and home health care. 
8. Provision of knowledge about health care for 
patients at the individual and family levels. 
9. Counseling and support for people's 
participation in health promotion. 
10. Oral health promotion and disease prevention: 
10.1 Oral health examination; 
10.2 Advice on dental health; 
10.3 Fluoride treatment among population 
groups at risk of dental caries such as 
children, elders, and patients taking 
radiation in the head and throat areas; 
10.4 Sealant application of dental pits for 
children under 15 years of age. 
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Annex 3 - Constructing the asset index from the SES data and analytical results 
from the 1998-2002 SES 
Methods 
Principal component analysis (peA) is a statistical technique closely related to factor 
analysis, which can determine a weight as a factor score for each asset variable. It seeks 
a linear combination of variables such that the maximum variance is extracted from the 
variables. Then it removes this variance and seeks a second linear combination which 
explains the maximum proportion of the remaining variance, and so on. This is called the 
Principal Axis Method and results in orthogonal (uncorrelated) factors. peA often 
provides a good approximation to common factor analysis. The first principal component 
is the linear index of variables with the largest amount of information common to all of 
the variables. We can write a result of the asset index derived from peA for each 
household asset with the following formula: 
Aj = f1 *(ajl-al) / (sl)+ ... + fn*(ajn - an)/ (sn) 
n 
Aj = "Lfi(aji-ai)/ Si 
1=1 
Where 
Aj IS the asset index for each household G =1, ....... ,n) 
f; IS the scoring factor for each household asset (i = 1, ...... ,n) 
aj; IS the i th asset of j th household (i,j = 1, ...... ,n) 
a; IS the mean of i th asset of household (i = 1, ...... ,n) 
S; IS the standard deviation of i th asset of household (i = 1, ...... ,n) 
Z IS the standardized variables of each household 
Derived from peA, sconng factors of the first principal component (the efficient 
component) are used for constructing the asset index of each household. This means a 
new factor which has a linear correlation with original variables is developed. A weight 
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is assigned to each variable (asset) in order to maximize variation of the new variable, 
subject to number of constraints. 
The mean value of the index is zero by construction. Since all asset variables are 
dichotomous and take only a value of zero or one, then the weight is easy to be 
interpreted. A move from 0 to 1 changes the index by j;/Si. 
Using the asset index computed by this formula, each household is assigned into 
quintiles. The first quintile is the poorest, while the fifth quintile is the richest. Given the 
population in Thailand below the national poverty line in 2002 was 9.8 % (United 
Nations 2002), therefore households in the first decile of the 2002 SES can be assumed as 
those having living standards below the poverty line. A comparison between poor 
households in the first decile classified by the asset index and the national poverty line 
can show correlation and consistency between the asset index and money-metric 
measures. 
To explore the associations between the asset index and household income and 
expenditure, the Pearson Correlation was employed in order to analyze a correlation 
between using the asset index and household income/expenditure to classify households 
as different quintiles. 
Data sources 
The 1998, 2000, and 2002 SES were used as the main data sources for computing the 
asset index. Data of housing characteristics, ownership of household assets, and water 
supply system in "Record Five" of SES were exploited. Household income and 
expenditure per capita available in "Record One" of the SES were also used for 
classifying households to different household quintiles compared to using the asset index. 
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A range of 28 to 30 variables of household assets in the three years of the SES data sets 
could be categorized into three groups: housing characteristics; types of household 
sanitation and water supply; and ownership of durable and semi-durable assets. 
Most variables were dichotomous having a value of either zero or one. Variables that 
were not dichotomous such as material types of housing construction were changed into a 
dichotomous character, namely permanent or non-permanent materials of housing 
construction. Then, the entire variables can be used to construct the asset index. 
Results 
1. Details of the asset indexes during 1998 to 2002 
After the asset index was calculated by using peA, we classified sample households of 
the 1998, 2000 and 2002 SES into quintiles, from the poorest to the richest. Mean value 
of the index was zero by construction and the mean in each quintile was distinctly 
different from each other. For instance, the differences between the first quintile and the 
third quintile were 3.08,3.18 and 3.13 in 1998,2000 and 2002 respectively, while the 
differences between the third and the fifth quintile were 3.54, 3.55 and 3.75, 
correspondingly (Table 1). 
Table 1: Mean and standard deviation of the asset index in each quintile in 1998, 2000, 
and 2002 SES 
Year No. of Mean factor SDFactor 1 Mean factor score by quintile 
variables 1 Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
1998 28 0.000 2.364 -3.20 -1.20 -0.12 1.11 3.42 
2000 29 0.000 2.399 -3.29 -1.19 -0.11 1.16 3.44 
2002 30 0.000 2.448 -3.29 -1.28 -0.16 1.13 3.59 
As the entire asset variables were modified in a dichotomous (zero or one) manner, a 
move from zero to one changes the asset index by the factor score of each asset divided 
by its standard deviation or f I / S I. The asset index is defined as the sum of the factor 
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score of each asset. For example, in the 2002 SES, a household that owns an air-
conditioner has an asset index higher by 0.748 than another household without it, and 
owning a refrigerator raises a household's asset index by 0.618 relative to a household 
having no refrigerator (Table 2). 
Table 2: Mean, standard deviation, and factor scores of selected asset variables in the 
2002 SES 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max factor score F/SD 
Washing machine 0.366459 0.481851 0 1 0.27512 0.570965 
Telephone 0.312940 0.463703 0 1 0.26761 0.577115 
Video 0.401795 0.490275 0 1 0.25368 0.517424 
Refrigerator 0.805421 0.395888 0 1 0.24477 0.618281 
Electrical cooking pot 0.568071 0.495359 0 1 0.23928 0.483044 
Mobile phone 0.296415 0.456689 0 1 0.23411 0.512624 
Bed 0.526045 0.499336 0 1 0.23367 0.467962 
Air conditioner 0.109212 0.311913 0 1 0.23329 0.747932 
Iron 0.800789 0.399418 0 1 0.23155 0.579718 
Water boiler 0.107954 0.310331 0 1 0.22561 0.726999 
In the first principal component of peA, factor scores of the household assets among the 
1998, 2000, and 2002 SES were quite similar. Ownership of a washing machine was the 
variable that had the highest factor scores in the three years of SES data sets explored. 
Having a telephone, a refrigerator, and a video recorder were three other variables that 
had high factor scores in these three-year data sets. In the 2002 SES, owning an electrical 
cooking pot and a mobile phone played an important role in the first principal 
component, while this was not observed in the 1998 and 2000 SES (Table 3). It is 
noteworthy that some asset variables, such as having a sofa in the living room, were not 
asked about in the 2002 SES, and an additional item such as having a mobile phone was 
added instead. This leads to differences in the top-ten factor scores of the asset variables 
among the three data sets. 
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Table 3: Top-ten factor scores of asset variables in the first principal component among 
the 1998, 2000, and 2002 SES 
1998 2000 2002 
- Assets Factor assets Factor Assets Factor 
scores scores scores 
Washing machine 0.27774 Washing machine 0.28077 Washing machine 0.27512 
Refrigerator 0.27748 Telephone 0.28015 Telephone 0.26761 
Telephone 0.27648 Refrigerator 0.26458 Video recorder 0.25368 
Video recorder 0.26828 V ideo recorder 0.26366 Refrigerator 0.24477 
Sofa in living Sofa in living room 0.25941 Electrical cooking pot 0.23928 
room 0.2639 
Bed 0.25531 Bed 0.25161 Mobile phone 0.23411 
Electrical iron 0.24967 Electrical iron 0.24207 Bed 0.23367 
Gas cooking stove 0.23541 Gas cooking stove 0.23170 Air conditioner 0.23329 
Air conditioner 0.22715 Water boiler 0.21869 Electrical iron 0.23155 
Water boiler 0.20723 Television 0.20520 Water boiler 0.22561 
After categorizing the sample households into five quintiles by using the asset index, we 
found that the PCA grouped the asset index quite well. In other words, it can be used to 
measure household living standards because the index produces significant differences 
among different socio-economic groups, especially in the assets with high factor scores. 
Households in the fourth and the fifth quintiles usually have assets with high factor scores 
such as a washing machine, a telephone, a video recorder, and a mobile phone, while 
none or a small percentage of households in the first and second quintiles owned such 
assets. In contrast, a high percentage of households in all quintiles owned assets with low 
factor scores such as toilets, bicycles, and light bulbs. For example, in 2002, only 1 % of 
households in the first quintile owned a washing machine, while 89 % of households in 
the fifth quintile did. Moreover, of households in the fifth quintile, 94 percent owned a 
telephone in 2000 and 86% in 2002, while only 1-2 % of households in the first quintile 
owned that communication device during those periods (Table 4). 
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Table 4: Mean availability of selected asset variables among different household quintiles 
classified by the asset index in the 1998-2002 SES 
- 1998 2000 
Assets Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Ql Q2 
Washing machine 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.40 0.83 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.53 0.90 0.01 0.05 
Telephone 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.38 0.84 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.54 0.94 0.01 0.04 
Video recorder 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.34 0.80 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.43 0.84 0.02 0.13 
Refrigerator 0.12 0.66 0.94 0.99 1.00 0.20 0.77 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.26 0.82 
Electrical cooking pot 0.43 0.79 0.91 0.94 0.96 0.50 0.84 0.93 0.96 0.98 0.11 0.36 
Mobile phone NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.02 0.08 
Sofa in a living room 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.52 0.83 0.02 0.07 0.25 0.55 0.85 NA NA 
Bed 0.10 0.20 0.46 0.76 0.93 0.10 0.22 0.54 0.78 0.94 0.13 0.28 
Toilet 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 
Air conditioner 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.49 0.00 0.00 
Bicycle 0.32 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.43 0.30 0.37 0.40 0.44 0.51 0.35 0.47 
Light bulb 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.35 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.32 0.09 0.11 
Average asset index -3.23 -1.26 -0.18 1.07 3.43 -3.29 -1.19 -0.11 1.16 3.44 -3.29 -1.28 
2. Pearson correlation of households living standards classified by asset index, 
















Table 5 presents the level of correlation between household quintiles determined by the 
asset index, and household income and expenditure. The correlation between household 
quintiles classified by the asset index and household expenditure is similar to that of 
household income in the three years of SES data sets analyzed. 
Table 5: Pearson correlation between economic quintiles classified by the asset index, household 
income and expenditure in 1998-2002 




























A comparison between households classified by the asset index and household income in 
2002 reveals a greater correlation between households in the first and fifth quintiles than 
the middle socio-economic groups. Approximately 47 % of households in the first quintile 
classified by the asset index exactly matched those classified by household income, while 
52 % of the households in the fifth asset quintile matched the richest income quintile. The 
lower matching was found in the second, the third and the fourth quintiles. 
Likewise, a comparison between households classified by the asset index and household 
expenditure per capita reveals a similar finding. The percentage of sample households 
matched between the asset index and household expenditure per capita in the first and the 
fifth quintiles are higher than those found among the middle quintiles in the 2002 SES 
(Table 6). 
Table 6: A comparison between sampled households classified by household expenditure, 
income per capita and the asset index in 2002 
Income Expenditure 
factorl Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
QI 1322 913 602 420 241 1,405 840 585 412 258 
% 47.2 28.3 16.2 11.1 6.1 40.1 24.0 16.7 11.8 7.4 
-Q2 838 942 859 546 316 841 1,039 807 534 321 
~ 
% 29.9 29.2 23.1 14.5 8.0 23.7 29.3 22.8 15.1 9.1 
-Q3 440 802 974 779 500 384 746 965 839 583 
~~ 
% 15.7 24.8 26.2 20.7 12.6 10.9 21.2 27.4 23.9 16.6 
Q4 173 472 915 1093 849 111 426 944 1,143 823 
% 6.2 14.6 24.6 29.0 21.4 3.2 12.4 27.4 33.2 23.9 
-Q5 25 102 374 931 2061 10 78 407 1,018 1,970 
-~ 
% 0.9 3.2 10.0 24.7 52.0 0.47 2.34 9.12 25.02 63.1 
3. Using the asset index and the money-metric measures to identify the poor 
Due to concerns of the government over the poor and their vulnerability, a comparison 
between using the asset index and household income or total expenditure to identify 
households being above or below the poverty line is also explored. As the proportion of 
Thai households below the national poverty line in 2002 was 9.8%, therefore, households 
in the first decile classified by either income or expenditure in 2002 should be assumed as 
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those under the poverty line. Based on this assumption, a comparison of households in 
the first decile classified by the asset index and the money-metric measures can reflect 
the possibility of using the asset index to identify poor households. 
Table 7 shows a companson between uSIng the asset index and household 
income/expenditure to identify households above or below the poverty line. It reveals 
that only 31 % and 35% of the first household decile classified by household income and 
expenditure exactly matched those classified by the asset index. The correlation between 
using the asset index and household income I expenditure to classify households over or 
below the poverty line is only 0.23 and 0.28, respectively. 
Table 7: A comparison of households above and below the poverty line classified by the 
asset index, household income and expenditure in the 2002 SES 
Households above and below the poverty line classified by HH income & 
Asset index expenditure in the 2002 SES (N = 17,489 HH) 
Household income Household expenditure 
Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor 
Non-poor 14,536 1,204 14,605 1,135 
(92.4%) (68.8%) (92.8%) (64.8%) 
Poor 1,204 545 1,133 616 
(7.6%) (31.2%) (7.2%) (35.2%) 
Total 15,740 1,749 15,738 1,751 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
References 
United Nations. (2002, October 2002). "The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and 
the United Nations Role." Retrieved 24 June, 2005, from 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/MDGs-FACTSHEETl.pdf. 
351 
Annex 4 - Investigating tools for the qualitative study 
Investigating Tool One 
Household members and their relationships 
Purposes 
1. To identify household members and their relatives in each household. 
2. To clarify the dimensions of interpersonal relationships among household 
members and their relatives: interdependence, power/authority, money flows, 
family and kinship. 
3. To develop trust and a good relationship between researcher / fieldworkers and 
household members of the selected households. 
Preparation for visit 
1. Make an initial visit to the household to: 
a. ask if they are willing to participate in the study; 
h. explain objectives of the study and what is involved; 
c. tell them that you will like to visit them every two weeks; 
d. ask when would be the most convenient time to come. 
2. Look at household information from the record of preliminary visit before the 
actual visit. 
3. Prepare other assisting devices such as a tape-recorder, field notes, etc. 
Approach 
1. This visit is for all selected households. 
2. The patient and household head in each household should be appropriate key 
informants. If they cannot give you adequate details, you may ask for more 
information from other key adults within the household. 
3. Making the respondent feel comfortable and at ease with you is important. 
4. The aim of this visit is to draw a diagram of household members and a map of 
their relationships. In addition, trying to understand the relationships among 
household members and their relatives are essential for the interviewer. 
5. Try to see and know each household member and patient's relatives that the key 
informant mentions (if he or she is available) 
6. If the person is busy or pre-occupied with something else, please try to reschedule 
the interview. If he or she is not ready or not feeling like talking, the interview 
will not be very informative. 
7. You also need to make sure there is some degree of privacy, especially if there 
may be conflict between household members, as it may be an emotional or 
sensitive interview. 
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8. Give a brief summary of the issues / themes that you would like to talk about in 
the interview at the start. Use the probes to encourage the respondent to talk. 
Once the flow of the interview has started, do not interrupt - steer the interview 
around the themes. 
9. The probes are very important; one-sentence answers from respondents are not 
enough to provide the detail that we are looking for. 
10. The interviews should also be taped. 
11. Make additional notes on your note pad or other paper if you need to, and use the 
numbers to refer to those additional notes. 
Writing up 
1. From this interview, you will have: 
a. a tape of the interview; 
b. field jottings and other types of field notes; 
2. A diagram of household members and a map of their relationships need to be 
written up. Use a formal symbol of a family tree that you were framed in during 
the pilot study. 
3. Transcription of the interview. 
4. Listen to the tape and add additional information to what you have already written 
up. 
Visit 
Greeting and general chat 
Introduce yourself again in case there is any household member available and you see 
him or her for the first time. 
Introduction for the interview 
Consent questions 
Ask the respondent to give permission for tape-recording 
Questions 
I would like to talk to you about your family members and relatives; 
Perhaps we can draw a diagram of your family members and write the name of each 
member into the diagram. Let the respondent check whether the diagram we write is 
correct or not. 
Can you tell me about details of your family members and relatives drawn in the 
diagram? , 
It is possible that the respondents will give you some information about the relationship 
between him or her with other household members during a conversation of family 
members and relatives. Please record and take note of such information because it will 
let you understand more about interpersonal relationships among patients, household 
members, and their relatives. 
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What are reactions or support that your family members provided if someone in the 
family need help or a support? 
Who is/are your appreciated family member? Why? 
Note: Do not ask about income or expenditure at this visit. 
However, if patients and their household members tell you about their income or 
expenditure unintentionally, or they tell you about household health expenditure, please 
record and take note of such information for the next visit. 
Examples of probes 
Can you explain more? 
What happened next? 
What did you do? 
Why? 
Anything else 
Key issues that we are interested in this visit 
1. How many household members and relatives of the selected households? Where 
are they? 
2. How are relationships among patients, household members, and their relatives? 
3. Who has the authority to make a decision within the household? 
Note: it is possible that more details of the relationships among patients, household 
members, and their relatives will emerge from next visits. Then, data of household 
member relationships gathered from the investigation tool one will have to be revised at 
every visit if there is any information changed or added. 
Note: This tool was adapted from household investigating tools of the South African Costs 
and Coping study (SACOCO) and the Society and Health Institute, Thailand 
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Investigating Tool Two 
Life history and life-line 
Purposes 
1. To understand patient's life history and key events in this household's history. 
2. To identify how those key events have affected the household's livelihood , 
especially illness of a household member and how the household members coped 
with those events. 
3. To provide a context and background information for other household data that 
we collect 
Preparation for visit 
1. Look at the household data from preliminary visit and the relationships among 
patients, household members, and their relatives. 
2. Draw a life-line from existing data that you already have and take this with you to 
the interview. 
3. Prepare assisting devices: a tape recorder, field notes, a camera, etc. 
Approaches 
1. This visit is for all selected households. 
2. The patient in each household should be appropriate respondent. If the patient 
may not be the most suitable person, either due to poor health or lack of 
knowledge, a caregiver is probably the best person. 
3. The aim is for the respondent to tell you a story of patient's life history, so make 
sure that the person is relaxed and willing to talk to you. 
4. If the person is busy or pre-occupied with something else, please try to reschedule 
the interview. If he or she is not ready or not feeling like talking, the interview 
will not be very informative. 
5. You also need to make sure that there is some degree of privacy, as it may be an 
emotional or sensitive interview, especially when the patient tells you about his or 
her illness. Please prepare yourself to respond such situation properly and be 
ready to provide appropriate advice. 
6. Give a brief summary of the issues / themes that you would like to talk about in 
the interview at the start. Use the probes to encourage the respondent to talk. 
Once the flow of the interview has started, do not interrupt - steer the interview 
around the themes. 
7. The probes are very important; one-sentence answers from respondents are not 
enough to provide the detail that we are looking for. So, use the probes below to 
clarify what the respondent wants to tell you. 
8. The interviews should also be taped. However, if the person refuses, make notes 
instead. 
9. If some photos are needed as additional information, please ask permission for 
taking a photograph from the respondent and their household members. 
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10. Make additional notes on your note pad or other paper if you need to, and use the 
numbers to refer to those additional notes. 
Writing up 
1. Type up the transcript of the tape into Thai 
2. If possible, translate the transcript into English 
3. Draw a life-line diagram of the patient. 
Visit 
Greeting and general chat 
Introduce yourself again in case there is any household member available and you see 
him or her for the first time. 
Introduction for the interview 
Consent questions 
Ask the respondent to give permission for tape-recording and taking a photo 
Questions 
I would like to talk to you about the story of your life; 
Perhaps we can draw a line for the years / time passing, and we can write on the line what 
happened and when? 
Can you tell me about the time when you moved into this house? 
What have been the important events / changes in the family? 
Can you tell me about the best time of your family? 
Can you tell me about the worst times of your family life? 
Do not ask about income and expenditure at this visit. 
However, if the patient and their household members tell you some details about their 
income, expenditure, especially household health expenditure by chance, please record 
and take note of such information for the next visit. 
Examples of probes 
Can you explain more? 
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What happened next? 
What did you do? 
Why? 
Anything else 
Remember that the key issue that we are interested in this visit is "patient's life 
story". 
1. What are the key events in the patient's life history? Some examples might be: 
a. Having a baby, 
b. someone coming back to live in the household, 
c. someone leaving and not coming back, 
d. getting work, 
e. losing a job, 




2. What are the impact of those key events on patient's livelihood and other 
household members, especially illness of a household member? 
3. We are also interested in: 
a. How the household is affected by illness? 
b. How they coped? 
So, when these topics come up, it is necessary to probe. 
Note: This tool was adapted from household investigating tools of the South African Costs 
and Coping study (SACOCO) and the Society and Health Institute, Thailand 
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Investigating Tool Three 
Illness narratives 
Purposes 
1. To understand the overall picture of how the patient and the household members 
have responded to illness - their perception, how it affected their lives, and their 
ability to cope and shape their responses. 
2. To set the scene of how the patient's health came to be at this current situation. 
3. To learn details of the patient's and household's interaction with the health 
service system, and how it has shaped their health seeking behaviour, and coping 
strategies. 
Preparation for visit 
1. Go back and re-read patient's data in the household member profile, the life 
history interview, field notes, and look at the life-line. 
2. Take those patient's data with you when you visit the household. 
3. Prepare assisting devices: a tape recorder, a camera, field notes, etc. 
Approaches 
1. The patient is the most suitable person to give information of his or her illness. 
However, if the patient cannot talk due to poor health, a care giver in the 
household may be another choice for the interview. 
2. You may need to ask the consent questions, if this is a new respondent. 
3. The aim is for the respondent to tell you a story of patient's illness and his or her 
perception, so make sure that the person is relaxed and willing to talk to you. 
4. If the person is busy or pre-occupied with something else, please try to reschedule 
the interview. If he or she is not ready or not feeling like talking, the interview 
will not be very informative. 
5. You also need to make sure there is some degree of privacy, as it may be an 
emotional or sensitive interview. So, please prepare yourself to respond such 
situation properly and be ready to provide appropriate advice or sympathy. 
6. Give a brief summary of the issues / themes that you would like to talk about in 
the interview at the start. Use the probes to encourage the respondent to talk. 
Once the flow of the interview has started, do not interrupt - steer the interview 
around the themes. 
7. The probes are very important; one-sentence answers from respondents are not 
adequate to provide the details that we are looking for. So, use the probes below 
to clarify what the respondent want to tell you. 
8. The interviews should also be taped. However, if the person refuses. make notes 
instead. 
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9. Photos of the patient, household members, housing conditions, and surroundings 
may be needed as additional information. So, please ask permission before taking 
such photos from the respondent and household members. 
10. Make additional notes on your note pad or other paper if you need to, and use the 
numbers to refer to those additional notes. 
Writing up 
1. Type up the transcript of the tape into Thai 
2. If possible, translate the transcript into English 
Greeting and general chat 
Introduction for the interview 
Consent questions 
Visit 
Ask the respondent to give permission for tape-recording 
Questions 
Can you tell me about the story of your illness? 
Can you tell me about the start of your illness and how does it progress? 
What did you or others do? What happened next? 
Has the illness or symptom changed? And how do you cope with such change? 
How does illness change your life and others in the households? 
Can you tell me about the magnitude of health expenditure regarding your illness 
as well as other related costs (such as transportation, lodging, etc.)? 
Who pays for health expenditure regarding your illness? 
Can you tell me about health care services that you have utilized since your illness 
started? 
Details of health care services that you have received (where, when, and how) 
What do you feel about the health care services that you have received? 
What do you like and what do you dislike? 
Do those health care services differ greatly from your expectation? 
What are the reasons why you decide to use such health services? 
Do you have any difficulties in or problems with access to and utilization of 
health services regarding to your illness? 
In your opinion, what are barriers to health services that still persist under UC? 
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Examples of probes 
Can you explain more? 
What happened next? 
What did you do? 
Why? 
Anything else 
The key issues that we are interested in: 
1. What happened in the story of the patient's illness? 
2. How did it start? What was done and what happened next? 
3. The magnitude of health expenditure and other related costs regarding the 
patient's illness 
4. How has the illness and its expenditure affected the patient or other household 
members? 
5. How has the illness and its expenditure affected the household's livelihood? 
6. Types and places of health services that the patient has utilized and the reasons 
behind such decisions. 
7. What is (are) patient's and lor household members' perception towards health 
care services that they have received? And what are their expectations for health 
services? 
8. In patient's and household members' point of view, what are barriers to health 
services regarding patient's illness that still persist under UC? 
Note: This tool was adapted from household investigating tools of the South African Costs 
and Coping study (SACOCO) and the Society and Health Institute, Thailand 
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Investigating Tool Four 
Household Income and Expenditure 
Purposes 
1. To elicit household income and expenditure, especially health expenditure from 
the selected households. 
2. To explore the proportion of household health expenditure to total household 
expenditure and income. 
3. To understand the impact of health expenditure on other household activities and 
livelihood. 
4. To classify socio-economic status of each selected household into either richer or 
poorer household. 
Preparations 
. 1. Go back to existing household data and re-read patient's data in the life history 
interviews and field notes, and the illness narratives. These data might contain 
information about household income and expenditure, especially health 
expenditure. 
2. Fill the figures of household income and expenditure that you have already known 
from the previous interviews into the household income and expenditure tables. 
3. Takes those patient's data with you when you visit the household. 
4. Prepare assisting devices: a tape recorder, a camera, field notes, etc. 
Approaches 
1. Respondent: the patient may not be the most suitable person because he or she 
may not know about how the family is responding I coping with the household 
health expenditure and the impact. 
2. Therefore, the first step is to find out, sensitively, who is the most suitable person. 
Some information from previous interviews will help. 
3. You may need to ask the consent questions, if this is a new respondent. 
4. If the person is busy or pre-occupied with something else, please try to reschedule 
the interview. If he or she is not ready or not feeling like talking, the interview 
will not be very informative. 
5. As household income and expenditure data are sensitive and some household 
members may not be willing to reveal their actual income and expenditure, 
therefore, you have to assure the respondent that such information is for the study 
and it will be kept confidential. 
6. Information of household income and expenditure, especially health expenditure 
may be collected from previous household interviews. You have to explore 
existing data and re-check with the respondent whether such information is 
correct or not. 
7. The probes are very important. So, use the probes below to clarify what the 
respondents want and do not want to tell you. 
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8. The interviewer is responsible for filling the tables of household income and 
expenditure below. At the end, you have to check those figures with the 
respondent whether they are correct or not. 
9. The interviews should also be taped. However, if the person refuses, make notes 
instead. 
10. Make additional notes on your note pad or other paper if you need to, and use the 
numbers to refer to those additional notes. 
Writing up 
1. Type up the transcript of the tape into Thai 
2. If possible, translate the transcript into English 
3. Fill the tables of household income and expenditure below. 
Greeting and general chat 
Introduction for the interview 
Consent questions 
Visit 
Ask the respondent to give permission for tape-recording 
Questions 
What is average household monthly income for the items that are still missing in the 
table? 
What is average monthly expenditure of the items that are still missing in the table? 
Were there large expenditure items during last month? What were the items and 
what was the reason for the expenditure? 
Where does the money come from? Or what are the main sources of household 
income? 
Overall, in your opinion, is current household monthly income adequate for 
household expenditure? Why? 
Examples of probes 
Can you explain more? 
Can you give me more details? 
Anything else 
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Why does this figure differ from the previous figure you gave? 
Table of average household monthly income (filled by the interviewer) 
A verage monthly income note 
Household income items (Baht) 
• From agriculture 
• From industry 
• From selling goods 
• From services 
• From employment 
• From their kin or children 
• From borrowing 
• Others 
Total 
Dec 04 Jan 05 Feb 05 
Table of average household monthly expenditure (filled by the interviewer) 
A verage monthly expenditure note 
Household expenditure items (Baht) 
• Health related expenditure 
medical care costs 
non-medical care costs 
• Food 
• Transport 
• Telephone / c~llphone 
• Fuel 
• Electricity / water 
• Education / books 
• Shoes / clothes 
• Soap, toothpaste, bleach etc. 
• Beer, cigarettes 
• Housing / rent 
• Societies and funeral insurance 
• Money borrowed 
• Debt repayment 
• Savings 
• Social events 
• Others 
Total 
Dec 04 Jan 05 Feb 05 
Note: This tool was adapted from household investigating tools of the South African Costs 
and Coping study (SACOCO) and the Society and Health Institute, Thailand 
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Annex 5 - Patient Information sheet and informed consent forms 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PATIENT INFORMATION SHEET 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research title: 
"The impact of the universal coverage policy on equity of the Thai health care 
system in Nakorn Ratchasima province, Thailand" 
Principal investigator's name and address: 
Dr. Phusit Prakongsai 
International Health Policy Program - Thailand 
Ministry of Public Health 
Tiwanon road 
Nonthaburi province 11000 
Tel. (662) 5902366 - 7 
Fax. (662) 5902385 
E-mail address:phusit@ihpp.thaigov.netorPhusit.Prakongsai@lshtm.ac.uk 
Rationale and objectives of the research 
After the nationwide implementation of a policy on universal coverage (UC) for access to 
health care in April 2001, the new tax-financed health insurance scheme - the UC 
scheme - was introduced by the new government. This scheme aims to guarantee 
universal access to essential health services for anyone who is not covered by two public 
health insurance schemes, the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) and the 
Social Security Scheme (SSS). Although the benefit package of the UC scheme includes 
comprehensive health services ranging from primary, secondary, tertiary, and emergency 
health services, as well as a range of expensive medical treatments, some expensive 
health services such as renal replacement therapy (RR T) for end-stage renal disease 
(ESRD) patients are excluded from the benefit package, and some treatments such as 
open heart surgery and coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery are included in the 
benefit package with a cap of reimbursement at 100,000 Baht per annum. Due to 
considerable changes in the Thai health care system and the UC benefit package, this 
research aims to investigate the impact of the UC policy on equity in health care finance 
and health service use among different socio-economic groups of Thais prior to and after 
DC, and to explore roles of the UC policy in any changes observed. Benefit incidence 
and implications of the UC scheme's benefit package at the household level would be 
analyzed. Furthermore, an alternative index for classifying household socio-economic 
status instead of using household income and expenditure will be explored. 
For a qualitative study involving households in Nakorn Ratchasima province, the 
investigation aims to describe household financial burden, access to, and utilization of, 
expensive medical treatments included in and excluded from the UC benefit package and 
the impact of the UC benefit package on households requiring expensive medical 
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treatments. Twenty households having end-stage renal disease (ESRD) patients and 
sixteen households with patients requiring open heart surgery, of different socio-
economic status and from different geographical areas in this province, will be selected. 
This inevitably requires a number of households with different socio-economic status and 
different geographical areas to participate in the research. The research team comprising 
the researcher and research assistants considers that you and your family members are 
relevant to this study and information as well as opinions provided by you and your 
family members will be useful for the UC policy. It is hoped that this research will 
provide more understanding on the effectiveness of the UC policy in protecting 
households from financial risk of expensive health services. Moreover, findings of the 
research will facilitate policy-makers to understand more the impact of the decision to 
exclude some expensive medical treatments from the UC benefit package. This may 
guide policy-makers to improve the effectiveness of the UC policy. 
Conditions and results of participation 
Household information regarding household member relationships, life story of patients, 
illness and health service use, and household income as well as expenditure, will be asked 
about by the research team. You and your relatives will be guaranteed that any questions 
related to the investigation will be unconditionally answered without any concealment. 
Participation in this research is voluntary and you have right to terminate or end 
participation in the research anytime without having to give a reason. Termination of 
involvement will not affect any treatments or benefits that you deserve in the future. In 
case you or your relatives feel uncomfortable with any questions regarding household 
member relationships, patient illness, household income or expenditure, you have rights 
to deny answering such questions. The research team will visit your family every two 
weeks at your most convenient time starting from January to April 2005. 
Confidentiality 
Interviews and conversations between you and the research team may be tape-recorded 
and photographed. However, permission will be asked before the tapes are recorded or 
the photographs are taken. The research team, especially the principal investigator will 
be responsible for keeping the data of you and your relatives to be confidential and the 
tapes will be erased after five years of the completion of the study. Information related to 
you and your relatives may be published and presented publicly for academic and policy 
formulation purposes, but your name, identities or addresses will not be associated with 
the publication and presentation. Your data will be shown to those who are responsible 
for the research, supervisors, or those who provide funding support for the study. Dr. 
Phusit Prakongsai, the principal investigator of this research, is responsible for the 
confidentiality of the materials and its use or disposal at the end of the study. 
The proposal of this research was approved by the Ethics committee of London School of 
Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, UK as well as the Ethical Committee of the Ministry of 
Public Health, Thailand. 
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research title: 
"Financial burden and health service use among Thai households requiring 
expensive medical treatments included and excluded from the DC benefit package 
in N akorn Ratchasima province, Thailand" 
Principal investigator's name and address: 
Dr. Phusit Prakongsai 
International Health Policy Program - Thailand 
Ministry of Public Health 
Tiwanon road 
Nonthaburi province 11000 
Tel. (662) 5902366 - 7 
Fax. (662) 5902385 
E-mail address:phusit@ihpp.thaigov.net 
I have read the information sheet concerning this study [or have understood the verbal 
explanation] and I understand what will be required of me and what will happen to me if 
I take part in it 
My questions concerning this study have been answered by Dr. Phusit Prakongsai, the 
principal investigator and his research assistants. 
I understand that at any time I may withdraw from this study without giving a reason and 
without affecting my normal care and management. 
I have considered and read this informed consent form thoroughly and understand 
it clearly. Then, my relatives and I agree to take part in this study and sign this 
form willingly. 
Name and signature Date 
.................................................. Patient 
( ............................................... ) 
P · , I' ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... atlent s re atlve 
( ................................................ ) 
.................................................... Witness 
( ................................................ ) 
................................................... Researcher 
( ................................................. ) 
................................................ The research assistant 
( .............................................. ) 
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Patient Consent Form for Photography 
Patl'ent name: .......................................... Date' ......................... 
I consent for photographs to be made of me, or my relatives, or my child (or person for 
whom I am legal guardian). I understand that infonnation and these photographs may be 
used for purposes of a dissemination meeting or for publication in journals as I have 
designated below. By consenting to these photographs, I understand that I will not 
receive payment from any party or from the researcher. Refusal to consent to 
photographs will in no way affect the medical care or other benefits I will receive. If I 
have any questions or wish to withdraw my consent in the future I may contact: 
Dr. Phusit Prakongsai 
International Health Policy Program - Thailand 
Ministry of Public Health 
Tiwanon Road, Muang district 
N onthaburi province, 11000 
E-mail address:phusit@ihpp.thaigov.net 
By signing this fonn below, I confinn that this consent fonn has been explained to me in 
terms which I understand. 
1. I consent for these photographs to be used in domestic and international 
publications, including journals and electronic publications. I understand that the 
image may be seen by members of the general public, in addition.to health policy-
makers, scientists, health care providers, and academic researchers that regularly 
use these publications in their work and professional education. Although these 
photographs will be used without identifying infonnation such as my name, 
identities or my address, I understand that it is possible that someone may 
recogmze me. I also agree for my image to be shown for research and teaching 
purposes . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Signature) ........................... (Witness) 
2. I agree for my image to be shown for research and teaching purposes but NOT 
FOR publication: 
............................................. (Signature) ....................... (Witness) 
For patients between ages 7 and 15 years, a signature below indicates that infonnation in this 
consent form has been explained to me, and I assent to use of my images as outlined above: 
.................................................. . .................................... . 
(Signature of patient) (Witness) 
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A guideline for dealing with households in critical or difficult situations 
1. Research assistants will be encouraged and supported to be very sensitive to the 
emotional state of respondents and to provide appropriate advice to those who are 
founq in need. 
2. Research assistants will try to build trust and show their openness to patients and 
household members. 
3. Efforts will be made to identify local/provincial supporting office and to connect 
patients and their household members to those officers. 
4. If someone is found in need for urgent care, simple medicine such as antipyretics, 
analgesics, or antacid, will be deliberately provided by the researcher or the 
research assistants. 
5. Although research assistants may have some basic knowledge about primary 
healthcare, but they are not health care providers. Therefore, if there are any 
questions or doubts on how to deal with a case with urgent care or a difficult 
situation, a consultation from the researcher will be provided to the research 
assistants anytime they need. 
6. Health services system in Korat province as well as the nearest health care 
facilities will be informed to the research assistants before the actual studies 
commence. Therefore, the research assistants will be encouraged to provided 
effective advice to those who are found in need for health services. 
7. Research assistants will be encouraged and supported to listen and express their 
sympathy to households in serious need. They must prepare themselves to judge 
and deal appropriately with a difficult situation. 
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Annex 6 The 2003 Health and Welfare Survey (HWS) questionnaire 
Part 1 : Characteristic of household member Part 2 : Education 
Ask only 
Ask every household member persons aged 15 Ask persons aged 6 
years and over years and over 
No. Name- Relationship to Sex age Marital status What is ....... 's highest grade 
surname head of of education completed? 
household 
code code code (specify grade, year 
household's Male .... l (age of Single ............ 1 complete, certificate, 
head .............. 1 Female .. 2 last Married ......... 2 diploma) 
husband/wife ... 2 birthda Widowed ....... 3 
unmarried y if age Divorced ....... .4 Specify "never attended" if 
children .......... 3 less Separated ....... 5 never attended school. 
married than 1 Ever-married but 
children ......... .4 year, unknown If graduated from 
spouse of married record status ............ 6 vocational or Teacher 
children ......... .5 "00") Training schools or 
grand children ... 6 Universities, ask the names 
parents, parents- of the college or universities. 
in-law ............. 7 
Other relatives ... 8 
Non-relative, 
servants ........... 9 







Part 3 : Employment, durine 12 months before interview's date 
Ask persons aged 15 years and over 
Occupation Industry Work status Income 
"During 12 "Why did "What kind of "What Was Ask person who months before .............. not business or 
......... 's work 
interview's work?" industry of the status?" record code 1-2 and 
date job?" 4-7 in Fll 
What type of Record 
work did ........ reasons i.e. Record 
"What is average monthly do?" - housewife characteristic of code income?" 
- student job or kind of Employer .......... 1 
if worked, - pensioner enterprise Own account (Income means salary, wage, 
record main - jobless worker without profit from business or 
task and duty of - etc. employee .......... 2 agriculture, interest from money 
the work Unpaid family saving or property holding etc.) 
occupy the most Then go to worker. ............. 3 
hour, then go to F12 Government Note: this information will be 
FlO employee .......... .4 kept confidentially and will not 
Government affect tax payment. If did not work enterprise 
record "did not employee ........... 5 Average Average 
work" and go to Private monthly cash monthly kind F9 employee ........... 6 income income and 
Member of co- other benefits 
operative ........... 7 
(if record code 3, 
go to F 14) 
F8 F9 FlO F11 F12 F13 
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"Before 2003, 
did .......... have any 
health welfare? If yes, 
where did .... obtain 
from? " 
Code 
Did not have ............. 01 
Government official! 
state enterprise 
welfare/pensioner ...... 02 
Employee 
welfare ................... 03 
Social security / Worker 
Compensation 
Fund ........................ 04 
Health cards 
Voluntary hc .......... 05 
Community leaders/ 
health volunteer hc .... 06 
Low income 
card ..................... 07 
Children under 12 .... 08 
Elderly card ........... 09 
Disability card ........ 10 
UC card 
Do not pay fee ....... 11 
Pay fee 30 Baht ...... 12 
Private insurance ....... 13 
Others (specify) ......... 14 
Fl4 
Part 4 : Health Insurance 
"At present, does ......... have 
any health welfare? If yes, 
where does ............ obtain 
from?" 
(record every health welfare 
scheme obtained) 
Code 
Does not have welfare ........ 1 
Government official/ state 
enterprise 
welfare/pensioner ............. 2 
Employee welfare ........... .3 
Social security/ Worker 
Compensation Fund ........ .4 
UC card 
Do not pay fee ............. 5 
Pay fee 30 Baht. ........... 6 
Private insurance ............. 7 
Others (specify) ................. 8 
FI5 FI6 FI7 
Ask only persons who record code 5,6 
in F151F161F17 
Ask .............. to show 
his/her DC card, then 
record name and type of 
health care provider 
indicated in the card. 
Code 
Inconvenient to 
show the card ............... O 
Private hospital ............. 1 
Private clinic ............... .2 
Government Institutes 
- PCU ....................... 3 
- Health center. ........... .4 
- Community hospital.. ... 5 
- Provincial/General 
hospitaL .................. 6 
- University hospitaL ..... 7 
- Other government 
hospital .................. 8 
Others (specify) ............. 9 
FI8 
"Is .......... satisfied with 
the health care 
provider indicated in 
the UC card?" 
(ask everyone who has a 
UC card) 
(Record in F19) 
Code 
Satisfied ... '" ............ 1 
Unsatisfied ......... '" ... 2 
Not sure .................. 3 
(Record in F20) 
If unsatisfied, the 
reason is ................. .. 
Code 
Not have confidence 
in the quality ............. 1 
Inconvenience / 
far from home ............ 2 
not accessible because 
of migration ............. 3 
Others 




..-- Part 5 : Illness and Health Service Facility (Ask eveITbody) 
A. Illness durin2 1 month before interview's date (Only ambulatory care) 
t-"During 1 month Ask only person "If ........ i11 or not " Did the illness " If yes, how long 
before interview's who record code 1 feeling well, what keep ........ away did .......... away 
date, did ........... in F21 was the kind of from regular from regular 
get ill or not feeling sickness or activities?" activities? " 
well?" "During 1 month symptoms?" 
before interview's 
date, how many 
Code times did ......... Code 
. III or not feeling get ill?" yes ................. l 
well .......... , ...... 1 Record symptoms or (continue to F25) 
(continue to F22) last kind of sickness Record number of 
days absent from 
if delivery, record No .................. 2 regular activities. 
. Did not ill or "delivery" (go to F26) 
feeling well. ....... 2 
(go to F35) 
F21 F22 F23 F24 F25 
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Part 5 : Illness and Health Service Facility (Ask everybody) (contd.) 
A. Illness during one month before interview date (Only ambulatory care) (contd.) 
"How much did ............. spend for his/her last ambulatory care?" 
- If there were more than one types of treatment, record every type and its expenditure. 
- If it was a free treatment, record "00" 
- If the expenditure could be reimbursed, record "0" 
- If the expenditure was partial paid, record the amount of money that was partial paid. 
- If the expenditure was paid by relatives, record the amount of money paid by those as well. 
Type of treatment 
Code 
-None ................................................................................. 01 
-Used herb or traditional medicine ............................................... 02 
-Traditional healer. .................................................................................. 03 
- Buy self-medication ................................................................................. 04 
-Primary Care Unit ...... '" '" ........................ '" .......................... 05 
-Health centers ...................................................................... 06 
-Governmental hospital, community leveL ........................... '" ....... 07 
-Governmental hospital, provincial or regional leveL .. '" .................... 08 
- University hospital ................................................................ 09 
-Other governmental hospitals .................................................... 10 
- Private clinic ....................................................................... 11 
- Private hospitals ...................................................................................... 12 
-Others (specity) ....................................................................................... 13 
151 type of treatment 2nd type of treatment 
Type of Health Expendi Type of Health Expendi 
treatment welfare ture treatment welfare ture 
(Baht) (Baht) 
F26 F27 F28 F29 F30 F31 
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"For each treatment, did ........... use 
the benefit from health welfare 
scheme?" (If used, record the most 
significant health welfare scheme that 
was used) 
Code 
Does not have any welfare ............. l 
Government official! state 
Enterprise welfare/pensioner ........... 2 
Employee welfare ............................ 3 
Social security/ Worker 
Compensation Fund .................... .4 
UC card 
Do not pay fee ........................ 5 
Pay fee 30 Baht ........................... 6 
Private insurance ........................ 7 
Others (specity) ................................ 8 
Have welfare but did not 
want to use ............................... 9 
3 rd type of treatment 
Type of Health Expendit 
treatment welfare ure 
(Baht) 
F32 F33 F34 
.-
Part 5 : Illness and Health Service Facility (Ask everybody) (contd.) 
,.... 
A. Illness during 1 month before interview's date (Only ambulatory care) (contd.) 
"Has .•.•...... · •• had any chronic disease?" If yes, during 1 month before the interview's date, did ...... 
obtain any health care services due to his/her chronic disease following doctor's appointment? 
Note: The examples of chronic disease are heart disease, Hypertension, Diabetic Mellitus, Chronic lung 
disease, Epilepsy, chronic liver disease, chronic renal disease, asthma, osteoarthritis, cataract, HI VIA IDS 
etc. 
"Has ........ Record "During . "During "Which type "For the last "How "Was ...... 
had any the name one month 1 month of the health service, much .... satisfied 
chronic of the before the before care provider did ......... use was the with the 
disease?" chronic interview's interview did ........ the benefit from expendi health care 
disease. date, 's date, seek for health welfare ture that service 
Code If there did .... obtai how his/her last scheme?" can not obtained 
yes ........ 1 are more n any many service?" be last time?" 
(continue) than one health care times did Code reimbur 
chronic services due ......... Code Does not have sed?" 
No ......... 2 disease, to his/her get the PCU ........... I any Code 
(go to Part record chronic health Health welfare ......... l If did -Satisfied ... 1 
58) only two disease?" care center ......... 2 Government not have -Unsatisfied 
significant services? Community official/ state to pay, due to poor 
chronic Code " hospitaL ...... 3 Enterprise record service ... 2 
diseases. yes ......... l Provincial / welfare/ 110" -Poor drug's 
(continue) General pensioner. ...... 2 quality ..... 3 
hospital ...... .4 Employee -Have to pay 
No .......... 2 University welfare ........... 3 for 
(go to Part hospitaL ...... .5 Social security/ services .. .4 
5B) Other Worker -Discrimina 
government Compensation tion ........ 5 
hospitaL ...... 6 Fund ............ 4 -Poor 
I Private UC card, do not doctor's 
clinic .......... 7 pay fee ......... 5 competence 
Private UC card, have to ................ 6 
hospitaL ...... 8 pay fee 30 -do not get 
Others Baht ............. 6 better. ..... 7 
(specify) ...... 9 Private -Others .... 8 
insurance ........ 7 
Others 
(specify) ......... 8 
Have welfare but 
did not want to 
use .................. 9 
F35 F36 F37 F38 F39 F40 F41 F42 
'-
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Part S : Illness and Health Service Facility (Ask everybody) (contd.) 
B. Illness during 1 month before interview's date (Beyond the ambulatory care in Part SA) 
"During 1 month before 
interview's date, did .......... . 
get any health care services 
beyond the service in SA?" 
Code 
No ...................................... O 
(go to Part 5C) 
If Yes, record type of service: 
Get a vaccination ................ 1 
Antenatal care .................... 2 
Family planning ................. .3 
Post partum care ................. 4 
Health check up .................. 5 
Other services following 
appointment. ..................... 6 
Dental health services ........... 7 
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"Which type of the 
health care provider 
did ........ seek for 
his/her last service?" 
Code 
Drug store .............. 1 
PCU ..................... 2 
Health center ........... 3 
Community hospital. .. 4 
Provincial/General 
hospital .................. 5 
University hospital. ... 6 
Other government 
hospital .................. 7 
Private clinic ........... 8 
Private hospitaL ....... 9 
Others (specify) ...... 10 
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"For the last 
service, 
did ......... use the 
benefit from health 
welfare scheme?" 
Code 
Does not have any 




pensioner ............ .2 
Employee welfare ... 3 
Social security / 
Worker 
Compensation 
Fund ................... 4 
UC card, do not 
pay fee ................ 5 
UC card, have to pay 
fee 30 Baht ........... 6 
Private insurance .... 7 
Others (specify) ...... 8 
Have welfare 
but did not want to 
use ......................... 9 
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"How much was the 
expenditure that can not be 
reimbursed?" 




Part 5 : Illness and Health Service Facil~ {Ask everybod~ (contd-l 
I C. Admission during 12 months before interview's date (Inpatient care) 
"During 12 Record the number If there was more than one admission during the past 12 months, record only 
months before of admissions in the last admission. If got health care services from more than one hospital, 
interview's hospitals during the record only the last hospital of admission. 
date, past 12 months 
has ........ ·.ever 
been inpatients Record the Record the hospital's "Why did ........... "How long 
(including name of type of the last choose to admit in was the 
delivery)?" disease that admission that hospital?" last 
caused the last admission 
admission. If Code Code for ...... ?" 
it was Community W as referred from 
Code delivery, hospital.. .................. l prior hospital. ..... 1 
Yes ............. 1 record Provincial/General Poverty ............ .2 
(continue) "Delivery" hospital ............... 2 Convenience / 
University hospital not far 
No .............. 2 hospital ............... 3 from home ......... 3 
(go to Part 5D) Govern Private Other government Impress in prompt 
ment hospital hospitaL ............. .4 attention and 
hospital s Private polyclinic ... 5 service .............. 4 
s Private hospital ...... 6 Not expensive with 
Others (specify) ...... 7 services fee ........ 5 
Has specialized 
doctors ............. 6 
Has advanced 
medical 
instruments ......... 7 
Admission due to 
UC or Social 
Security Card 
Notification ........ 8 
Others (specify) ... 9 
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Part 5 : Illness and Health Service Facil!!)r Ask everybody)jcontd.) 
r- C. Admission during 12 months before interview's date (Inpatient care) (contd.) 
r-
If there was more than one admission during the past 12 months, record only the last admission. 
services from more than one hospital, record only the last hospital of admission. 
If got health care 
"What was the "How much was "For the last admission, "Why did ...... not "Was .......... satisfied 
traveling the expenditure did ......... use the benefit want to use the with the health care 
expenditure for that can not be from health welfare existing benefit services obtained from 
the last reimbursed for scheme?" from his!her the last admission?" 
admission?" the last health welfare 
admission?" Code scheme?" 
(If used private Does not have any Code 
car, estimated If did not have to welfare ..................... 1 (record the Satisfied ....................... 1 
the expenditure pay, record "0" Government official! state reasons) Unsatisfied 
as traveling by Enterprise welfare! 
- due to poor 
a taxi) pensioner. ................. 2 services .............. 2 
Employee welfare ........ 3 
- Poor drug's 
Social security! Worker quality ............... 3 
Compensation Fund .... .4 
- Have to pay for 
UC card, do not services .............. 4 
pay fee ..................... 5 
- Discrimination ....... 5 
UC card, have to pay 
- Poor doctor's 
fee 30 Baht ................ 6 competence ............. 6 
Private insurance ......... 7 - Do not get 
Others (specify) ............ 8 better .................. 7 
Have welfare but - Others (specify) ...... 8 
did not want to use ....... 9 
(if do not record code 9, 









Part 5 : Illness and Health Service Facility (Ask everybody) (contd.) 
D. Dental Health Services during 12 month before interview's date 
"During 12 Record the number Record the hospital's type "For the last dental "How much was 
months before of dental health of the last dental health health service, the expenditure 
interview's services during the servIces did ......... use the that can not be 
date, past 12 months benefit from health reimbursed for the 
has .......... ever Code welfare scheme?" last dental health 
been obtained Health center without service?" 
dental health a visit of dentist or Code 
services?" dental health officer ...... 1 Does not have any If did not have to 
Health center that has a welfare .................. 1 pay, record "0" 
visit of dentist or dental Government official! 
health officer .............. 2 state Enterprise welfare/ 
Code Community hospital. ...... 3 pensioner. .............. 2 
yes ............. 1 Provincial/General Employee welfare ...... 3 
(continue) hospitaL ................... .4 Social security/ 
University hospital ...... 5 Worker Compensation 
No .............. 2 Other government Fund ..................... 4 
(go to Part 6) hospitaL .................... 6 UC card, do not 
Private hospital. ........... 7 pay fee ................... 5 
Private dental clinic ...... 8 UC card, have to pay 
Others (specify) ............. 9 fee 30 Baht .............. 6 
Private insurance ....... 7 
Others (specify) .......... 8 
Have welfare but 
did not want to use ..... 9 
Have welfare but the 
service was not 
included in the minimal 
benefit package ....... 1 0 
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Part 6:Housing Characteristics and assets 
Record code for each question 
1. Type of dwelling Code 
- Single house ............................. 1 
- Row house ............................. 2 
- Townhouse or twin-house .......... .3 
- Apartment / condominium 
or flat .................................. 4 
- Rented room or rooms ............... 5 
- Impoverished quarters ................. 6 
- Others (specify) ....................... 7 
2. Construction material 
- Cement or brick ....................... 1 
- Wood ................................... 2 
- Wood and cement (or brick) ......... 3 
- Local material. ....................... .4 
- Re-used material. .................... .5 
- Others (specify) ......................... 6 
3. Tenure 
- Owns dwelling and land ............. 1 
- Owns dwelling on rented Iand ...... 2 
- Owns dwelling on public area ...... 3 
- Hire - purchased ....................... .4 
- Rented dwelling ......................... 5 
- Rent paid by others ................... 6 
- Receives rent free ..................... 7 
4. Number of rooms 
- entire rooms (exclude toilet) 
- sleeping rooms 
5. Electricity in dwelling 
- Yes ..................................... l 
- No ...................................... 0 
6. Cooking fuel (mostly used) 
- Charcoal ............................... 1 
- Wood ................................... 2 
- Kerosene .............................. 3 
- Gas ..................................... 4 
- Electricity ............ '" ............... 5 
- Others .................................. 6 
- No cooking done ..................... 7 
7. Toilet facilities (mostly used) 
- Flush latrine ............................ 1 
- Molded latrine ........................ 2 
- Burrowed cavity or 
canal/river or others ................. 3 
N f: '1" b 
- 0 aCI Itles near y .................... 4 
8. Drinking water Code 
- Water-bottle ....................................... 1 
- Water supply-piped inside ...................... 2 
- Under ground water-piped inside ............... 3 
- Water supply-piped outside .................... .4 
- Well········ ........................................ 5 
- River, stream, etc ................................. 6 
- Rain water .......................................... 7 
- Other ............................................... 8 
9. Water supply for use 
(record in same code as 8) 
10. Assets owned by household 
(If yes, record the number of each asset. If does 
not, record "0 '') 
- Living room sofa .............. . 
- Bed (wood or metal) ......... .. 
- Cooking stove-gas ............ . 
- Cooking stove-electric ........ . 
- Microwave oven ............... . 
- Electrical boiling pot ......... . 
- Refrigerator .................... . 
- Electrical iron ................. . 
- Electrical cooking pot ....... . 
- Electrical fan ...... '" ........ . 
- Radio ..... o ••••••••••••••••••••• 
Television .................... . 
Video .......... , ... , '" ...... .. 
- Washing machine ......... " 
- Air conditioner ............ . 
- Water heater in bathroom ..... . 
- Bicycle ....................... . 
- Personal computer .......... . 
- Telephone (include PCT) ... . 
- Mobile phone ................. . 
- Fax machine .................. . 
- Fluorescence lamps ........... . 
- Light bulbs .................... . 
- Compact fluorescence lamps ...... . 
11. Transportation assets owned by household 
(If yes, record the number of each asset, If does not 
have, record "0") 
- Automobile .......... , ......... , .. . 
- Pick up (mini-truck, van) ...... .. 
- Other mini-truck (local made) .... . 
- Motor boat .......................... . 
- Motorcycle ........................ .. 
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Annex 7 The 2002 SES questionnaire 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOCIO-ECONOMIC SURVEY (SES) 2002 




1. Region .............. .. 
2. Province ............ .. 
3. District .............. . 
4. Sub-district. .......... . 
5. Block / village ................. C) Municipality 0 Non-municipality 
6. Interviewing month ................. . 
7. Street ............................ . 
8. Household number ............ .. 
9. Name of household's head .......... . 
Part .1: Household expenditure 
How much did household members spend on following items during last month? 
clothes and clothing Mending, sewing, Footwear Mending, cleaning, and 
modifying, and ironing renting footwear 
clothes 
For For For For For For For For For For For For 
men women boys men women boys men women boys men women boys 
and and and and 
girls girls girls girls 




Part 1: Household expenditure (contd.) 
r-- How much did household members spend on following items during last month? 
r- Rental taxes, Housing utilities and Health services and medical Personal transporta 
construction, services supplies supplies tion 
and housing and 
restoration services 
Electricity ........ , ... 01 Medicine Ambulat Hospita Buses ... 0 I 
Gas and cooking ..... 02 and medical ory care lization Taxis ... 02 
Gas for other equipments Tricycles 
purposes ............... 03 
........... 03 
Charcoal. ............. 04 Motorcycl 
Wood .................. 05 es ........ 04 
Kerosene .............. 06 Vans ..... 05 
Batteries ......... '" ... 07 School 
Matches ......... '" ... 08 buses .... 06 
Candles ................ 09 Boats .... 07 
Light bulbs, Trains ... 08 
Fluorescence ............ 10 Others ... 09 
Lamps .................. 11 
Water rates ............ 12 
Underground water ... 13 
Other fuel and light.. .14 
301 302 401 402 402 411-412 501 
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- Part 1: Household expenditure (contd.) 
- How much did household members spend on following items during last month 
and last year? 
Income tax Insurance Major Communication Contributions Food, 
and other premium equipment equipment and other beverages and 
direct taxes expenses tobacco 
1ncome tax ... 01 Property Beds ........ 01 
House and insurance ..... 01 Chairs, 
Land tax ...... 02 Life tables ....... 02 
Fine ............ 03 insurance ...... 02 Sofas ....... 03 
Other taxes ... 04 Cremation Other 
. 
fees ............ 03 furniture ... 04 
Auto Carpets ..... 05 
insurance ...... 04 Mattress, i 
Third party pillows ..... 06 
I insurance ...... 05 Cook stove, I 
Other gas .......... 07 
insurance ...... 06 Microwave 
ovens ....... 08 
Electrical 
pots ......... 09 
900 930 313 530 910,950 Record no.7 
382 
.~ 
Title of Project : . 
Principle Investigator : 
Place of proposed study: 
Reviewed Document: 
Document No ... ~~.{~.??~. " .. 
The Ethical Review Committee for Research in Human Subjects 
Ministry of Public Health, Thailand 
------------
Equity in health care financing and health service utilization before 
and after universal health care coverage (UC) in Thailand (Ref. No. 68/2547) 
Dr. Phusit Prakongsai 
Intemational Health Policy Program, Thailand 
1. Protocol Thai version dated June 10, 2005 
2. Protocol English version dated February 1, 2005 
3. Thai translation of informed consent dated Febf\..lary 1, 2005 
4. Patient information sheet and informed consent form Thai version November, 2004 
5. Questionnaires Household members and their relationships, lif~ history and life-line, illness ~arratives, field notes 
from the fieldworkers, household Income and Expenditure version November, 2004 
6. Curriculum vitae of investigators 
We also confirm that we are an ethics committee constituted in agreement and in accordance with the 
ICH-GCP. 
The Ethical Review Committee for Research in Human Subjects Ministry of Public Health, Thailand had 
reviewed both Thai and Englis,h protocol. In ethical concern, the committee has reviewed and approved for 
implementation of the research study as above mention, therefore the Thai protocol will be mainly conduct. 
~~~~ 
.......................... ~ .. t .•............. ··.······ ...... . Chairman 
(Mr. Chafri Banchuin) 
~bu riu· a1 
................ ??: .................. ~ ... ~............ Secretary 
(Mr. Pakorn Siriyong) 
Date of meeting ____ --'-!.M""'aCJ..y-'1"""9 ..... , 2....,0"'-'0<...:4'---______ _ 
Date of Approval ____ S'~e+_pi-'el"r\'--b-e=r---'2"'4_} _200~5~ ____ Date of expire_....!~~P~:t.=:::e..:.:.m~b~e:..!...f~~O::::".o-..:=2.=OO-b __ _ 
Document No ..... ~.~ ..... .. .12005 
The Ethical-Review Committee for Research in Human Subjects 
Ministry of Public Health, Thailand 
Chairman 
Mr. Seree Tuchinda 
Vice Chairman 
Mr. Vichai Chokevivat 
Member 
Mr. Luecha Wanaratana 
Mr. Tanongsan Sutatam 





Mrs. Mayura Kusump 
Ms. Yuppadee 
Javroongrit 
Mr. Pinit Kunlavanit 




29 August 2001 - Present 
Director-General, 
Department of Medical 
Services 
Director -General, 
Department of development 
of Thai traditional and 
alternative medicine 
Senior Public Health officer 
(Nutrition), Office of the 
Permanent Secretary 
Deputy director general, 
pepartment of Medical 
Services 
Senior Medical Officer, 
Department of Health 
Senior Expert in Preventive 
Medicine, Department of 
Communication Disease 
Control 
Senior Psychiatrist S.Omdet 
Chaopraya Hospital, 
Department of Mental 
Health 
Senior Principal Medical 
Scientist, Department of 
Medical Sciences 
Senior Pharmacist, The 
Food and Drug 
Administration 
Secretary General, The 
Thai Medical Council 
Director of Legal Affairs 




































Document No ..... <:l.~ ...... .. /2005 















Date of Meeting 
Director of Medical 
Registration Division, 
Office of the Permanent 
Secretary 
Associate Professor, 
Faculty of Social Science 
and Humanities, Mahidol 
University 
Senior Medical Doctor 
Department of Medical 
Services 
Physician, Department of 
Medical Services 
Senior Pharm~cist, The 
Food and Drug 
Administration 
Senior Health Technical 
Officer, Departm.ent of 
Medical Services 
Senior Health Technical 
Officer; Department of 
Medical Services 
Health Technical Officer, 
Department of 11edical 
Services 








B.Sc in Pharm. 
Ph.D. 
B.Sc. in Public 
Health nursing., 
M.A. 
B. Sc. in Nurse & 
Midwife., 
M.P.H.· 










Date of Approval: .. ~~.p.1?:"!l.9.e:r ... J ...... ,2005 
For Protocol Equity in health care financing and health service utilization before 
and ~fter universal health care coverage (UC) in Thailand 
(Ref. No. 68/2547) 
Signed: ..... c{l.lJ!!. .... ~~w ............ (Secretary of Ethics Committee) 
../ 
../ 
LONDON SCHOOL OF HYGIENE 
& TROPICAL MEDICINE 
ETHICS COMMITTEE 
APPROVAL FORM 
Application number: 3002 
Name of Principal Investigator Phusit Prakongsai 
Department Public Health and Policy 
Head of Department Gill Walt 
Title: Equity in health care financing and health service utilization 
before and after universal coverage in Thailand. 
Approval of this study is granted by the Committee. 
~ "vi. Chair ..... l ... -.. 0.!.: .. ( ... \(~~ ......................................................... . 
Professor Tom Meade 
Date 3D 3. L.Vr.X0-
............................................................................................... 
Approval is dependent on local ethical approval having been received. 
Any subsequent changes to the consent form must be re-submitted to the 
Committee. 
